15000 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Aug 15, 2002 5:58pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi Victor, As RobK is in Bangkok without instant access to a computer, I hope you don't mind my joining in while we are waiting for a reply. As you know I am always wrestling with the idea of Anatta, but, through the kind patient repetitive explanations of the members of this List, I was actually beginning to feel accept the explanation "in reality there exists only this continually self- consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena, and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without this process." (Nyanatiloka's dictionary) Do you have any objections to Nyanatiloka's definition? I would really welcome your input on this topic, Victor - expanding on just how you understand that the view "there is no being" is pernicious and a gross misrepresentation, and what you see as the correct explanation. I would really appreciate it in your own words (hyperlinks to suttas are not particularly helpful) if you are willing to articulate your understanding for us, as Robert has done. metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi all, > > The view "there is no being", as I see it, is pernicious. It is a > gross misrepresentation of what the Buddha taught. > > Regards, > Victor > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" > wrote: > > --- > > Dear Stephen, > > Arrived in Bangkok( the rainy season by the look of it). > > > > These are not easy things to understand. Every moment > > is new and it is all arising and falling away with great > rapidity. > > However, each moment conditions the next moment and so there is > > continuity. As TG nicely explained the Buddha's words were a > > condition for Rahula to reflect wisely . > > If that situation is analysed there was really no Buddha or Rahula. > > But there was sound, there was hearing; these disappeared as soon > as > > they arose but they conditioned cittas that understood the concepts > > that were expressed by the myriad sounds. Cittas arise and fall > away > > instantly too but they can - and do - take a concept > > and repeatedly examine it and so the cittas in succession may seem > > much the same, for split seconds, seconds or even longer. > > > > But by wise attention there can be the insight that begins to study > > the nature of citta and see how it is different, albeit similar, > > moment to moment. This wise attention can lead to seeing, so the > > texts say, that nama and rupa are very different types of reality - > > and continue on to know more. > > There is no self anywhere in this process, so the Dhamma ; but the > > unbroken continuity of rising and falling, deludes the unwise > (i.e.us) > > into believing there is something substantial there , something > > somewhere that can direct, decide , that is doing this or that. > > RobM mentioned the term ayuhana, accumulating, ealier. And this > > process means that all the time there is new accumulating > > occuring, subtley altering, right now, what was accumulated from > the > > past; so that in the future accumulations may be very different > from > > what they are now. Wisdom may develop, or not; kindness or cruelty; > > patience or impatience; metta or anger. It can be studied, this > > process; while it happens, but usually there is a barrier, self > view > > which distorts and stops us understanding. > > Robert 15001 From: sukinderpal Date: Thu Aug 15, 2002 7:49pm Subject: Re: Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' Hi, Chris I usually wait for others to answer, since I know that most probably they all would give better ones than I would. But since no one has yet replied to this and since you have so bravely decided to take up Robert's place in responding to Victor's remark, I will overlook my fear of being mistaken and go ahead. You mention people who are "now attempting to follow the Teachings", this means that they have the opportunity to at least glimpse the most sublime of teachings. Some people understand that their parents are part of the conditions which have allowed them to be born as they are. But they will however also think that it could have been any other pair of man /woman who could have caused them to be born. But I do not think so. I think that all the conditions work together in such a way that if one is missing then the result would not have come to be. Such that the kamma which decided your rebirth consciousness carries with it the deciding factor of exactly what sort of parents you will be born to. So no matter how one's parents treated one, if finally you have come in contact with the Teachings, then you must remember that it wouldn't have been if these exact parents were not yours. With regard to those who do NOT come to know the Teachings, one has to realize that one is born to reap the fruits of one's kamma. So without these parents one does not get the opportunity to repay these partucular debts. So either way I think, parents ARE worthy of respect and reverence. And surely, in the world where billions of cittas are arising and falling every second, what is a few acts of "repaying" to them going to make a difference!? That is why the best that one can do for them, is to establish them in the Dhamma. I am going to meet Sarah, Jon, Robert and his kids, Betty, Ell and Ivan for lunch in a couple of hours. Hope no envy arises in the " continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena" conveniently called Christine.;-) Best wishes, Sukin. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear All, > > I acknowledge that many parents love and care for their children with > great sacrifice and devotion, as I always try to do, and as I hope do > all the parents on this List. But, in this world, very many parents > do not behave lovingly or even humanely. Not just a few occasional > exceptions, but very many. Parents are often the major cause of harm > to children physically and mentally, and are the one's responsible > for most acts of gross neglect and abuse, assault, manslaughter and > murder of children. > I feel that the general 'unqualified' exhortation to give unlimited > respect, honour and service to one's parents could be the condition > for distress in those who have suffered greatly at their parents > hands, and are now attempting to follow the Teachings. It seems to > be based on an idealised version of what parents should be or could > be, rather than the reality of what many actually are. For many > children, the parents were just the unwilling gateway into this world > of suffering. When I read teachings such as those in the sutta > below, I wonder if it is not a little naive, and could the Buddha > have meant it to apply generally no matter how appalling the parents > actions were, or did he mean where parents actually did bring up, > feed and guide their children lovingly through this world? > > Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' > "I declare, O monks, that there are two person's one can never > repay. What two? One's mother and father. > Even if one should carry about one's mother on one should er and > one's father on the other, and while doing so should live a hundred > years, reach the age of a hundred years; and if one should attend to > them by anointing them with salves, by massaging, bathing and rubbing > their limbs, and they should even void their excrements there - even > by that would one not do enough for one's parents, one would not > repay them. Even if one were to establish one's parents as the > supreme lords and rulers over this earth so rich in the seven > treasures, one would not do enough for them, one would not repay > them. What is the reason for this? Parents do much for their > children: they bring them up, feed them and guide them through this > world." > > metta, > Christine 15002 From: sukinderpal Date: Thu Aug 15, 2002 7:50pm Subject: Re: Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' Hi, Chris I usually wait for others to answer, since I know that most probably they all would give better ones than I would. But since no one has yet replied to this and since you have so bravely decided to take up Robert's place in responding to Victor's remark, I will overlook my fear of being mistaken and go ahead. You mention people who are "now attempting to follow the Teachings", this means that they have the opportunity to at least glimpse the most sublime of teachings. Some people understand that their parents are part of the conditions which have allowed them to be born as they are. But they will however also think that it could have been any other pair of man /woman who could have caused them to be born. But I do not think so. I think that all the conditions work together in such a way that if one is missing then the result would not have come to be. Such that the kamma which decided your rebirth consciousness carries with it the deciding factor of exactly what sort of parents you will be born to. So no matter how one's parents treated one, if finally you have come in contact with the Teachings, then you must remember that it wouldn't have been if these exact parents were not yours. With regard to those who do NOT come to know the Teachings, one has to realize that one is born to reap the fruits of one's kamma. So without these parents one does not get the opportunity to repay these partucular debts. So either way I think, parents ARE worthy of respect and reverence. And surely, in the world where billions of cittas are arising and falling every second, what is a few acts of "repaying" to them going to make a difference!? That is why the best that one can do for them, is to establish them in the Dhamma. I am going to meet Sarah, Jon, Robert and his kids, Betty, Ell and Ivan for lunch in a couple of hours. Hope no envy arises in the " continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena" conveniently called Christine.;-) Best wishes, Sukin. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear All, > > I acknowledge that many parents love and care for their children with > great sacrifice and devotion, as I always try to do, and as I hope do > all the parents on this List. But, in this world, very many parents > do not behave lovingly or even humanely. Not just a few occasional > exceptions, but very many. Parents are often the major cause of harm > to children physically and mentally, and are the one's responsible > for most acts of gross neglect and abuse, assault, manslaughter and > murder of children. > I feel that the general 'unqualified' exhortation to give unlimited > respect, honour and service to one's parents could be the condition > for distress in those who have suffered greatly at their parents > hands, and are now attempting to follow the Teachings. It seems to > be based on an idealised version of what parents should be or could > be, rather than the reality of what many actually are. For many > children, the parents were just the unwilling gateway into this world > of suffering. When I read teachings such as those in the sutta > below, I wonder if it is not a little naive, and could the Buddha > have meant it to apply generally no matter how appalling the parents > actions were, or did he mean where parents actually did bring up, > feed and guide their children lovingly through this world? > > Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' > "I declare, O monks, that there are two person's one can never > repay. What two? One's mother and father. > Even if one should carry about one's mother on one should er and > one's father on the other, and while doing so should live a hundred > years, reach the age of a hundred years; and if one should attend to > them by anointing them with salves, by massaging, bathing and rubbing > their limbs, and they should even void their excrements there - even > by that would one not do enough for one's parents, one would not > repay them. Even if one were to establish one's parents as the > supreme lords and rulers over this earth so rich in the seven > treasures, one would not do enough for them, one would not repay > them. What is the reason for this? Parents do much for their > children: they bring them up, feed them and guide them through this > world." > > metta, > Christine 15003 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Aug 15, 2002 8:48pm Subject: Re: Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' Dear Sukin, As always your answer is 'just right' - and speaks with 'Dhamma sense' to the main points of rebirth and kamma fruition, the how and the why. (I should point out that I was speaking from what I observe through my work and in the world in general.) Thank you Sukin. You should post more often.:) Regarding your luncheon engagement - I'm not feeling even the slightest quiver of envy, not a shiver, a shudder, a tingle, a flutter or a flicker - though I must be coming down with something, I have turned a light green colour. :):) metta, Chris --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "sukinderpal" wrote: > Hi, Chris > > I usually wait for others to answer, since I know that most probably > they all would give better ones than I would. > But since no one has yet replied to this and since you have so > bravely decided to take up Robert's place in responding to Victor's > remark, I will overlook my fear of being mistaken and go ahead. > > You mention people who are "now attempting to follow the Teachings", > this means that they have the opportunity to at least glimpse the > most sublime of teachings. > > Some people understand that their parents are part of the conditions > which have allowed them to be born as they are. But they will however > also think that it could have been any other pair of man /woman who > could have caused them to be born. But I do not think so. I think > that all the conditions work together in such a way that if one is > missing then the result would not have come to be. Such that the > kamma which decided your rebirth consciousness carries with it the > deciding factor of exactly what sort of parents you will be born to. > So no matter how one's parents treated one, if finally you have come > in contact with the Teachings, then you must remember that it > wouldn't have been if these exact parents were not yours. > > With regard to those who do NOT come to know the Teachings, one has > to realize that one is born to reap the fruits of one's kamma. So > without these parents one does not get the opportunity to repay these > partucular debts. > So either way I think, parents ARE worthy of respect and reverence. > And surely, in the world where billions of cittas are arising and > falling every second, what is a few acts of "repaying" to them going > to make a difference!? That is why the best that one can do for them, > is to establish them in the Dhamma. > > I am going to meet Sarah, Jon, Robert and his kids, Betty, Ell and > Ivan for lunch in a couple of hours. > Hope no envy arises in the " continually self-consuming process of > arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena" conveniently called > Christine.;-) > > Best wishes, > Sukin. > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear All, > > > > I acknowledge that many parents love and care for their children > with > > great sacrifice and devotion, as I always try to do, and as I hope > do > > all the parents on this List. But, in this world, very many parents > > do not behave lovingly or even humanely. Not just a few occasional > > exceptions, but very many. Parents are often the major cause of > harm > > to children physically and mentally, and are the one's responsible > > for most acts of gross neglect and abuse, assault, manslaughter and > > murder of children. > > I feel that the general 'unqualified' exhortation to give unlimited > > respect, honour and service to one's parents could be the condition > > for distress in those who have suffered greatly at their parents > > hands, and are now attempting to follow the Teachings. It seems to > > be based on an idealised version of what parents should be or could > > be, rather than the reality of what many actually are. For many > > children, the parents were just the unwilling gateway into this > world > > of suffering. When I read teachings such as those in the sutta > > below, I wonder if it is not a little naive, and could the Buddha > > have meant it to apply generally no matter how appalling the > parents > > actions were, or did he mean where parents actually did bring up, > > feed and guide their children lovingly through this world? > > > > Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' > > "I declare, O monks, that there are two person's one can never > > repay. What two? One's mother and father. > > Even if one should carry about one's mother on one should er and > > one's father on the other, and while doing so should live a hundred > > years, reach the age of a hundred years; and if one should attend > to > > them by anointing them with salves, by massaging, bathing and > rubbing > > their limbs, and they should even void their excrements there - > even > > by that would one not do enough for one's parents, one would not > > repay them. Even if one were to establish one's parents as the > > supreme lords and rulers over this earth so rich in the seven > > treasures, one would not do enough for them, one would not repay > > them. What is the reason for this? Parents do much for their > > children: they bring them up, feed them and guide them through > this > > world." > > > > metta, > > Christine 15004 From: yuzhonghao Date: Thu Aug 15, 2002 8:53pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi Christine and all, If what you quoted is Nyanatiloka's explanation of "anatta", then I would say that's his interpretation, and, as I see it, he didn't get it. Christine, I am going to put forth some questions: If there is no being, would you say there is killing? Would you say there is killing, but no one is being killed? Or would you say there is no killing, just blade (a rupa) going through flesh (another rupa), bullet (rupa) going through the head (another rupa)? If there is no being, would you say there is birth, aging and death? Some people argue that "there is no being" is the truth. Consider these questions: are you a human being? Were you born? Are you getting old? Is birth, aging and death satisfactory or unsatisfactory? Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi Victor, > > As RobK is in Bangkok without instant access to a computer, I hope > you don't mind my joining in while we are waiting for a reply. > As you know I am always wrestling with the idea of Anatta, but, > through the kind patient repetitive explanations of the members of > this List, I was actually beginning to feel accept the > explanation "in reality there exists only this continually self- > consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena, > and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without this > process." (Nyanatiloka's dictionary) > Do you have any objections to Nyanatiloka's definition? > I would really welcome your input on this topic, Victor - expanding > on just how you understand that the view "there is no being" is > pernicious and a gross misrepresentation, and what you see as the > correct explanation. I would really appreciate it in your own words > (hyperlinks to suttas are not particularly helpful) if you are > willing to articulate your understanding for us, as Robert has done. > > > metta, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > The view "there is no being", as I see it, is pernicious. It is a > > gross misrepresentation of what the Buddha taught. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" > > wrote: > > > --- > > > Dear Stephen, > > > Arrived in Bangkok( the rainy season by the look of it). > > > > > > These are not easy things to understand. Every moment > > > is new and it is all arising and falling away with great > > rapidity. > > > However, each moment conditions the next moment and so there is > > > continuity. As TG nicely explained the Buddha's words were a > > > condition for Rahula to reflect wisely . > > > If that situation is analysed there was really no Buddha or > Rahula. > > > But there was sound, there was hearing; these disappeared as soon > > as > > > they arose but they conditioned cittas that understood the > concepts > > > that were expressed by the myriad sounds. Cittas arise and fall > > away > > > instantly too but they can - and do - take a concept > > > and repeatedly examine it and so the cittas in succession may > seem > > > much the same, for split seconds, seconds or even longer. > > > > > > But by wise attention there can be the insight that begins to > study > > > the nature of citta and see how it is different, albeit similar, > > > moment to moment. This wise attention can lead to seeing, so the > > > texts say, that nama and rupa are very different types of > reality - > > > and continue on to know more. > > > There is no self anywhere in this process, so the Dhamma ; but > the > > > unbroken continuity of rising and falling, deludes the unwise > > (i.e.us) > > > into believing there is something substantial there , something > > > somewhere that can direct, decide , that is doing this or that. > > > RobM mentioned the term ayuhana, accumulating, ealier. And this > > > process means that all the time there is new accumulating > > > occuring, subtley altering, right now, what was accumulated from > > the > > > past; so that in the future accumulations may be very different > > from > > > what they are now. Wisdom may develop, or not; kindness or > cruelty; > > > patience or impatience; metta or anger. It can be studied, this > > > process; while it happens, but usually there is a barrier, self > > view > > > which distorts and stops us understanding. > > > Robert 15005 From: Purnomo . Date: Thu Aug 15, 2002 10:02pm Subject: pattidana hi all, what is pattidana ? Is there 'transfer' kamma to somebody else? for example; my grandma was died. I want to transfer my kamma to my grandma because she maybe born in dukkha realsm. Is it true? Please explain metta, purnomo 15006 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Aug 15, 2002 10:29pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi Victor, and All, I asked first.:) I just realised Victor that nearly every time you post on the question of 'self' 'non-self' or 'anatta', you either post hyperlinks to suttas with no discussion, or you pose questions as a reply and don't respond to many questions put to yourself. I am not going to answer a series of leading questions out of the very little knowledge I have, but I would be deeply interested in hearing what your understanding is, and learning from it. You have alluded to a strongly held knowledge on the subject of anatta, but I have never yet seen it articulated. I hope you will do so as I believe it could be very helpful for us all to hear it I would hope you feel moved to write a few paragraphs on what your position is. In this instance, as you commented very strongly on Robert's post, it would be a courtesy, and very interesting for us all if you would give an explanation of your thoughts on the matter. But - no worries if you don't wish to. What 'I' am trying to let go of is the result of the conditioning of Western culture and schooling, and the Christian religion that I grew up in, where there are beliefs in 'beings' and 'souls'. What is crucial to me above all is what the Buddha's Dhamma says. I have included a sutta from the Kindred Sayings about 'beings'. What I quoted was certainly in Nyanatiloka's explanation of 'anatta' and the full text is below with the hyperlink for you to check. It surprises me that you say "he didn't get it', and would, no doubt, surprise him.:):) Do you have any comments on the full text? http://www.budsas.org/ebud/bud-dict/dic3_a.htm metta, Christine From the Kindred Sayings 1, Ch v, 10 At Savatthi, Sister Vajira, rising early plunged into the depths of Dark Wood, and seated herself at the foot of a certain tree for noonday rest. Then Mara the evil one, desirous to arouse fear, wavering, and dread in her, desirous of making her desist from being alone, went up to her, and addressed her in verse:- By whom was wrought this being? Where is he Who makes him? Whence doth a being rise? Where doth the being cease and pass away? Then Sister Vajira thought: Who now is this, human or non-human, that speaketh verse? Sure it is Mara the evil one that speaketh verse, desirous of arousing in me fear, wavering, and dread, desirous of making me desist from being alone. And the Sister, knowing it was Mara, replied in verse:- Being! Why dost thou harp upon that word? Mong false opinions, Mara, hast thou strayed. Mere bundle of conditioned factors, this! No being can be here discerned to be. For just as, when the parts are rightly set, The word chariot ariseth [in our minds], So doth our usage covenant to say: A being when the aggregates are there. Nay, it is simply ill that rises, ill That doth persist, and ill that wanes away. Nought beside ill it is that comes to pass, Nought else but ill it is doth cease to be. Then Mara the evil one thought: Sister Vajira knows me, and sad and sorrowful he vanished there and then. ------------------------------------ anattá: 'not-self', non-ego, egolessness, impersonality, is the last of the three characteristics of existence (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) The anattá doctrine teaches that neither within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of them, can be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding substance. This is the central doctrine of Buddhism, without understanding which a real knowledge of Buddhism is altogether impossible. It is the only really specific Buddhist doctrine, with which the entire Structure of the Buddhist teaching stands or falls. All the remaining Buddhist doctrines may, more or less, be found in other philosophic systems and religions, but the anattá-doctrine has been clearly and unreservedly taught only by the Buddha, wherefore the Buddha is known as the anattá-vádi, or 'Teacher of Impersonality'. Whosoever has not penetrated this impersonality of all existence, and does not comprehend that in reality there exists only this continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena, and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without this process, he will not be able to understand Buddhism, i.e. the teaching of the 4 Noble Truths (sacca, q.v.), in the right light. He will think that it is his ego, his personality, that experiences suffering, his personality that performs good and evil actions and will be reborn according to these actions, his personality that will enter into Nibbána, his personality that walks on the Eightfold Path. Thus it is said in Vis.M. XVI: "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found; The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there; Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it; The path is, but no traveler on it is seen." "Whosoever is not clear with regard to the conditionally arisen phenomena, and does not comprehend that all the actions are conditioned through ignorance, etc., he thinks that it is an ego that understands or does not understand, that acts or causes to act, that comes to existence at rebirth .... that has the sense-impression, that feels, desires, becomes attached, continues and at rebirth again enters a new existence" (Vis.M. XVII, 117). While in the case of the first two characteristics it is stated that all formations (sabbe sankhárá) are impermanent and subject to suffering, the corresponding text for the third characteristic states that "all things are not-self" (sabbe dhammá anattá; M. 35, Dhp. 279). This is for emphasizing that the false view of an abiding self or substance is neither applicable to any 'formation' or conditioned phenomenon, nor to Nibbána, the Unconditioned Element (asankhatá dhátu). The Anattá-lakkhana Sutta, the 'Discourse on the Characteristic of Not-self', was the second discourse after Enlightenment, preached by the Buddha to his first five disciples, who after hearing it attained to perfect Holiness (arahatta). The contemplation of not-self (anattánupassaná) leads to the emptiness liberation (suññatá-vimokkha, s. vimokkha). Herein the faculty of wisdom (paññindriya) is outstanding, and one who attains in that way the path of Stream-entry is called a Dhamma-devotee (dhammánusári; s. ariya-puggala); at the next two stages of sainthood he becomes a vision-attainer (ditthippatta); and at the highest stage, i.e. Holiness, he is called 'liberated by wisdom' (paññá- vimutta). For further details, see paramattha-sacca, paticca-samuppáda, khandha, ti-lakkhana, náma-rúpa, patisandhi. -------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine and all, > > If what you quoted is Nyanatiloka's explanation of "anatta", then I > would say that's his interpretation, and, as I see it, he didn't get > it. > > Christine, I am going to put forth some questions: > If there is no being, would you say there is killing? Would you say > there is killing, but no one is being killed? Or would you say there > is no killing, just blade (a rupa) going through flesh (another > rupa), bullet (rupa) going through the head (another rupa)? If there > is no being, would you say there is birth, aging and death? Some > people argue that "there is no being" is the truth. Consider these > questions: are you a human being? Were you born? Are you getting > old? Is birth, aging and death satisfactory or unsatisfactory? > > Metta, > Victor > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Hi Victor, > > > > As RobK is in Bangkok without instant access to a computer, I hope > > you don't mind my joining in while we are waiting for a reply. > > As you know I am always wrestling with the idea of Anatta, but, > > through the kind patient repetitive explanations of the members of > > this List, I was actually beginning to feel accept the > > explanation "in reality there exists only this continually self- > > consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental > phenomena, > > and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without this > > process." (Nyanatiloka's dictionary) > > Do you have any objections to Nyanatiloka's definition? > > I would really welcome your input on this topic, Victor - > expanding > > on just how you understand that the view "there is no being" is > > pernicious and a gross misrepresentation, and what you see as the > > correct explanation. I would really appreciate it in your own > words > > (hyperlinks to suttas are not particularly helpful) if you are > > willing to articulate your understanding for us, as Robert has > done. > > > > > > metta, > > Christine > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > > Hi all, > > > > > > The view "there is no being", as I see it, is pernicious. It is > a > > > gross misrepresentation of what the Buddha taught. > > > > > > Regards, > > > Victor 15007 From: ranil gunawardena Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 0:47am Subject: man & woman Anguttara Nikaya I.1-10 Pariyadana Sutta Overpowering Translated from the Pali by Sean Whittle. Copyright ©2001 Sean Whittle. For free distribution only. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thus I have heard: On one occasion the Blessed One was staying in Savatthi at Jeta's Grove, Anathapindika's monastery. At that time he addressed the monks: "Monks!" "Venerable sir," as the monks listened closely to the Blessed One. The Blessed One said this: "Monks, I do not see any other single form that invades the mind of a man and remains like the form of a woman. Monks, the form of a woman invades the mind of a man and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single sound that invades the mind of a man and remains like the voice of a woman. Monks, the voice of a woman invades the mind of a man and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single scent that invades the mind of a man and remains like the scent of a woman. Monks, the scent of a woman invades the mind of a man and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single taste that invades the mind of a man and remains like the taste of a woman. Monks, the taste of a woman invades the mind of a man and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single touch that invades the mind of a man and remains like the touch of a woman. Monks, the touch of a woman invades the mind of a man and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single form that invades the mind of a woman and remains like the form of a man. Monks, the form of a man invades the mind of a woman and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single sound that invades the mind of a woman and remains like the voice of a man. Monks, the voice of a man invades the mind of a woman and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single scent that invades the mind of a woman and remains like the scent of a man. Monks, the scent of a man invades the mind of a woman and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single taste that invades the mind of a woman and remains like the taste of a man. Monks, the taste of a man invades the mind of a woman and remains. "Monks, I do not see any other single touch that invades the mind of a woman and remains like the touch of a man. Monks, the touch of a man invades the mind of a woman and remains." -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Revised: Sun 12 May 2002 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-001.html 15008 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 1:08am Subject: RE: [dsg] pattidana Dear Purnomo, In use ful posts: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_ Posts There are some topics under "Merits, Transfer of". The second link in that topic has a definition of pattidana. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: Purnomo . [mailto:purnomo9@h...] > Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2002 10:02 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] pattidana > > > hi all, > > what is pattidana ? > Is there 'transfer' kamma to somebody else? for > example; my grandma was > died. I want to transfer my kamma to my grandma > because she maybe born in > dukkha realsm. Is it true? Please explain > > > metta, > > > purnomo 15009 From: Sukinder Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 2:58am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' Dear Chris, Sarah conveyed your message to me, so I must have had a kind of sixth sense no? On your point about your query being from your observation etc., I know Chris that it is not your own doubt; I wasn't thinking it to be so. Your understanding seem to have progressed very markedly and I am learning a lot from your posts. Thanks. Regarding turning 'green' I have something to console you. At the hotel, when I saw the menu, I couldn't get myself to order anything except a cup of coffee, so I remained hungry for 5 hours until finally I got a double cheese burger at A&W at cost of 1/8th of what I would have paid at the hotel.:-) Metta, Sukin. -----Original Message----- From: christine_forsyth [mailto:cforsyth@v...] Sent: Friday, August 16, 2002 10:49 AM To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: [dsg] Re: Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' Dear Sukin, As always your answer is 'just right' - and speaks with 'Dhamma sense' to the main points of rebirth and kamma fruition, the how and the why. (I should point out that I was speaking from what I observe through my work and in the world in general.) Thank you Sukin. You should post more often.:) Regarding your luncheon engagement - I'm not feeling even the slightest quiver of envy, not a shiver, a shudder, a tingle, a flutter or a flicker - though I must be coming down with something, I have turned a light green colour. :):) metta, Chris --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "sukinderpal" wrote: > Hi, Chris > > I usually wait for others to answer, since I know that most probably > they all would give better ones than I would. > But since no one has yet replied to this and since you have so > bravely decided to take up Robert's place in responding to Victor's > remark, I will overlook my fear of being mistaken and go ahead. > > You mention people who are "now attempting to follow the Teachings", > this means that they have the opportunity to at least glimpse the > most sublime of teachings. > > Some people understand that their parents are part of the conditions > which have allowed them to be born as they are. But they will however > also think that it could have been any other pair of man /woman who > could have caused them to be born. But I do not think so. I think > that all the conditions work together in such a way that if one is > missing then the result would not have come to be. Such that the > kamma which decided your rebirth consciousness carries with it the > deciding factor of exactly what sort of parents you will be born to. > So no matter how one's parents treated one, if finally you have come > in contact with the Teachings, then you must remember that it > wouldn't have been if these exact parents were not yours. > > With regard to those who do NOT come to know the Teachings, one has > to realize that one is born to reap the fruits of one's kamma. So > without these parents one does not get the opportunity to repay these > partucular debts. > So either way I think, parents ARE worthy of respect and reverence. > And surely, in the world where billions of cittas are arising and > falling every second, what is a few acts of "repaying" to them going > to make a difference!? That is why the best that one can do for them, > is to establish them in the Dhamma. > > I am going to meet Sarah, Jon, Robert and his kids, Betty, Ell and > Ivan for lunch in a couple of hours. > Hope no envy arises in the " continually self-consuming process of > arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena" conveniently called > Christine.;-) > > Best wishes, > Sukin. > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear All, > > > > I acknowledge that many parents love and care for their children > with > > great sacrifice and devotion, as I always try to do, and as I hope > do > > all the parents on this List. But, in this world, very many parents > > do not behave lovingly or even humanely. Not just a few occasional > > exceptions, but very many. Parents are often the major cause of > harm > > to children physically and mentally, and are the one's responsible > > for most acts of gross neglect and abuse, assault, manslaughter and > > murder of children. > > I feel that the general 'unqualified' exhortation to give unlimited > > respect, honour and service to one's parents could be the condition > > for distress in those who have suffered greatly at their parents > > hands, and are now attempting to follow the Teachings. It seems to > > be based on an idealised version of what parents should be or could > > be, rather than the reality of what many actually are. For many > > children, the parents were just the unwilling gateway into this > world > > of suffering. When I read teachings such as those in the sutta > > below, I wonder if it is not a little naive, and could the Buddha > > have meant it to apply generally no matter how appalling the > parents > > actions were, or did he mean where parents actually did bring up, > > feed and guide their children lovingly through this world? > > > > Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' > > "I declare, O monks, that there are two person's one can never > > repay. What two? One's mother and father. > > Even if one should carry about one's mother on one should er and > > one's father on the other, and while doing so should live a hundred > > years, reach the age of a hundred years; and if one should attend > to > > them by anointing them with salves, by massaging, bathing and > rubbing > > their limbs, and they should even void their excrements there - > even > > by that would one not do enough for one's parents, one would not > > repay them. Even if one were to establish one's parents as the > > supreme lords and rulers over this earth so rich in the seven > > treasures, one would not do enough for them, one would not repay > > them. What is the reason for this? Parents do much for their > > children: they bring them up, feed them and guide them through > this > > world." > > > > metta, > > Christine 15010 From: egberdina Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 4:02am Subject: Re: ADL ch. 20 (2) Hi Rob, I think this captures it very well. The purpose of study is the gaining of wisdom. Very nice. Best Regards Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Herman, > > "Grant me the strength to change the things that I can change, the > patience to accept the things that I cannot change and the wisdom to > know the difference." > > If the object of the "study of things that cannot be altered" is to > have the "wisdom to known the difference" then, I think it is useful. > > Of course, in the mundane world, it is often necessary to study > things that cannot be altered (history, gravity, etc.). > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > > I am happy to conclude that neither thoughts of planes of > existence > > or thoughts of rebirth are the main game. In fact, I would go so > far > > as to say that the study of things that cannot be altered is > utterly > > futile. > > > > What do you reckon about that :-) 15011 From: abhidhammika Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 7:29am Subject: Time Does Not Exist As A Reality Dhamma Dear Dhamma friends A few days ago, Suan Lu Zaw said the following to Stephen and Joyce regarding time. "Time does not exist independently of real phenomena. Time is best understood as measurement of the events of conditioned real phenomena. There are only three real phenomena and their cessation, making Four Ultimate Dhammas. As you can easily figure out, three real phenomena are matter, consciousness and mental associates. They belong to conditioned realities. Nibbaana, the cessation of the conditioned phenomena, on the other hand, is the fourth reaility. Nibbaana is the only unconditioned reality, as you already know. As we have Four Ultimate Realities only, it becomes clear that time has no status of a reality. Thus, the concept of time is a human invention, and a human convention." -------------------------------------- After having said the above, Suan told KKT the following regarding kha.nika. "Kha.nika is meausrement of the three sub-events of a reality event such as matter or consciousness where kha.nikas for consciousness are faster than those for matter while the kha.nikas that measure the emergence and vanishment of matter and consciousness are said to be equal. The lasting sub-event of matter alone is said to be longer than that of consciousness." -------------------------------------------- Afterwards, Suan also spoke to Howard regarding time as follows. "Your presentation of kha.nas in Abhidhamma is good and correct. Thank you for your input. The point I was making in response to Stephen and Joyce was that time could not exist independently of the reality events, that is to say, Dhammas In Progress. Thus, the reality of time is relative at best, non-existent at worst. Time is a function of reality events if we used the mathematical parlance. We can test the non-reality of time when we attempt to manipulate time on its own. We can't! But, we can manipulate the reality events, that is to say, we can predict the outcomes of the reality events by manipulating test conditions. Depending on the types of test conditions, we can describe the relevant types of measurements such as moments or sub- moments for consciousness or matter. Put another way, time is how we could describe a reality event,- in terms of how long the event would take. In the absence of an event, there is nothing to describe, let alone how the event occurs. Time is not a what, but a how - a how to describe a what. Therefore, I repeat, "Time does not exist independently of realty events"." With kind regards, Suan Lu Zaw http://www.bodhiology.org 15012 From: frank kuan Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 9:04am Subject: who does the granting? Re: [dsg] Re: ADL ch. 20 (2) > "Grant me the strength to change the things that I > can change, the > > patience to accept the things that I cannot change > and the wisdom > to > > know the difference." Who's doing the granting here? Your mom? The government? Microsoft? Santa Claus? At first glance, this prayer seems to indicate a useful intention to generate wisdom. Upon further review, this has to be rejected as an odious and utterly futile hope with no chance of coming to fruition. Proof? Witness planet earth, with the number of inhabitants invoking this prayer addressed to an omnipotent being who shall remain nameless for the moment, and the results they've accomplished. First of all, who is the appeal directed to? I've seen a very similar prayer to this, except it is preceded by the first line "Dear God". Let's say that there does exist an omnipotent and omniscient God. If that's the case, then the state of the world (including the intellegence, wisdom, and spiritual capacity of its inhabitants) would indicate that this God is completely incompetent, lacking in anything resembling compassion, and has no ability whatsoever to make any of his devoted followers happier and more wise. Conclusion: appeal to god to increase your wisdom is going to fall on deaf ears. Whether you believe in a God or not, the prayer should be directed to YOURSELF. Only you can change yourself. You want wisdom? You have to do something to generate wisdom. And it's not going to happen with you sitting around moping and hoping some god or someone is going to just hand it to you on a silver platter. While you're wishing for wisdom to suddenly materialize, you might as well ask for a winning lottery ticket and the Cubs to win the world series. Let me develop wisdom by developing right view, right thought, right mindfulness, right effort. Let my effort be continuous and unrelenting. Let my efforts come to fruition with perfect right view. -fk p.s. Dear Frank, please grant me the ability to practice right speech so I don't post something on a public forum that would offend millions of people in the world. Guess what? This isn't right speech, and I can keep making that prayer religiously 3 times a day for the rest of my life and I still won't have a clue about right speech. Right speech has to be preceded by right view, and right view doesn't materialize by magic. Right view has to be cultivated. 15013 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 10:01am Subject: The Perfections, Ch 4, Renunciation, no 4 The Perfections, ch 4, Renunciation, no. 4. The perfection of renunciation is the elimination, the giving up and the subduing of attachment to sense objects, the departing from them. We only realize with regard to this life that we cling to visible object, sound, odour, flavour and tangible object. To what extent can we gradually become more detached from these objects? We may see the benefit of developing the perfection of renunciation. Although someone may have given up the laylife and become a monk, if he still clings to the five sense objects just as a layman, there is no difference between being a monk or a layman. Therefore, the perfection of renunciation does not merely mean leaving the household life and becoming a monk. Renunciation means having the energy and courage to eliminate the clinging we all have to visible object, sound and the other sense objects. So long as we have not attained the excellent state of the non-returner, we have not eradicated clinging to sense objects. We should know ourselves as we are, we should know whether we are sincere and have the firm determination to eliminate the clinging to the five sense objects. We are, for example, attached to colour, when we look at pictures, when we find them beautiful and delightful. Generally, when we see something beautiful, we are likely to have enjoyment and clinging, lobha. If there is heedfulness, it can be known that at such a moment this is only a reality, a dhamma, that appears. Attachment can decrease by not trying to obtain the attractive object so that we accumulate even more attachment. Thus, when there is a pleasant object, we can see it, but when it is not there and we cannot see it, we should not search for it. We may usually eat delicious food, and when we eat too much it is bad for our body. However, the citta that is attached to the flavour of food causes us to eat even when we are not hungry. If we can eliminate clinging, if we can have renunciation with regard to flavour, we shall eat just enough to satisfy our hunger, and if possible, we shall not even relish the food so much. Someone may not be hungry, and he knows that he will feel uncomfortable if he still eats. However, because the food is so delicious, he will just savour one morsel. This shows that he does not have renunciation. If there is renunciation, someone can begin to train himself by endurance, and thus, he needs to have also the perfection of patience, so that he will eat just sufficiently to satisfy his hunger; he knows when the amount of food is enough and will be of use to his body. We can understand that it is most difficult to be free from clinging to the sense objects, because even training oneself to decrease clinging is already difficult. Therefore, we should develop moral strength so that all the perfections can assist satipatthåna to be aware of the characteristics of realities more often in daily life. If we have patience we can endure the experience of heat or cold. When the weather is hot, we do not need to make special efforts to have a cold bath, or when it is cold, we do not need a warm bath. For some people it may be necessary for their body to take care of the right temperature of their bath. However, when this is not the case, we may just be attached to the temperature of the water. Some people, when they have a warm bath, just feel comfortable and pleasant; even though their body is strong and they do not need a warm bath, they just like to have this pleasant sensation. Or sometimes they take pleasure in having a cold bath. When someone understands the perfection of renunciation, he can have more endurance, no matter whether he experiences heat or cold. When he has endurance, he also needs the perfection of patience and of energy. Nobody can tell someone else to give up attachment to sense pleasures, nor can one tell oneself to do this, but it must be paññå which understands the true meaning of the perfection of renunciation. 15014 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 10:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' op 15-08-2002 11:07 schreef christine_forsyth op cforsyth@v...: Dear Christine, Lodewijk, my husband, had a dialogue with my father. He has an alarm, and now and then when he falls out of bed in the night we are woken up and go to him. Lodewijk has to lift him up from the floor. Lodewijk said that he should let us know whenever he has problems. Pa: No, you are already doing a lot for me. L: But the Buddha said we can never do enough for our parents. Pa: That is old fashioned. Isn't it delightful from the lips of someone born in 1900? Now your problem, I understand what you mean. I asked A. Sujin, and she said that any way it is due to our parents that we are introduced into this world where we still have the opportunity to hear the teachings and develop understanding. It may be helpful not to think so much of the person of the parent, but consider metta-citta. Shouln't we not have metta and karuna, regardless for whom it is? When we have problems with some's personality, it helps to consider that there are only seeing and visible object, hearing and sound, and all of them fall away. No person who stays. Best wishes, Nina. > I feel that the general 'unqualified' exhortation to give unlimited > respect, honour and service to one's parents could be the condition > for distress in those who have suffered greatly at their parents > hands, and are now attempting to follow the Teachings. It seems to > be based on an idealised version of what parents should be or could > be, rather than the reality of what many actually are. For many > children, the parents were just the unwilling gateway into this world > of suffering. When I read teachings such as those in the sutta > below, I wonder if it is not a little naive, and could the Buddha > have meant it to apply generally no matter how appalling the parents > actions were, or did he mean where parents actually did bring up, > feed and guide their children lovingly through this world? > > Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' > "I declare, O monks, that there are two person's one can never > repay. What two? One's mother and father. > Even if one should carry about one's mother on one should er and > one's father on the other, and while doing so should live a hundred > years, reach the age of a hundred years; and if one should attend to > them by anointing them with salves, by massaging, bathing and rubbing > their limbs, and they should even void their excrements there - even > by that would one not do enough for one's parents, one would not > repay them. Even if one were to establish one's parents as the > supreme lords and rulers over this earth so rich in the seven > treasures, one would not do enough for them, one would not repay > them. What is the reason for this? Parents do much for their > children: they bring them up, feed them and guide them through this > world." 15015 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 10:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re:Study of details Dear Herman, Rob M and all, I appreciated and enjoyed the different reactions to Herman's post. Maybe I can add something. The teachings are complete, in all details: all causes and their effects have been expounded. Thus, rebirth as a non-percipient being cannot be omitted when different kinds of rebirths have been explained. This does not mean that you have to study what is not relevant to your everyday life. But when we read about births in certain planes of existence it can teach us that the right cause brings the appropriate result. The person who was born without nama had developed the highest rupajhana, and this jhana did not decline just before death. One may well develop jhana but only when jhanacitta arises just before the dying-consciousness can it produce result in the form of rebirth , in this case as a being without nama, because he saw the disadvantage of experiencing objects. He had patisandhi rupa, rebirth rupa. It is beneficial and necessary to know about the right cause which brings the appropriate effect. We read about the development of jhana and all the conditions necessary for its development. If one does not know about this one may have misunderstandings about this subject. Also, those who see the disadvantages of rupa, and attain arupa jhana, will, if arupa jhanacitta arises just before death, be reborn in the arupa brahma planes where there is no rupa. Another detail for those who like details (quite understandable that it is not appealing to everybody): In the Guide to Conditional Relations (by U Narada): one of the twentyfour classes of conditions is the condition which causes each citta that falls away to be succeeded by the next one: anantara paccaya, contiguity condition. In the case of someone born without citta: Herman, I have to run, we are going to our teacher for a piano lesson. Best wishes from Nina. op 15-08-2002 02:13 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@j...: > > "Grant me the strength to change the things that I can change, the > patience to accept the things that I cannot change and the wisdom to > know the difference." > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: >> I am happy to conclude that neither thoughts of planes of > existence >> or thoughts of rebirth are the main game. In fact, I would go so > far >> as to say that the study of things that cannot be altered is > utterly >> futile. 15016 From: Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 2:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. Dear Nina, I think you missed the point that I was talking about samatha _samadhi_, not the mere cultivation of tranquility. By 'samatha samadhi' I mean a precursor to jhana, a combination of one pointed focus and relinquishment in the form of tranquility. This is freely accessible to anyone. In order to cultivate samadhi it is necessary to recognize and cease (temporarily) any conceptual proliferation. In my estimation conceptual proliferation is the most obvious expression of belief in an ego. Thus this recognition and ceasing is the beginning of penetrating anatta, and, as the necessary attendants of anatta, dukkha and anicca as well. The question about panna and the hindrances was to the point that in the study of dhamma _without_ the training in samadhi and samatha it is much more difficult to abandon the hindrances, particularly restlessness, even temporarily. Looking forward to your post back, Larry ---------------- Nina wrote: Dear Larry, I intersperse my reactions below. op 10-08-2002 20:26 schreef LBIDD@w... op LBIDD@w...: L: could we say that samatha samadhi is the beginning of understanding the three characteristics in so far as it suppresses the hindrances, craving for rupa qualities, ill will, sloth & torpor, restlessness & remorse, and doubt? N: When we read about the three characteristics it means characteristics of paramattha dhammas, of nama and rupa. In Samatha the object of citta is a meditation subject and its aim is temporary calm. In order to understand the three characteristics insight has to be developed through awareness of nama and rupa, thus, of realities appearing through the six doors, at the present moment. First nama has to be known as nama and rupa as rupa, and later on their arising and falling away can be realized. Thus, the subduing of the hindrances in samatha is not the beginning of understanding of the three characteristics. We have to see the difference between samatha bhavana and vipassana bhavana. Different ways of development with different objectives. L: And further that this is worked toward (if not accomplished) by the discipline of onepointed focus which limits papanca and the nonclinging of tranquility? N: See above. When the citta is jhanacitta akusala dhammas do not arise, but only panna developed through awareness of nama and rupa can eradicate them. Also the hindrances and the papancas which arise again after the jhanacvitta has fallen away have to be known as non-self, otherwise they cannot be eradicated. L: Also, what is the relationship between panna and the hindrances? Does panna only arise after nibbana? N: Panna is gradually developed from life to life. First it is of the level of pariyatti, intellectual understanding of the dhammas of your life: nama and rupa. Understanding of citta, cetasika and rupa, understanding what defilements are, what kusala dhammas are. Then, panna can begin to with awareness characteristics of nama and rupa that appear now. This is the beginning of patipatti, the level of practice. Is there no seeing? it has a characteristic. Is there no hearing? It has a characteristic. Evenso, attachment, aversion, metta, they each have their own characteristic and these characteristics can be directly known and understood. Very gradually nama can be known as nama and rupa as rupa, and stages of insight can arise, we do not know when. It takes so many lives, but we do not mind. The teachings are still available and we are grateful for each slight amount of understanding. Panna can grow, and one day it can become panna of the level of pativedha, the penetration of the four noble Truths. Lokuttara panna arises, panna which experience the unconditioned dhamma, nibbana. Thus, this answers the end of your Q. The relationship between panna and the hindrances: Panna can eradicate these completely, at the different stages of enlightenment. There can be no question of eradicating any hindrance when it is still , thus, my lobha, my dosa. First the wrong view of self has to be eradicated. Perhaps it is not easy to see whether there is my lobha, my dosa. We notice these akusala dhammas, but do we realize when there is an idea of self inherent in them? For example: lobha arises, and we have aversion about it, do not want to have it or to control it. should not have it. We have to investigate the different cittas that arise, but it is not easy. Only panna can. Best wishes from Nina. 15017 From: robmoult Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 2:43pm Subject: who does the granting? Re: [dsg] Re: ADL ch. 20 (2) Hi Frank, This is a great example of papanca :-) Herman was questioning the relevance of studying things that cannot be changed. I wanted to make the point that wisdom involved understanding both that which could be changed and that which could not be changed (and the difference). To try and make my point, I quoted from a famous Christian prayer (I even put it in quotes). I intentionally omitted the first part, "Dear God...", fearing the mention of "God" would be like waving a red cape in a field of bulls. I find it amusing that you reacted strongly (strongly enough to write a lengthy reply) to something that was not there (by design). This shows how quick the mind is to add "mental contructions, elaborations, embellishments and conceptual proliferations". Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: Frank, I fully agree with your position on God, wisdom and the importance of right view, etc. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > > "Grant me the strength to change the things that I > > can change, the > > > patience to accept the things that I cannot change > > and the wisdom > > to > > > know the difference." > > Who's doing the granting here? Your mom? The > government? Microsoft? Santa Claus? > At first glance, this prayer seems to indicate a > useful intention to generate wisdom. Upon further > review, this has to be rejected as an odious and > utterly futile hope with no chance of coming to > fruition. Proof? Witness planet earth, with the number > of inhabitants invoking this prayer addressed to an > omnipotent being who shall remain nameless for the > moment, and the results they've accomplished. > First of all, who is the appeal directed to? I've > seen a very similar prayer to this, except it is > preceded by the first line "Dear God". Let's say that > there does exist an omnipotent and omniscient God. If > that's the case, then the state of the world > (including the intellegence, wisdom, and spiritual > capacity of its inhabitants) would indicate that this > God is completely incompetent, lacking in anything > resembling compassion, and has no ability whatsoever > to make any of his devoted followers happier and more > wise. Conclusion: appeal to god to increase your > wisdom is going to fall on deaf ears. > Whether you believe in a God or not, the prayer > should be directed to YOURSELF. Only you can change > yourself. You want wisdom? You have to do something to > generate wisdom. And it's not going to happen with you > sitting around moping and hoping some god or someone > is going to just hand it to you on a silver platter. > While you're wishing for wisdom to suddenly > materialize, you might as well ask for a winning > lottery ticket and the Cubs to win the world series. > > Let me develop wisdom by developing right view, right > thought, right mindfulness, right effort. Let my > effort be continuous and unrelenting. Let my efforts > come to fruition with perfect right view. > > -fk > > p.s. > Dear Frank, please grant me the ability to practice > right speech so I don't post something on a public > forum that would offend millions of people in the > world. > > Guess what? This isn't right speech, and I can keep > making that prayer religiously 3 times a day for the > rest of my life and I still won't have a clue about > right speech. Right speech has to be preceded by right > view, and right view doesn't materialize by magic. > Right view has to be cultivated. 15018 From: yuzhonghao Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 3:03pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi Christine, and all, Hmmm....I hope I have answered your question on Nyanatiloka's definition. I put forth eight questions. If one holds the view "there is no being," then the first four questions are challenging. Regarding the last four questions, I think you should be able to answer them with confidence. As recorded in the Pali Canon, the Buddha articulated clearly the teaching on "anatta". The crucial factor in understanding the teaching is how one understands the word "self" in the context "Form is not self. Form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self'". One might understand it as "permanent, unchanging entity" or as "complex composite/flow of nama and rupa" or simply as a pronoun that one uses to refer oneself. "Self is a permanent, unchanging entity" is an assumption, and "self is a complex composite/flow of nama and rupa" is another. Both are speculative views. What in Nyanatiloka's explanation on "anatta" shows that he did not get it? The very fact that he understood the word "self" as "self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding substance". Regarding the view "there is no being," I have stated that it is a pernicious view. Consider a murderer who was being tried in court. When being questioned if he had committed the murder, he replied thus: "Mere killing exists, no killer nor one being killed is found; The acts of killing were, but no one committed the killing was there." "There is no being, and this is the truth. There is no killer nor one being killed." The Kindred Sayings 1, Ch v, 10 provides an interesting imagery. Make sure whether Sister Vajira stated that there is no being. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi Victor, and All, > > I asked first.:) I just realised Victor that nearly every time you > post on the question of 'self' 'non-self' or 'anatta', you either > post hyperlinks to suttas with no discussion, or you pose questions > as a reply and don't respond to many questions put to yourself. I am > not going to answer a series of leading questions out of the > very little knowledge I have, but I would be deeply interested in > hearing what your understanding is, and learning from it. You have > alluded to a strongly held knowledge on the subject of anatta, but I > have never yet seen it articulated. I hope you will do so as I > believe it could be very helpful for us all to hear it I would hope > you feel moved to write a few paragraphs on what your position is. > In this instance, as you commented very strongly on Robert's post, it > would be a courtesy, and very interesting for us all if you would > give an explanation of your thoughts on the matter. But - no worries > if you don't wish to. > > What 'I' am trying to let go of is the result of the conditioning > of Western culture and schooling, and the Christian religion that I > grew up in, where there are beliefs in 'beings' and 'souls'. What is > crucial to me above all is what the Buddha's Dhamma says. I have > included a sutta from the Kindred Sayings about 'beings'. > > What I quoted was certainly in Nyanatiloka's explanation of 'anatta' > and the full text is below with the hyperlink for you to check. It > surprises me that you say "he didn't get it', and would, no doubt, > surprise him.:):) Do you have any comments on the full text? > http://www.budsas.org/ebud/bud-dict/dic3_a.htm > > metta, > Christine > > From the Kindred Sayings 1, Ch v, 10 > At Savatthi, Sister Vajira, rising early plunged into the depths of > Dark Wood, and seated herself at the foot of a certain tree for > noonday rest. Then Mara the evil one, desirous to arouse fear, > wavering, and dread in her, desirous of making her desist from being > alone, went up to her, and addressed her in verse:- > > By whom was wrought this being? Where is he > Who makes him? Whence doth a being rise? > Where doth the being cease and pass away? > Then Sister Vajira thought: Who now is this, human or non-human, that > speaketh verse? Sure it is Mara the evil one that speaketh verse, > desirous of arousing in me fear, wavering, and dread, desirous of > making me desist from being alone. And the Sister, knowing it was > Mara, replied in verse:- > > Being! Why dost thou harp upon that word? > Mong false opinions, Mara, hast thou strayed. > Mere bundle of conditioned factors, this! > No being can be here discerned to be. > For just as, when the parts are rightly set, > The word chariot ariseth [in our minds], > So doth our usage covenant to say: > A being when the aggregates are there. > > Nay, it is simply ill that rises, ill > That doth persist, and ill that wanes away. > Nought beside ill it is that comes to pass, > Nought else but ill it is doth cease to be. > Then Mara the evil one thought: Sister Vajira knows me, and sad and > sorrowful he vanished there and then. > > ------------------------------------ > anattá: 'not-self', non-ego, egolessness, impersonality, is the > last > of the three characteristics of existence (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) The > anattá doctrine teaches that neither within the bodily and mental > phenomena of existence, nor outside of them, can be found anything > that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a self-existing real > ego-entity, soul or any other abiding substance. This is the central > doctrine of Buddhism, without understanding which a real knowledge of > Buddhism is altogether impossible. It is the only really specific > Buddhist doctrine, with which the entire Structure of the Buddhist > teaching stands or falls. All the remaining Buddhist doctrines may, > more or less, be found in other philosophic systems and religions, > but the anattá-doctrine has been clearly and unreservedly taught > only > by the Buddha, wherefore the Buddha is known as the > anattá-vádi, > or 'Teacher of Impersonality'. Whosoever has not penetrated this > impersonality of all existence, and does not comprehend that in > reality there exists only this continually self-consuming process of > arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena, and that there is no > separate ego-entity within or without this process, he will not be > able to understand Buddhism, i.e. the teaching of the 4 Noble Truths > (sacca, q.v.), in the right light. He will think that it is his ego, > his personality, that experiences suffering, his personality that > performs good and evil actions and will be reborn according to these > actions, his personality that will enter into Nibbána, his > personality that walks on the Eightfold Path. Thus it is said in > Vis.M. XVI: > "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found; > The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there; > Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it; > The path is, but no traveler on it is seen." > > "Whosoever is not clear with regard to the conditionally arisen > phenomena, and does not comprehend that all the actions are > conditioned through ignorance, etc., he thinks that it is an ego that > understands or does not understand, that acts or causes to act, that > comes to existence at rebirth .... that has the sense-impression, > that feels, desires, becomes attached, continues and at rebirth again > enters a new existence" (Vis.M. XVII, 117). > > While in the case of the first two characteristics it is stated that > all formations (sabbe sankhárá) are impermanent and subject to > suffering, the corresponding text for the third characteristic states > that "all things are not-self" (sabbe dhammá anattá; M. 35, > Dhp. > 279). This is for emphasizing that the false view of an abiding self > or substance is neither applicable to any 'formation' or conditioned > phenomenon, nor to Nibbána, the Unconditioned Element > (asankhatá > dhátu). > > The Anattá-lakkhana Sutta, the 'Discourse on the Characteristic of > Not-self', was the second discourse after Enlightenment, preached by > the Buddha to his first five disciples, who after hearing it attained > to perfect Holiness (arahatta). > > The contemplation of not-self (anattánupassaná) leads to the > emptiness liberation (suññatá-vimokkha, s. vimokkha). Herein > the > faculty of wisdom (paññindriya) is outstanding, and one who > attains > in that way the path of Stream-entry is called a Dhamma-devotee > (dhammánusári; s. ariya-puggala); at the next two stages of > sainthood > he becomes a vision-attainer (ditthippatta); and at the highest > stage, i.e. Holiness, he is called 'liberated by wisdom' (paññá- > vimutta). > > For further details, see paramattha-sacca, paticca-samuppáda, > khandha, ti-lakkhana, náma-rúpa, patisandhi. > > -------------------------------------------------- > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > Hi Christine and all, > > > > If what you quoted is Nyanatiloka's explanation of "anatta", then I > > would say that's his interpretation, and, as I see it, he didn't > get > > it. > > > > Christine, I am going to put forth some questions: > > If there is no being, would you say there is killing? Would you > say > > there is killing, but no one is being killed? Or would you say > there > > is no killing, just blade (a rupa) going through flesh (another > > rupa), bullet (rupa) going through the head (another rupa)? If > there > > is no being, would you say there is birth, aging and death? Some > > people argue that "there is no being" is the truth. Consider these > > questions: are you a human being? Were you born? Are you getting > > old? Is birth, aging and death satisfactory or unsatisfactory? > > > > Metta, > > Victor > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > > wrote: > > > Hi Victor, > > > > > > As RobK is in Bangkok without instant access to a computer, I > hope > > > you don't mind my joining in while we are waiting for a reply. > > > As you know I am always wrestling with the idea of Anatta, but, > > > through the kind patient repetitive explanations of the members > of > > > this List, I was actually beginning to feel accept the > > > explanation "in reality there exists only this continually self- > > > consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental > > phenomena, > > > and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without this > > > process." (Nyanatiloka's dictionary) > > > Do you have any objections to Nyanatiloka's definition? > > > I would really welcome your input on this topic, Victor - > > expanding > > > on just how you understand that the view "there is no being" is > > > pernicious and a gross misrepresentation, and what you see as the > > > correct explanation. I would really appreciate it in your own > > words > > > (hyperlinks to suttas are not particularly helpful) if you are > > > willing to articulate your understanding for us, as Robert has > > done. > > > > > > > > > metta, > > > Christine > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > > > Hi all, > > > > > > > > The view "there is no being", as I see it, is pernicious. It > is > > a > > > > gross misrepresentation of what the Buddha taught. > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > Victor 15019 From: Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 5:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi, Victor (and Christine) - In a message dated 8/16/02 6:04:48 PM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > The Kindred Sayings 1, Ch v, 10 provides an interesting imagery. > Make sure whether Sister Vajira stated that there is no being. > > Metta, > Victor > > > > From the Kindred Sayings 1, Ch v, 10 > > At Savatthi, Sister Vajira, rising early plunged into the depths of > > Dark Wood, and seated herself at the foot of a certain tree for > > noonday rest. Then Mara the evil one, desirous to arouse fear, > > wavering, and dread in her, desirous of making her desist from > being > > alone, went up to her, and addressed her in verse:- > > > > By whom was wrought this being? Where is he > > Who makes him? Whence doth a being rise? > > Where doth the being cease and pass away? > > Then Sister Vajira thought: Who now is this, human or non-human, > that > > speaketh verse? Sure it is Mara the evil one that speaketh verse, > > desirous of arousing in me fear, wavering, and dread, desirous of > > making me desist from being alone. And the Sister, knowing it was > > Mara, replied in verse:- > > > > Being! Why dost thou harp upon that word? > > Mong false opinions, Mara, hast thou strayed. > > Mere bundle of conditioned factors, this! > > No being can be here discerned to be. > > For just as, when the parts are rightly set, > > The word chariot ariseth [in our minds], > > So doth our usage covenant to say: > > A being when the aggregates are there. > > > > Nay, it is simply ill that rises, ill > > That doth persist, and ill that wanes away. > > Nought beside ill it is that comes to pass, > > Nought else but ill it is doth cease to be. > > Then Mara the evil one thought: Sister Vajira knows me, and sad and > > sorrowful he vanished there and then. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: You request: "Make sure whether Sister Vajira stated that there is no being." Well, Sister Vajira does say: "No being can be here discerned to be." That's pretty close, huh? Does she mean that there may be a being hiding somewhere, but it just can't be discerned? I don't think so.The Buddha was both phenomenalist and pragmatist. What is not discernable is nonexistent. The Buddha again and again said things such as "it is not found" or "it is not seen" to mean "it doesn't exist". It is made clear by Sister Vajira that talk of a "being" is just manner of speaking - mere convention. She said "So doth our usage covenant to say: A being when the aggregates are there." Her point is that a "being" is mere convention, an agreed upon verbal usage, and not an actuality. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15020 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 10:14pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi Victor and All, Thanks for your reply - could we look at our definitions of self? I have seen the word "self" used in a number of different ways, some just in everyday life for ease of communication. Often when speaking I refer to "myself" or "oneself". I understand the Buddha frequently used language in this way also with no problem e.g. The Buddha said, as he told the story of the acrobats, "' But the apprentice said: 'Not so, master. You! O Master, should protect YOURSELF, and I too shall protect MYSELF. Thus self- protected and self-guarded we shall safely do our feats." 'This is the right way,' said the Blessed One and spoke further as follows: 'It is just as the apprentice said: 'I shall protect MYSELF,' in that way the Foundation of Mindfulness should be practised." Satipatthanasamyutta 19 I use the words 'I' and 'Me' to refer to my own person - saves me saying this great long description everytime '"May this continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena conveniently called Christine have a cup of tea please", which would get an unprintable response from my esteemed colleagues. Much easier to say 'May 'I' have a cup of tea please'. My understanding of the Teaching on anatta (more than likely gained from reading the DSG Useful Posts and listening to Bhikkhu Bodhi tapes) is that it does not deny the existence of the person taken as a psycho-physical complex. (So I would think that your example of the murderer does not hold. The mundane laws for dealing with the mundane psycho-physical complex are still expected to apply). What the Teaching denies is that the person exists as a 'self', a substantial, lasting, indivisible ego-entity - existing at the core of the psycho- physical personality. It is with the idea of self in this sense that I believe the Buddha's teaching is concerned. I don't think Nyanatiloka is the only one who understands the "self" in this way ----> "The anattá doctrine teaches that neither within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of them, can be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding substance." I believe all of Theravada and Mahayana accept this understanding as a foundation doctrine of Buddhism. If I am incorrect could someone speak a little on how I am misunderstanding? In NO INNER CORE - ANATTA by Sayadaw U Silananda it indicates agreement between the two traditions: "As we can see, Buddhism is the only major religion that denies the existence of a metaphysical entity which is usually called a self or soul. Buddhism is divided into two major schools, Theravada and Mahayana, which have, in some cases, major differences. But both schools adhere to the anatta doctrine. H. von Glasenapp writes: "The negation of an imperishable Atman is the common characteristic of all dogmatic systems of the Lesser as well as the Great Vehicle (meaning here Theravada and Mahayana, respectively], and, there is, therefore, no reason to assume that Buddhist tradition which is in complete agreement on this point has deviated from the Buddha's original teaching." Although the anatta doctrine is so important, so distinctive, and supposedly so universally accepted by Buddhists, it is still the most misunderstood, the most misinterpreted, and the most distorted of all the teachings of the Buddha. " http://www.buddha.per.sg/dharma01/anatta1.htm I've re-read Sister Vajira's words in the first mentioned and another translation. I think she is definitely saying in both translations that there is no being involved with the aggregates. When you say "Make sure whether Sister Vajira stated that there is no being", are you thinking there could be 'a being' somewhere else? Inside the aggregates, like the idea of the Christian Soul? or a Great Universal Oversoul maybe? Or a Super-consciousness, a Watcher? If not one of those, what else? In the translation, by Bhikkhu Bodhi, Sister Vajira says: "Why now do you assume 'a being'? Mara, is that your speculative view? This is a heap of sheer formations: Here no being is found. Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word 'chariot' is used, So, when the aggregates exist, There is the convention 'a being'. "It's only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases." Then Mara the Evil One, realizing, "The bhikkhuni Vajira knows me," sad and disappointed, disappeared right there. The notes say Vism 593.18-19 also quotes these two verses to confirm that "there is no being apart from name-and-form." 'Suffering' in the final verse signifies the inherent unsatisfactoriness of the five aggregates which is identical with 'the heap of sheer formations'. "What arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is only suffering ceasing." In your definition of selfhood - could you also put forward its dominant criteria? Bhikkhu Bodhi states that they are: (a) the idea of duration or lastingness (b) simplicity, incomposite entity (c) unconditioned (d) susceptibility to control (which do not exist in the five aggregates). metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine, and all, > > Hmmm....I hope I have answered your question on Nyanatiloka's > definition. > > I put forth eight questions. If one holds the view "there is no > being," then the first four questions are challenging. Regarding the > last four questions, I think you should be able to answer them with > confidence. > > As recorded in the Pali Canon, the Buddha articulated clearly the > teaching on "anatta". The crucial factor in understanding the > teaching is how one understands the word "self" in the context "Form > is not self. Form is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > self'". One might understand it as "permanent, unchanging entity" or > as "complex composite/flow of nama and rupa" or simply as a pronoun > that one uses to refer oneself. > > "Self is a permanent, unchanging entity" is an assumption, and "self > is a complex composite/flow of nama and rupa" is another. Both are > speculative views. What in Nyanatiloka's explanation on "anatta" > shows that he did not get it? The very fact that he understood the > word "self" as "self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other > abiding substance". > > Regarding the view "there is no being," I have stated that it is a > pernicious view. Consider a murderer who was being tried in court. > When being questioned if he had committed the murder, he replied thus: > "Mere killing exists, no killer nor one being killed is found; > The acts of killing were, but no one committed the killing was there." > "There is no being, and this is the truth. There is no killer nor > one being killed." > > The Kindred Sayings 1, Ch v, 10 provides an interesting imagery. > Make sure whether Sister Vajira stated that there is no being. > > Metta, > Victor 15021 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Aug 16, 2002 10:47pm Subject: Re: Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One's Parents' Dear Nina, Thank you for sharing such a lovely story I'll tell it to the Medical Wards Social Workers, particularly the "That is old fashioned' remark - often they get quite despondent at sending people off to nursing homes in their sixth decade, your dear father's independent spirit will really brighten their day. I agree with your post entirely - now. I never seem to understand at the time I am experiencing or thinking something, perhaps that comes in time..... Strange to be talking with Victor about anatta in the other thread, but missing the understanding of it entirely in daily life until now. :) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 15-08-2002 11:07 schreef christine_forsyth op cforsyth@v...: > Dear Christine, > Lodewijk, my husband, had a dialogue with my father. He has an alarm, and > now and then when he falls out of bed in the night we are woken up and go to > him. Lodewijk has to lift him up from the floor. Lodewijk said that he > should let us know whenever he has problems. > Pa: No, you are already doing a lot for me. > L: But the Buddha said we can never do enough for our parents. > Pa: That is old fashioned. > Isn't it delightful from the lips of someone born in 1900? > Now your problem, I understand what you mean. I asked A. Sujin, and she said > that any way it is due to our parents that we are introduced into this world > where we still have the opportunity to hear the teachings and develop > understanding. It may be helpful not to think so much of the person of the > parent, but consider metta-citta. Shouln't we not have metta and karuna, > regardless for whom it is? When we have problems with some's personality, it > helps to consider that there are only seeing and visible object, hearing and > sound, and all of them fall away. No person who stays. > Best wishes, Nina. > 15022 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 2:27am Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi Christine and all, I have seen many people holding either the assumption "self is psycho- physical complex" or the assumption "self is substantial, lasting, indivisible ego-entity-existing at the core of the psycho-physical personality" or any other definition of selfhood in interpretating what the Buddha taught. The very definition of what self is is speculative. I think it would be beneficial and helpful to see how the Buddha used language in communication, in particular, the word "self", and I believe you have provided a good example from Satipatthanasamyutta 19. Regarding your questions: "are you thinking there could be 'a being' somewhere else? Inside the aggregates, like the idea of the Christian Soul? or a Great Universal Oversoul maybe? Or a Super-consciousness, a Watcher? If not one of those, what else?" My response to you is: "Being! Why dost thou harp upon that word? Why now are you assume 'a being'?" Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi Victor and All, > > Thanks for your reply - could we look at our definitions of self? > I have seen the word "self" used in a number of different ways, some > just in everyday life for ease of communication. Often when > speaking I refer to "myself" or "oneself". I > understand the Buddha frequently used language in this way also with > no problem e.g. The Buddha said, as he told the story of the > acrobats, "' But the apprentice said: 'Not so, master. You! O Master, > should protect YOURSELF, and I too shall protect MYSELF. Thus self- > protected and self-guarded we shall safely do our feats." 'This is > the right way,' said the Blessed One and spoke further as > follows: 'It is just as the apprentice said: 'I shall protect > MYSELF,' in that way the Foundation of Mindfulness should be > practised." Satipatthanasamyutta 19 > > I use the words 'I' and 'Me' to refer to my own person - saves me > saying this great long description everytime '"May this continually > self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental > phenomena conveniently called Christine have a cup of tea please", > which would get an unprintable response from my esteemed colleagues. > Much easier to say 'May 'I' have a cup of tea please'. > > My understanding of the Teaching on anatta (more than likely gained > from reading the DSG Useful Posts and listening to Bhikkhu Bodhi > tapes) is that it does not deny the > existence of the person taken as a psycho-physical complex. (So I > would think that your > example of the murderer does not hold. The mundane laws for dealing > with the mundane psycho-physical complex are still expected to > apply). What the > Teaching denies is that the person exists as a 'self', a substantial, > lasting, indivisible ego-entity - existing at the core of the psycho- > physical personality. It is with the idea of self in this sense that > I believe the Buddha's teaching is concerned. > I don't think Nyanatiloka is the only one who understands the "self" > in this way ----> "The anattá doctrine teaches that neither within > the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of them, > can be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as > a self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding > substance." I believe all of Theravada and Mahayana accept this > understanding as a foundation doctrine of Buddhism. If I am > incorrect could someone speak a little on how I am misunderstanding? > In NO INNER CORE - ANATTA by Sayadaw U Silananda it indicates > agreement between the two traditions: > "As we can see, Buddhism is the only major religion that denies the > existence of a metaphysical entity which is usually called a self or > soul. Buddhism is divided into two major schools, Theravada and > Mahayana, which have, in some cases, major differences. But both > schools adhere to the anatta doctrine. H. von Glasenapp writes: "The > negation of an imperishable Atman is the common characteristic of all > dogmatic systems of the Lesser as well as the Great Vehicle (meaning > here Theravada and Mahayana, respectively], and, there is, therefore, > no reason to assume that Buddhist tradition which is in complete > agreement on this point has deviated from the Buddha's original > teaching." Although the anatta doctrine is so important, so > distinctive, and supposedly so universally accepted by Buddhists, it > is still the most misunderstood, the most misinterpreted, and the > most distorted of all the teachings of the Buddha. " > http://www.buddha.per.sg/dharma01/anatta1.htm > I've re-read Sister Vajira's words in the first mentioned and > another > translation. I think she is definitely saying in both translations > that there is no being involved with the aggregates. When you > say "Make sure whether Sister Vajira stated that there is no being", > are you thinking there could be 'a being' somewhere else? Inside the > aggregates, like the idea of the Christian Soul? or a Great Universal > Oversoul maybe? Or a Super-consciousness, a Watcher? If not one of > those, what else? > In the translation, by Bhikkhu Bodhi, Sister Vajira says: > > "Why now do you assume 'a being'? > Mara, is that your speculative view? > This is a heap of sheer formations: > Here no being is found. > > Just as, with an assemblage of parts, > The word 'chariot' is used, > So, when the aggregates exist, > There is the convention 'a being'. > > "It's only suffering that comes to be, > Suffering that stands and falls away. > Nothing but suffering comes to be, > Nothing but suffering ceases." > > Then Mara the Evil One, realizing, "The bhikkhuni Vajira knows me," > sad and disappointed, disappeared right there. > The notes say Vism 593.18-19 also quotes these two verses to confirm > that "there is no being apart from name-and-form." 'Suffering' in > the final verse signifies the inherent unsatisfactoriness of the five > aggregates which is identical with 'the heap of sheer > formations'. "What arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is > only suffering ceasing." > > In your definition of selfhood - could you also put forward its > dominant criteria? > > Bhikkhu Bodhi states that they are: > (a) the idea of duration or lastingness > (b) simplicity, incomposite entity > (c) unconditioned > (d) susceptibility to control > (which do not exist in the five aggregates). > > metta, > Christine 15023 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 3:44am Subject: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi Howard and all, The usage of the word "being" is bound by agreed-upon usage of language, or in your term, "convention." From what I understand in reading the discourses, how and what the Buddha spoke is always bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language, or in your term, convention. A being is not a convention, not a verbal usage. It is the word "being" that is bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language in communication, or in your term, convention. A being is a being. You are a human being. I am a human being. And a human being is not to be found in the five aggregates, just as a chariot is not to be found in the pole, the axle, the chariot-body, the yoke, the reins, and the goading stick. Regarding your question "Does she mean that there may be a being hiding somewhere, but it just can't be discerned?", I would like to remind you that Sister Vajira was reponding to Mara's metaphysical questions in the first place. If Mara questioned Sister Vajira thus: "Is there a being hiding somewhere, but it just can't be discerned?" she would probably respond thus: "Being! Why dost thou harp upon that word? Why now are you assume 'a being'?" Metta, Victor > Howard: > You request: "Make sure whether Sister Vajira stated that there is no > being." > Well, Sister Vajira does say: "No being can be here discerned to be." > That's pretty close, huh? Does she mean that there may be a being hiding > somewhere, but it just can't be discerned? I don't think so.The Buddha was > both phenomenalist and pragmatist. What is not discernable is nonexistent. > The Buddha again and again said things such as "it is not found" or "it is > not seen" to mean "it doesn't exist". > It is made clear by Sister Vajira that talk of a "being" is just > manner of speaking - mere convention. She said "So doth our usage covenant to > say: A being when the aggregates are there." Her point is that a "being" is > mere convention, an agreed upon verbal usage, and not an actuality. > > With metta, > Howard 15024 From: frank kuan Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 6:43am Subject: Re: who does the granting? Re: [dsg] Re: ADL ch. 20 (2) Hi Rob, --- robmoult wrote: > I wanted to make the point that wisdom > involved > understanding both that which could be changed and > that which could > not be changed (and the difference). I understand. I wasn't addressing you or herman. Just the quote, and the validity of the quote. > To try and make my point, I quoted from a famous > Christian prayer That quote is not just a minor pet peeve. As I pointed out, just expressing a mere wish for wisdom of discernment to arise is foolish, and even more so that one would expect some imaginary being to grant that wish. Maybe in a forum of interreligious dialogue that could be seen as a diplomatic maneuver to show commonality between two completely different religions, but in a place like this, where wisdom cultivators have a mighty habit of spotting and rejecting wrong view, gross or subtle, it's like waving a red cape that blankets the whole sky. I understand what point you were trying to convey from referencing the quote, but the wisdom that should be cultivated versus the imaginary/undefined wisdom foolishly wished for in the prayer have NOTHING in common. Or if it is the same wisdom by coincidence, the person who foolishly prays is not going to see it magically materialize, and even if it did, they would not recognize it. No matter how poetic a quote is, if it has some serious fundamental flaws or deficiencies, it probably won't add credibility to the point you're trying to make. -fk 15025 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 6:46am Subject: Let go Hi Christine, Upon rereading your message, I would say: "Let go!" Let go of what? Let go of the views, intepretations, definitions, and assumptions you've gathered from various literature. You've accumulated a lot. Let them go. Read the discourses with a simple mind and "listen" what the Buddha said. What does it mean by "simple mind"? It is a mind without proliferation in various views. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi Victor and All, > > Thanks for your reply - could we look at our definitions of self? > I have seen the word "self" used in a number of different ways, some > just in everyday life for ease of communication. Often when > speaking I refer to "myself" or "oneself". I > understand the Buddha frequently used language in this way also with > no problem e.g. The Buddha said, as he told the story of the > acrobats, "' But the apprentice said: 'Not so, master. You! O Master, > should protect YOURSELF, and I too shall protect MYSELF. Thus self- > protected and self-guarded we shall safely do our feats." 'This is > the right way,' said the Blessed One and spoke further as > follows: 'It is just as the apprentice said: 'I shall protect > MYSELF,' in that way the Foundation of Mindfulness should be > practised." Satipatthanasamyutta 19 > > I use the words 'I' and 'Me' to refer to my own person - saves me > saying this great long description everytime '"May this continually > self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental > phenomena conveniently called Christine have a cup of tea please", > which would get an unprintable response from my esteemed colleagues. > Much easier to say 'May 'I' have a cup of tea please'. > > My understanding of the Teaching on anatta (more than likely gained > from reading the DSG Useful Posts and listening to Bhikkhu Bodhi > tapes) is that it does not deny the > existence of the person taken as a psycho-physical complex. (So I > would think that your > example of the murderer does not hold. The mundane laws for dealing > with the mundane psycho-physical complex are still expected to > apply). What the > Teaching denies is that the person exists as a 'self', a substantial, > lasting, indivisible ego-entity - existing at the core of the psycho- > physical personality. It is with the idea of self in this sense that > I believe the Buddha's teaching is concerned. > I don't think Nyanatiloka is the only one who understands the "self" > in this way ----> "The anattá doctrine teaches that neither within > the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of them, > can be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as > a self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding > substance." I believe all of Theravada and Mahayana accept this > understanding as a foundation doctrine of Buddhism. If I am > incorrect could someone speak a little on how I am misunderstanding? > In NO INNER CORE - ANATTA by Sayadaw U Silananda it indicates > agreement between the two traditions: > "As we can see, Buddhism is the only major religion that denies the > existence of a metaphysical entity which is usually called a self or > soul. Buddhism is divided into two major schools, Theravada and > Mahayana, which have, in some cases, major differences. But both > schools adhere to the anatta doctrine. H. von Glasenapp writes: "The > negation of an imperishable Atman is the common characteristic of all > dogmatic systems of the Lesser as well as the Great Vehicle (meaning > here Theravada and Mahayana, respectively], and, there is, therefore, > no reason to assume that Buddhist tradition which is in complete > agreement on this point has deviated from the Buddha's original > teaching." Although the anatta doctrine is so important, so > distinctive, and supposedly so universally accepted by Buddhists, it > is still the most misunderstood, the most misinterpreted, and the > most distorted of all the teachings of the Buddha. " > http://www.buddha.per.sg/dharma01/anatta1.htm > I've re-read Sister Vajira's words in the first mentioned and > another > translation. I think she is definitely saying in both translations > that there is no being involved with the aggregates. When you > say "Make sure whether Sister Vajira stated that there is no being", > are you thinking there could be 'a being' somewhere else? Inside the > aggregates, like the idea of the Christian Soul? or a Great Universal > Oversoul maybe? Or a Super-consciousness, a Watcher? If not one of > those, what else? > In the translation, by Bhikkhu Bodhi, Sister Vajira says: > > "Why now do you assume 'a being'? > Mara, is that your speculative view? > This is a heap of sheer formations: > Here no being is found. > > Just as, with an assemblage of parts, > The word 'chariot' is used, > So, when the aggregates exist, > There is the convention 'a being'. > > "It's only suffering that comes to be, > Suffering that stands and falls away. > Nothing but suffering comes to be, > Nothing but suffering ceases." > > Then Mara the Evil One, realizing, "The bhikkhuni Vajira knows me," > sad and disappointed, disappeared right there. > The notes say Vism 593.18-19 also quotes these two verses to confirm > that "there is no being apart from name-and-form." 'Suffering' in > the final verse signifies the inherent unsatisfactoriness of the five > aggregates which is identical with 'the heap of sheer > formations'. "What arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is > only suffering ceasing." > > In your definition of selfhood - could you also put forward its > dominant criteria? > > Bhikkhu Bodhi states that they are: > (a) the idea of duration or lastingness > (b) simplicity, incomposite entity > (c) unconditioned > (d) susceptibility to control > (which do not exist in the five aggregates). > > metta, > Christine 15026 From: Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 6:01am Subject: Victor / Some Excerpts on Anatta from the Website "Beyond the Web" Hi, Victor (and all) - I send the following excerpts for whatever value you may deem them to have: WHAT THE TEACHING DENIES To grasp the exact meaning of this teaching we have to discriminate between what the teaching denies and what it does not deny. We can approach this task by distinguishing the different meanings of the word self. 'Anatta' means literally ' not self'. So what is the 'self' that is denied in the teaching of 'Anatta'?The word "self" can be used in three senses. (a) With a reflexive meaning, as when when we speak of "myself". "yourself", "oneself".The Buddha accepts this use of the word "self". He says that you have to train yourself, one must purify oneself, you have to make the effort yourself and so on. (b) To refer to one's own person, to refer to the compound of body and mind. Here the word self or it is a shorthand device used to refer easily and economically to what is really a complex process. 'Self' in this sense is acceptable to Buddhism. (c) A substantial ego entity, a lasting subject existing at the core of the psycho-physical personality. It is with the idea of selfhood in this sense that the Buddha's teaching is concerned, for it is this assumption that draws us into suffering. ******************************** SELFHOOD To make the teaching of Anatta clearer we have to investigate two things more carefully: 1) What exactly is the nature of selfhood ? 2) Why is the person not-self? (What are the reasons for negating selfhood in the five aggregates?) There are four dominant criteria of selfhood: (a) the idea of duration or lastingness (b) simplicity, incomposite entity (c) unconditioned (d) susceptibility to control (a) Idea of Lastingness Self has to be an entity which persists through time. It might be a temporary duration. eg. that we come into being at birth, continue as the same self throughout life, and are annihilated at death. Or else a permanent duration, the idea of an eternal everlasting self. (b) Simplicity This is the idea that the self is not compounded, that it possesses a basic simplicity or indivisibility. (c) Unconditioned We assume that the self must possess its own power of being, it must be self-sufficient, unconditioned, not dependent upon causes and conditions. (d) Control. If something really belongs to us we should be able to exercise mastery over it, to control it so that it is subject to our determination. **************************** Selfness nature of the five aggregates. To illustrate the selfless nature of the five aggregates the Buddha gives certain similies. He says:(a)The body is like a lump of foam - seems solid but when crushed turns out to be a hollow. (b)Feeling is like a bubble - bubbles on water just arise and break up and show themselves to be empty. (c)Perception is like a mirage. A mirage appears but when we examine it we don't find anything substantial. (d)Formations are like the trunk of a banana tree. Just rolls of tissue within rolls and rolls without hard wood. (e)Consciousness is like a magical illusion.It appears but has no substance. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15027 From: anders_honore Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 0:00pm Subject: Re: Anders and Views (1), (was:forwarding to list) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Anders, > > --- Anders Honore wrote: > Hi Sarah. Snipped > > This is correct for Buddhas only. For the rest of us, the order, without > exception, is hearing, then considering, then realizing. It is for this > reason the Buddha taught and the Scriptures were written down. Consider the case of Bahiya again. How does he fit this? I am not saying that one (unless you're a SammasamBuddha or Pacekka) can realise the Dhamma without hearing parts of it, but it is not the case of wisdom being imparted from the teachings. It is a case of the teachings helping to efface the delusions preventing one from realising it already. Perhaps you can answer me, where did the Buddha's realisation come from? Since all non-Buddhas, you say, realise the Dhamma through hearing it, how did the Buddha realise it? > No self to develop, > understand or practise apart from panna. Is this statement born of your own personal experience, or from your reflection on the scriptural teaching? > ..... > > What do you say then, is the nature of direct understanding? If not the > > Buddha's understanding, then what? The scriptures' understanding? What > > understanding to they have? They are just expressions of understanding. > > Not > > understanding itself. > ..... > The Buddha's understanding is so all-encompassing that it understands all > accumulations, kamma, intricate nature of all conditions and so on. This > is reflected in the Scriptures. Of course these are expressions only, but > expressions representing realities and development of satipatthana. The > task of panna (rt understanding) is not to emulate the Buddha's wisdom, > but to begin to understand realities appearing at this moment. Only in > this way can it gradually develop, eventually to realize higher insights > and eradicate kilesa (defilements). I am not talking about the siddhis of the Buddha here (except for the siddhi of knowledge of the completion of the path), but of the realisation of the Buddha. > I would refer to the anatta (non-self) nature of > paramattha dhammas (absolute realities) and the existence of different > namas and rupas (mental and physical phenomena. This is a discussion in > itself.> And a diversion from the topic of this thread, I think. We'll save this one for a later day. > 2) When we talk about panna understanding the 4 Noble Truths and `cause > and effect', I question whether it is possible at this moment. What do you mean 'this moment'? This age, the moment of experience itself, this moment in your own development, or mine? Please clarify. > > Bottom line here -- unless someone can tell me a lot about the > characteristics of different realities appearing now (and from direct > experience rather than just repeating lists to give Frank a hard- time;-)), > it's hard for me to have any confidence that there really is any > realization of the 4NT. Some people say it's not possble to put the > developed panna into words, but I find plenty of words in the Tipitaka. Well, you know where I stand. I speak according to my own understanding. When not, I say so. I am still learning how to distinguish properly between direct vision and inferrence and speculation based on it. The trick is that the mind is very much capable of speculating on things further down the path, based on what may be already seen with Panna now. Although the speculation is based on panna, the speculation itself is intrinsically rooted in ignorance, and thus flawed in its understanding to a certain extent. Although I am beginning to catch it, much of what I say is still a product of delusion unrecognised, although I am at a stage where, oin hinsight, I can usually detect much of it in my writings. But not that often in the actual moment, which is of course what counts. So don't be surprised to see my back out of any of my previous statements, lol. As for expressing such insight, words cannot duplicate Panna, only imitate it. Panna can be likened to tasting an apple. If you have never tasted or seen one, and I have, then no matter how hard I try to describe what it is like for you, then you won't know for yourself what an apple is like. You may have a vague idea, but that is all. However, the Buddha's Dhamma is also such that, should you one day taste and appl, and know the taste for yourself, you will (if you remember my description) know that this is exactly what I described as an apple, and know you know it too. 15028 From: robmoult Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 0:15pm Subject: who does the granting? Re: [dsg] Re: ADL ch. 20 (2) Hi Frank, I understand your point better now. "Wisdom" has a very special place in Buddhism (particularly in the Therevada tradition). Wishing for it, or expecting some divine being to grant it, goes against our grain. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > Hi Rob, > > That quote is not just a minor pet peeve. As I > pointed out, just expressing a mere wish for wisdom of > discernment to arise is foolish, and even more so that > one would expect some imaginary being to grant that > wish. 15029 From: robmoult Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 0:29pm Subject: What would you have said? Hi All, I was recently in China eating dinner with a group of about 15 colleagues who spoke little English. One of my colleagues mentioned to the table (in Chinese) that I was a Buddhist and taught Buddhist philosophy on Sunday morning to a class of Malaysian Chinese students. This started quite a conversation going, which somebody summarized for me as "We are embarassed that it takes a Westerner to teach us an Eastern religion. Many of us claim to be Buddhists, but don't know much at all about the religion." A colleague whose English was slightly better than the rest asked me a question, "As a Buddhist, what is the most important belief?" Considering the casual setting, the background of the people at the table and the limited language skills, I replied, "Understanding. Belief or faith without understanding is blind. It is important to understand the mind because everything that we do, good or bad, starts in the mind." What would you have said, had you been asked this question? Thanks, Rob M :-) 15030 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Aug 17, 2002 3:42pm Subject: Re: Let go Hi Victor, Thanks for your advice Victor. It certainly is a useful reminder to us all. I guess clinging to Wrong View is one of the hardest things to realise. One always tends to see *others* as wilfully not getting the point and having faulty understanding. Often, even when studying, one only seeks scripture that supports a strongly held view and ignores the rest. Such a long, long journey to Right Understanding. I've enjoyed *not* finding out your thoughts and reasons behind your original post to RobK . :) While waiting, it has encouraged me to re-visit the suttas on Ditthi, then those on Anatta, which led again to those on the Paticcasamuppada. An exhilarating journey. I was surprised to find that since I put Anatta in the 'Too hard basket' and ignored it for a while, it has become a little more intelligible. Imagine that! :) May you be well and happy, Victor, metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > Upon rereading your message, I would say: "Let go!" > > Let go of what? Let go of the views, intepretations, definitions, > and assumptions you've gathered from various literature. You've > accumulated a lot. Let them go. > > Read the discourses with a simple mind and "listen" what the Buddha > said. What does it mean by "simple mind"? It is a mind without > proliferation in various views. > > Metta, > Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi all, > > The view "there is no being", as I see it, is pernicious. It is a > gross misrepresentation of what the Buddha taught. > > Regards, > Victor > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" > wrote: > > --- > > Dear Stephen, > > Arrived in Bangkok( the rainy season by the look of it). > > > > These are not easy things to understand. Every moment > > is new and it is all arising and falling away with great > rapidity. > > However, each moment conditions the next moment and so there is > > continuity. As TG nicely explained the Buddha's words were a > > condition for Rahula to reflect wisely . > > If that situation is analysed there was really no Buddha or Rahula. > > But there was sound, there was hearing; these disappeared as soon > as > > they arose but they conditioned cittas that understood the concepts > > that were expressed by the myriad sounds. Cittas arise and fall > away > > instantly too but they can - and do - take a concept > > and repeatedly examine it and so the cittas in succession may seem > > much the same, for split seconds, seconds or even longer. > > > > But by wise attention there can be the insight that begins to study > > the nature of citta and see how it is different, albeit similar, > > moment to moment. This wise attention can lead to seeing, so the > > texts say, that nama and rupa are very different types of reality - > > and continue on to know more. > > There is no self anywhere in this process, so the Dhamma ; but the > > unbroken continuity of rising and falling, deludes the unwise > (i.e.us) > > into believing there is something substantial there , something > > somewhere that can direct, decide , that is doing this or that. > > RobM mentioned the term ayuhana, accumulating, ealier. And this > > process means that all the time there is new accumulating > > occuring, subtley altering, right now, what was accumulated from > the > > past; so that in the future accumulations may be very different > from > > what they are now. Wisdom may develop, or not; kindness or cruelty; > > patience or impatience; metta or anger. It can be studied, this > > process; while it happens, but usually there is a barrier, self > view > > which distorts and stops us understanding. > > Robert 15031 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 1:55am Subject: Hello from Bangkok Dear All A delay at the airport at Bangkok as we wait for our flight to Koh Samui gives me a chance to say hello. We had a useful but short discussion with Dhamma friends this morning (including Rob K, Betty, Sukin, Num and Ivan and Ell) on some of the points that have cropped up recently on the list, with plently of reminders from Khun Sujin about the importance of awareness of the reality of the present moment and, as a condition for that, of repeated listening to and reflection on the teachings. There's a queue of other delayed passengers waiting for their turn, so time's up for now. Speak again from Samui. Jon 15032 From: robmoult Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 2:37am Subject: Re: Accumulations Hi Robert, Thanks for your research on ayuhana. I just came across this essay on Alayavijnana - Store Consciousness by Ven. Dr. Walpola Rahula that can provide more background. http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha195.htm Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > > Hi Robert, > > > >> I looked up the term ayuhana in "BUDDHIST DICTIONARY Manual of > > Buddhist Terms & Doctrines" by Ven. Nyanatiloka and found: > > > > ayuhana: (karmic) 'accumulation', is a name used in the > commentarial > > literature for the wholesome and unwholesome volitional activities > > (karma, q.v.) or karma-formations (sankhara; s. paticca- > samuppada), > >___________________________ > > Dear RobM, > Thanks very much for supplying the quote from Nyanatiloka, I was > able to find it thanks to this.. > áyúhana (Aayuu- > hana)is fairly rare by itself in the texts but often occurs either > in the form Aayuuhana.m or as part of a complex word phrases . > > It is indeed a very useful word to understand. The Mahavagga tika > (subcommentary) to the Digha nikaya explains (I add some more to > Nyantiloka's excellent explanation): 15033 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 7:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. Dear Larry, I am missing your point again, I am afraid. What is a precursor to jhana, samatha or vipassana? What is relinguishment in the form of tranquillity? Where in the texts is it said that for samatha one should cease proliferation? The word papa~nca has several meanings. It can mean: clinging to self without wrong view, clinging with wrong view and clinging with conceit. These slow down the process of development leading out of samsara. The hindrance of restlessness arises with each akusala citta. When there is kusala citta it does not arise. As I said before: the three characteristics are characteristics of nama and rupa. Impermanence: not *thinking* that everything in life is evanescent, but realizing the arising and falling of this rupa now, this nama now. Thus, the development of nama and rupa cannot occur when jhanacitta experiences the meditation subject of jhana. Different ways of development. I am not inclined to think that one way of development is easier, I find, nothing is easy. I quote from the Netti, the Guide, from a post by Rob K: < The Netti-pakarana p168 Herein the Blessed one teaches samatha to one of keen faculties; The blessed one teaches samatha and insight to one of medium faculties and the blessed one teaches insight [alone] to one of blunt faculties. Thus for the great ones, the wise ones, indeed the path of samatha preceeding insight can be developed. For the blunt, slow ones it shows that insight alone is the way, inferior though it is.> I have no trouble classifying myself among the blunt, slow ones. Sarah wrote some time ago a post about two groups of people: those who developed jhana and insight, and insight alone, the dhammayogas: Best wishes Nina. op 16-08-2002 23:10 schreef LBIDD@w... op LBIDD@w...: > I think you missed the point that I was talking about samatha _samadhi_, > not the mere cultivation of tranquility. By 'samatha samadhi' I mean a > precursor to jhana, a combination of one pointed focus and > relinquishment in the form of tranquility. This is freely accessible to > anyone. > > In order to cultivate samadhi it is necessary to recognize and cease > (temporarily) any conceptual proliferation. In my estimation conceptual > proliferation is the most obvious expression of belief in an ego. Thus > this recognition and ceasing is the beginning of penetrating anatta, > and, as the necessary attendants of anatta, dukkha and anicca as well. > > The question about panna and the hindrances was to the point that in the > study of dhamma _without_ the training in samadhi and samatha it is much > more difficult to abandon the hindrances, particularly restlessness, > even temporarily. 15034 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 7:01am Subject: Mindfulness of Breathing, Sutta and Co. Dear Rob Ep, Larry and all: We read in the Anapanasati sutta (MN no. 118): (Introductory Section) 1] Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Savatthi in the Eastern Park, in the Palace of Migara's Mother, together with many very well-known elder disciples -- the Venerable Sariputta, the Venerable Maha-Moggallana, the Venerable Maha Kassapa, the Venerable Maha Kaccana, the Venerable Maha Kotthita, the Venerable Maha Kappina, the Venerable Cunda, the Venerable Anuruddha, the Venerable Revata, the Venerable Ananda, and other very well known elder disciples. 2] Now on that occasion elder Bhikkhus had been teaching and instructing new Bhikkhus; some elder Bhikkhus had been teaching and instructing ten new Bhikkhus, some elder Bhikkhus had been teaching and instructing twenty. . . thirty. . . forty new Bhikkhus. And the new Bhikkhus, taught and instructed by the elder Bhikkhus, had achieved successive stages of high distinction. 3] On that occasion -- the Uposatha day of the fifteenth, on the full-moon night of the Pavarana ceremony,[9] The Blessed One was seated in the open surrounded by the Sangha of Bhikkhus. Then, surveying the silent Sangha of Bhikkhus, he addressed them thus: 4] "Bhikkhus, I am content with this progress. My mind is content with this progress. So arouse still more energy to attain the unattained, to achieve the unachieved, to realize the unrealized. I shall wait here at Savatthi for the Komudi full moon of the fourth month." ******* Mindfulness of Breathing has been translated by Ven. Nanamoli, with extracts from the Co. to this sutta and the Path of Discrimination. He has helpful notes, but he gives only abridged translations of the Co. Invitation, pavaara.naa: After the rainy season, each monk invites the Sangha to point out his faults during the preceding period. (N: How this induces humbleness of mind and respect the monks should have for each other!) N: As we read in the Intro, the sutta was spoken near Savatthi in the Eastern Monastery. The great disciples were present. There were arahats, non-returners, once-returners, sotapannas. Moreover those who were developing the four satipatthanas, and the factors leading to enlightenment, who were developing metta and other meditation subjects and also mindfulness on breathing. The Invitation ceremony was put off for one month until the Komudi festival, so that the mons could more fully develop excellent qualities. The Co. explains why the Buddha wanted to wait for the Komudi festival in Savatthi, to have the Invitation ceremony, the pavarana. He waited because otherwise the bhikkhus would go away and travel all over Savatthi. The Buddha (N: he showed his great compassion) thought of the bhikkhus who were still weak in samatha and vipassana and who would not be able to have excellent attainments. He considered the difficulty of finding lodgings if the monks would go traveling. The elders (of sixty rainy seasons) were allowed to take lodgings first and in that case other monks would have trouble finding them. Since the Buddha wanted to stay near Savatthi, there would not be such worry and the monks could further develop samatha and vipassana and reach distinctions. N: In the Sutta we read that the Buddha said: Note of Ven. Nanamoli: this refers to arahatship. We read in the Co. that the monks were determined to consider the conditioned dhammas, sankhara dhammas, and that some attained the fruition of sotapanna, etc. and of arahatship. This is the meaning of excellent quaitiesd of a higher degree they attained. We read in the sutta what the Buddha said one month later, at the Komudi festival. This we should carefully consider so that we can understand to whom the explanation of anapanasati was addressed: 8] "Bhikkhus, this assembly is free from prattle, this assembly is free from chatter.[10] It consists purely of heartwood. Such is this Sangha of Bhikkhus, such is this assembly. Such an assembly as is worthy of gifts, worthy of hospitality, worthy of offerings, worthy of reverential salutation, an incomparable field of merit for the world -- Such is this assembly. Such an assembly that a small gift given to it becomes great and a great gift becomes greater -- such is this Sangha of Bhikkhus, such is this assembly. Such an assembly as is rare for the world to see -- such is this Sangha of Bhikkhus, such is this assembly. Such an assembly as would be worthy journeying many leagues with a travel-bag to see -- such is this Sangha of Bhikkhus, such is this assembly. 9] "In this Sangha of Bhikkhus, there are Bhikkhus who are arahats with taints destroyed, who have lived the holy life, done what had to be done, laid down the burden, reached the true goal, destroyed the fetters of being, and are completely liberated through final knowledge -- such Bhikkhus are there in this Sangha of Bhikkhus. 10] "In this Sangha of Bhikkhus there are Bhikkhus who, with the destruction of the five lower fetters, are due to reappear spontaneously (in the pure abodes) and there attain final Nibbana, without ever returning from that world -- such Bhikkhus are there in this Sangha of Bhikkhus. 11] "In this Sangha of Bhikkhus there are Bhikkhus who, with the destruction of three fetters and with the attenuation of lust, hate and delusion, are once-returners, returning once to this world to make an end of suffering -- such Bhikkhus are there in this Sangha of Bhikkhus. 12] "In this Sangha of Bhikkhus there are Bhikkhus who, with the destruction of the three fetters, are stream-enterers, no longer subject to perdition, bound [for deliverance], headed for enlightenment -- such Bhikkhus are there in this sangha of Bhikkhus. 13] "In this Sangha of Bhikkhus there are Bhikkhus who abide devoted to the development of the four foundations of mindfulness[11] -- such Bhikkhus are there in this Sangha of Bhikkhus. In this Sangha of Bhikkhus there are Bhikkhus who abide devoted to the four right kinds of strivings (efforts). . . of the four bases for spiritual power. . . of the five faculties. . . of the five powers. . . of the seven enlightenment factors. . . of the Noble Eightfold Path -- such Bhikkhus are there in this Sangha of Bhikkhus 14] "In this Sangha of Bhikkhus there are Bhikkhus who abide devoted to the development of loving-kindness. . . of compassion. . . of appreciative joy. . . of equanimity. . . of the meditation of foulness. . . of the perception of impermanence - - such Bhikkhus are there in this Sangha of Bhikkhus. In this Sangha of Bhikkhus there are Bhikkhus who abide devoted to the development of mindfulness of breathing. ******* The Co explains that all these were meditation subjects the monks were very interested in. In the sutta where it is stated: they dwell devoted to the four foudations of mindfulness... the noble eightfold Path, there is reference to the thirtyseven factors of enlightenment. The Co explains about the factors of enlightenment, bodhipakkhiya dhammas, that these are lokiya (not lokuttara, that is, those arising when enlightenment is attained) and lokuttara. It states that they are lokiya for the monks who develop vipassana, insight. In the sutta we read about the perception of impermanence. The Co explains that here insight, vipassana, is meant by sa~n~naa, perception. N: we can compare here the use of the word sanna: we find in the texts at times atta-sanna, perception of self, and anatta-sanna, perception of non-self. We read in the Co. that the monks were very interested in anapana sati. That is why the Buddha dealt with the other meditation subjects in short, but with mindfulness of breathing in detail. The Co now refers to the Visuddhimagga for details about this subject. ***** After this the Co deals with seeing the body in the body. This is for next time. Nina. 15035 From: Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 7:46am Subject: Away for a While Hi, all (especially Lee, on D-L) - I will be away at a conference at Princeton University until late next Wednesday. Any posts sent to me will be replied to after I return. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15036 From: Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 0:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. Dear Nina, Maybe you won't find my point in a book. I think you have to try one-pointed concentration with tranquility for yourself. It is a matter of practical experience that if one tries to focus on one thing continuously, a myriad of other thoughts with feelings usually arise. Recognizing these thoughts as thoughts, I maintain, is an insight into anatta, as 'self' is mostly conceptual proliferation on the side of subject rather than object. You can do this; anyone can. Every Buddhist organization in the world, except this one, teaches this basic technique to beginning students. As for the development of tranquility, this also is a beginners practice, though not mastered until realization. By your demeanor, and emphasis on the *long* view, I would say you know it well. In the Path Of Purification, the sila/samadhi/panna formula, and the ariya magga the usual order of things is for meditation to precede insight. Whether it does or not in one's own life is no reason to not cultivate, or at least dip one's toe into the experience of meditation. Without this you simply will not know what we are talking about. Best wishes, and strong encouragement, Larry 15037 From: egberdina Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 3:51pm Subject: who does the cultivating? Hi Frank, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > > "Grant me the strength to change the things that I > > can change, the > > > patience to accept the things that I cannot change > > and the wisdom > > to > > > know the difference." > > Who's doing the granting here? Your mom? The > government? Microsoft? Santa Claus? > > Let me develop wisdom by developing right view, right > thought, right mindfulness, right effort. Let my > effort be continuous and unrelenting. Let my efforts > come to fruition with perfect right view. > > Right view has to be cultivated. Who does the cultivating? I do not hold the use of personal pronouns against anyone, because I am at one with my duality :-) Even atta is anatta. All the best Herman 15038 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 8:21pm Subject: Re: Let go Hi Christine, No problem. Regarding my original post to Rob K, see it as an opinion, a reminder. Why do I see the view "there is no being" pernicious? Because it is a falsehood. Why is it a falsehood? Because, Christine, we are human beings. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi Victor, > > Thanks for your advice Victor. It certainly is a useful reminder to > us all. I guess clinging to Wrong View is one of the hardest > things to realise. One always tends to see *others* as wilfully not > getting the point and having faulty understanding. Often, even > when studying, one only seeks scripture that supports a strongly held > view and ignores the rest. Such a long, long journey to Right > Understanding. > > I've enjoyed *not* finding out your thoughts and reasons behind your > original post to RobK . :) While waiting, it has encouraged me to > re-visit the suttas on Ditthi, then those on Anatta, which led again > to those on the Paticcasamuppada. An exhilarating journey. I was > surprised to find that since I put Anatta in the 'Too hard basket' > and ignored it for a while, it has become a little more intelligible. > Imagine that! :) > > May you be well and happy, Victor, > > metta, > Christine 15039 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 8:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, Sutta and Co. Dear Nina, This is great. Thank you for this good material. I'm looking forward to the next installment! Best, Robert Ep. ======================== --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, Larry and all: > > We read in the Anapanasati sutta (MN no. 118): > > (Introductory Section) > > 1] Thus have I heard. ... 15040 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 8:49pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hi Christine, > > No problem. > > Regarding my original post to Rob K, see it as an opinion, a reminder. > > Why do I see the view "there is no being" pernicious? Because it is > a falsehood. Why is it a falsehood? Because, Christine, we are > human beings. Dear Victor, 'Human beings' is a term that is used to describe the bodymind we inhabit. I say 'we inhabit' but it is only a linguistic conceit that there is someone 'inhabiting' something. You say 'we are human beings', but what does this mean? It is clear that we have a body, with thoughts, feelings and sensations arising within it. There is consciousness keeping track to some extent of all of these events. But clearly there is no 'little man' hiding in our interior overseeing all of this. Is there a 'person' inside the person you see when you see a 'human being'. Where is he located? Show me a central being; show me one internal focus of awareness that is the experiencer of all that happens. If you say there is a being, identify it. Show me what it looks like, and of what its beingness consists. In my own experience, there is an impersonal field or function of awareness that does experience interrnal and external events, but this awareness cannot be construed as a being in any way. It is not a person, it doesn't identify with a thought or feeling; it is just present. It has no location; it does not occupy space; it does not change or act within time. So it is not a person or being in any sense. Again, if there is a self, a being or an entity within which is the recipient of perceptions, thoughts, experiences, one should be able to describe its form and its location. Otherwise, it seems to me that it is a presumption or a myth. Yes, events take place. There is intelligence and awareness in the bodymind. But this does not constitute a being, or a self. Best, Robert Ep. 15041 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 8:50pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. Hi Nina and Larry, I've only just got round to reading this thread (13 posts) - and am finding it very interesting. I wonder if I can ask a couple of questions - I apologise for being a bit behind in my reading, and the length of this reply. Larry, I admire your enthusiasm for the Dhamma and the courage and honesty in your posts and questions. I am sure you are the condition for much deeper consideration of the Dhamma for many on this list. I don't think any of us would care if we don't find your point in a book - but we would care if we couldn't find it in the Tipitaka. :) It is difficult for me to follow a discussion if general statements and broad claims are unsupported by references, and I wonder if you could point me to where in the Canon you have obtained your understanding of 'a precursor to jhana, a combination of one pointed focus and relinquishment in the form or tranquillity''. I am not disputing it, just need to find more info on it. I am also having a little trouble with the word 'relinquishment' - I have only come across in it places like 7 Gelanna Sutta 'The Sick Ward' Samyutta Nikaya XXXVI.7 http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/sam/sn36-7.htm You say "Every Buddhist organization in the world, except this one, teaches this basic technique to beginning students". 'This one' isn't an Organisation and doesn't teach anything. It is a Yahoo List of 230 or so individuals who joined from all Traditions, presumably, because they had read the Home Page and thought it suited their needs. The Home page clearly says it is a discussion forum for anyone interested in understanding the Buddha's teachings as found in all three baskets of the Tipitaka, the original record of the Buddha's word in the Theravada tradition, and as further elucidated in the ancient commentaries of that tradition. The discussions include matters of both theory and practice, with the aim of developing precise understanding of the realities of the present moment." The people on this list practice in a variety of ways, and I recognise that they are attracted to their preferred form of practice because of accumulations. - habits, tendencies and talents. They recognise and support the right of others to practise the Teachings in their own way, and enjoy the illuminating discussions that follow from a diversity of viewpoints. A great percentage of people on this List have practiced samatha meditation at one time, some to a high level, and many still do daily practice. I used to meditate 'religiously' twice a day for up to an hour each time following the Mahasi method - a form of Samatha- Vipassana. I went to many one day and weekend retreats and a number of five and ten day retreats. I had various experiences in meditation. I am not unfamiliar with one-pointed concentration and tranquillity. I simply find it not useful for progression on the Path FOR ME. I do not doubt that it is a vital component of the practice of others, and I totally support them in applying formal periods of samatha or vipassana meditation as one of their methods of practice. It is all a question of time. I truly believe this is a scarce, precious human rebirth that could end at any time. The development of Right Understanding is of prime importance. You make an interesting remark about 'proliferation is the most obvious expression of belief in an ego - thus this recognition and ceasing is the beginning of penetrating anatta, and, as the necessary attendants of anatta, dukkha and anicca as well." I wonder if it might be useful to look at what the Buddha indicated was the way to the end of Dukkha (Suffering)? He said "Both formerly & now, it is only suffering that I describe, and the cessation of suffering." (Anuradha Sutta) As I understand the Teachings, the permanent Cessation of suffering is not obtained through Samatha. 'Samatha-kammatthana' existed before the appearance of the Lord Buddha in this world. Every religion had kinds of this meditation, for example there were sages hermits, monks of other religions. When the Blessed One had studied thoroughly he realised that this was not the way to eradicate asava- kilesa. As I have been taught, the Blessed One tried with patience, perseverance and effort to discover the way that leads out of the suffering of the rounds of rebirth, samsara-vatta the process of birth, old age, sickness and death; this way out that he discovered was the Dhamma which has the function to completely eradicate the asava-kilesa which are the cause of attachment to remain in Samsara. At first, the Buddha studied with two renowned teachers, one of them named Alara Kalama who taught samatha to reach the hightest rupa-jhana (absorption of the fine-material sphere). The second one, Uddaka Ramaptta, taught samatha to reach the hightest arupa-jhana (absorption of the immaterial sphere). The Buddha experimented with this meditation in every way realising that this is not the way to the Full Enlightenment of a Buddha. He left these teachers and searched for himself until be became enlightened to the four Noble Truths which can destroy asava-kilesa completely. The Buddha declared that he was the One rightfully enlightened by himself. In the preaching of the 'Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta' the first sermon, delivered to the group of five ascetics at Isipatana deer park, near Benares, he pointed out the Noble Eightfold Path or the Middle Way which comprises 'samma-ditthi', that is 'panna' right view or seeing the four Noble Truths. The practice of the Eightfold Path is actually nothing but the practice of Vipassana (Insight mediation). http://www.buddhanet.net/lmed11.htm "Thus, in terms of the Noble Eightfold Path, as soon as we pay attention to our mind, there is already samma vayama (effort) and samma sati (mindfulness). When samma sati is full and complete, the mind enters instantaneously into khanika samadhi (momentary concentration), which brings forth pañña (wisdom)Wisdom sees things in the right perspective, samma ditthi. Wisdom brings samma sankappa (right thought); and thereby samma vaca (right speech), samma kammanta (right action) and samma ajiva (right livelihood.) Hence it is possible in every conscious moment that sila, samadhi and pañña are all three incorporated in our daily business of living - while we eat, work, play and struggle. In short, our life itself becomes the Noble Eightfold Path" Nina, thank you for sharing your knowledge, understanding and practice in daily life with us all - you make the Dhamma come alive for me and your dealings with others always exemplify respect, patience and kindness. I enjoy all your posts (particularly The Perfections) but I particularly enjoyed your post 14712 of Sunday 4 August. (Oh dear! 325 posts ago.) "Arahats are different, with different distinctions: there are those who did not develop jhana, there are those who developed jhana and those who also had the four discriminative knowledges (patisambhiddas). Such difference in distinctions and talents happen because of conditions but what is most important: all of them eradicated defilements completely through pa~n~naa. Since jhana can be a base of insight should it not be developed first, is a question some people ask. The question, should we or shouldn't we, does not need to arise, because someone with the accumulated skills for jhana and the inclination to it, develops it already. If he has accumulated panna and develops insight, so that he has right understanding of the three characteristics of the jhanafactors after emerging from jhana, there are conditions that he can do so. Whatever we do or don't do, it all evolves because of conditions." In my formal meditating days, a friend found out the hard way about conditions. Three months of his long service leave, sitting in the Australian bush (heat/cold, flies, mosquitos, ants), meditating 15 hours a day ..... and as he saw it "nothing as the result". He had plenty of serenity, and was very calm for a long time afterward - but the anticipated Jhanas did not eventuate despite believing they would, conscientious practice and years of devoted meditation experience. (I see now that apart from not having the accumulations for jhana, there was a self who had lobha for a desired result.). much metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Dear Nina, > > Maybe you won't find my point in a book. I think you have to try > one-pointed concentration with tranquility for yourself. It is a matter > of practical experience that if one tries to focus on one thing > continuously, a myriad of other thoughts with feelings usually arise. > Recognizing these thoughts as thoughts, I maintain, is an insight into > anatta, as 'self' is mostly conceptual proliferation on the side of > subject rather than object. You can do this; anyone can. Every Buddhist > organization in the world, except this one, teaches this basic technique > to beginning students. > > As for the development of tranquility, this also is a beginners > practice, though not mastered until realization. By your demeanor, and > emphasis on the *long* view, I would say you know it well. > > In the Path Of Purification, the sila/samadhi/panna formula, and the > ariya magga the usual order of things is for meditation to precede > insight. Whether it does or not in one's own life is no reason to not > cultivate, or at least dip one's toe into the experience of meditation. > Without this you simply will not know what we are talking about. > > Best wishes, and strong encouragement, > > Larry 15042 From: Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 9:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go Dear Christine and Victor, It seems the main reason for not espousing the view of non-being is because of clinging and aversion to views. See below. Beyond that, there are many interesting and subtle distinctions between vibhava, anatta, sunnata, and nibbana. It would make a useful post if someone would illustrate the various qualities of these terms with scriptural quotations [including ucchedavada (annhilationism) and natthikavada (nihilism)]. metta, Larry ----------------- Majjhima Nikaya 11.6 Culasihanada Sutta: "Bhikkhus, there are these two views: the view of being and the view of non-being. Any recluses or brahmans who rely on the view of being, adopt the view of being, accept the view of being, are opposed to the view of non-being. Any recluses or brahmans who rely on the view of non-being, adopt the view of non-being, accept the view of non-being, are opposed to the view of being.[5] 7. "Any recluses or brahmans who do not understand as they actually are the origin, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger and the escape[6] in the case of these two views are affected by lust, affected by hate, affected by delusion, affected by craving, affected by clinging, without vision, given to favoring and opposing, and they delight in and enjoy proliferation. They are not freed from birth, aging and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair; they are not freed from suffering, I say. 8. "Any recluses or brahmans who understand as they actually are the origin, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger and the escape in the case of these two views are without lust, without hate, without delusion, without craving, without clinging, with vision, not given to favoring and opposing, and they do not delight in and enjoy proliferation. They are freed from birth, aging and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair; they are freed from suffering, I say. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn011.html 15043 From: Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 10:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. Dear Christine, I expressed only my own experience and thoughts. Sorry, no scriptural references. metta, Larry 15044 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 10:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hi Howard and all, > > The usage of the word "being" is bound by agreed-upon usage of > language, or in your term, "convention." From what I understand in > reading the discourses, how and what the Buddha spoke is always > bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language, or in your term, > convention. > > A being is not a convention, not a verbal usage. It is the > word "being" that is bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language > in communication, or in your term, convention. A being is a being. > You are a human being. I am a human being. And a human being is not > to be found in the five aggregates, just as a chariot is not to be > found in the pole, the axle, the chariot-body, the yoke, the reins, > and the goading stick. Dear Victor, I think you may have an essential disagreement with the Buddha here. I think the Buddha clearly stated that there is no human being apart from the five aggregates, and that in fact the term 'human being' is nothing but a convention, just like the word. Isn't the unique point of Buddhism that there is no being outside the aggregates, and that one should cease conceptualizing the idea of a self within? You say a human being is a being, and that it is more than the sum of its parts. If so, you are invoking the same mystical belief in a being that cannot be identified or defined that everyone does in establishing the idea of a self that is a true entity, that really exists. If the self is the sum of the five aggregates, why say it is something other? It was the Buddha's role to dissect the self and show that in fact it did break down to the five aggregates and nothing more. If there is a true self beyond the five aggregates, it must be something that is neither within nor composed of the components of the psychophysical being, since the psychophysical being is completely composed of the five aggregates. Best, Robert Ep. 15045 From: kenhowardau Date: Sun Aug 18, 2002 11:35pm Subject: Re: Let go --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > Upon rereading your message, I would say: "Let go!" > > Let go of what? Let go of the views, intepretations, definitions, > and assumptions you've gathered from various literature. You've > accumulated a lot. Let them go. > > Read the discourses with a simple mind and "listen" what the Buddha > said. What does it mean by "simple mind"? It is a mind without > proliferation in various views. > > Metta, > Victor > Dear Victor, I think there is a big danger in letting go of conventional wisdom, namely, losing it. We've all seen "Buddhists" who have lost it -- who have `lost the plot.' (I know for certain that you are not one of them, by the way.) They have a far-away look in their eyes, a fixed smile on their faces, they adopt an affectation of saintliness and they talk a lot of nonsense. `Letting go' is a product of New Age religions and I'm sure it plays absolutely no role in the Buddha's teaching. Those of us who have met Christine in person or have corresponded with her on dsg, are aware of her well-informed, well-reasoned understanding. I am sure she will not let go it, there is no need to. Kind regards Ken H P.S. I have reluctantly snipped Christine's original message (#15020), it's well worth reading again. KH 15046 From: Purnomo . Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 0:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One'sParents' if the parents is thieves or have bad attitude, should we gratitude them? metta, purnomo 15047 From: Sukinder Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 2:37am Subject: RE: [dsg] Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One'sParents' Dear Purnomo, Nice to hear from you. Gratitude is gratitude, it is our (conventionally speaking)kusala, it has no relation to our parents akusala actions. If we express ungratefulness, then we are accumulating akusala. If we show them dhamma, then it is *very* kusala;-). Best wishes, Sukin -----Original Message----- From: Purnomo . [mailto:purnomo9@h...] Sent: Monday, August 19, 2002 2:12 PM To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One'sParents' if the parents is thieves or have bad attitude, should we gratitude them? metta, purnomo 15048 From: abhidhammika Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 2:54am Subject: Defining What Is Real According To Abhidhamma Dear Dhamma friends The following conversation between Joyce Short and Suan Lu Zaw took place in the form of questions and answers. Joyce asked: "What do you mean when you use the word "real" - this is always confusing in English (to me)." Suan answered as follows. I reserved the modifier "real" for any existent things. An existent thing is what we can observe, experience, manipulate, predict its behaviors and the like. Existent things are not what we speculate about, or believe. For example, the Absolute Consciousness or Big Self is not an existent thing (that is to say, it does not exist). It is only a speculation put forward by the authors of Veda and their followers. The same goes for the God, or the Creator. The God or the Creator is a concept some people believe. Now, what are existent things? Matter, consciousness, and mental associates are existent things in the sense that we can observe, experience, or manipulate them. We can also predict their behaviors. Here, in the phrase "existent things such as matter and consciousness", the modifier "existent" does not mean that those things have static existences. The adjective "existent" only means that those things can emerge if relevant conditions are present. And they will vanish for good once those conditions are gone. Existent things will emerge and vanish depending on the relevant conditions being present and absent. Their emergence and vanishment do not depend on the speculation and beliefs of the people such as the authors of Veda or the writers of the Bible. -------------------------------------------- Joyce also asked: "What is "seven more times" referring to and what is it that is "reborn" no more than seven more times?" Suan answered as follows. The modifier "seven" refers to measurement of rebirths for a stream insider (sotaapanna). As a stream insider hasn't accomplished eradication of the three existential roots called greed, anger and ignorance, his resultant consciousness (vipaaka viññaa.na) is yet to emerge (that is to say, to be reborn) because he still has those roots as conditions for the emergence of consciousness. But, he or she has awakening at the level of a stream insider, we cannot measure their rebirths in terms of more than seven times. ---------------------------------- I hope that my answers to Joyce satisfied your expectations. With kind regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org 15049 From: yuzhonghao Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 3:25am Subject: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi Robert Ep, Please read the first part of my message to Howard again: "The usage of the word "being" is bound by agreed-upon usage of language, or in your term, "convention." From what I understand in reading the discourses, how and what the Buddha spoke is always bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language, or in your term, convention. A being is not a convention, not a verbal usage. It is the word "being" that is bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language in communication, or in your term, convention." If you are holding the view that the self did break down to the five aggregates and nothing more, I suggest you let go that assumption. I also suggest you let go the assumption "If there is a true self beyond the five aggregates, it must be something that is neither within nor composed of the components of the psychophysical being, since the psychophysical being is completely composed of the five aggregates." There are beings, Robert, and we as human beings were born. We get old and we will die some day. Birth, aging-and-death is stressful, suffering, unsatisfactory, dukkha. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > > Hi Howard and all, > > > > The usage of the word "being" is bound by agreed-upon usage of > > language, or in your term, "convention." From what I understand in > > reading the discourses, how and what the Buddha spoke is always > > bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language, or in your term, > > convention. > > > > A being is not a convention, not a verbal usage. It is the > > word "being" that is bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language > > in communication, or in your term, convention. A being is a being. > > You are a human being. I am a human being. And a human being is not > > to be found in the five aggregates, just as a chariot is not to be > > found in the pole, the axle, the chariot-body, the yoke, the reins, > > and the goading stick. > > Dear Victor, > I think you may have an essential disagreement with the Buddha here. I think the > Buddha clearly stated that there is no human being apart from the five aggregates, > and that in fact the term 'human being' is nothing but a convention, just like the > word. Isn't the unique point of Buddhism that there is no being outside the > aggregates, and that one should cease conceptualizing the idea of a self within? > > You say a human being is a being, and that it is more than the sum of its parts. > If so, you are invoking the same mystical belief in a being that cannot be > identified or defined that everyone does in establishing the idea of a self that > is a true entity, that really exists. If the self is the sum of the five > aggregates, why say it is something other? It was the Buddha's role to dissect > the self and show that in fact it did break down to the five aggregates and > nothing more. > > If there is a true self beyond the five aggregates, it must be something that is > neither within nor composed of the components of the psychophysical being, since > the psychophysical being is completely composed of the five aggregates. > > Best, > Robert Ep. 15050 From: yuzhonghao Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 4:05am Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Robert, Let go, abandon the assumption that whether being is the "little man", the assumption that whether there is a person inside the person you see when you see a human being. These kindd of speculative thinking is not helpful, not beneficial, not leading to happiness. Metta, Victor > Dear Victor, > 'Human beings' is a term that is used to describe the bodymind we inhabit. I say > 'we inhabit' but it is only a linguistic conceit that there is someone > 'inhabiting' something. You say 'we are human beings', but what does this mean? > It is clear that we have a body, with thoughts, feelings and sensations arising > within it. There is consciousness keeping track to some extent of all of these > events. But clearly there is no 'little man' hiding in our interior overseeing > all of this. Is there a 'person' inside the person you see when you see a 'human > being'. Where is he located? Show me a central being; show me one internal focus > of awareness that is the experiencer of all that happens. If you say there is a > being, identify it. Show me what it looks like, and of what its beingness > consists. > > In my own experience, there is an impersonal field or function of awareness that > does experience interrnal and external events, but this awareness cannot be > construed as a being in any way. It is not a person, it doesn't identify with a > thought or feeling; it is just present. It has no location; it does not occupy > space; it does not change or act within time. So it is not a person or being in > any sense. > > Again, if there is a self, a being or an entity within which is the recipient of > perceptions, thoughts, experiences, one should be able to describe its form and > its location. Otherwise, it seems to me that it is a presumption or a myth. > > Yes, events take place. There is intelligence and awareness in the bodymind. But > this does not constitute a being, or a self. > > Best, > Robert Ep. 15051 From: yuzhonghao Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 4:23am Subject: Re: Let go Hi Ken, Did I tell anyone to let go of, abandon conventional wisdom? How do you know for certain that I am not one of those "Buddhists" who have lost it, who have `lost the plot', who have a far-away look in their eyes, a fixed smile on their faces, who adopt an affectation of saintliness and talk a lot of nonsense? What kind of nonsense do they talk about when they let go of conventional wisdom? Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "kenhowardau" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > Hi Christine, > > > > Upon rereading your message, I would say: "Let go!" > > > > Let go of what? Let go of the views, intepretations, definitions, > > and assumptions you've gathered from various literature. You've > > accumulated a lot. Let them go. > > > > Read the discourses with a simple mind and "listen" what the Buddha > > said. What does it mean by "simple mind"? It is a mind without > > proliferation in various views. > > > > Metta, > > Victor > > > Dear Victor, > > I think there is a big danger in letting go of > conventional wisdom, namely, losing it. > > We've all seen "Buddhists" who have lost it -- who > have `lost the plot.' (I know for certain that you > are not one of them, by the way.) They have a far-away > look in their eyes, a fixed smile on their faces, they > adopt an affectation of saintliness and they talk a > lot of nonsense. > > `Letting go' is a product of New Age religions and I'm > sure it plays absolutely no role in the Buddha's > teaching. > > Those of us who have met Christine in person or have > corresponded with her on dsg, are aware of her > well-informed, well-reasoned understanding. I am sure > she will not let go it, there is no need to. > > Kind regards > Ken H > > P.S. > I have reluctantly snipped Christine's original > message (#15020), it's well worth reading again. > KH 15052 From: azita gill Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 4:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Phassa > > > Dear dsg's, < today I was reading Nina's work on 'Cetasikas'. I was reading about Phassa [contact]. < 'Phassa arises together with every citta and < conditions the citta by 'contacting' the object < which citta experiences. When seeing experiences < visible object, Phassa also experiences visible < object. At that moment Phassa contacts visible < object and conditions seeing consciousness to see. < Phassa is the condition that visible object, the < the eye-sense and seeing-consciousness 'come < together', so that seeing-consciousness can < cognise visible object.' < and this was a condition for me to stare off into space [as I often do,btw] when suddenly I felt a shock at how 'alone' I was, or rather, how empty 'our' lives really are. If these events are happening now, and these are the very events the Buddha taught that need to be known if Nibbana is to be experienced, then I feel that most of my daily life is a bit of a waste. Not much kusala, just doing the same old stuff. I sound depressed, eh? [a Queensland expression] but it was a condition for me to now feel quite fortunate to have heard the Dhamma from such wonderful people, and to have this opportunity to continue to have this Dhamma contact [not Phassa type contact] may we continue to support and help each other. < Not-depressed Azita. xxxxx 15053 From: ranil gunawardena Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 5:30am Subject: There are people There are people in this universe who are going to be, Maithree Buddha, his diciples, his son, his wife, his mother, his father, and there are people in this universe who are going to be, future Buddhas, Paceka Buddhas, Arhaths... And all this people are among us. with us. (why not) even us. The world is not so bad after all... :) ~with meththa ranil 15054 From: robmoult Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 8:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Phassa Hi Azita, I couldn't agree with your more (in spite of the fact that "feeling fortunate" is probably a form of mana, conceit). Such good kamma (or should I say vipaka?) to be born a human, to be born at a time that the Dhamma is accessible and to have the opportunity to be in contact (phassa?) with the Dhamma. All of these fortunate events have taken a "huge chunk out of my kamma bank account" and I feel obliged to work diligently to replenish it. Dana (in all its forms), Sila (precepts and more) and bhavana not only replenish the "kamma bank account" but generate their own positive energy as well. With metta, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., azita gill wrote: > it was a condition for me to now feel > quite fortunate to have heard the Dhamma from such > wonderful people, and to have this opportunity to > continue to have this Dhamma contact [not Phassa type > contact] may we continue to support and help each > other. 15055 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 10:00am Subject: Perfections, Ch 4, Renunciation, no. 5 Perfections Ch 4, Renunciation, no 5. We read in the ³Jatukannimånavapucchå², Jatukanní¹s Questions, of the Cúlaniddesa, ³Khuddhaka Nikåya²: (There is) renunciation, nekkhamma (when there is) seeing, seeing clearly, comparing, considering, developing, so that one clearly understands the right practice, the proper practice, the practice that is an enemy 3), the practice that is beneficial, the practice of Dhamma according to the Dhamma that leads to purity of síla. (There is renunciation, when there is) the guarding of the sensedoors 4) , moderation in eating, the application of energy so that one is alert and awake, sati sampajañña (sati and paññå). (There is renunciation, when there are) the four applications of mindfulness, the four right efforts, the four bases of success, the five spiritual faculties, the five powers, the seven factors of enlightenment, the eight Path factors 5), nibbåna and the practice leading to nibbåna. (When there is renunciation) with happiness, (there is) resistance, a refuge, a protection, no danger, unshakable, the deathlessness, a dhamma departing from clinging, which is like a thread that fastens. Having seen(all this), there is renunciation with happiness. It is not easy to see that renunciation means happiness. We should understand that it must be paññå that sees the benefit , that compares and considers the practice, so that one should follow the right and proper practice that opposes attachment and clinging to visible object, sound, odour, flavour and tangible object. One should see the benefit of the practice of Dhamma according to the Dhamma and develop the thirtyseven factors of enlightenment. Therefore it must be paññå which understands and knows that renunciation which departs from sense objects is to be achieved by sati sampajañña, the thirtyseven factors of enlightenment, the attainment of nibbåna and the practice leading to nibbåna, as stated by the Cúlaniddesa. And all this is practised with happiness, which means, that one should see the disadvantage and danger of defilements. One should have an unshakable determination to develop paññå in order to completely eradicate clinging to sense objects. This has to begin by listening and considering the Dhamma so that one first sees the benefit of the practice. One should realize that renunciation means happiness, and this kind of happiness is without a self who seeks enjoyment. We should see that detachment from the sense objects leads to the highest calm and wellbeing. Each of the perfections should be developed together with paññå, otherwise kusala is not of the degree of a perfection. If one does not see the danger of akusala and if one does not realize the benefit of the perfections, they cannot be developed. In that case paññå is too weak to see the benefit of their development. Footnotes 3. An enemy, opposed to attachment. 4. The guarding of the sensedoors, indriya samvara síla. 5.The four bases of success, iddhipådas, are: wish-to-do, chanda, energy, viriya, citta and vímaósa, investigation. The four right efforts, sammå-padhånas, are: the effort of avoiding akusala, of overcoming akusala, of developing kusala and of maintaining kusala. The five faculties, indriyas are: confidence, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. The five powers, balas, are the same realities as the five spiritual faculties, indriyas, but when the indriyas have been developed so that they are unshakable by their opposites, they have become powers. The seven factors of enlightenment are: sati, investigation of the Dhamma (dhamma-vicaya), energy (viriya), rapture (píti), tranquillity (passaddhi), concentration (samådhi) and equanimity (upekkhå). All these thirtyseven factors, bodhipakkhiya dhammas, are the factors pertaining to enlightenment; if they are developed, they lead to enlightenment. 15056 From: egberdina Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 3:40pm Subject: Dilemma Nr 183 & 184 Hi all, Following on from the discussion re the debt we owe our parents, regardless of the quality of the parenting, I have the following questions and would appreciate your consideration. Is it wisdom to not have children, because: 1 ]that way one can devote much more effort to the realisation of the path, and 2 ]there is no control over the being one brings into the world. One may well be consigning a being to aeons of hell by virtue of having brought this being into this world. Whatever way one looks at it, samsara goes yet another revolution. or is it selfish and unwise to not have children, because: 1 ]children are very adept at exposing all the preconceptions one clings to, thus opening the way for the possibility of the shedding of some views, and 2 ]by not having children, one is preventing a being from experiencing birth in this realm, with all it's concomitant benefits. All the best Herman 15057 From: Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 4:54pm Subject: ADL ch. 21 (1) http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 21 (1) SAMATHA We would like to have more wholesomeness in our life, but often we are unable to do wholesome deeds, to speak in a wholesome way or to think wholesome thoughts. Our accumulated defilements hinder us in the performing of kusala. We learn from the Buddhist teachings that there are 'hindrances' (nivarana), which are akusala cetasikas, arising with akusala cittas. We all have these hindrances. They are: - sensuous desire, in Pali: kamacchandha - ill-will, in Pali: vyapada - torpor and languor, in Pali: thina and middha - restlessness and worry, in Pali: uddhacca and kukkucca - doubt, in Pali: vicikiccha Kamacchandha or sensuous desire is the cetasika which is lobha (attachment). It is attachment to the objects we can experience through the sense-doors and the mind-door. We all have kamacchandha in different forms and intensities. Because of economic progress and technical inventions there is more prosperity in life. One can afford more things which make life pleasant and comfortable. This, however, does not bring contentedness; on the contrary, we are not satisfied with what we have and we are forever looking for more enjoyment and happiness. There is kamacchandha with our deeds, words and thoughts. Even when we think that we are doing good deeds and helping others, kamacchandha can arise. Kamacchandha makes us restless and unhappy. Vyapada or ill-will is the cetasika which is dosa. Vyapada can trouble us many times a day; we feel irritated about other people or about things which happen in life. Vyapada prevents us from kusala. When there is vyapada we cannot have lovingkindness and compassion for other people. Thina and middha are translated as 'torpor' and 'languor', or as 'sloth' and 'torpor'. Thina and middha cause us to have lack of energy for kusala. The 'Visuddhimagga' (XIV, 167) states concerning thina and middha : ... Herein, stiffness (thina) has the characteristic of lack of driving power. Its function is to remove energy. It is manifested as subsiding. Torpor (middha) has the characteristic of unwieldiness. Its function is to smother. It is manifested as laziness, or it is manifested as nodding and sleep. The proximate cause of both is unwise attention to boredom, sloth, and so on. Don't we all have moments in a day when there is laziness and lack of energy to perform kusala? When, for example, we are listening to the preaching of Dhamma or reading the scriptures, there are opportunities for kusala cittas. Instead, we may feel bored and we lack the energy for kusala. It may happen that we see someone else who needs our help, but we are lazy and do not move. Then we are hindered by thina and middha. Thina and middha make the mind unwieldy (Vis XIV 105, where the hindrances are mentioned as being specifically obstructive to jhana.). Uddhacca is translated as 'agitation' or 'excitement' and kukkucca as 'worry' or 'flurry'. Uddhacca arises with each and every type of akusala citta. It prevents the citta from wholesomeness. As regards kukkucca, worry, the 'Visuddhimagga' (XIV, 174) states: ...It has subsequent regret as its characteristic. Its function is to sorrow about what has and what has not been done, It is manifested as remorse. Its proximate cause is what has and what has not been done. It should be regarded as slavery. When we have done something wrong or we have not done the good deed we should have done, we might be inclined to think about it again and again. We may ask ourselves why we acted in the way we did, but we cannot change what is past already. While we worry we have akusala cittas; worry makes us enslaved. Uddhacca and kukkucca prevent us from being tranquil. As regards vicikiccha, doubt, there are many kinds of doubt. One may have doubts about the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, or doubt about the Eightfold Path. Doubt is akusala and a hindrance to the performing of kusala. All of the hindrances are obstructions to the performing of kusala. Is there a way to eliminate them? Samatha or the development of calm is a way to temporarily eliminate the hindrances. The calm which is developed in samatha has to be wholesome calm, it cannot arise with akusala citta. There is a degree of calm with each kusala citta but it is hard to know the characteristic of calm precisely, because there are bound to be akusala cittas very shortly after the kusala cittas. In order to develop the calm which is temporary freedom from the hindrances, right understanding (panna) is indispensable. If one merely tries to concentrate on a meditation subject without right understanding of kusala and akusala and of the characteristic of calm, calm cannot grow. The panna of samatha does not eradicate defilements, but it knows the characteristic of calm and it knows how it can be developed by means of a suitable meditation subject. Akusala citta is likely to arise time and again, also when one applies oneself to samatha. One may be attached to silence and then there is akusala citta instead of the calm of samatha. Or one may think that when there is no pleasant feeling nor unpleasant feeling but indifferent feeling there is calm. However, indifferent feeling can arise with kusala citta as well as with akusala citta; lobha-mula-citta can be accompanied by indifferent feeling and moha-mula-citta is invariably accompanied by indifferent feeling. Thus, when there is indifferent feeling it may seem that one is calm, but there is not necessarily the wholesome calm of samatha. The panna of samatha must be very keen in order to recognize the defilements which arise, even when they are more subtle. We read in the scriptures about people who could attain jhana if they cultivated the right conditions for it. Before the Buddha's enlightenment jhana was the highest form of kusala people could attain. Jhana, which is sometimes translated as absorption, is a high degree of calm. At the moment of jhanacitta one is free from sense-impressions and from the defilements which are bound up with them. The attainment of jhana is extremely difficult, not everybody who develops samatha can attain it. However, even if one has no intention to cultivate jhana there can be conditions for moments of calm in daily life if there is right understanding of the characteristic of calm and of the way to develop it. 15058 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 8:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Dear Nina, > > Maybe you won't find my point in a book. I think you have to try > one-pointed concentration with tranquility for yourself. It is a matter > of practical experience that if one tries to focus on one thing > continuously, a myriad of other thoughts with feelings usually arise. > Recognizing these thoughts as thoughts, I maintain, is an insight into > anatta, . You can do this; anyone can. Every Buddhist > organization in the world, except this one, teaches this basic technique > to beginning students. > > As for the development of tranquility, this also is a beginners > practice, though not mastered until realization. at least dip one's toe into the experience of meditation. > Without this you simply will not know what we are talking about. > > Best wishes, and strong encouragement, > > Larry _____________ Dear Larry, Just time for a few comments at an internet cafe in Bangkok. You say: ""one-pointed concentration with tranquility is a matter of practical experience that if one tries to focus on one thing continuously, a myriad of other thoughts with feelings usually arise."" What little I have seen of tranquility is that if it is genuine then there is no "myriad of thoughts" arising at the same time. I was also interested to hear that this is what all Buddhists in the world (except for a very few on this list) are teaching. You say that this is insight into anatta, why do you say so? How long does it take to come to this "insight into anatta" , is it a matter of minutes or hours (in your own case)? Robert 15059 From: Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 9:08pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. Hi Robert, in the time it takes a thought to go from a subject to an object it is seen as anatta. If you noticed, I made a point of separating samadhi and samatha. That is the way I experience it when I practice one pointed meditation. One pointed focus does not come easily. Thoughts keep flowing but because there is the intention to focus on one object, thoughts must be disengaged, seen as not 'me'. At this stage in my practice, samatha is something I bring to samadhi. My impression is that at more advanced levels, samatha is the fruition of samadhi. best wishes, Larry --------------- Robert wrote: Dear Larry, Just time for a few comments at an internet cafe in Bangkok. You say: ""one-pointed concentration with tranquility is a matter of practical experience that if one tries to focus on one thing continuously, a myriad of other thoughts with feelings usually arise."" What little I have seen of tranquility is that if it is genuine then there is no "myriad of thoughts" arising at the same time. I was also interested to hear that this is what all Buddhists in the world (except for a very few on this list) are teaching. You say that this is insight into anatta, why do you say so? How long does it take to come to this "insight into anatta" , is it a matter of minutes or hours (in your own case)? Robert 15060 From: Seylan Bank - DBD (Sumane Rathnasuriya) Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 9:38pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One'sParents' Yes Purnomo, Your gratitude is your action - your Kamma. Your gratitude may be on account of one good action they may have done for you, at least in bringing you to this world & help you see the world right and do good. All the other bad they may be doing or have done, need not be your problem, if you cannot accommodate them in your good kamma. What one should be worried about first is the nobility of one's own action. Thereafter one may try help another, even one's own parents. If possible, well and good. If not possible, it should not perturb the one who tried. That worry itself is bad -akusala. He/she could make it to make bad parents good, his/her life's ambition and try in various ways, use strategy OR discard that effort & devote to some other good in this world. It is how you think & act. It is for you. Metta! Sumane Rathnasuriya > -----Original Message----- > From: Purnomo . [mailto:purnomo9@h...] > Sent: 19 August 2002 13:12 > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. > 'Repaying One's Parents' > > > if the parents is thieves or have bad attitude, should we > gratitude them? > > > metta, > > purnomo 15061 From: robmoult Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 10:37pm Subject: Four Sublime States Hi All, Last week's class (right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration) was a bit heavy, but went well. This week's class is on the four sublime states (metta, karuna, mudita and upekkha). I am looking for practical applications, stories, analogies, interesting facts, etc. to share with the class. I know many people who practice metta meditation, but I don't know of anybody who has experience with karuna or mudita meditation. Does anybody have any experiences to share? I would appreciate any assistance you could provide. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15062 From: kenhowardau Date: Mon Aug 19, 2002 11:36pm Subject: Re: Let go Hello Victor, Christine posted a scholarly, elucidating message on the doctrine of anatta. The main aim of my bumbling effort, was to express appreciation for what she had written but, by concentrating on your reply, it created unnecessary misunderstanding. So, I'll take that part back, if I may. Kind regards Ken H 15063 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 4:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] Samatha, Samadhi and Right Concentration Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - ... > =============================== > I find little to disagree with in the foregoing. By in large I > agree > with what you wrote. Where we differ I think is in the following: "To > put my > 'concerns' in a nutshell, I do not understand the Buddha to be saying > that > kusala can be developed by *directed attention* or *conscious effort* > and, in > particular, I don't read him as saying that insight is developed by > directed > attention to a *selected object or range of objects*." It is not so much > the > part about the restriction to a "selected object or range of objects" > that we > differ on, because I think that seeing the tilakkhana is possible in all > > conditioned dhammas, but moreso in the first part of what you say here. > I DO > see the Buddha as teaching that "kusala can be developed [or at least > encouraged/fostered] by directed attention or conscious effort". The > effort, > however, cannot consist in mere *willing* of kusala traits, including > wisdom, > but rather should consist in conscious efforts at guarding the senses > cultivating samatha and vipassana through mindfulness practice, both > during > "ordinary times" as well as during the restricted-input context of > formal > meditation practice. In all of this, I see effort at maintaining > mindfulness > and clear comprehension as primary. > > With metta, > Howard I agree when you say that the effort that is right effort "cannot consist in mere *willing* of kusala traits". The kusala that is guarding the sense doors, or cultivating samatha or vipassana cannot arise without some other conditioning factor/s. It is the 'other factor(s)' that we need to consider further and in detail, as given in the teachings, since this is what distinguishes the akusala from the kusala. I am not so sure about your next point, though;-)). You say "I see effort at maintaining mindfulness and clear comprehension as primary". What is this effort that you describe as the 'effort at maintaining mindfulness' etc. Is it really any different from the willing of kusala traits referred to earlier, or is it simply another twist on the latter? As I have mentioned before, all forms of kusala can arise naturally, without the 'willing'-type effort, given the right conditions. Is there ever any awareness of these dhammas as and when they do arise in this manner? If not, how can we know at the 'willed' moments whether the mental state is truly kusala or whether it only seems to be so? Jon 15064 From: Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 4:52am Subject: Patisambhidamagga # 4 , and the meeting in BKK Path of Discrimination / Patisambhidamagga # 4 Dear Nina, Kom and everyone. Sarah asked me rgd the usefulness of studying PTSM in daily life when we had a group discussion in BKK on the weekend. The only answer I could come up with is; it’s very helpful for me to remind myself how little I know. A.Sujin stressed more on the benefit of listening to dhamma and reflecting about it. We talked briefly about the quest for a shortcut of practice for both samadhi and vipassana. It usually is a well-disguised form of our own subtle lobha, clinging to an idea of getting quickest possible result. The discussion was somewhat short, but it’s very nice feeling to meet nice, knowledgeable, and a very eager to learn group of people. I was little surprised to hear that BKK was cooler than Hong Kong and Kyushu! OK, I try to continue with PTSM. Last time I talked about 4 n~ana: 1) Sutamayan~a_n.a : knowledge in remembering dhamma from listening. 2) Silamayan~ana : Knowledge in listening to dhamma and then restrain. 3) Samadhibhavanamayan~na : Knowledge in restraint and then concentrate. 4) Dhammat.hitin~ana (thiti:sustain) : Knowledge in discernment of conditions. ************** This time I am going to continue with 3 more n~ana: 5. Sammasanan~ana (sammasana: grasp, sum) Matika: wisdom in summing up dhammas: past, future, present, and then discerning is sammasanan~ana. Commentary: The Com. talks about definition of past, future, and present. The Com. says that “present” here refers to paccupanna-santati (continuos present), not the paccupanna-addha(lifelong present) nor khanigapaccupanna (present moment). It’s said that this n~ana sees a group (kala_pa) of khandha and able to discern that khandha in a group or mass. In this n~ana, tilakkhana of a group of khandha can be appreciated. At times this n~ana called kala_pasammasanan~ana b/c it sees the change of a group of khandha. 6. Udayabbayanupassana~nana (udaya: rise, baya: decay) Matika: Wisdom in seeing the change (uncertainty) of present dhamma is udayabbayan~ana. Commentary: Wisdom in seeing the arising and deforming of the present khandha. (tilakhana of khandha can be appreciated, this called tiranaparin~n~a.) 7. Vipassana~nana (bhanganupassanan~ana) (bhanga: fall away, break, dissolute) Matika: Wisdom in discerning an object, and in seeing that the wisdom has fallen away is vipassana~nana. Commentary: (Bhanganupassane pan~n~a vipassane n~an.am.) This n~ana refers to 2 wisdoms, 1) wisdom in seeing the falling away of an object, and 2) wisdom in seeing the falling away of the wisdom in 1), (that why this n~ana called vipassanan~ana). The commentary then talks about magga_maggan~nadassana (wisdom in seeing what is the path and what is not the path: Magga+ Amagga+ N~ana+ Dassana). The knowledge of magga_magga is perfected by wisdom at this level, bhanganupassana~nana (wisdom in seeing dhamma (rupa&nama) falling away. << A.Supee: Amagga here refers to 10 vipassanukilesas: 1) Obhasa (illumination) 2) Piti 3) passaddhi (tranquility if mind) 4) adhimokkha (determination) 5) paggaha (viriya cetasika) 6) sukha 7) n~ana (panna) 8) upat.th.ana (ekaggata, samadhi) 9) upekkha, and 10) nikanti (lobha). They can be categorized in 3 groups 1.Abhayakata: illumination 2.Kusala: piti, tranquility, determination, viriya, sukha, panna, ekaggata, and upekkha 3.Akusala: lobha. The 10-vipassanukilesa is the possible object of kilesa, which at this level is the group of lotikacetasika (lobha, mana, and dit.thi). Some call this “the 30 vipassanakilesas” (3 cetasika*their 10 possible objects). Here it shows that kusala, even panna from the previous n~ana can conditions fine and subtle kilesa, the lobha group. If one wrongly takes those as magga, he is off the right path. The 10 vipassanukilesas occur in udayabbayan~ana when it’s still weak (tarun.a-udayabbayan~ana ), when the udayabbayan~ana becomes stronger (balava-udayabbayan~ana) and able to overcome those 10 possible objects, one is on the path (pat.ipadan~anadassanavisuddhi).>> <> Best wishes, Num 15065 From: yuzhonghao Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 4:27am Subject: Re: Let go Hi Ken, The message you wrote was ambiguous. I thought if you wanted to express appreciation for what Christine had written, the message should be addressed to her, not to me. What you wrote about the "Buddhists" who have lost it and "letting go" as product of New Age religion certainly does not express appreciation in any sense. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "kenhowardau" wrote: > Hello Victor, > > Christine posted a scholarly, elucidating message on the doctrine of > anatta. The main aim of my bumbling effort, was to express > appreciation for what she had written but, by concentrating on your > reply, it created unnecessary misunderstanding. So, I'll take that > part back, if I may. > > Kind regards > Ken H 15066 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 4:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] rupas out there Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - ... > > << The phenomenalist and pragmatist ask how this [i.e., that > rupas do > > arise at times other than when they are the object of consciousness] > is to > > be known.>> > > > > However, no such question arises for the student of the dhamma, since > the > > issue is seen as having no direct bearing on the discernment of the > true > > nature of the presently appearing dhamma. > > > > Dhamma > > or by modern science, sometimes views existence in the following > manner: > > What exists is what is experienced or is able to be experienced > subject to > > the satisfaction of various conditions.>> > > > > In terms of the teachings, this is pure ‘fabricated view’, as I > understand > > the context. This of course allows the person to defing his terms > (like > > "existence" here) in a way that begs the position he holds. > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, I can't imagine any sort of really adequate definition of > 'existence', and it is clear to me that exactly what 'existence' is is > not > completely evident. To me, however, "existence" implies the actuality or > > possibility of being experienced. > But you are correct in pointing out the danger in making one's > definitions fit one's preconceived views. This is, of course, what we > all do > all the time, and I will not claim to be immune from this disease, not > even > with regard to this particular matter. It is certainly possible. > -------------------------------------------------------- 'Existence' is a concept, at least as I understand the term. There is no actuality that this term describes or represents. So the very question 'What is existence' may not be of any real value as far as the development of understanding and release from samsara is concerned. > > When I said that the abhidhamma speaks of rupas arising in groups, I > meant > > arising contemporaneously, not sequentially (unlike, say, cittas which > > arise in sequential ‘groups’ called processes). These groups of > rupas are > > called kalapas. There is no kalapa of rupas with less than 8 rupas. > See > > the entry from Nyanatiloka's Dictionary pasted below. Thus, according > to > > the Abhidhamma, whenever say visible object is the object of > consciousness > > there are at least 7 other rupas also arising that are not, and could > > never be, the object of the same moment of consciousness. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Ahh, I understand. I didn't realize that these are groups of > co-occurring, and not sequential, rupas. This would be a point at which > Abhidhamma and the phenomenalist perspective might well diverge. Yet I > read > the Kalakarama Sutta and the Bahiya Sutta as expressing phenomenalism. > The > possible harmonizing of the two could lie in the understanding of > "existence" > as including the *potentiality* for being experienced as well as the > actuality. But you are quite correct in pointing directly at this to > highlight a very possible point of divergence. > -------------------------------------------------- I see you are still keen to find a way to reconcile phenomenalism with the dhamma ;-)). May I ask what you would see as being the consequence of achieving, or not achieving, that reconciliation? Jon 15067 From: Sarah Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 4:43am Subject: To Howard & Rita with our best wishes Dear Howard & Rita, I know you're out of town but I hope you may check in to receive our best wishes for your wedding anniversary today (35th, I believe)and for many more happy years together.We know it's a special day for you. When we got married in England, Ven Saddhatissa gave us a blessing and discussed the 'Different Kinds of Marriages' (AN, Bk of 4s,53 p94 B.Bodhi's anthology: ***** "Householders, there are these four kinds of marriages. What four? A wretch lives together with a wretch; a wretch lives together with a godess; a god lives together with a wretch; a god lives together with a goddess." A wretch is described as one "who destroys life, takes what is not given, engages in sexual misconduct, speaks falsely, and indulges in wines, liquor and intoxicants which are a basis for negligence; he is immoral, of bad character; he dwells at home with a heart obsessed by the stain of stinginess; he abuses and reviles ascetics and brahmins." A god or goddess, on the otherhand, is described as one who "abstains from the destruction of life.....from wines, liquor and intoxicants;(s)he is virtuous, of good character; (s)he dwells at home with a heart free from the stain of stinginess; (s)he does not abuse or revile ascetics and brahmins." ***** I know you have a good example of the 4th kind of marriage mentioned above and may we all learn to live a little more like 'gods and goddesses'. metta, Sarah (& Jon) p.s I know, Howard, you'll be particularly happy to know we just returned from a very pleasant afternoon with Erik and Eath at their home up on the side of a mountain. They live simply but healthily and both are looking very contented and relaxed. Eath now speaks very fluent English and offered us beautiful fruits and tea. She told us how she doesn't judge people by their age, nationality or the colour of their hair, but only by 'heart'. In other words, the 'inside' is what counts. Thank you Eath. We had useful discussions on some favourite themes with Erik -- mindfulness in daily life, concentration, practice, conventional and ultimate realities and quite a bit on lobha (attachment). We discussed lobha for results in practice, lobha for kusala( wholesome) states and one more area that was particularly helpful for me in light of some recent difficulties. This was with regard to attachment to harmony in relationships and friendships and attachment to helping others in trouble. Erik gave me many good pointers from his own experience and study and always gives good reminders that we can only ever know our 'own' citta at this moment as opposed to others' cittas which can only be the subject of speculation or inference. Finally we discussed different realities whilst falling over - hearing, sound, hardness, mana, dosa and so on. Hopefully we'll continue over breakfast at our hotel on Thursday. Finding an internet cafe in Samui that doesn't have a loud TV blaring, doesn't lose posts sent or lose the connection every 5 mins has not been easy.....I'd better sign off before I push my luck too far;-) Appreciating all the fine posts, More next week, Sarah ====== 15068 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. Dear Larry, It is quite all right you expressed your own thoughts. I fully endorse Christine's post. What I prefer to do now is studying the scriptures, and I must say, often your questions are very helpful to consider the Dhamma more. You have such enthusiasme to study. With appreciation, Nina. op 19-08-2002 07:01 schreef LBIDD@w... op LBIDD@w...: > Dear Christine, > > I expressed only my own experience and thoughts. Sorry, no scriptural > references. 15069 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 1:57pm Subject: Re: Four Sublime States Hi Rob, Compassion is easy to think about and talk about, but hard to consistently practice. Is compassion a mind-state or action? It is 'easy' to feel compassion (or one of its near enemies?) for beings while on the cushion, or distant victims of horrific experiences, especially if the newpapers or TV provide accompanying images of cute children or animals or distressed people. It is 'easy' to show compassion for those we love in a 'one-off' situation that will be resolved with love and support. It is 'easy' to show compassion for those who are 'grateful' for our compassion. The hardest thing in my experience is to feel compassion for the person who has caused and keeps on causing grave harm to others. Those demonized by Society (e.g. the serial paedophile, rapist, the addict, or someone with a personality disorder) - In my case, especially when I also have contact with the victims of such people. Another difficult category is where someone is, inescapably, caring for a near relative in their own home - perhaps an ex-alchoholic relative (with all the family dynamics surrounding that), now helpless and bedridden, likely to live for years, who has no bladder or bowel control and who is full of hate for the world - which finds its expression in verbal abuse of the carer. The daily grind of such a relationship is incrredibly exhausting and can wreck the quality of many person's lives. Would a half hour a day, meditating on the Brahma Viharas (especially when angry demanding shouts are coming from the sick person's room) help? As a Buddhist working in an acute public hospital (never ending conveyor belt supply of short stay patients), a particular interest for me is Compassion Fatigue. http://pspinformation.com/caregiving/thecaregiver/compassion.shtml Q: What is compassion fatigue? A: This term has replaced the more familiar term "burn-out." It refers to a physical, emotional and spiritual fatigue or exhaustion that takes over a person and causes a decline in his or her ability to experience joy or to feel and care for others. Compassion fatigue is a one-way street, in which individuals are giving out a great deal of energy and compassion to others over a period of time, yet aren't able to get enough back to reassure themselves that the world is a hopeful place. It's this constant outputting of compassion and caring over time that can lead to these feelings Q: What are some telltale signs of compassion fatigue? A: First, you should understand that it's a process. It's not a matter of one day, you're living your life with a great deal of energy and enjoyment, and the next, you wake up exhausted and devoid of any energy - both physical and emotional. Compassion fatigue develops over time - taking weeks, sometimes years to surface. Basically, it's a low level, chronic clouding of caring and concern for others in your life - whether you work in or outside the home. Over time, your ability to feel and care for others becomes eroded through overuse of your skills of compassion. You also might experience an emotional blunting - whereby you react to situations differently than one would normally expect. I also wonder if 'idiot compassion' - as expressed by Chogyam Trungpa "the abdication of discriminating wisdom and the loss of moral fiber to voice it - is too often equated with spirituality" comes within the boundaries of your lesson? Chogyam Trungpa's distinction between actual compassion and idiot compassion seems to include things like the short-term fix we offer a suffering person in order to console him, even though it might encourage him to keep doing what brought on his pain (and the pain of others). I agree with the "highest manifestation of compassion" in the brief article below. http://www.vipassana.com/meditation/four_sublime_states.php#II "Compassion (Karuna) The world suffers. But most men have their eyes and ears closed. They do not see the unbroken stream of tears flowing through life; they do not hear the cry of distress continually pervading the world. Their own little grief or joy bars their sight, deafens their ears. Bound by selfishness, their hearts turn stiff and narrow. Being stiff and narrow, how should they be able to strive for any higher goal, to realize that only release from selfish craving will effect their own freedom from suffering? It is compassion that removes the heavy bar, opens the door to freedom, makes the narrow heart as wide as the world. Compassion takes away from the heart the inert weight, the paralyzing heaviness; it gives wings to those who cling to the lowlands of self. Through compassion the fact of suffering remains vividly present to our mind, even at times when we personally are free from it. It gives us the rich experience of suffering, thus strengthening us to meet it prepared, when it does befall us. Compassion reconciles us to our own destiny by showing us the life of others, often much harder than ours. Behold the endless caravan of beings, men and beasts, burdened with sorrow and pain! The burden of every one of them, we also have carried in bygone times during the unfathomable sequence of repeated births. Behold this, and open your heart to compassion! And this misery may well be our own destiny again! He who is without compassion now, will one day cry for it. If sympathy with others is lacking, it will have to be acquired through one's own long and painful experience. This is the great law of life. Knowing this, keep guard over yourself! Beings, sunk in ignorance, lost in delusion, hasten from one state of suffering to another, not knowing the real cause, not knowing the escape from it. This insight into the general law of suffering is the real foundation of our compassion, not any isolated fact of suffering. Hence our compassion will also include those who at the moment may be happy, but act with an evil and deluded mind. In their present deeds we shall foresee their future state of distress, and compassion will arise. The compassion of the wise man does not render him a victim of suffering. His thoughts, words and deeds are full of pity. But his heart does not waver; unchanged it remains, serene and calm. How else should he be able to help? May such compassion arise in our hearts! Compassion that is sublime nobility of heart and intellect which knows, understands and is ready to help. Compassion that is strength and gives strength: this is highest compassion. And what is the highest manifestation of compassion? To show to the world the path leading to the end of suffering, the path pointed out, trodden and realized to perfection by Him, the Exalted One, the Buddha." Just some thoughts, metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi All, > > Last week's class (right effort, right mindfulness, right > concentration) was a bit heavy, but went well. > > This week's class is on the four sublime states (metta, karuna, > mudita and upekkha). I am looking for practical applications, > stories, analogies, interesting facts, etc. to share with the class. > > I know many people who practice metta meditation, but I don't know > of anybody who has experience with karuna or mudita meditation. Does > anybody have any experiences to share? > > I would appreciate any assistance you could provide. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) 15070 From: robmoult Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 3:21pm Subject: Re: Four Sublime States Hi All, In her last posting, Christine touched on a very important issue - compassion. At some point in our lives, it is likely that we will all have to deal with a family member who is losing physical / mental capacity, is self-destructive or chronically depressed. What is the "correct Buddhist way" of dealing with this all too common situation? We are warned against trying to radiate metta to our spouse as it would be too easy to fall prey to the near enemy of sensual desire. Does the same hold true about trying to radiate karuna to a family member? Should we avoid it because it is too easy to slip into the near enemy of aversion (due to the accompanying emotional baggage)? Thanks, Rob M :-) 15071 From: robmoult Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 3:47pm Subject: Re: Four Sublime States Hi Christine, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Another difficult category is where someone is, inescapably, caring > for a near relative in their own home - perhaps an ex-alchoholic > relative (with all the family dynamics surrounding that), now > helpless and bedridden, likely to live for years, who has no bladder > or bowel control and who is full of hate for the world - which finds > its expression in verbal abuse of the carer. The daily grind of such > a relationship is incrredibly exhausting and can wreck the quality of > many person's lives. Would a half hour a day, meditating on the > Brahma Viharas (especially when angry demanding shouts are coming > from the sick person's room) help? I remember listening to a Steven Covey tape a few years ago where he talked about the experience of a chronic care nurse whose job it was to support an ungrateful patient. He talked of the liberation of realizing that we are all responsible... response-able, able to choose our own response to a situation. We do not have to empower the weaknesses of others ruin our lives. That there is a space between stimulus and response where we have the freedom of choice and our happiness depends on our choice, not on our situation. He used the simile of "pressing the PAUSE button" and then using one or more of the following four strategies [I will now use Buddhist terminology]: - Sati (mindfulness / self awareness): examine our thoughts, moods and behaviour - Sila (conscience): understanding right from wrong and following personal integrity - Yoniso Manasikara (wise attention): acting independently of external influences - Positive thinking / imagination : visualizing beyond experience and present reality. I visualize myself as a "black box" receiving negative vibrations. If I choose to react in a negative way, I am responsible for continuing the vibrations and making the world more negative. If I choose not to react, I am stopping that stream of negative vibrations. If I choose to react in a positive way, I am creating a stream of positive vibrations and the world will be a better place. I am going to summarize the information you provided on "compassion fatigue" to the class. I would like to use your situation as a case study (withoout mentioning your name). How do you use your Buddhist training to help you cope with the emotional demands of your job? Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: Thanks, Christine, for other link as well. This was extracted from a larger piece that I am summarizing for the class as well. The complete piece is at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel006.html 15072 From: Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 4:00pm Subject: ADL ch. 21 (2) http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 21 (2) In the cultivation of samatha one develops five cetasikas which can eliminate the hindrances; they are the jhana-factors. The first jhana-factor is vitakka, which is translated into English as 'applied thinking'. Vitakka is a mental factor (cetasika) which arises with many kinds of citta ; it can arise with kusala citta as well as with akusala citta. When the wholesome kind of vitakka is developed in samatha it is one of the jhana-factors. The 'Visuddhimagga' (lV, 88) states concerning vitakka: ... Herein, applied thinking (vitakkana) is applied thought (vitakka); hitting upon, is what is meant. It has the characteristic of directing the mind onto an object (mounting the mind on its object). Its function is to touch and strike-- for the meditator is said, in virtue of it, to have the object touched at by applied thought, struck by applied thought. It is manifested as the leading of the mind onto an object... Vitakka, when it is a jhana-factor, is opposed to thina and middha (sloth and torpor). In 'thinking' of the meditation-subject vitakka helps to inhibit thina and middha temporarily. Another jhana-factor is vicara, which is translated as 'sustained thinking'. This cetasika arises with different kinds of citta, but when it is developed in samatha, it is a jhana-factor. The 'Visuddhimagga' (IV, 88) states concerning vicara: ... Sustained thinking (vicarana) is sustained thought (vicara); continued sustainment (anusancarana), is what is meant. It has the characteristic of continued pressure on (occupation with) the object. Its function is to keep conascent (mental) states (occupied) with that. It is manifested as keeping consciousness anchored (on that object). In samatha, vicara keeps the citta anchored on the meditation subject. When we continue to think of wholesome subjects such as the Buddha's virtues or his teachings there is no vicikiccha or doubt. Vicara helps to inhibit doubt. Another jhana-factor is piti, translated as 'rapture', 'enthusiasm' or 'happiness'. Piti arises also with akusala cittas, but when it is developed in samatha it is a jhana-factor. The 'Visuddhimagga' (IV, 94) states concerning piti: ...It refreshes (pinayati), thus it is happiness (piti). It has the characteristic of endearing (sampiyayana). Its function is to refresh the body and the mind; or its function is to pervade (thrill with rapture). It is manifested as elation. But it is of five kinds as minor happiness, momentary happiness, showering happiness, uplifting happiness, and pervading (rapturous) happiness. According to the 'Visuddhimagga' (IV, 99) the jhana-factor piti is the 'pervading happiness' which is the root of absorption and comes by growth into association with absorption. When piti is developed in samatha it inhibits the hindrance which is ill-will (vyapada). However, keen understanding is needed in order to know whether there is akusala piti which arises with attachment or kusala piti. Even when one thinks that there is wholesome enthusiasm about a meditation subject, there may be clinging. The jhana-factor piti takes an interest in the meditation subject without clinging. Wholesome piti which delights in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha or in another meditation subject refreshes the mind and then there is no aversion, no boredom as to kusala. Another jhana-factor is sukha. This jhana-factor is not bodily pleasant feeling (sukha vedana), but it is somanassa or mental happy feeling. Sukha which is developed in samatha is happy feeling about a meditation subject. However, as we know, happy feeling arises also with attachment. Panna should know precisely when happy feeling is akusala and when it is kusala. The jhana-factor which is wholesome sukha inhibits the hindrances which are restlessness and worry (uddhacca and kukkucca). When there is wholesome happy feeling about a meditation subject there is no restlessness and no worry. Piti and sukha are not the same. Sukha, which is translated as happiness, bliss, ease or joy, is happy feeling. Piti, which is translated as joy, rapture, zest, and sometimes also as happiness, is not feeling; it is not vedanakkhandha, but sankharakkhandha (the khandha which is all the cetasikas, except vedana and sanna). When reading the English translations, we have to find out from the context which cetasika is referred to, piti or sukha. The 'Visuddhimagga' (IV, 100) states concerning the difference between happiness (piti) and bliss (sukha): And wherever the two are associated, happiness (piti) is the contentedness at getting a desirable object, and bliss (sukha) is the actual experiencing of it when got. Where there is happiness there is bliss (pleasure); but where there is bliss there is not necessarily happiness. Happiness is included in the sankharakkhandha; bliss is included in the vedanakkhandha (feeling). If a man exhausted in a desert saw or heard about a pond on the edge of a wood, he would have happiness; if he went into the wood's shade and used the water, he would have bliss... The jhana-factor which is samadhi or concentration is the cetasika which is ekaggata cetasika. This cetasika arises with every citta and its function is to focus on an object. Each citta can have only one object and ekaggata cetasika focuses on that one object. Ekaggata cetasika or samadhi can be kusala as well as akusala. Samadhi when it is developed in samatha is wholesome concentration on a meditation subject. Together with samadhi there must be right understanding which knows precisely when the citta is kusala citta and when akusala citta and which knows how to develop calm, otherwise the right concentration of samatha will not grow. If one tries very hard to concentrate without there being right understanding there may be attachment to one's effort to become concentrated, or, if one cannot become concentrated, aversion may arise. Then calm cannot grow. If there is right understanding there are conditions for samadhi to develop. The 'Visuddhimagga' (XIV, 139) states concerning samadhi: It puts (adhiyati) consciousness evenly (samam) on the object, or it puts it rightly (samma) on it, or it is just the mere collecting (samadhana) of the mind, thus it is concentration (samadhi). Its characteristic is non-wandering, or its characteristic is non-distraction. Its function is to conglomerate conascent states as water does bath powder. It is manifested as peace. Usually its proximate cause is bliss. It should be regarded as steadiness of the mind, like the steadiness of a lamp's flame when there is no draught. Samadhi inhibits kamacchandha (sensuous desire). When there is right concentration on a subject of meditation, one is at that moment not hindered by kamacchandha. Summarizing the five jhana-factors necessary for the attainment of the first stage of jhana, they are: - vitakka, which is translated as applied thinking. - vicara, which is translated as sustained thinking. - piti, which is translated as enthusiasm, rapture or happiness. - sukha, which is translated as happy feeling or bliss. - samadhi, which is concentration. 15073 From: kenhowardau Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 10:55pm Subject: Re: Let go --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Ken, > > The message you wrote was ambiguous. I thought if you wanted to > express appreciation for what Christine had written, the message > should be addressed to her, not to me. What you wrote about > the "Buddhists" who have lost it and "letting go" as product of New > Age religion certainly does not express appreciation in any sense. > > Metta, > Victor Dear Victor, I think we all realise that I was in the wrong. But we should also realise that there was no being who was in the wrong; there were only fleeting, conditioned nama and rupa. This right understanding may be only at the intellectual stage, but it is none-the-less, precious and hard to come by. It is not always there when we need it because there is no self who can hold on to it. That doesn't mean we should let go of it. Kind regards Ken H 15074 From: Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 7:51pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hello Robert, Christine, Victor, all If I may jump back into this discussion I'd like attempt to disentangle anatta from the other threads, especially whether beings exist. Robert asked if I agreed with: >"There is no doer of the deed, >Or one who reaps the deed's result." VM XIX 19 >"The mental (nama) and material (rupa) are really here, >But here there is no human being to be found..." VM The first, yes, in a way, but not the second. The Buddha denied a self under certain descriptions, and these have been clearly stated. For instance, in the Bhikkhu Bodhi quote, four: 1. The idea of duration or lastingness; 2. Simplicity, incomposite entity; 3. Unconditioned; 4. Susceptibility to control. (Though on #4 what the Buddha said: one can't just, e.g., will to be handsome or healthy, not the uncontrollability of flashes of consciousness.) Or, in another post, on what the teachings deny: " A substantial ego entity, a lasting subject existing at the core of the psycho-physical personality." This is anatta, and I completely agree. But there is a self that doesn't have these properties, one that is conditioned, and changing or insubstantial, and composite. In rejecting a permanent substratum the Buddha was not rejecting the idea of a continuing being. This concept is necessary to distinguish one stream of being/consciousness from another, to account for the unity of personality within a stream, and (key) as an agent of moral action*. This person is a flux of conditioned processes, not a substantial entity or soul; so we can say that such a person is a conventional usage. The self is the functional unity of the five aggregates. I reject the search for ultimate realities, for something hidden under experience, both within (atta) and without (sabhava dhamma). ("The Buddha did not analyze experience into discrete entities or momentary impressions and then try to find a way of unifying them. Such an enterprise was undertaken by his misguided disciples a few centuries later..." Kalupahana, The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, p. 22) So you can see that I agree with the first but, in accepting various and sundry beings, have problems with the second. >If that situation is analyzed there was really no Buddha or Rahula. Yes, there is; one should just not be deceived about what they are. (I also have problems with positing two fundamental modes of being, material and mental stuff, nama and rupa; with Cartesian dualism.) (Further, I find the entire project of distinguishing paramattha dhammas / pure experiences from panatti / concepts dubious at best. To quote Kalupahana again: "Each one of our perceptions constitutes a mixed bag of memories, concepts, and dispositions as well as the material elements...A pure percept undiluted by such conditions is not recognized by the Buddha or any subsequent Buddhist psychologist who has remained faithful to the Buddha. A pure percept is as metaphysical as a pure a priori category." p. 18) We are so far apart it's no wonder you didn't understand my position. Perhaps, hopefully, we agree on anatta. Otherwise I hope your trip to Bangkok is going well and that you are in good health and spirits. metta, stephen *As I argued before, when this thread was focused on free will, one can't build a moral agent out of paramattha dhammas. It's simply no good to say it's mundanely or conventionally true, but in actuality false. Victor's example of killing is exactly right; with no beings, it's just rupas penetrating rupas. 15075 From: Date: Tue Aug 20, 2002 7:53pm Subject: Re: rupas out there Hello Howard, Jon, >Howard: To me, however, "existence" implies the actuality or > possibility of being experienced. How so? Bees can see the ultraviolet patterns on flowers, sharks can sense electric currents in water, and such; we can't. Now all these things can be 'experienced' indirectly (say by using film that will record ultraviolet light then printing it on paper that translates this into the slice of the spectrum we can see). This commonplace is relevant if you mean to limit 'existence' to only things that can be experienced directly (as a paramattha dhamma and not pannatti?). That is, I see your project as identifying a sense-datum (phenomenalism) with a dhamma (Buddhadhamma). Is this correct? The Buddha was certainly an empiricist. But the above is a statement of the core principle of Logical Positivism, which was never able to give a coherent account of the Verification Principle (that kept out metaphysics, i.e., pannatti ;-). Do you mean to go down this road? [How would one experience the statement "Existence implies the actuality or possibility of being experienced." --or is it unreal?] "[The] programme of translating talk about physical objects and their locations into talk about possible experiences...is widely supposed to have failed, and the priority the approach gives to experience has been much criticized. It is more common in contemporary philosophy to see experience as itself a construct from the actual way of the world rather than the other way around." Phenomenalism, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy" This, incidentally, is essentially a restatement of my previous post where I argued that one can't construct the world (specifically of free choice and ethics) out of paramattha dhammas. metta, stephen 15076 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 5:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Ken H > This right understanding may be only at the > intellectual stage, but it is none-the-less, > precious > and hard to come by. It is not always there when we > need it because there is no self who can hold on to > it. That doesn't mean we should let go of it. if there is no self to hold it, why bother to let it go in the first place :) cheers Ken O 15077 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 5:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States Rob M I am not sure there is such a thing as a 'correct Buddhist way' of dealing with a situation. For an example of how differently the members of this list see a given situation where compassion is concerned, see the earlier thread initiated by Lisa and set out below;-)). Could you perhaps mention to your class the difficulty of developing kusala (whether metta, karuna or whatever) when there is little or no understanding by direct experience of the characteristic of moments of kusala vs moments of akusala? Your listeners may also like to have it pointed out that metta, karuna etc do arise at times naturally and spontaneously in their lives, but that there may be moments of akusala (attachment or aversion, for example) intermingled with the kusala, and it is not possible to say that one or the other would be more apparent or liable to be the object of direct discernment in any given instance. This to me is the 'practical' side of the abhidhamma. I hope this helps. Jon --- robmoult wrote: > Hi All, > > In her last posting, Christine touched on a very important issue - > compassion. > > At some point in our lives, it is likely that we will all have to > deal with a family member who is losing physical / mental capacity, > is self-destructive or chronically depressed. What is the "correct > Buddhist way" of dealing with this all too common situation? > > We are warned against trying to radiate metta to our spouse as it > would be too easy to fall prey to the near enemy of sensual desire. > Does the same hold true about trying to radiate karuna to a family > member? Should we avoid it because it is too easy to slip into the > near enemy of aversion (due to the accompanying emotional baggage)? > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) 15078 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 5:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] There are people Ranil --- ranil gunawardena wrote: > There are people in this universe who are going to be, > Maithree Buddha, his diciples, his son, his wife, his mother, his > father, > and there are people in this universe who are going to be, > future Buddhas, Paceka Buddhas, Arhaths... > > And all this people are among us. with us. (why not) even us. > > The world is not so bad after all... :) > > ~with meththa > ranil You seem to know something that the rest of us don't! What makes you so sure that these future enlightened ones are among us now (and do you have a way of identifying them)? Jon 15079 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 6:34am Subject: Re: Let go Hi Ken, Let me put forth these questions: Are you a human being? Were you born? Do you get old? Will you die someday? Are birth, aging-and- death satisfactory or unsatisfactory? Regarding right understanding, is the view "there is no being" right understanding? How do you know it is right understanding? By what criteria do you accept it as right understanding? Let go the self-view "I am fleeting, conditioned nama-and-rupa". The fleeting, conditioned nama-and-rupa is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." Metta, Victor > > Dear Victor, > > I think we all realise that I was in the wrong. But > we should also realise that there was no being who was > in the wrong; there were only fleeting, conditioned > nama and rupa. > > This right understanding may be only at the > intellectual stage, but it is none-the-less, precious > and hard to come by. It is not always there when we > need it because there is no self who can hold on to > it. That doesn't mean we should let go of it. > > Kind regards > Ken H 15080 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 6:34am Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi Stephen and all, The view "there is no doer of the deed, or one who reaps the deed's result" is pernicious. Why is it pernicious? Because it denies/contradicts the very foundation for living a virtuous life, the law of kamma. Any delineation/description/definition of self is speculative self- view, and it is not assumed it in the teaching of "anatta" as recorded in the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta. Self-view such as "the self is a substantial ego entity, a lasting subject existing at the core of the psycho-physical personality" or "the self is the functional unity of the five aggregates" are to be abandoned, put away. Any of these views are not to be assumed in the first place. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Robert, Christine, Victor, all > If I may jump back into this discussion I'd like attempt to disentangle > anatta from the other threads, especially whether beings exist. > Robert asked if I agreed with: > >"There is no doer of the deed, > >Or one who reaps the deed's result." VM XIX 19 > >"The mental (nama) and material (rupa) are really here, > >But here there is no human being to be found..." VM > The first, yes, in a way, but not the second. > The Buddha denied a self under certain descriptions, and these have been > clearly stated. For instance, in the Bhikkhu Bodhi quote, four: 1. The idea > of duration or lastingness; 2. Simplicity, incomposite entity; 3. > Unconditioned; 4. Susceptibility to control. (Though on #4 what the Buddha > said: one can't just, e.g., will to be handsome or healthy, not the > uncontrollability of flashes of consciousness.) Or, in another post, on what > the teachings deny: " A substantial ego entity, a lasting subject existing at > the core of the psycho-physical personality." This is anatta, and I > completely agree. But there is a self that doesn't have these properties, one > that is conditioned, and changing or insubstantial, and composite. > In rejecting a permanent substratum the Buddha was not rejecting the idea of > a continuing being. This concept is necessary to distinguish one stream of > being/consciousness from another, to account for the unity of personality > within a stream, and (key) as an agent of moral action*. This person is a > flux of conditioned processes, not a substantial entity or soul; so we can > say that such a person is a conventional usage. The self is the functional > unity of the five aggregates. > I reject the search for ultimate realities, for something hidden under > experience, both within (atta) and without (sabhava dhamma). ("The Buddha did > not analyze experience into discrete entities or momentary impressions and > then try to find a way of unifying them. Such an enterprise was undertaken by > his misguided disciples a few centuries later..." Kalupahana, The Principles > of Buddhist Psychology, p. 22) So you can see that I agree with the first > but, in accepting various and sundry beings, have problems with the second. > >If that situation is analyzed there was really no Buddha or Rahula. > Yes, there is; one should just not be deceived about what they are. > (I also have problems with positing two fundamental modes of being, material > and mental stuff, nama and rupa; with Cartesian dualism.) > (Further, I find the entire project of distinguishing paramattha dhammas / > pure experiences from panatti / concepts dubious at best. To quote Kalupahana > again: "Each one of our perceptions constitutes a mixed bag of memories, > concepts, and dispositions as well as the material elements...A pure percept > undiluted by such conditions is not recognized by the Buddha or any > subsequent Buddhist psychologist who has remained faithful to the Buddha. A > pure percept is as metaphysical as a pure a priori category." p. 18) > We are so far apart it's no wonder you didn't understand my position. > Perhaps, hopefully, we agree on anatta. > Otherwise I hope your trip to Bangkok is going well and that you are in good > health and spirits. > metta, stephen > *As I argued before, when this thread was focused on free will, one can't > build a moral agent out of paramattha dhammas. It's simply no good to say > it's mundanely or conventionally true, but in actuality false. Victor's > example of killing is exactly right; with no beings, it's just rupas > penetrating rupas. 15081 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 7:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Dear Victor, When you say 'we grow old' and 'there is a being' these are assumptions. You speak of these things like anyone should realize that they are there, but you do not discuss the idea that these are not actual things. You say 'Of course we are beings! Of course we are alive!' But this is just common language. It is not inspected for whether it is actually true or not. I will agree that there are cells, organs, blood, activity, brainwaves, thoughts, perceptions, feelings. I will agree that we are aware that these things are taking place and that awareness notes them and so there is consciousness. But in all of that you still do not show me any part of this process that in itself is a 'self' or a 'being'. If you want to say that the whole process is a 'being' i will agree with you, but then I will say in that case, that a 'being' is not a 'person', an 'entity' that you can identify in its own right, but it is nothing but a collection of processes. You say that the 'being' is greater than the sum of its parts, but you can only claim this in a general way. You cannot actually show that this is the case. Buddha asked us to be detached from all of these processes, and all of its objects, not to cling to them. Clinging creates suffering, because all of these objects, all of these processes, are temporary and unsatisfying. We cannot hold onto them. We cannot even hold onto self. Buddha asks us to let go of the idea of 'self' and 'being' and to stop thinking of ourselves as separate individuals identified with the body and the mind. Buddha also says not to cling to 'non-being' or 'annihilation' because that is still involvement with the idea of a being, either to preseve it or to destroy it. Either way we are caught in the self-idea and cannot be released from it. This is my understanding of the Buddha's admonitions not to either assert or deny the existence of a being. But it is clear that we are to let go of all ideas and formulations of a self or entity, and not to cling to any such notion, or comfort ourselves with the idea that we really exist or really do not exist. Best, Robert Ep. ============================== --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hi Robert Ep, > > Please read the first part of my message to Howard again: > > "The usage of the word "being" is bound by agreed-upon usage of > language, or in your term, "convention." From what I understand in > reading the discourses, how and what the Buddha spoke is always > bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language, or in your term, > convention. A being is not a convention, not a verbal usage. It is > the word "being" that is bounded within the agreed-upon usage of > language in communication, or in your term, convention." > > If you are holding the view that the self did break down to the five > aggregates and nothing more, I suggest you let go that assumption. > > I also suggest you let go the assumption "If there is a true self > beyond the five aggregates, it must be something that is neither > within nor composed of the components of the psychophysical being, > since the psychophysical being is completely composed of the five > aggregates." > > There are beings, Robert, and we as human beings were born. We get > old and we will die some day. Birth, aging-and-death is stressful, > suffering, unsatisfactory, dukkha. > > Metta, > Victor 15082 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 10:00am Subject: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6. Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6. If one¹s goal is the realization of the four noble Truths, one should not only develop paññå but also the perfections. Each of the perfections is an important and helpful condition for the realization of the four noble Truths. Some people may wonder why it is necessary to develop day after day the perfections together with satipaììhåna. The reason is that satipaììhåna does not arise all the time. Someone may understand the development of the eightfold Path. He may know that sati should be aware of the characteristics of realities that are appearing, and that paññå gradually considers, notices and understands the characteristics of the dhammas that are non-self, as nåma, the reality which experiences, or rúpa, the reality which does not experience. Satipatthåna cannot arise all the time, but still, the fact that one is developing it, that one has listened to the Dhamma and accumulated understanding of the way of developing satipatthåna, all these factors are conditions for the arising of a level of sati other than sati of satipatthåna. This means: sati of the level of all the excellent qualities which are the perfections 6. Therefore, each perfection implies a level of refined sati. This kind of sati is conditioned by one¹s development of satipatthåna. Satipatthåna cannot arise all the time, it does not arise when there are no conditions for its arising, when akusala citta arises. However, the fact that the development of satipatthåna has been accumulated can be a condition for the arising of sati of another level which can be mindful, non-forgetful of kusala. We should develop satipatthåna together with all the perfections, and this for an endlessly long time. We shall know that satipatthåna gradually will grow, together with the perfections which we have developed and accumulated. As we have seen, even when sati of the level of satipatthåna does not arise, the perfections are accompanied by sati of another level, and this level of sati is very refined. In order to realize the four noble Truths all the perfections should be developed, not only generosity and morality, but also renunciation, the giving up of clinging to the sense objects. We also need to have the perfections of energy and patience, we should have endurance and we should not be disturbed by the sense objects, be they desirable or undesirable. We read that the Bodhisatta in one of his former lives considered the true nature of his akusala, he knew that it often arose. He realized how difficult it was to give up clinging to the sense objects. We read in the Commentary to the ³Susíma Jåtaka²(no. 411) that the Bodhisatta considered the citta which had to strive after the giving up of clinging to sense objects, to visible object, sound, odour, flavour and tangible object: The Bodhisatta considered: a sick person cannot turn himself over by his own strength. The hospital nurse has to attach a string so that he can pull himself up, and he should exhort him with the words, ³come, pull this string so that you can turn yourself over.² When he pulls that string he can turn himself over and experiences bodily wellbeing, but he does not find mental ease, be it even slight. This situation is the same as when beings are inflamed because of their defilements: they cannot uplift themselves and turn away from defilements by means of happiness arising from solitude. If there is no clinging to the sense objects, one will have true calm, there will be happiness arising from solitude; one is tranquil and free from clinging to the sense objects. However, in order to become uplifted and turn away from defilements, to become free from clinging, to depart from sensepleasures, we need the assistance of the perfections we have accumulated. Only in that way can we renounce the sense pleasures. Footnote; 6. Each kusala citta is accompanied by sati that is heedful, non-forgetful of what is kusala. Thus, there are many levels of sati: sati of dåna, of síla, of samatha and of satipatthåna. Sati of satipttìhåna is non-forgetful of the characteristic of reality, nåma or rúpa, that appears. 15083 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Patisambhidamagga # 4 , remarks Dear Num, I am just delighted with your report on Path of Discrimination, thank you very much. I have some remarks and questions, interspersed. op 20-08-2002 13:52 schreef sinsk@m... op sinsk@m...: > Path of Discrimination / Patisambhidamagga # 4 > > Sarah asked me rgd the usefulness of studying PTSM in daily life Nina: Very good question. The whole book is about panna, and here are more details on the stages of insight than in the Vis. It is very beneficial to know more details, because it will help one not to take for insight what is not insight, only one's own thinking, thinking with attachment to a result one wishes for so much. It becomes clearer how subtle the clinging to result is, see what Num wrote about the discussion, which can be applied at any time, even now: Num: We talked > briefly > about the quest for a shortcut of practice for both samadhi and vipassana. It > usually is a well-disguised form of our own subtle lobha, clinging to an idea > of > getting quickest possible result. > Nina: How well disguised it is, so hard to see oneself if someone else does not point it out. The lobha can condition anger, aversion, distress, frustration, downheartedness. One wonders where the progress is one wants so much. >Num: This time I am going to continue with 3 more n~ana: Nina: this can be found in the English: Path of Discrimination, p. 53. Compare with Vis. XX,6. Num: 5. Sammasanan~ana (sammasana: grasp, sum) > Matika: wisdom in summing up dhammas: past, future, present, and then > discerning is sammasanan~ana. > Commentary: The Com. talks about definition of past, future, and present. The > Com. says that “present” here refers to paccupanna-santati (continuos > present), > not the paccupanna-addha(lifelong present) nor khanigapaccupanna (present > moment). It’s said that this n~ana sees a group (kala_pa) of khandha and able > to > discern that khandha in a group or mass. In this n~ana, tilakkhana of a group > of > khandha can be appreciated. At times this n~ana called kala_pasammasanan~ana > b/c it sees the change of a group of khandha. Nina: I find it difficult to understand this, especially to understand a whole group. What is continuous presence? When I hear the word khandha I am inclined to consider one nama or one rupa, not a mass, because than I would be thinking of a whole, a concept. This ~naana is insight, direct experience, not thinking. How can the five khandhas be experienced all at the same time? Also the Vis. text about this is difficult to understand. The feeling khandha can be understood at one moment, the sa~n~naa khandha at another moment. How can they be understood in a group? I remember that A. Sujin explained that the realization of the falling away of realities, of this ~naana, is not as precise as the following ~naana, the udayabhaya ~naana, where this is realized of one nama or rupa very precisely, one at a time. Num: 6. Udayabbayanupassana~nana (udaya: rise, baya: decay) > Matika: Wisdom in seeing the change (uncertainty) of present dhamma is > udayabbayan~ana. > Commentary: Wisdom in seeing the arising and deforming of the present khandha. > (tilakhana of khandha can be appreciated, this called tiranaparin~n~a.) > > 7. Vipassana~nana (bhanganupassanan~ana) (bhanga: fall away, break, > dissolute) > Matika: Wisdom in discerning an object, and in seeing that the wisdom has > fallen > away is vipassana~nana. > Commentary: (Bhanganupassane pan~n~a vipassane n~an.am.) This n~ana > refers to 2 wisdoms, 1) wisdom in seeing the falling away of an object, and 2) > wisdom in seeing the falling away of the wisdom in 1), (that why this n~ana > called > vipassanan~ana). Nina: this is very important, one may forget to consider the panna itself which realizes the falling away. Then one gets stuck again, taking the panna for self. The Vis. XX, 78 has something similar, but not as clear as this passage of the Co. Even listening to the Dhamma is not self, as I was recently reminded on a tape. We are so intently listening and considering that we forget that this is only a dhamma, arisen because of conditions, not self. Num: The commentary then talks about magga_maggan~nadassana > (wisdom in seeing what is the path and what is not the path: Magga+ Amagga+ > N~ana+ Dassana). The knowledge of magga_magga is perfected by wisdom at > this level, bhanganupassana~nana (wisdom in seeing dhamma (rupa&nama) > falling away. > > << A.Supee: Amagga here refers to 10 vipassanukilesas: Here it shows that kusala, even panna from the previous > n~ana > can conditions fine and subtle kilesa, the lobha group. If one wrongly takes > those > as magga, he is off the right path. Nina: I like the reminder that even insight can condition fine and subtle kilesa. Is it not beneficial to know about all this, to know how intricate and tricky lobha is? We learn from studying the subject of the Path of Discrimination. Num: The 10 vipassanukilesas occur in > udayabbayan~ana when it’s still weak (tarun.a-udayabbayan~ana ), when the > udayabbayan~ana becomes stronger (balava-udayabbayan~ana) and able to > overcome those 10 possible objects, one is on the path > (pat.ipadan~anadassanavisuddhi).>> > > < first peak is bhangan~ana: this peak is when one can overcome amagga. And the > second peak is gotarabhun~ana, the last lokiyan~ana before entering > maggan~ana>> Nina: Thank you, Num, very good reminders. With appreciation, Nina. 15084 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 10:20am Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi KenO, (and KenH, Victor, RobK, RobEp, and Stephen) and All, KenO - How wonderful to *see* you! Are you just slipping back in as if you wouldn't have been missed? (You were) .... I do notice these things you know. :) We are still talking about Anatta, so it could be anytime in the last year, no? :) If you hadn't re-surfaced soon, I was going to get desperate and post something on 'luminous mind' ... Think what you have saved the List from experiencing! :) I've been reading U Silananda's NO INNER CORE - ANATTA again, and, as always, find that I get a lot to think about - even from the Introduction. This time about Personality and Kamma. Part of the Intro is pasted below: http://www.buddha.per.sg/dharma01/anatta1.htm metta, Christine Introduction Impermanence, Suffering and No-Soul Direct Experience of Anatta Analysis of the Discourse on the Characteristic of No-Soul Understanding Anatta Misunderstanding Anatta Questions and Answers "Introduction The following discourse is based on a collection of lectures on the Anatta doctrine given by Sayadaw U Silananda. Anatta is a Pali word consisting of a negative prefix, `an' meaning not, plus atta, soul, and is most literally translated as no-soul. The word atta, however has a wide range of meanings, and some of those meanings cross over into the fields of psychology philosophy and everyday terminology as, for example, when atta can mean self, being, ego, and personality. Therefore, in this preface, we will examine and elucidate the wide range of meanings which atta can signify in order to determine exactly what the Buddha denied when He proclaimed that He teaches anatta, that is, when He denied the existence of atta. We will examine both Buddhist and non-Buddhist definitions of the term soul, and we will also examine modern definitions of terms such as ego and self. Most writers in the field of religion, when writing about soul or anatta specifically use the terms self, ego, being and soul interchangeably, while psychologists define those terms as totally different entities. If we define atta as including the terms self ego, personality, and being, we may make the mistake of claiming that Buddha denied the phenomena of individual differences, individual personalities, individual kamma and other features of individuality in people. But if we say that Buddha denied only the theological entity of a soul, while leaving intact a psychological entity such as an ego or self, then we are also mistaken. The resolution of this dilemma lies in the fact that we must deal with two levels of reality simultaneously, the ultimate level and the conventional level. In the absolute sense, the anatta doctrine denies any and all psychological entities or agents inside the person. In the absolute sense, all phenomena, including what is called a person, are composed of elements, forces, and a stream of successive states. The Buddha organised these phenomena into conceptual groups, known as khandhas (aggregates), and they are: (1) material processes, also known as bodily form, corporeality or matter; (2) feeling; (3) perception; (4) mental formations; and (S) consciousness. Most importantlý when all mental and physical phenomena are analysed into those elements, no residual entity, such as a soul, self, or ego, can be found. In short, there are actions executed by these groups, but no actor The workings of these groups of forces and elements appear to us as an ego or personality but in reality the ego or self or agent of the actions has only an illusory existence. However on the conventional level, the workings of these forces, elements, and states are organised by causal laws, and, although they in no way constitute any extra-phenomenal self or soul, they do produce a human individual, a person - if we want to call a certain combination of material and mental processes a person. This complex combination of material and mental processes is dependent entirely on previous processes, especially the continuity of kamma which is the process of ethical volitions and the results of those volitions. Thus individual differences are accounted for even though the self or ego or personality is, in the ultimate sense, denied. An individual may be an angry, hot-tempered person, for example, because in the past he or she has performed actions which leave conditions for traits, which are kamma results, to arise in the present. But this happens because kamma leaves a potential for those traits of anger and ill will to arise, not because any kind of self of the person is continuing. Actually the human individual does not remain the same for two consecutive moments; everything is a succession of forces and elements, and there is nothing substantial. Therefore, on the conventional level, we may say that individual differences have an illusory existence. Common everyday conceptions, such as ego, self, and personality seem to be very real, obvious, and well-defined by psychologists and laymen alike, but they are, on the absolute level and in the eyes of those who have achieved enlightenment, illusory. Another way to approach Buddhist psychology is to examine the very complex and technical psychological system known as Abhidhamma. The Abhidhamma is, in the words of Narada Maha Thera, "a psychology without a psyche. Abhidhamma teaches that ultimate reality consists of four elementary constituents. One, Nibbana (in Sanskrit, Nirvana) is unconditioned, and the other three, citta, cetasika, and rupa - consciousness, mental factors, and matter respectively - are conditioned. These elementary constituents, called dhammas, alone possess ultimate reality. The familiar world of objects and persons, and the interior world of ego and self are only conceptual constructs created by the mind out of the elemental dhammas. Abhidhamma thus restricts itself to terms that are valid from the standpoint of ultimate realities: it describes reality in terms of ultimate truth. Thus it describes dhammas, their characteristics, their functions, and their relations. All conceptual entities such as self or being or person, are resolved into their ultimates, into bare mental and material phenomena, which are impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, and empty of any abiding self or substance. Consciousness, for example, which seems like one continual flow, is described as a succession of discrete evanescent mental events, the cittas, and a complex set of mental factors, the cetasikas, which perform more specialised tasks in the act of consciousness. There is no self, soul, or any kind of agent inside a person involved in this process." <<<<<<>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Ken H > > > > This right understanding may be only at the > > intellectual stage, but it is none-the-less, > > precious > > and hard to come by. It is not always there when we > > need it because there is no self who can hold on to > > it. That doesn't mean we should let go of it. > > > if there is no self to hold it, why bother to let it > go in the first place :) > > cheers > Ken O 15085 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 0:05pm Subject: Re: Four Sublime States Hi Rob, You are quite welcome to use whatever you consider helpful. I liked your description of the Steven Covey tape, the term 'response-able', and his simile of the 'PAUSE button' - a few of us use our'Drafts' folder like that to delay impulsive email responses. Not always managing the Pause in my 'face to face' dealings, though. :) One difference in Steven Covey's situation is that he is not tied by an emotional and biological relationship to the patient, he can only work a certain number of hours by law, and then he goes somewhere else to his own life, his own loved ones and friends. He gets paid for what he does and has had professional training, supervision and support. He also knows he can leave, without stigma, and take a job with a more amenable patient. Not so the relative, with the 24 hours/7 days job, emotional 'baggage', no pay, no training , no break, very little support, and little ability to leave and go elsewhere. You ask: >How do you use your Buddhist > training to help you cope with the emotional demands of your job?< When I came to Buddhism, I had been working professionally for many years, with continuous skills training, professional supervision and debriefing, and valuable peer support. Initially, I tried to use Buddhism as a sedative, to provide sweet calm and peace. This worked for a while but 'sweet calm and peace'never lasted and the reality of suffering kept breaking through. Then I changed my focus and sought to find in Buddhism an explanation of why the world and its multitude of sentient beings is the way it is. Buddhism (principally Suttas, Abhidhamma, and Admirable Friends) has taught me to be much more aware of what is happening *now*, moment by moment. It has revealed how I mostly live in the past or the future. I have become only too aware of my defilements and their tremendous, repetitive power. The Buddhist teachings - on beginningless time, impermanence, anatta and no-control, suffering, conditions, kamma and rebirth - revitalised my view of each person as unique, deserving of respect, kindness, understanding, and compassion. I realised that no matter how heinous a person's actions, they were doing nothing that I was not capable of and had probably done in uncountable lifetimes. That though causing suffering, they were suffering also. Their behaviour was the result of conditions and accumulations, and, in turn, would be a condition for more suffering now and in future rebirths. Though believing I was non- judgmental, I gained a deeper understanding of the meaning by seeing the example of some of my Admirable friends. The teaching on anatta is slowly reducing attachment to persons, things, and to gaining particular outcomes. Buddhism has helped to loosen the shackles that have kept me a slave to emotional reactions like 'righteous anger', contempt and fear. The gap between instant emotional turmoil and a reasonable calm understanding is closing a little. A bit garbled I'm afraid - hard to separate the 'how it is' from the 'how it was' ..... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Another difficult category is where someone is, inescapably, > caring > > for a near relative in their own home - perhaps an ex-alchoholic > > relative (with all the family dynamics surrounding that), now > > helpless and bedridden, likely to live for years, who has no > bladder > > or bowel control and who is full of hate for the world - which > finds > > its expression in verbal abuse of the carer. The daily grind of > such > > a relationship is incrredibly exhausting and can wreck the quality > of > > many person's lives. Would a half hour a day, meditating on the > > Brahma Viharas (especially when angry demanding shouts are coming > > from the sick person's room) help? > > I remember listening to a Steven Covey tape a few years ago where he > talked about the experience of a chronic care nurse whose job it was > to support an ungrateful patient. He talked of the liberation of > realizing that we are all responsible... response-able, able to > choose our own response to a situation. We do not have to empower > the weaknesses of others ruin our lives. That there is a space > between stimulus and response where we have the freedom of choice > and our happiness depends on our choice, not on our situation. He > used the simile of "pressing the PAUSE button" and then using one or > more of the following four strategies [I will now use Buddhist > terminology]: > - Sati (mindfulness / self awareness): examine our thoughts, moods > and behaviour > - Sila (conscience): understanding right from wrong and following > personal integrity > - Yoniso Manasikara (wise attention): acting independently of > external influences > - Positive thinking / imagination : visualizing beyond experience > and present reality. I visualize myself as a "black box" receiving > negative vibrations. If I choose to react in a negative way, I am > responsible for continuing the vibrations and making the world more > negative. If I choose not to react, I am stopping that stream of > negative vibrations. If I choose to react in a positive way, I am > creating a stream of positive vibrations and the world will be a > better place. > > I am going to summarize the information you provided on "compassion > fatigue" to the class. I would like to use your situation as a case > study (withoout mentioning your name). How do you use your Buddhist > training to help you cope with the emotional demands of your job? > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > PS: Thanks, Christine, for other link as well. This was extracted > from a larger piece that I am summarizing for the class as well. The > complete piece is at > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel006.html 15086 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 0:10pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Robert, Are you human being? What kind of language do you speak besides common language? Did I say whether or not the 'being' is greater than the sum of its parts? If the Buddha asks us to let go of the idea of 'self' and 'being', then why are you coming up with the assumption that the whole process is being, is self? And did I talk about whether we really exist or really do not exist? Read Paticca-samuppada-vibhanga Sutta. Pay close attention in how the Buddha explained what birth, aging and death are. What kind of language did the Buddha use? Uncommon language? Read Saccavibhanga Sutta and Sammaditthi Sutta, and pay close attention in what Venerable Sariputta said about birth, aging and death. What kind of language did Venerable Sariputta use? Uncommon language? Also, read about what the Buddha said on wrong view and right view in Maha-cattarisaka Sutta. However, don't go by scripture. Ask yourself: Is the view "there is no being" skillful? Is it blameless? Is it praised by the wise? When adopted, does it lead to welfare and to happiness? Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Victor, > When you say 'we grow old' and 'there is a being' these are assumptions. You > speak of these things like anyone should realize that they are there, but you do > not discuss the idea that these are not actual things. You say 'Of course we are > beings! Of course we are alive!' But this is just common language. It is not > inspected for whether it is actually true or not. I will agree that there are > cells, organs, blood, activity, brainwaves, thoughts, perceptions, feelings. I > will agree that we are aware that these things are taking place and that awareness > notes them and so there is consciousness. But in all of that you still do not > show me any part of this process that in itself is a 'self' or a 'being'. If you > want to say that the whole process is a 'being' i will agree with you, but then I > will say in that case, that a 'being' is not a 'person', an 'entity' that you can > identify in its own right, but it is nothing but a collection of processes. You > say that the 'being' is greater than the sum of its parts, but you can only claim > this in a general way. You cannot actually show that this is the case. Buddha > asked us to be detached from all of these processes, and all of its objects, not > to cling to them. Clinging creates suffering, because all of these objects, all > of these processes, are temporary and unsatisfying. We cannot hold onto them. We > cannot even hold onto self. Buddha asks us to let go of the idea of 'self' and > 'being' and to stop thinking of ourselves as separate individuals identified with > the body and the mind. Buddha also says not to cling to 'non- being' or > 'annihilation' because that is still involvement with the idea of a being, either > to preseve it or to destroy it. Either way we are caught in the self-idea and > cannot be released from it. This is my understanding of the Buddha's admonitions > not to either assert or deny the existence of a being. But it is clear that we > are to let go of all ideas and formulations of a self or entity, and not to cling > to any such notion, or comfort ourselves with the idea that we really exist or > really do not exist. > > Best, > Robert Ep. 15087 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 0:14pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Dear Group, A short article by Joseph Goldstein on anatta. http://www.tricycle.com/buddhistbasics/noself.html metta, Christine "If there is no self, who is born, who dies, who meditates? ONE OF THE MOST PUZZLING ASPECTS OF the Buddha's teachings is the idea of no self. If there's no self, who gets angry, who falls in love, who makes effort, who has memories or gets reborn? What does it mean to say there is no self? Sometimes people are afraid of this idea, imagining themselves suddenly disappearing in a cloud of smoke, like a magician's trick. We can understand no-self in several ways. The Buddha described what we call "self" as a collection of aggregates—elements of mind and body—that function interdependently, creating the appearance of woman or man. We then identify with that image or appearance, taking it to be "I" or "mine," imagining it to have some inherent self-existence. For example, we get up in the morning, look in the mirror, recognize the reflection, and think, "Yes, that's me again." We then add all kinds of concepts to this sense of self: I'm a woman or man, I'm a certain age, I'm a happy or unhappy person—the list goes on and on. When we examine our experience, though, we see that there is not some core being to whom experience refers; rather it is simply "empty phenomena rolling on." Experience is "empty" in the sense that there is no one behind the arising and changing phenomena to whom they happen. A rainbow is a good example of this. We go outside after a rainstorm and feel that moment of delight if a rainbow appears in the sky. Mostly, we simply enjoy the sight without investigating the real nature of what is happening. But when we look more deeply, it becomes clear that there is no "thing" called "rainbow" apart from the particular conditions of air and moisture and light. Each one of us is like that rainbow—an appearance, a magical display, arising out of the various elements of mind and body. So when anger arises, or sorrow or love or joy, it is just anger angering, sorrow sorrowing, love loving, joy joying. Different feelings arise and pass, each simply expressing its own nature. The problem arises when we identify with these feelings, or thoughts, or sensations as being self or as belonging to "me": "I'm angry, I'm sad." By collapsing into the identification with these experiences, we contract energetically into a prison of self and separation. As an experiment in awareness, the next time you feel identified with a strong emotion or reaction or judgment, leave the story line and trace the physical sensation back to the energetic contraction, often felt at the heart center. It might be a sensation of tightness or pressure in the center of the chest. Then relax the heart, simply allowing the feelings and sensations to be there. Open to the space in which everything is happening. In that moment, the sense of separation disappears, and the union of lovingkindness and emptiness becomes clear. We see that there is no one there to be apart. As the Chinese poet Li Po wrote: "We sit together the mountain and me/ Until only the mountain remains." --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Victor, > When you say 'we grow old' and 'there is a being' these are assumptions. You > speak of these things like anyone should realize that they are there, but you do > not discuss the idea that these are not actual things. You say 'Of course we are > beings! Of course we are alive!' But this is just common language. It is not > inspected for whether it is actually true or not. I will agree that there are > cells, organs, blood, activity, brainwaves, thoughts, perceptions, feelings. I > will agree that we are aware that these things are taking place and that awareness > notes them and so there is consciousness. But in all of that you still do not > show me any part of this process that in itself is a 'self' or a 'being'. If you > want to say that the whole process is a 'being' i will agree with you, but then I > will say in that case, that a 'being' is not a 'person', an 'entity' that you can > identify in its own right, but it is nothing but a collection of processes. You > say that the 'being' is greater than the sum of its parts, but you can only claim > this in a general way. You cannot actually show that this is the case. Buddha > asked us to be detached from all of these processes, and all of its objects, not > to cling to them. Clinging creates suffering, because all of these objects, all > of these processes, are temporary and unsatisfying. We cannot hold onto them. We > cannot even hold onto self. Buddha asks us to let go of the idea of 'self' and > 'being' and to stop thinking of ourselves as separate individuals identified with > the body and the mind. Buddha also says not to cling to 'non- being' or > 'annihilation' because that is still involvement with the idea of a being, either > to preseve it or to destroy it. Either way we are caught in the self-idea and > cannot be released from it. This is my understanding of the Buddha's admonitions > not to either assert or deny the existence of a being. But it is clear that we > are to let go of all ideas and formulations of a self or entity, and not to cling > to any such notion, or comfort ourselves with the idea that we really exist or > really do not exist. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ============================== > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > > Hi Robert Ep, > > > > Please read the first part of my message to Howard again: > > > > "The usage of the word "being" is bound by agreed-upon usage of > > language, or in your term, "convention." From what I understand in > > reading the discourses, how and what the Buddha spoke is always > > bounded within the agreed-upon usage of language, or in your term, > > convention. A being is not a convention, not a verbal usage. It is > > the word "being" that is bounded within the agreed-upon usage of > > language in communication, or in your term, convention." > > > > If you are holding the view that the self did break down to the five > > aggregates and nothing more, I suggest you let go that assumption. > > > > I also suggest you let go the assumption "If there is a true self > > beyond the five aggregates, it must be something that is neither > > within nor composed of the components of the psychophysical being, > > since the psychophysical being is completely composed of the five > > aggregates." > > > > There are beings, Robert, and we as human beings were born. We get > > old and we will die some day. Birth, aging-and-death is stressful, > > suffering, unsatisfactory, dukkha. > > > > Metta, > > Victor 15088 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 0:23pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States Dear Rob M, > -----Original Message----- > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > > At some point in our lives, it is likely that we will all have to > deal with a family member who is losing physical / mental capacity, > is self-destructive or chronically depressed. What is the "correct > Buddhist way" of dealing with this all too common situation? The best way to handle this is obviously with kusala and panna! How is it done outwardly? That depends on accumulations, I think. > > We are warned against trying to radiate metta to our spouse as it > would be too easy to fall prey to the near enemy of sensual desire. > Does the same hold true about trying to radiate karuna to a family > member? Should we avoid it because it is too easy to slip into the > near enemy of aversion (due to the accompanying emotional baggage)? I would be interested in hearing more about the practice of radiating metta and karuna (etc) to other beings. What do you think are relevant references? When can we do it? Why would we want to do? How do we do it? What are the causes and conditions for such events? kom 15089 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 0:32pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Christine and all, I suggest that instead of reading U Silananda's NO INNER CORE - ANATTA, read Anatta-lakkhana Sutta without the assumption "self is a complex combination of material and mental processes" or the assumption "self is a residual entity" or the assumption "self is psychological entities or agents inside the person." Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi KenO, (and KenH, Victor, RobK, RobEp, and Stephen) and All, > > KenO - How wonderful to *see* you! Are you just slipping back in as > if you wouldn't have been missed? (You were) .... I do notice these > things you know. :) We are still talking about Anatta, so it could > be anytime in the last year, no? :) If you hadn't re-surfaced > soon, I was going to get desperate and post something on 'luminous > mind' ... Think what you have saved the List from experiencing! :) > > I've been reading U Silananda's NO INNER CORE - ANATTA again, and, > as always, find that I get a lot to think about - even from the > Introduction. This time about Personality and Kamma. Part of the > Intro is pasted below: > http://www.buddha.per.sg/dharma01/anatta1.htm > > metta, > Christine > > > Introduction > > Impermanence, Suffering and No-Soul > > Direct Experience of Anatta > > Analysis of the Discourse on the Characteristic of No-Soul > > Understanding Anatta > > Misunderstanding Anatta > > Questions and Answers > > > > "Introduction > > The following discourse is based on a collection of lectures on the > Anatta doctrine given by Sayadaw U Silananda. Anatta is a Pali word > consisting of a negative prefix, `an' meaning not, plus atta, soul, > and is most literally translated as no-soul. The word atta, however > has a wide range of meanings, and some of those meanings cross over > into the fields of psychology philosophy and everyday terminology as, > for example, when atta can mean self, being, ego, and personality. > Therefore, in this preface, we will examine and elucidate the wide > range of meanings which atta can signify in order to determine > exactly what the Buddha denied when He proclaimed that He teaches > anatta, that is, when He denied the existence of atta. We will > examine both Buddhist and non-Buddhist definitions of the term soul, > and we will also examine modern definitions of terms such as ego and > self. > Most writers in the field of religion, when writing about soul or > anatta specifically use the terms self, ego, being and soul > interchangeably, while psychologists define those terms as totally > different entities. If we define atta as including the terms self > ego, personality, and being, we may make the mistake of claiming that > Buddha denied the phenomena of individual differences, individual > personalities, individual kamma and other features of individuality > in people. > > But if we say that Buddha denied only the theological entity of a > soul, while leaving intact a psychological entity such as an ego or > self, then we are also mistaken. The resolution of this dilemma lies > in the fact that we must deal with two levels of reality > simultaneously, the ultimate level and the conventional level. > > In the absolute sense, the anatta doctrine denies any and all > psychological entities or agents inside the person. In the absolute > sense, all phenomena, including what is called a person, are composed > of elements, forces, and a stream of successive states. > > The Buddha organised these phenomena into conceptual groups, known as > khandhas (aggregates), and they are: (1) material processes, also > known as bodily form, corporeality or matter; (2) feeling; (3) > perception; (4) mental formations; and (S) consciousness. Most > importantlý when all mental and physical phenomena are analysed into > those elements, no residual entity, such as a soul, self, or ego, can > be found. In short, there are actions executed by these groups, but > no actor The workings of these groups of forces and elements appear > to us as an ego or personality but in reality the ego or self or > agent of the actions has only an illusory existence. > > However on the conventional level, the workings of these forces, > elements, and states are organised by causal laws, and, although they > in no way constitute any extra-phenomenal self or soul, they do > produce a human individual, a person - if we want to call a certain > combination of material and mental processes a person. > > This complex combination of material and mental processes is > dependent entirely on previous processes, especially the continuity > of kamma which is the process of ethical volitions and the results of > those volitions. Thus individual differences are accounted for even > though the self or ego or personality is, in the ultimate sense, > denied. > > An individual may be an angry, hot-tempered person, for example, > because in the past he or she has performed actions which leave > conditions for traits, which are kamma results, to arise in the > present. But this happens because kamma leaves a potential for those > traits of anger and ill will to arise, not because any kind of self > of the person is continuing. Actually the human individual does not > remain the same for two consecutive moments; everything is a > succession of forces and elements, and there is nothing substantial. > > Therefore, on the conventional level, we may say that individual > differences have an illusory existence. Common everyday conceptions, > such as ego, self, and personality seem to be very real, obvious, and > well-defined by psychologists and laymen alike, but they are, on the > absolute level and in the eyes of those who have achieved > enlightenment, illusory. > > Another way to approach Buddhist psychology is to examine the very > complex and technical psychological system known as Abhidhamma. The > Abhidhamma is, in the words of Narada Maha Thera, "a psychology > without a psyche. Abhidhamma teaches that ultimate reality consists > of four elementary constituents. > > One, Nibbana (in Sanskrit, Nirvana) is unconditioned, and the other > three, citta, cetasika, and rupa - consciousness, mental factors, and > matter respectively - are conditioned. These elementary constituents, > called dhammas, alone possess ultimate reality. The familiar world of > objects and persons, and the interior world of ego and self are only > conceptual constructs created by the mind out of the elemental > dhammas. > > Abhidhamma thus restricts itself to terms that are valid from the > standpoint of ultimate realities: it describes reality in terms of > ultimate truth. Thus it describes dhammas, their characteristics, > their functions, and their relations. All conceptual entities such > as self or being or person, are resolved into their ultimates, into > bare mental and material phenomena, which are impermanent, > conditioned, dependently arisen, and empty of any abiding self or > substance. > > Consciousness, for example, which seems like one continual flow, is > described as a succession of discrete evanescent mental events, the > cittas, and a complex set of mental factors, the cetasikas, which > perform more specialised tasks in the act of consciousness. There is > no self, soul, or any kind of agent inside a person involved in this > process." > <<<<<<>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------ > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Ken H > > > > > > > This right understanding may be only at the > > > intellectual stage, but it is none-the-less, > > > precious > > > and hard to come by. It is not always there when we > > > need it because there is no self who can hold on to > > > it. That doesn't mean we should let go of it. > > > > > > if there is no self to hold it, why bother to let it > > go in the first place :) > > > > cheers > > Ken O 15090 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 0:37pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi Christine and all, The question "If there is no self, who is born, who dies, who meditate?" is not a valid question because it starts with the speculative view "there is no self." This question is to be put aside in the first place. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Group, > > A short article by Joseph Goldstein on anatta. > http://www.tricycle.com/buddhistbasics/noself.html > > metta, > Christine > > "If there is no self, who is born, who dies, who meditates? 15091 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 1:45pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Victor, In reading anything, particularly the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, one must understand the meaning the author intended for the terms he used. Otherwise a completely wrong perception will develop. With regard to the Buddha's words - it is extremely risky for someone living 2500 years after his death, in a different culture, reading a translation in a different language, to want to read the page and attribute his/her own contemporary meaning to the term. Particularly the term that is of such crucial importance that it underpins the Buddha's teachings. Far safer to rely on the understanding that has been faithfully passed down within the Theravada tradition initially from those of the ariya sangha who knew the Blessed One and were in his presence when he explained this term and the doctrine of anatta. I believe Human rebirth is so rare, samsara so long, suffering so painful and anatta too important a topic to waste this chance by accepting a colloquial meaning of the term or by leaning towards one's own desire of what that meaning should be. Best wishes, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine and all, > > I suggest that instead of reading U Silananda's NO INNER CORE - > ANATTA, read Anatta-lakkhana Sutta without the assumption "self is a > complex combination of material and mental processes" or the > assumption "self is a residual entity" or the assumption "self is > psychological entities or agents inside the person." > > Metta, > Victor > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Hi KenO, (and KenH, Victor, RobK, RobEp, and Stephen) and All, > > > > KenO - How wonderful to *see* you! Are you just slipping back in > as > > if you wouldn't have been missed? (You were) .... I do notice these > > things you know. :) We are still talking about Anatta, so it could > > be anytime in the last year, no? :) If you hadn't re-surfaced > > soon, I was going to get desperate and post something on 'luminous > > mind' ... Think what you have saved the List from experiencing! :) > > > > I've been reading U Silananda's NO INNER CORE - ANATTA again, and, > > as always, find that I get a lot to think about - even from the > > Introduction. This time about Personality and Kamma. Part of the > > Intro is pasted below: > > http://www.buddha.per.sg/dharma01/anatta1.htm > > > > metta, > > Christine > > > > > > Introduction > > > > Impermanence, Suffering and No-Soul > > > > Direct Experience of Anatta > > > > Analysis of the Discourse on the Characteristic of No-Soul > > > > Understanding Anatta > > > > Misunderstanding Anatta > > > > Questions and Answers > > > > > > > > "Introduction > > > > The following discourse is based on a collection of lectures on the > > Anatta doctrine given by Sayadaw U Silananda. Anatta is a Pali word > > consisting of a negative prefix, `an' meaning not, plus atta, soul, > > and is most literally translated as no-soul. The word atta, however > > has a wide range of meanings, and some of those meanings cross over > > into the fields of psychology philosophy and everyday terminology > as, > > for example, when atta can mean self, being, ego, and personality. > > Therefore, in this preface, we will examine and elucidate the wide > > range of meanings which atta can signify in order to determine > > exactly what the Buddha denied when He proclaimed that He teaches > > anatta, that is, when He denied the existence of atta. We will > > examine both Buddhist and non-Buddhist definitions of the term > soul, > > and we will also examine modern definitions of terms such as ego > and > > self. > > Most writers in the field of religion, when writing about soul or > > anatta specifically use the terms self, ego, being and soul > > interchangeably, while psychologists define those terms as totally > > different entities. If we define atta as including the terms self > > ego, personality, and being, we may make the mistake of claiming > that > > Buddha denied the phenomena of individual differences, individual > > personalities, individual kamma and other features of individuality > > in people. > > > > But if we say that Buddha denied only the theological entity of a > > soul, while leaving intact a psychological entity such as an ego or > > self, then we are also mistaken. The resolution of this dilemma > lies > > in the fact that we must deal with two levels of reality > > simultaneously, the ultimate level and the conventional level. > > > > In the absolute sense, the anatta doctrine denies any and all > > psychological entities or agents inside the person. In the absolute > > sense, all phenomena, including what is called a person, are > composed > > of elements, forces, and a stream of successive states. > > > > The Buddha organised these phenomena into conceptual groups, known > as > > khandhas (aggregates), and they are: (1) material processes, also > > known as bodily form, corporeality or matter; (2) feeling; (3) > > perception; (4) mental formations; and (S) consciousness. Most > > importantlý when all mental and physical phenomena are analysed > into > > those elements, no residual entity, such as a soul, self, or ego, > can > > be found. In short, there are actions executed by these groups, but > > no actor The workings of these groups of forces and elements appear > > to us as an ego or personality but in reality the ego or self or > > agent of the actions has only an illusory existence. > > > > However on the conventional level, the workings of these forces, > > elements, and states are organised by causal laws, and, although > they > > in no way constitute any extra-phenomenal self or soul, they do > > produce a human individual, a person - if we want to call a certain > > combination of material and mental processes a person. > > > > This complex combination of material and mental processes is > > dependent entirely on previous processes, especially the continuity > > of kamma which is the process of ethical volitions and the results > of > > those volitions. Thus individual differences are accounted for even > > though the self or ego or personality is, in the ultimate sense, > > denied. > > > > An individual may be an angry, hot-tempered person, for example, > > because in the past he or she has performed actions which leave > > conditions for traits, which are kamma results, to arise in the > > present. But this happens because kamma leaves a potential for > those > > traits of anger and ill will to arise, not because any kind of self > > of the person is continuing. Actually the human individual does not > > remain the same for two consecutive moments; everything is a > > succession of forces and elements, and there is nothing > substantial. > > > > Therefore, on the conventional level, we may say that individual > > differences have an illusory existence. Common everyday > conceptions, > > such as ego, self, and personality seem to be very real, obvious, > and > > well-defined by psychologists and laymen alike, but they are, on > the > > absolute level and in the eyes of those who have achieved > > enlightenment, illusory. > > > > Another way to approach Buddhist psychology is to examine the very > > complex and technical psychological system known as Abhidhamma. The > > Abhidhamma is, in the words of Narada Maha Thera, "a psychology > > without a psyche. Abhidhamma teaches that ultimate reality consists > > of four elementary constituents. > > > > One, Nibbana (in Sanskrit, Nirvana) is unconditioned, and the other > > three, citta, cetasika, and rupa - consciousness, mental factors, > and > > matter respectively - are conditioned. These elementary > constituents, > > called dhammas, alone possess ultimate reality. The familiar world > of > > objects and persons, and the interior world of ego and self are > only > > conceptual constructs created by the mind out of the elemental > > dhammas. > > > > Abhidhamma thus restricts itself to terms that are valid from the > > standpoint of ultimate realities: it describes reality in terms of > > ultimate truth. Thus it describes dhammas, their characteristics, > > their functions, and their relations. All conceptual entities such > > as self or being or person, are resolved into their ultimates, into > > bare mental and material phenomena, which are impermanent, > > conditioned, dependently arisen, and empty of any abiding self or > > substance. > > > > Consciousness, for example, which seems like one continual flow, is > > described as a succession of discrete evanescent mental events, the > > cittas, and a complex set of mental factors, the cetasikas, which > > perform more specialised tasks in the act of consciousness. There > is > > no self, soul, or any kind of agent inside a person involved in > this > > process." > > <<<<<<>>>>>> > > ------------------------------------------ > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > > Hi Ken H > > > > > > > > > > This right understanding may be only at the > > > > intellectual stage, but it is none-the-less, > > > > precious > > > > and hard to come by. It is not always there when we > > > > need it because there is no self who can hold on to > > > > it. That doesn't mean we should let go of it. > > > > > > > > > if there is no self to hold it, why bother to let it > > > go in the first place :) > > > > > > cheers > > > Ken O 15092 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 2:29pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Christine, What do you think the word "self" mean? What is the colloquial meaning of the word "self"? How did the Buddha use the word "self" as recorded in Anatta-lakkhana Sutta and other discourses? Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi Victor, > > In reading anything, particularly the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, one > must understand the meaning the author intended for the terms he > used. Otherwise a completely wrong perception will develop. With > regard to the Buddha's words - it is extremely risky for someone > living 2500 years after his death, in a different culture, reading a > translation in a different language, to want to read the page and > attribute his/her own contemporary meaning to the term. Particularly > the term that is of such crucial importance that it underpins the > Buddha's teachings. Far safer to rely on the understanding that has > been faithfully passed down within the Theravada tradition initially > from those of the ariya sangha who knew the Blessed One and were in > his presence when he explained this term and the doctrine of anatta. > I believe Human rebirth is so rare, samsara so long, suffering so > painful and anatta too important a topic to waste this chance by > accepting a colloquial meaning of the term or by leaning towards > one's own desire of what that meaning should be. > > Best wishes, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > Hi Christine and all, > > > > I suggest that instead of reading U Silananda's NO INNER CORE - > > ANATTA, read Anatta-lakkhana Sutta without the assumption "self is > a > > complex combination of material and mental processes" or the > > assumption "self is a residual entity" or the assumption "self is > > psychological entities or agents inside the person." > > > > Metta, > > Victor 15093 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 2:46pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States Hi Kom, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Kom Tukovinit" wrote: > Dear Rob M, > I would be interested in hearing more about the practice of radiating metta > and karuna (etc) to other beings. What do you think are relevant > references? When can we do it? Why would we want to do? How do we do it? > What are the causes and conditions for such events? > > kom I summarized the writings in a BPS Wheel publication 365 on the subject of Metta in my class notes (available in the Files section) pages 94-101 and added some of my own ideas on page 102 of my class notes. The full Wheel publication is at: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel365.html Pages 104-107 of my class notes summarizes Gregory Kramer's experience of sharing Metta meditation with his children. Full text available at http://www.buddhanet.net/imol/lovkids.htm As for meditating on karuna, mudita, etc., I found references in Wheel Publication #6 (Four Sublime States by Nyanaponika Thera) http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel006.html The September version of my class notes will include a summary of this material. Kom, did I address your questions? Thanks, Rob M :-) 15094 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 2:49pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Victor, I have included my understanding from the scriptures and from teachers in my posts over the last week. I think the frustration at the centre of this discussion is that a number of us have asked you to clearly state what you consider to be the meaning of the Buddha's teaching on anatta and his use of the term self, and have failed to elicit this from you. In post no. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/15006, I stated: "I just realised Victor that nearly every time you post on the question of 'self' 'non-self' or 'anatta', you either post hyperlinks to suttas with no discussion, or you pose questions as a reply and don't respond to many questions put to yourself. I am not going to answer a series of leading questions out of the very little knowledge I have, but I would be deeply interested in hearing what your understanding is, and learning from it. You have alluded to a strongly held knowledge on the subject of anatta, but I have never yet seen it articulated. I hope you will do so as I believe it could be very helpful for us all to hear it I would hope you feel moved to write a few paragraphs on what your position is. In this instance, as you commented very strongly on Robert's post, it would be a courtesy, and very interesting for us all if you would give an explanation of your thoughts on the matter." And so, 86 posts later, at post no. 15092, we are still marching on the same spot. I think this is another case of "I asked you first?" :):) It's been fun, but I have to go to work now. Best wishes, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > What do you think the word "self" mean? What is the colloquial > meaning of the word "self"? How did the Buddha use the word "self" > as recorded in Anatta-lakkhana Sutta and other discourses? > > Metta, > Victor > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Hi Victor, > > > > In reading anything, particularly the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, one > > must understand the meaning the author intended for the terms he > > used. Otherwise a completely wrong perception will develop. With > > regard to the Buddha's words - it is extremely risky for someone > > living 2500 years after his death, in a different culture, reading > a > > translation in a different language, to want to read the page and > > attribute his/her own contemporary meaning to the term. > Particularly > > the term that is of such crucial importance that it underpins the > > Buddha's teachings. Far safer to rely on the understanding that > has > > been faithfully passed down within the Theravada tradition > initially > > from those of the ariya sangha who knew the Blessed One and were in > > his presence when he explained this term and the doctrine of > anatta. > > I believe Human rebirth is so rare, samsara so long, suffering so > > painful and anatta too important a topic to waste this chance by > > accepting a colloquial meaning of the term or by leaning towards > > one's own desire of what that meaning should be. > > > > Best wishes, > > Christine > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > > Hi Christine and all, > > > > > > I suggest that instead of reading U Silananda's NO INNER CORE - > > > ANATTA, read Anatta-lakkhana Sutta without the assumption "self > is > > a > > > complex combination of material and mental processes" or the > > > assumption "self is a residual entity" or the assumption "self is > > > psychological entities or agents inside the person." > > > > > > Metta, > > > Victor 15095 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 2:55pm Subject: Re: Let go Hi Christine, I would suggest examining the criterion for accepting what the word "self" mean. Do not go upon what has been acquired by repeated hearing; nor upon tradition; nor upon rumor; nor upon what is in a scripture; nor upon surmise; nor upon an axiom; nor upon specious reasoning; nor upon a bias towards a notion that has been pondered over; nor upon another's seeming ability; nor upon the consideration, 'The monk is our teacher.' Christine, when you yourself know: 'These things are good; these things are not blamable; these things are praised by the wise; undertaken and observed, these things lead to benefit and happiness,' enter on and abide in them. Examine very closely the assumption "self is a complex combination of material and mental processes" or the assumption "self is a residual entity" or the assumption "self is psychological entities or agents inside the person." Are these assumptions good? Are they not blamable? Are they praised by the wise? Undertaken and observed, do they lead to benefit and happiness? How did the Buddha used the word "self"? When teaching, did he use the word "self" as reflexive pronoun without any assumption? Is using the word "self" as reflexive pronoun without any assumption bad? Is it blamable? Is it praised by the wise? Undertaken and observed, does it lead to harm and ill? Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi Victor, > > In reading anything, particularly the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, one > must understand the meaning the author intended for the terms he > used. Otherwise a completely wrong perception will develop. With > regard to the Buddha's words - it is extremely risky for someone > living 2500 years after his death, in a different culture, reading a > translation in a different language, to want to read the page and > attribute his/her own contemporary meaning to the term. Particularly > the term that is of such crucial importance that it underpins the > Buddha's teachings. Far safer to rely on the understanding that has > been faithfully passed down within the Theravada tradition initially > from those of the ariya sangha who knew the Blessed One and were in > his presence when he explained this term and the doctrine of anatta. > I believe Human rebirth is so rare, samsara so long, suffering so > painful and anatta too important a topic to waste this chance by > accepting a colloquial meaning of the term or by leaning towards > one's own desire of what that meaning should be. > > Best wishes, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > Hi Christine and all, > > > > I suggest that instead of reading U Silananda's NO INNER CORE - > > ANATTA, read Anatta-lakkhana Sutta without the assumption "self is > a > > complex combination of material and mental processes" or the > > assumption "self is a residual entity" or the assumption "self is > > psychological entities or agents inside the person." > > > > Metta, > > Victor 15096 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 11:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Samatha, Samadhi and Right Concentration Hi, Jon - In a message dated 8/20/02 7:18:06 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Jon - > ... > > =============================== > > I find little to disagree with in the foregoing. By in large I > > agree > > with what you wrote. Where we differ I think is in the following: "To > > put my > > 'concerns' in a nutshell, I do not understand the Buddha to be saying > > that > > kusala can be developed by *directed attention* or *conscious effort* > > and, in > > particular, I don't read him as saying that insight is developed by > > directed > > attention to a *selected object or range of objects*." It is not so much > > the > > part about the restriction to a "selected object or range of objects" > > that we > > differ on, because I think that seeing the tilakkhana is possible in all > > > > conditioned dhammas, but moreso in the first part of what you say here. > > I DO > > see the Buddha as teaching that "kusala can be developed [or at least > > encouraged/fostered] by directed attention or conscious effort". The > > effort, > > however, cannot consist in mere *willing* of kusala traits, including > > wisdom, > > but rather should consist in conscious efforts at guarding the senses > > cultivating samatha and vipassana through mindfulness practice, both > > during > > "ordinary times" as well as during the restricted-input context of > > formal > > meditation practice. In all of this, I see effort at maintaining > > mindfulness > > and clear comprehension as primary. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > I agree when you say that the effort that is right effort "cannot consist > in mere *willing* of kusala traits". The kusala that is guarding the > sense doors, or cultivating samatha or vipassana cannot arise without some > other conditioning factor/s. It is the 'other factor(s)' that we need to > consider further and in detail, as given in the teachings, since this is > what distinguishes the akusala from the kusala. > > I am not so sure about your next point, though;-)). You say "I see effort > at maintaining mindfulness and clear comprehension as primary". What is > this effort that you describe as the 'effort at maintaining mindfulness' > etc. Is it really any different from the willing of kusala traits > referred to earlier, or is it simply another twist on the latter? > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Gee, I dunno! ;-)) All I mean is making it a point to pay attention to what is going on, to notice when there is a lapse in that, and particularly, by repeated attempts to turn this attentiveness into a *habit*. If that is *willing* something I'm not sure. It is certainly goal-directed bahavior. ------------------------------------------------------- > As I have mentioned before, all forms of kusala can arise naturally, > without the 'willing'-type effort, given the right conditions. Is there > ever any awareness of these dhammas as and when they do arise in this > manner? If not, how can we know at the 'willed' moments whether the > mental state is truly kusala or whether it only seems to be so? > > Jon > > =========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15097 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 3:24pm Subject: ADL ch. 21 (3) http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 21 (3) The jhana-factors have to be developed in order to temporarily eliminate the hindrances. For the person who wants to develop the jhana-factors and attain jhana a great deal of preparation is required. We read in the 'Visuddhimagga' (II, 1; III, 1) that the person who wants to cultivate samatha should be well established in sila (morality), which is purified by such qualities as fewness of wishes, contentment, effacement, seclusion, energy, and, modest needs. In observing some of the ascetic practices (as described in Ch. II of the 'Visuddhimagga'), which pertain mostly to the monk with regard to the use of his robes, his almsfood and his place of dwelling, virtue will become more perfected. In the Buddha's time laypeople too could attain jhana, if they would lead a life which was compatible with its development (An example is Nanda's mother, about whom we read in the 'Gradual Sayings', Book of the Sevens, Ch. V, par, 10.), One should lead a secluded life and many conditions have to be fulfilled. Jhana is quite incompatible with sense-desires. One has to be 'quite secluded from sense-desires...' in order to attain the first jhana, as we read in many suttas. The 'Visuddhimagga' (IV, 81) explains: When absoluteness is introduced thus 'quite secluded from sense desires', what is expressed is this: sense desires are certainly incompatible with this jhana: when they exist, it does not occur, just as when there is darkness, there is no lamplight; and it is only by letting go of them that it is reached just as the further bank is reached by letting go of the near bank. That is why absoluteness is introduced. Thus we see that the development of jhana is not for everyone. Jhana cannot be attained if one leads a 'worldly life', full of sense-pleasures, instead of a life of 'fewness of wishes, seclusion, modest needs'. The 'Visuddhimagga' (III, 129) also states that one should sever any impediments to the development of samatha. Among them are one's dwelling, travelling and sickness. These can be hindrances to samatha. One should avoid living in a monastery which, for various reasons, is unfavourable to the development of samatha. Thus, even before one starts to develop samatha, many conditions have to be fulfilled. For the development of samatha one has to apply oneself to a suitable subject of meditation. There are forty meditation subjects which can condition calm and they are the following: 10 kasina exercises, which are, for example, coloured disks, a piece of earth, light. 10 loathsome subjects (in Pali: asubha), the 'cemetery meditations'. 10 recollections, comprising the recollection of the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha, virtue, generosity, deities, and also the recollections which are: mindfulness of death, mindfulness of the body, mindfulness of breathing and the recollection of peace (nibbana). The perception of repulsiveness in nutriment. The definition of the four elements (earth, water, fire and wind). 4 brahma-viharas (divine abidings) comprising: lovingkindness (metta), compassion (karuna), altruistic joy (mudita) and equanimity (upekkha) which, in this case, is not upekkha vedana or neutral feeling, but the wholesome cetasika which is tatramajjhattata. 4 meditation subjects for the development of the arupa-jhanas (immaterial jhanas), which will be mentioned later on. Not all subjects are suitable for everybody, it depends on the individual which subject is a means for him to become calm. If there is right understanding of the way to become calm by means of a suitable meditation subject calm can grow, even in our daily life. Metta and karuna, for instance, can and should be developed in our daily life, when we are in the company of other people and then there are kusala cittas instead of akusala cittas. Recollection on the Dhamma includes also reflection on the teachings and this is beneficial for everybody; it helps one to begin to understand one's life. While we reflect with kusala citta on the teachings or on one of the other meditation subjects, there are moments of calm if we do not cling to calm. In the 'Visuddhimagga' it is explained how one can develop higher degrees of calm by means of a meditation subject. It is explained (Vis. III, 119) that meditation subjects are learned by sight, by touch and by hearsay (words), depending on the nature of the subject. As regards the subjects which are learned by sight (such as nine of the kesinas and the 'ten cemetery-meditations'), the 'Visuddhimagga' (IV, 31) states that in the beginning one has to look closely at the meditation subject and later on one acquires a 'mental image' ('sign', in Pali: nimitta) of it; one no longer needs to look at the original object. At first the mental image is still unsteady and unclear, but later on it appears 'a hundred times, a thousand times more purified...' The original object, for example a coloured disk or a piece of earth, could have flaws, but the perfected mental image which one acquires when one is more advanced, does not have the imperfections of the original object one was looking at in the beginning. This perfected mental image is called the 'counterpart sign' (patibhaga nimitta). At the moment the 'counterpart sign' arises, there is a higher degree of calm and concentration is more developed. This stage is called 'access concentration' (upacara samadhi). The citta is not jhanacitta, it is still kamavacara citta (of the sense-sphere), but the hindrances do not arise at the moment of 'access concentration'. However, the jhana-factors are not developed enough yet for the attainment of jhana and now one has to cultivate the right conditions in order to attain jhana. 'Access concentration' is already very difficult to attain, but 'guarding the sign' which has to be done in order to attain jhana is also very difficult. One has to 'guard the sign' (nimitta) in order not to lose the perfected mental image one has developed. The conditions for guarding the sign are, among others, the right dwelling-place, suitable food, avoidance of aimless talk. One should ' balance' the 'five faculties' (indriyas) which are the following cetasikas: - saddha (confidence in wholesomeness) - viriya (energy) - sati (mindfulness) - samadhi (concentration) - panna (wisdom) Confidence should be balanced with wisdom so that one has not confidence uncritically and groundlessly. Concentration should be balanced with energy, because if there is too much energy and not enough concentration, there is a danger of becoming agitated and then one cannot attain jhana. If there is concentration but not enough energy there will be idleness and jhana cannot be attained either. All five indriyas should be balanced. From the foregoing examples we see that samatha cannot be cultivated without a basic understanding of the realities taught in the Abhidhamma which are in fact the realities of daily life, and without careful consideration of them. One should know precisely when the citta is kusala citta and when it is akusala citta. One should know which realities the jhana-factors are and one should realize as regards oneself whether the jhana-factors are developed or not. One should know whether the cetasikas which are the five indriyas (faculties) are developed or not, whether they are balanced or not. If there is not the right understanding of all these different factors and conditions necessary for the attainment of 'access concentration' and of jhana, one is in danger of taking for 'access concentration' what is not 'access concentration' and taking for jhana what is not jhana. Neither 'access concentration' nor jhana can be attained without having cultivated the right conditions. 15098 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 11:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] rupas out there Hi, Jon - In a message dated 8/20/02 7:35:32 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > I see you are still keen to find a way to reconcile phenomenalism with the > dhamma ;-)). May I ask what you would see as being the consequence of > achieving, or not achieving, that reconciliation? > > ========================= The consequence would be a release of tension! ;-)) They both seem true to me and mutually supportive. I would prefer not having to "give up" phenomenalism, as it helps me to understand the Dhamma, and, as a mathematician, I find it "lovely". So what's it all about? Why, clinging, of course, Jon! That's the bottom line. (But you knew that!! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15099 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 3:36pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Christine, In understanding what the Buddha taught: "Form is not self. Form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" the word "self" is to be seen as a reflexive pronoun, without making any assumption on what self is. I hope I have answered your question. I don't think frustration can be fun. Otherwise, I would frustrate myself everyday. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hi Victor, > > I have included my understanding from the scriptures and from > teachers in my posts over the last week. > I think the frustration at the centre of this discussion is that a > number of us have asked you to clearly state what you consider to be > the meaning of the Buddha's teaching on anatta and his use of the > term self, and have failed to elicit this from you. > In post no. > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/15006, I > stated: > "I just realised Victor that nearly every time you > post on the question of 'self' 'non-self' or 'anatta', you either > post hyperlinks to suttas with no discussion, or you pose questions > as a reply and don't respond to many questions put to yourself. I am > not going to answer a series of leading questions out of the > very little knowledge I have, but I would be deeply interested in > hearing what your understanding is, and learning from it. You have > alluded to a strongly held knowledge on the subject of anatta, but I > have never yet seen it articulated. I hope you will do so as I > believe it could be very helpful for us all to hear it I would hope > you feel moved to write a few paragraphs on what your position is. > In this instance, as you commented very strongly on Robert's post, it > would be a courtesy, and very interesting for us all if you would > give an explanation of your thoughts on the matter." > > And so, 86 posts later, at post no. 15092, we are still marching on > the same spot. > > I think this is another case of "I asked you first?" :):) > > It's been fun, but I have to go to work now. > Best wishes, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > > Hi Christine, > > > > What do you think the word "self" mean? What is the colloquial > > meaning of the word "self"? How did the Buddha use the word "self" > > as recorded in Anatta-lakkhana Sutta and other discourses? > > > > Metta, > > Victor 15100 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 11:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] To Howard & Rita with our best wishes Hi, Sarah (and Jon) - In a message dated 8/20/02 7:45:03 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > Dear Howard & Rita, > > I know you're out of town but I hope you may check in to receive our best > wishes for your wedding anniversary today (35th, I believe)and for many > more happy years together.We know it's a special day for you. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I did have just a second yesterday (the 20th), between sessions at the conference, to ck my e-mail and see that you had written, but I couldn't get to read it until now. Thank you!! ------------------------------------------------------ > > When we got married in England, Ven Saddhatissa gave us a blessing and > discussed the 'Different Kinds of Marriages' (AN, Bk of 4s,53 p94 > B.Bodhi's anthology: > ***** > > "Householders, there are these four kinds of marriages. What four? A > wretch lives together with a wretch; a wretch lives together with a > godess; a god lives together with a wretch; a god lives together with a > goddess." > > A wretch is described as one "who destroys life, takes what is not given, > engages in sexual misconduct, speaks falsely, and indulges in wines, > liquor and intoxicants which are a basis for negligence; he is immoral, > of bad character; he dwells at home with a heart obsessed by the stain of > stinginess; he abuses and reviles ascetics and brahmins." > > A god or goddess, on the otherhand, is described as one who "abstains from > the destruction of life.....from wines, liquor and intoxicants;(s)he is > virtuous, of good character; (s)he dwells at home with a heart free from > the stain of stinginess; (s)he does not abuse or revile ascetics and > brahmins." > ***** > I know you have a good example of the 4th kind of marriage mentioned above > and may we all learn to live a little more like 'gods and goddesses'. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, we come *close* to type 4 - maybe type 3.95!! ;-)) --------------------------------------------------------- > > metta, > > Sarah (& Jon) > > p.s > I know, Howard, you'll be particularly happy to know we just returned from > a very pleasant afternoon with Erik and Eath at their home up on the side > of a mountain. They live simply but healthily and both are looking very > contented and relaxed. Eath now speaks very fluent English and offered us > beautiful fruits and tea. She told us how she doesn't judge people by > their age, nationality or the colour of their hair, but only by 'heart'. > In other words, the 'inside' is what counts. Thank you Eath. ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: How wonderful! I am, indeed, happy to hear this. Thanks, Sarah! ---------------------------------------------------- > > We had useful discussions on some favourite themes with Erik -- > mindfulness in daily life, concentration, practice, conventional and > ultimate realities and quite a bit on lobha (attachment). We discussed > lobha for results in practice, lobha for kusala( wholesome) states and one > more area that was particularly helpful for me in light of some recent > difficulties. > ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Sorry that you've had difficulties. There's just no way we can escape them. ------------------------------------------------ This was with regard to attachment to harmony in> > relationships and friendships and attachment to helping others in trouble. > Erik gave me many good pointers from his own experience and study and > always gives good reminders that we can only ever know our 'own' citta at > this moment as opposed to others' cittas which can only be the subject of > speculation or inference. Finally we discussed different realities whilst > falling over - hearing, sound, hardness, mana, dosa and so on. Hopefully > we'll continue over breakfast at our hotel on Thursday. > > Finding an internet cafe in Samui that doesn't have a loud TV blaring, > doesn't lose posts sent or lose the connection every 5 mins has not been > easy.....I'd better sign off before I push my luck too far;-) > > Appreciating all the fine posts, > > More next week, > > Sarah > ============================ With much metta and genuine thanks from both Rita and me, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15101 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 4:22pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing, hindrances and concentration. Dear Nina, Could we at least say that insight could arise at any time, even while attempting to practice jhana? Incidentally, it occured to me that panna that cognizes an object as not self does not count as insight into the tilakkhana unless the object could be seen as me or mine. For example, to observe that the breath is impermanent and not self is not insight unless it is also seen that there is, or could be, a belief that the breath is me or mine. The "me or mine" adds the element of dukkha that makes it insight. Correct? Larry 15102 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 4:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 21 (3) ADL 21 (3): 4 brahma-viharas (divine abidings) comprising: lovingkindness (metta), compassion (karuna), altruistic joy (mudita) and equanimity (upekkha) which, in this case, is not upekkha vedana or neutral feeling, but the wholesome cetasika which is tatramajjhattata. ---------------- Hi all, in case you are curious, here is the definition of tatramajjhattata from Vism. XIV 153: Specific neutrality (tatra-majjhattata--lit. 'neutrality in regard thereto') is neutrality (majjhattata) in regard to those states [of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants arisen in association with it]. It has the characteristic of conveying consciousness and consciousness-concomitants evenly. Its function is to prevent deficiency and excess, or its function is to inhibit partiality. It is manifested as neutrality. It should be regarded as like a conductor (driver) who looks with equanimity on thoroughbreds progressing evenly. 15103 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 5:17pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States Dear Rob M, > -----Original Message----- > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Kom Tukovinit" wrote: > > Dear Rob M, > > I would be interested in hearing more about the practice of > radiating metta > > and karuna (etc) to other beings. What do you think are relevant > > references? When can we do it? Why would we want to do? How do > we do it? > > What are the causes and conditions for such events? > > > > kom > > I summarized the writings in a BPS Wheel publication 365 on the > subject of Metta in my class notes (available in the Files section) > pages 94-101 and added some of my own ideas on page 102 of my class > notes. The full Wheel publication is at: > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel365.html > > Pages 104-107 of my class notes summarizes Gregory Kramer's > experience of sharing Metta meditation with his children. Full text > available at > http://www.buddhanet.net/imol/lovkids.htm > > As for meditating on karuna, mudita, etc., I found references in > Wheel Publication #6 (Four Sublime States by Nyanaponika Thera) > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel006.html > > The September version of my class notes will include a summary of > this material. > > Kom, did I address your questions? > I would say, given the scope of the subject, it will take a while to get the answers for the quetions, so I will have to ask you to be patient with me on this one. The first and third links look promising: they have many references that can be checked and studied in details. Your study materials understandably don't have specific references, but I think I have the benefits of the author available to answer the questions! I want to look at your materials first, and will get back to you with some more questions. I will digest the other two references slowly... kom 15104 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 5:19pm Subject: Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata (was Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 21 (3)) Hi All, What is the difference difference between upekkha and tatramajjhattata? Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > ADL 21 (3): 4 brahma-viharas (divine abidings) comprising: > lovingkindness (metta), compassion (karuna), altruistic joy (mudita) and > equanimity (upekkha) which, in this case, is not upekkha vedana or > neutral feeling, but the wholesome cetasika which is tatramajjhattata. > ---------------- > Hi all, in case you are curious, here is the definition of > tatramajjhattata from Vism. XIV 153: > > Specific neutrality (tatra-majjhattata--lit. 'neutrality in regard > thereto') is neutrality (majjhattata) in regard to those states [of > consciousness and consciousness-concomitants arisen in association with > it]. It has the characteristic of conveying consciousness and > consciousness-concomitants evenly. Its function is to prevent deficiency > and excess, or its function is to inhibit partiality. It is manifested > as neutrality. It should be regarded as like a conductor (driver) who > looks with equanimity on thoroughbreds progressing evenly. 15105 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 2:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi, Stephen (and Robert, Christine, Victor, and all) - Gosh, I like this post of yours! First of all, I've been a fan of Kalupahana for quite a while. Also, at one point in the following you sound dangerously close to being a phenomenalist! ;-)) This is where you write "I reject the search for ultimate realities, for something hidden under experience, both within (atta) and without (sabhava dhamma)." I had written something quite close to this at one point to the effect of reifying neither subject nor object. (There is the mere subject and the mere object - the mere seeing and the merely seen, the mere hearing and the merely heard, etc.) I don't, however, *completely* agree with the final assertion of yours. There is a moral agent only conventionally, only in a manner of speaking. However, speaking of a moral agent is not complete nonsense either. Though no "true and real being" puts a sword through another, there is yet pain and suffering resulting from what we conventionally call "the killing if a sentient being by a sentient being", and this is not "good". Moreover, such kamma (the killing of a sentient being) results in painful kamma vipaka in the mindstream we conventionally refer to as "the perpetrator" as well. We go to extremes, avoiding the middle way. One mistake we make lies, I think, not in saying that conventional objects fail to be ultimate existents, but in saying that they have no reality at all and that all statements about them are meaningless. Conventional objects that are the named, intended referents of well grounded concepts are quite meaningfully talked about, because those concepts are knowledge-packed mental shorthand for intricate networks of interrelated, directly apprehended "realities". It is one extreme to believe that these conventional objects are complete fictions, and another extreme to think that they are fundamental realities - true, separate, and self-existent "things". With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/21/02 2:53:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > > Hello Robert, Christine, Victor, all > If I may jump back into this discussion I'd like attempt to disentangle > anatta from the other threads, especially whether beings exist. > Robert asked if I agreed with: > >"There is no doer of the deed, > >Or one who reaps the deed's result." VM XIX 19 > >"The mental (nama) and material (rupa) are really here, > >But here there is no human being to be found..." VM > The first, yes, in a way, but not the second. > The Buddha denied a self under certain descriptions, and these have been > clearly stated. For instance, in the Bhikkhu Bodhi quote, four: 1. The > idea > of duration or lastingness; 2. Simplicity, incomposite entity; 3. > Unconditioned; 4. Susceptibility to control. (Though on #4 what the Buddha > said: one can't just, e.g., will to be handsome or healthy, not the > uncontrollability of flashes of consciousness.) Or, in another post, on > what > the teachings deny: " A substantial ego entity, a lasting subject existing > at > the core of the psycho-physical personality." This is anatta, and I > completely agree. But there is a self that doesn't have these properties, > one > that is conditioned, and changing or insubstantial, and composite. > In rejecting a permanent substratum the Buddha was not rejecting the idea > of > a continuing being. This concept is necessary to distinguish one stream of > being/consciousness from another, to account for the unity of personality > within a stream, and (key) as an agent of moral action*. This person is a > flux of conditioned processes, not a substantial entity or soul; so we can > say that such a person is a conventional usage. The self is the functional > unity of the five aggregates. > I reject the search for ultimate realities, for something hidden under > experience, both within (atta) and without (sabhava dhamma). ("The Buddha > did > not analyze experience into discrete entities or momentary impressions and > then try to find a way of unifying them. Such an enterprise was undertaken > by > his misguided disciples a few centuries later..." Kalupahana, The > Principles > of Buddhist Psychology, p. 22) So you can see that I agree with the first > but, in accepting various and sundry beings, have problems with the second. > >If that situation is analyzed there was really no Buddha or Rahula. > Yes, there is; one should just not be deceived about what they are. > (I also have problems with positing two fundamental modes of being, > material > and mental stuff, nama and rupa; with Cartesian dualism.) > (Further, I find the entire project of distinguishing paramattha dhammas / > pure experiences from panatti / concepts dubious at best. To quote > Kalupahana > again: "Each one of our perceptions constitutes a mixed bag of memories, > concepts, and dispositions as well as the material elements...A pure > percept > undiluted by such conditions is not recognized by the Buddha or any > subsequent Buddhist psychologist who has remained faithful to the Buddha. A > > pure percept is as metaphysical as a pure a priori category." p. 18) > We are so far apart it's no wonder you didn't understand my position. > Perhaps, hopefully, we agree on anatta. > Otherwise I hope your trip to Bangkok is going well and that you are in > good > health and spirits. > metta, stephen > *As I argued before, when this thread was focused on free will, one can't > build a moral agent out of paramattha dhammas. It's simply no good to say > it's mundanely or conventionally true, but in actuality false. Victor's > example of killing is exactly right; with no beings, it's just rupas > penetrating rupas. > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15106 From: bodhi2500 Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 6:09pm Subject: Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati Hi I would like to thank Andrew for his hospitality on the SEQLD,DSG weekend. It was great to meet some of the DSGers and others interested in the Abhidhamma. I also recieved a hard copy of Nina's "Abhidhamma in daily life". Thanks to all involved. Looking forward to the next get together. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6. > Footnote; > 6. Each kusala citta is accompanied by sati that is heedful, non- forgetful > of what is kusala. Thus, there are many levels of sati: sati of dåna, of > síla, of samatha and of satipatthåna. Sati of satipttìhåna is non- forgetful > of the characteristic of reality, nåma or rúpa, that appears. Could someone please explain the differance between, Sati and Sammaasati. My understanding is that Sati arises with all kusala citta's (all kusala citta's?) and Sammaasati is a magga moment? Is this correct? Also what would be a example of micchaasati? Is micchasati a cetasika? Thanks Steve 15107 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 2:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: rupas out there Hi, Stephen - In a message dated 8/21/02 2:54:08 AM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > > Hello Howard, Jon, > > >Howard: To me, however, "existence" implies the actuality or > > > possibility of being experienced. > How so? > Bees can see the ultraviolet patterns on flowers, sharks can sense electric > > currents in water, and such; we can't. -------------------------------------------------- Howard: So? ------------------------------------------------ Now all these things can be > > 'experienced' indirectly (say by using film that will record ultraviolet > light then printing it on paper that translates this into the slice of the > spectrum we can see). This commonplace is relevant if you mean to limit > 'existence' to only things that can be experienced directly (as a > paramattha > dhamma and not pannatti?). ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I never said that *I* needed to experience everything. ------------------------------------------------------- > That is, I see your project as identifying a > sense-datum (phenomenalism) with a dhamma (Buddhadhamma). Is this correct? > The Buddha was certainly an empiricist. But the above is a statement of the > > core principle of Logical Positivism, which was never able to give a > coherent > account of the Verification Principle (that kept out metaphysics, i.e., > pannatti ;-). Do you mean to go down this road? > [How would one experience the statement "Existence implies the actuality or > > possibility of being experienced." --or is it unreal?] > "[The] programme of translating talk about physical objects and their > locations into talk about possible experiences...is widely supposed to have > > failed, and the priority the approach gives to experience has been much > criticized. It is more common in contemporary philosophy to see experience > as > itself a construct from the actual way of the world rather than the other > way > around." Phenomenalism, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy" This, > incidentally, is essentially a restatement of my previous post where I > argued > that one can't construct the world (specifically of free choice and ethics) > > out of paramattha dhammas. > ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't know, Stephen. I think that is exactly what we do all the time! (But I'm no philosopher.) ---------------------------------------------------- > metta, stephen > > ========================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15108 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 2:49pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi, Victor - You give questions. You act as "the teacher" using the Socratic method. But we can all be teachers here and we can all be students. Why not give answers as well as questions. Many of us would like to be clearer on what you mean/believe, and we would be very happy if you were to straight-out say what that might be. With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/21/02 5:57:13 PM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hi Christine, > > I would suggest examining the criterion for accepting what the > word "self" mean. > > Do not go upon what has been acquired by repeated hearing; nor upon > tradition; nor upon rumor; nor upon what is in a scripture; nor upon > surmise; nor upon an axiom; nor upon specious reasoning; nor upon a > bias towards a notion that has been pondered over; nor upon another's > seeming ability; nor upon the consideration, 'The monk is our > teacher.' > > Christine, when you yourself know: 'These things are good; these > things are not blamable; these things are praised by the wise; > undertaken and observed, these things lead to benefit and happiness,' > enter on and abide in them. > > Examine very closely the assumption "self is a complex combination of > material and mental processes" or the assumption "self is a residual > entity" or the assumption "self is psychological entities or agents > inside the person." > > Are these assumptions good? Are they not blamable? Are they praised > by the wise? Undertaken and observed, do they lead to benefit and > happiness? > > How did the Buddha used the word "self"? When teaching, did he use > the word "self" as reflexive pronoun without any assumption? > > Is using the word "self" as reflexive pronoun without any assumption > bad? Is it blamable? Is it praised by the wise? Undertaken and > observed, does it lead to harm and ill? > > Metta, > Victor > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15109 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 7:22pm Subject: Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati Hi Steve, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "bodhi2500" wrote: > Could someone please explain the differance between, Sati and > Sammaasati. > My understanding is that Sati arises with all kusala citta's (all > kusala citta's?) and Sammaasati is a magga moment? Is this correct? > Also what would be a example of micchaasati? Is micchasati a cetasika? "Sammasati" is "Right Mindfulness", the seventh factor of the Eightfold Noble Path. http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Academy/9280/s-sati1.htm http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/misc/waytoend.html By "magga moment", I assume you mean the instantaneous magga-citta that occurs when one reaches a stage of enlightenment (followed by phala-citta, fruit consciousness). In our cycles of existence, we will only experience four magga-cittas (if we work really, really, really hard): one when we achieve sotapanna, one when we achieve sakadagami, one when we achieve anagami and one when we achieve arahanthood. Magga-cittas are beyond the Noble Eightfold path; once the Noble Eightfold path is perfected, it is used as an instrument to develop wisdom and achive these ariyan states. Sati, as a cetasika, arises with every kusala citta. When sati appears as a path factor, it is also supported by the other path factors. In other words, anybody can do dana, and when they do so, there is a moment that includes sati. This type of sati is not a path factor because it is not supported by Right View, etc. In brief, sammasati is a special form of sati (when applied as part of the Noble Eightfold Path) and magga-citta is another subject entirely. I found one reference to micchasati on line: "Therefore one can deduce from methods of practice which one is not the development of panna that studies and notes the characteristics of nama-dhamma and rupa-dhamma, but an attempt to do something different from what is actually the normal daily life. That path is micchamagga comprising micchaditthi, micchasankappa, micchavaca, micchakammanta, micchaajiva, micchavayama, micchasati and micchasamadhi, not sammamagga, which is the development of sati- patthana, vipassana." http://www.dhammastudy.com/paramat3.html My "Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines" defines micchasati as part of the 'Eightfold Wrong Path' and states that it is bound to all akusala cittas. Micchasati is not a cetasika. My interpretation is that it would be closely linked with pananca, the layers of mental elaboration, embellishment, or conceptual proliferation that the latent defilements add to "actual reality" (that which sati is aware of) to create perceived reality. Steve, I hope that this helps. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15110 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 7:47pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi, Howard, Let me put forth some questions: What is the difference between human being and the true and real human being? How would you speak ultimately about a sentient being killing sentient being? Would you say that ultimately, there is no sentient being, no killing? Would you say that conventionally, there was Holocaust, but ultimately, there was none? Would you say conventionally there is moral agent but ultimately there is none? You said that speaking of moral agent is not completely nonsense, is it partly nonsense? Would you say that conventionally one reaps the consequence of his or her action but ultimately there is no one that reaps the result his or her own action? What would you say about killing ultimately? Is it ultimately "good", "bad", neither "good" nor "bad"? Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Stephen (and Robert, Christine, Victor, and all) - > > Gosh, I like this post of yours! First of all, I've been a fan of > Kalupahana for quite a while. Also, at one point in the following you sound > dangerously close to being a phenomenalist! ;-)) This is where you write "I > reject the search for ultimate realities, for something hidden under > experience, both within (atta) and without (sabhava dhamma)." I had written > something quite close to this at one point to the effect of reifying neither > subject nor object. (There is the mere subject and the mere object - the mere > seeing and the merely seen, the mere hearing and the merely heard, etc.) > I don't, however, *completely* agree with the final assertion of > yours. There is a moral agent only conventionally, only in a manner of > speaking. However, speaking of a moral agent is not complete nonsense either. > Though no "true and real being" puts a sword through another, there is yet > pain and suffering resulting from what we conventionally call "the killing if > a sentient being by a sentient being", and this is not "good". Moreover, such > kamma (the killing of a sentient being) results in painful kamma vipaka in > the mindstream we conventionally refer to as "the perpetrator" as well. > We go to extremes, avoiding the middle way. One mistake we make lies, > I think, not in saying that conventional objects fail to be ultimate > existents, but in saying that they have no reality at all and that all > statements about them are meaningless. Conventional objects that are the > named, intended referents of well grounded concepts are quite meaningfully > talked about, because those concepts are knowledge-packed mental shorthand > for intricate networks of interrelated, directly apprehended "realities". It > is one extreme to believe that these conventional objects are complete > fictions, and another extreme to think that they are fundamental realities - > true, separate, and self-existent "things". > > With metta, > Howard 15111 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 4:15pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hello Victor, Your position confuses me; it *appears* to be an untenable middle ground. On one hand you have clearly stated that there are beings, especially human beings, as the agents of moral responsibility. But, on the other hand, that one should have no theory whatsoever about the concept 'self.' Now why shouldn't we simply call a human being a 'person' or 'self,' as long as it's understood this refers to a process, not an unchanging Self? This, I believe, is just what the Buddha did. Do this and come over to my side, the loyal opposition. On the other hand if you reject using 'self' in this manner how do you justify using human being and such; these are also simply the names of dynamic processes. Same deal. So, to be consistent, reject the use of 'beings' and go over to the dark side ;-) I don't see how you can have it both ways. Can you clarify this? metta, stephen 15112 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 4:39pm Subject: Re: Let go Hello Christine, (from Silananada—downloaded his article, I'll read it as possible. Thank you.) >However on the conventional level, the workings of these forces, >elements, and states are organized by causal laws, and, although they >in no way constitute any extra-phenomenal self or soul, they do >produce a human individual, a person - if we want to call a certain >combination of material and mental processes a person. Why wouldn't one say that's exactly what a person or self is? A dynamic continuum. For two reasons, both metaphysical searches for ultimate realities. 1. (atta) Someone is looking for a Self, some unconditioned and substantial entity. We all agree this is wrong. 2. One has a theory of elemental bits of reality (dhammas). >Common everyday conceptions, >such as ego, self, and personality seem to be very real, obvious, and >well-defined by psychologists and laymen alike, but they are, on the >absolute level and in the eyes of those who have achieved >enlightenment, illusory. In what possible sense "illusory?" Table and trees are the paradigm cases by which terms such as 'real' and 'solid' are defined. Lets suppose they are made of parts; this has no consequences as (probably) everything is. Everything is conditioned (well, save one). Let me ask you for some examples of paramattha dhammas, these putative elementary things. If everything is made of them it's odd no one seems to know, or at least say, precisely what they are. I would suggest that any nama is going to turn out to be composite and not ultimate. If it's color it's going to be extended, not a point; so it has parts. And is dependent on photons, neuronal stim, etc. A salty taste consists of sodium chloride, which is made of two types of elements, which are made of leptons (electrons) and hadrons (protons, neutrons), the latter being made of quarks, which may be made of strings...So mental dhammas aren't elementary; so they aren't really real? (I really have no idea what ultimately real, means, in distinction to the everyday world; or in what possible sense it could be illusory or not real.) What if it's Chinese boxes ad infinitum? metta, stephen 15113 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 8:54pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi, Howard, Instead of giving my answers to the questions below now, I would like you to come up with your answers, if you want to answer them at all. Given the assumption "self is a complex combination of material and mental processes", the assumption "self is a residual entity", and the assumption "self is psychological entities or agents inside the person." Q1) Are these assumptions good? Q2) Are they not blamable? Q3) Are they praised by the wise? Q4) Undertaken and observed, do they lead to benefit and happiness? Q5) How did the Buddha used the word "self"? Q6) When teaching, did he use the word "self" as reflexive pronoun without any assumption? Q7) Is using the word "self" as reflexive pronoun without any assumption bad? Q8) Is it blamable? Q9) Is it censured* by the wise? Q10) Undertaken and observed, does it lead to harm and ill? Metta, Victor * In the original message, I had the word "praised" in place of the word "censured" --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Victor - > > You give questions. You act as "the teacher" using the Socratic > method. But we can all be teachers here and we can all be students. Why not > give answers as well as questions. Many of us would like to be clearer on > what you mean/believe, and we would be very happy if you were to straight-out > say what that might be. > > With metta, > Howard 15114 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 9:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati Hi Steve and Rob, In a brief conversation with Kom about miccha magga he said miccha sati is lobha. Larry 15115 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 9:20pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Victor, I have been silent on this ongoing stream because I am still trying to figure this anatta thing out myself. Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that that many of the questions that you are asking below were taken from the Kalama Sutta. Here is part of Bhikkhu Bodhi's commentary on the Kamala Sutta (full commentary at http://www.buddhistinformation.com/lecture_on_the_kalama_sutra.htm ) Now this passage, like everything else spoken by the Buddha, has been stated in a specific context -- with a particular audience and situation in view -- and thus must be understood in relation to that context. The Kalamas, citizens of the town of Kesaputta, had been visited by religious teachers of divergent views, each of whom would propound his own doctrines and tear down the doctrines of his predecessors. This left the Kalamas perplexed, and thus when "the recluse Gotama," reputed to be an Awakened One, arrived in their township, they approached him in the hope that he might be able to dispel their confusion. From the subsequent development of the Sutta, it is clear that the issues that perplexed them were the reality of rebirth and kammic retribution for good and evil deeds. In brief, I am not sure that the Buddha held up these questions to be used as the litmus test for all aspects of the Dhamma as you are applying them to anatta. Nonetheless, I don't have any better questions and I certainly don't have any answers on anatta. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Q1) Are these assumptions good? > > Q2) Are they not blamable? > > Q3) Are they praised by the wise? > > Q4) Undertaken and observed, do they lead to benefit and happiness? > > Q5) How did the Buddha used the word "self"? > > Q6) When teaching, did he use the word "self" as reflexive pronoun > without any assumption? > > Q7) Is using the word "self" as reflexive pronoun without any > assumption bad? > > Q8) Is it blamable? > > Q9) Is it censured* by the wise? > > Q10) Undertaken and observed, does it lead to harm and ill? 15116 From: Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 9:40pm Subject: Re: Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata (was Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 21 (3)) Hi Rob, According to Ven. Nyanatiloka upekkha as indifferent feeling is 'adukkha-m-asukha vedana'. So upekkha vedana is indifferent, doesn't care, while upekkha sankhara (tatramajjhattata) functions to "prevent deficiency and excess, or its function is to inhibit partiality". Larry ------------------- Rob: " Hi All, What is the difference between upekkha and tatramajjhattata? Thanks, Rob M :-)" 15117 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 21, 2002 9:50pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati Hi Larry, Hmmm.. interesting. Please help me to understand better. Miccha = wrong, Sati = mindfulness The paramattha (object of mindfulness) would become 'wrong' when it is corrupted, covered over by papanca; an action of one of the latent defilements. The latent defilement of sensuous desire would corrupt the paramattha object to allow lobha to arise. The latent defilement of ill will would corrupt the paramattha object to allow dosa to arise. The latent defilements of sloth & torpor, reslessness & worry and doubt would corrupt the paramattha object to allow moha to arise. Only wise attention (yoniso manasikara), which sees things as they truly are (and therefore is not part of 'wrong' mindfulness) will give rise to a beautiful citta. This covering over of the paramattha object caused by the latent defilements creates papanca (the covering). The covering (papanca) covers over and distorts the paramattha object as a layer of clouds obscures the moon, and creates a percieved reality which the defilement can hook into to come to the surface and direct the Votthapana citta. The optimist sees the glass as half full, the pessismist sees the glass as half empty. The mindful person sees no glass, no water, only visible object. Is it possible that Kom was giving one example of the result of miccha magga? Larry (and others), I have pieced the above together from a number of places, so I am not going to swear that it is 100% correct. I would appreciate anybody setting me right if I am confused. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Steve and Rob, > > In a brief conversation with Kom about miccha magga he said miccha sati > is lobha. > > Larry 15118 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 1:04am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati Dear Rob & Larry, I think Larry understood what I said right, where I equated micha-sati to lobha. Unfortunately, I can't find any references to back this up. There are commentaries in the sutta and abhidhamma that equate Micha-sati with akusala citta (and cetasikas?) in general though. In MN8, Sallekha Sutta, the brief discussion of micha-sati is this (translated from Thai commentaries...): [begin translation] In truth, Micha-sati is like micha-sangappa, it is not specific to a particular dhamma, but it is a name for the 4 akusala kandha, which arises in one who thinks of the past(???). When the Buddha said, "Bikkhu, the Tatagatha said that there is sati (micha), not that there isn't. There is sati in those who thinks of gaining sons, gaining properties and gaining honors". The Buddha meant the arising of the fake (artificial, untrue, etc.) sati. [end translation] In Pathamasamantapasatika, the commentaries to Suttanta pitakas, KN, Patisambhida magga, Maha vagga, nanna gatha, it says: [begin translation] Micha-sati - wrong mindfulness which is akusala citta which is the enemy of sati. [end translation] So it appears to me that micha-sati, by the explanation of the commentaries, mean all the akusala states. Thanks for bringing this up again giving me a chance to look. This gives me a good reminder that I should verify what I think the Buddha says! kom > -----Original Message----- > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2002 9:50 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] Re: Perfections, Ch IV, > Renunciation, no 6./Sati > > > Hi Larry, > > Hmmm.. interesting. Please help me to understand better. > > Miccha = wrong, Sati = mindfulness 15119 From: bodhi2500 Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 3:08am Subject: [dsg] Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati Hi This is from Ven. Nyanatiloka's Manual of Buddhist Terms> "Miccha-sankappa,Miccha-vayama,Miccha-sati and Miccha-samadhi are inseparably bound up with every karmically unwholesome state of consciousness." Is this the "4 akusala khandha" that is talked about in the below post? Thanks for the replies. Steve --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Kom Tukovinit" wrote: > Dear Rob & Larry, > > I think Larry understood what I said right, where I equated > micha-sati to lobha. > > Unfortunately, I can't find any references to back this up. > There are commentaries in the sutta and abhidhamma that > equate Micha-sati with akusala citta (and cetasikas?) in > general though. > > In MN8, Sallekha Sutta, the brief discussion of micha-sati > is this (translated from Thai commentaries...): > > [begin translation] > In truth, Micha-sati is like micha-sangappa, it is not > specific to a particular dhamma, but it is a name for the 4 > akusala kandha, which arises in one who thinks of the > past(???). When the Buddha said, "Bikkhu, the Tatagatha > said that there is sati (micha), not that there isn't. > There is sati in those who thinks of gaining sons, gaining > properties and gaining honors". The Buddha meant the > arising of the fake (artificial, untrue, etc.) sati. > [end translation] > > In Pathamasamantapasatika, the commentaries to Suttanta > pitakas, KN, Patisambhida magga, Maha vagga, nanna gatha, it > says: > > [begin translation] > Micha-sati - wrong mindfulness which is akusala citta which > is the enemy of sati. > [end translation] > > So it appears to me that micha-sati, by the explanation of > the commentaries, mean all the akusala states. > > Thanks for bringing this up again giving me a chance to > look. This gives me a good reminder that I should verify > what I think the Buddha says! > > > kom > > -----Original Message----- > > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > > Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2002 9:50 PM > > To: dhammastudygroup@y... > > Subject: [dsg] Re: Perfections, Ch IV, > > Renunciation, no 6./Sati > > > > > > Hi Larry, > > > > Hmmm.. interesting. Please help me to understand better. > > > > Miccha = wrong, Sati = mindfulness 15120 From: egberdina Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 6:01am Subject: Re: Let go Hi Stephen, Abhidhamma only makes sense as Abhidhamma, studied within the parameters of its domain, so to speak. The subject matter of the Abhidhamma is the "mechanics of the mind". Comparisons between Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, the periodic table of elements and Abhidhamma will add at least 33.2 aeons to your samsaric experience :-) I am about to score some brownie points with Howard here, and I do so unashamedly. Abhidhamma is pure phenomenology. I stopped getting the shits with Abhidhamma once I realised the limits and extent of it's subject matter. And then, yes, the irreducibles, the parramatha dhammas, make an awful lot of sense. I do not doubt that from within other systems of thought colour, taste, sound, smell etc can be further broken down, but limited to the study of raw experience I think the parramattha dhammas are pretty spot on. My opinion only, of course :-) (My kids enjoyed their stay at LA. Thanks.) Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Christine, > > (from Silananadaâ€"downloaded his article, I'll read it as possible. Thank you.) > >However on the conventional level, the workings of these forces, > > >elements, and states are organized by causal laws, and, although they > > >in no way constitute any extra-phenomenal self or soul, they do > > >produce a human individual, a person - if we want to call a certain > > >combination of material and mental processes a person. > Why wouldn't one say that's exactly what a person or self is? A dynamic > continuum. > For two reasons, both metaphysical searches for ultimate realities. > 1. (atta) Someone is looking for a Self, some unconditioned and substantial > entity. We all agree this is wrong. > 2. One has a theory of elemental bits of reality (dhammas). > > >Common everyday conceptions, > > >such as ego, self, and personality seem to be very real, obvious, and > > >well-defined by psychologists and laymen alike, but they are, on the > > >absolute level and in the eyes of those who have achieved > > >enlightenment, illusory. > In what possible sense "illusory?" Table and trees are the paradigm cases by > which terms such as 'real' and 'solid' are defined. Lets suppose they are > made of parts; this has no consequences as (probably) everything is. > Everything is conditioned (well, save one). > > Let me ask you for some examples of paramattha dhammas, these putative > elementary things. If everything is made of them it's odd no one seems to > know, or at least say, precisely what they are. I would suggest that any nama > is going to turn out to be composite and not ultimate. If it's color it's > going to be extended, not a point; so it has parts. And is dependent on > photons, neuronal stim, etc. A salty taste consists of sodium chloride, which > is made of two types of elements, which are made of leptons (electrons) and > hadrons (protons, neutrons), the latter being made of quarks, which may be > made of strings...So mental dhammas aren't elementary; so they aren't really > real? (I really have no idea what ultimately real, means, in distinction to > the everyday world; or in what possible sense it could be illusory or not > real.) What if it's Chinese boxes ad infinitum? > metta, stephen 15121 From: Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 3:30am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi, Victor (and Stephen) - In a message dated 8/21/02 10:47:35 PM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hi, Howard, > > Let me put forth some questions: > What is the difference between human being and the true and real > human being? How would you speak ultimately about a sentient being > killing sentient being? Would you say that ultimately, there is no > sentient being, no killing? Would you say that conventionally, there > was Holocaust, but ultimately, there was none? Would you say > conventionally there is moral agent but ultimately there is none? > You said that speaking of moral agent is not completely nonsense, is > it partly nonsense? Would you say that conventionally one reaps the > consequence of his or her action but ultimately there is no one that > reaps the result his or her own action? What would you say about > killing ultimately? Is it ultimately "good", "bad", neither "good" > nor "bad"? > > Metta, > Victor > ================================ Let *me* put forth some questions. First of all, I put to you exactly the questions you put to me, and with the request that you indicate your opinions/understanding by assertions instead of further questions. More generally, I ask you whether you believe that 'truth' has only one sense? I ask you whether you think there is any difference between the way things actually are and the way we speak about them. In particular, I ask you whether you think there are any distinctions among the usages of 'self', and whether the Buddha condemned any of them. I ask you whether or not you think there might be *degrees* of reality, or whether all things are equally real. I could go on and on and on. There is virtually no end to the homework assignment I can give to you in the way of questions to answer. But would it not be more reasonable for us to bite off a small chunk of the question cake (along with all the ingredients, Stephen! ;-)) at a time, each of us state straight-out how we understand the issues and our take on them, and then continue in that fashion, interactively, so that we might actually come to learn something from the other (though not necessarily agreeing)? I know - that's another question!! ;-)) With metta, Howard > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Stephen (and Robert, Christine, Victor, and all) - > > > > Gosh, I like this post of yours! First of all, I've been a > fan of > > Kalupahana for quite a while. Also, at one point in the following > you sound > > dangerously close to being a phenomenalist! ;-)) This is where you > write "I > > reject the search for ultimate realities, for something hidden > under > > experience, both within (atta) and without (sabhava dhamma)." I had > written > > something quite close to this at one point to the effect of > reifying neither > > subject nor object. (There is the mere subject and the mere object - > the mere > > seeing and the merely seen, the mere hearing and the merely heard, > etc.) > > I don't, however, *completely* agree with the final > assertion of > > yours. There is a moral agent only conventionally, only in a manner > of > > speaking. However, speaking of a moral agent is not complete > nonsense either. > > Though no "true and real being" puts a sword through another, there > is yet > > pain and suffering resulting from what we conventionally call "the > killing if > > a sentient being by a sentient being", and this is not "good". > Moreover, such > > kamma (the killing of a sentient being) results in painful kamma > vipaka in > > the mindstream we conventionally refer to as "the perpetrator" as > well. > > We go to extremes, avoiding the middle way. One mistake we > make lies, > > I think, not in saying that conventional objects fail to be > ultimate > > existents, but in saying that they have no reality at all and that > all > > statements about them are meaningless. Conventional objects that > are the > > named, intended referents of well grounded concepts are quite > meaningfully > > talked about, because those concepts are knowledge-packed mental > shorthand > > for intricate networks of interrelated, directly > apprehended "realities". It > > is one extreme to believe that these conventional objects are > complete > > fictions, and another extreme to think that they are fundamental > realities - > > true, separate, and self-existent "things". > > > > With metta, > > Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15122 From: Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 3:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi, Stephen - In a message dated 8/21/02 11:40:29 PM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > > Let me ask you for some examples of paramattha dhammas, these putative > elementary things. If everything is made of them it's odd no one seems to > know, or at least say, precisely what they are. I would suggest that any > nama > is going to turn out to be composite and not ultimate. If it's color it's > going to be extended, not a point; so it has parts. And is dependent on > photons, neuronal stim, etc. A salty taste consists of sodium chloride, > which > is made of two types of elements, which are made of leptons (electrons) and > > hadrons (protons, neutrons), the latter being made of quarks, which may be > made of strings...So mental dhammas aren't elementary; so they aren't > really > real? (I really have no idea what ultimately real, means, in distinction to > > the everyday world; or in what possible sense it could ============================== Just for the record, that would be just fine and dandy with me!! I have no commitment whatsoever to the particular inventory of "paramattha dhammas" given in the Abhidhamma nor to the principle that they are not further reducible. A thoroughgoing emptiness at levels beyond levels beyond levels, yet at the very same time being exactly "the world" of our experience, is very possibly the way things are, and bothers me not in the slightest. I do have a strong commitment (probably unshakeable) to both the tilakkhana and patticcasamuppada (sp?), and a (slightly less) strong commitment to phenomenalism and pragmatism. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15123 From: robmoult Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 10:56am Subject: [dsg] Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati Hi Rob, YOU'RE WRONG!!! WRONG, I TELL YOU!!! Attachment to senses, ill will, sloth & torpor, restlessness & worry and doubt are NOT "defilements"... they are "hindrances" to mental development (bhavana). It is ignorance (avijja), kammic disposition and current situation that determine the like / dislike / indifference toward an object. But if we have wise attention (yoniso manasikara), we can turn an unfavourable situation into kusala kamma. DON'T EVER LET ME CATCH YOU AGAIN MAKING A QUICK REPLY WITHOUT CHECKING YOUR SOURCES FIRST!!! OTHERWISE, I WILL BAN YOU FROM THIS DISCUSSION GROUP!!! Thanks, Rob :-( [My Mr. Hyde ;-)] --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Larry, > > Hmmm.. interesting. Please help me to understand better. > > Miccha = wrong, Sati = mindfulness > > The paramattha (object of mindfulness) would become 'wrong' when it > is corrupted, covered over by papanca; an action of one of the > latent defilements. The latent defilement of sensuous desire would > corrupt the paramattha object to allow lobha to arise. The latent > defilement of ill will would corrupt the paramattha object to allow > dosa to arise. The latent defilements of sloth & torpor, reslessness > & worry and doubt would corrupt the paramattha object to allow moha > to arise. Only wise attention (yoniso manasikara), which sees things > as they truly are (and therefore is not part of 'wrong' mindfulness) > will give rise to a beautiful citta. > > This covering over of the paramattha object caused by the latent > defilements creates papanca (the covering). The covering (papanca) > covers over and distorts the paramattha object as a layer of clouds > obscures the moon, and creates a percieved reality which the > defilement can hook into to come to the surface and direct the > Votthapana citta. > > The optimist sees the glass as half full, the pessismist sees the > glass as half empty. The mindful person sees no glass, no water, > only visible object. > > Is it possible that Kom was giving one example of the result of > miccha magga? > > Larry (and others), I have pieced the above together from a number > of places, so I am not going to swear that it is 100% correct. I > would appreciate anybody setting me right if I am confused. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > > Hi Steve and Rob, > > > > In a brief conversation with Kom about miccha magga he said miccha > sati > > is lobha. > > > > Larry 15124 From: Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 8:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi again, Victor - In a message dated 8/21/02 11:54:34 PM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hi, Howard, > > Instead of giving my answers to the questions below now, I would like > you to come up with your answers, if you want to answer them at all. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: So again you respond by giving questions. No, I really don't want to answer them. I think I have, over many posts, made my positon reasonably clear. As far as my ontological views are concerned, let me just say that I speak quite meaningfully about trees, tables, cars, and university curricula all the time without attributing essential existence to any of them and also without thinking that I'm talking total nonsense either. I see trees, tables, boxes of tissue paper - all the "things" of our day to day world as relatively real, but mind constructed. There is an objectivity to them, or, better, an intersubjectivity to them, because "we are all in this together"; that is, we share experiences (and relations among them), and we construct percepts/concepts from them in similar ways. To me, the notion that the soup that I am eating as I type in this message is a true, objective thing-in-itself, a core existent, with properties of liquidity, warmth, flavor, etc just does not ring true with me. But the co-occurrence of the experiences of liquidity, warmth, flavor, the patterned relations that exist among them, and the fact that what I experience is not foreign to what others can experience all do ring true to me. Moreover, while I have no problem talking of "the soup that I am eating as I type in this message" I don't understand that as you do or wish to. So be it. ----------------------------------------------------------------- > > Given the assumption "self is a complex combination of > material and mental processes", the assumption "self is a residual > entity", and the assumption "self is psychological entities or agents > inside the person." > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I make no such assumptions. The word 'self' is used in various ways. The notion of 'self' that the Buddha took exception to was that of an unchanging, unconditioned, essence or core in, or associated with, the five khandhas. ------------------------------------------------------- > > Q1) Are these assumptions good? > > Q2) Are they not blamable? > > Q3) Are they praised by the wise? > > Q4) Undertaken and observed, do they lead to benefit and happiness? > > Q5) How did the Buddha used the word "self"? > > Q6) When teaching, did he use the word "self" as reflexive pronoun > without any assumption? > > Q7) Is using the word "self" as reflexive pronoun without any > assumption bad? > > Q8) Is it blamable? > > Q9) Is it censured* by the wise? > > Q10) Undertaken and observed, does it lead to harm and ill? > > > Metta, > Victor > > * In the original message, I had the word "praised" in place of the > word "censured" > ============================= With metta, Howard > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Victor - > > > > You give questions. You act as "the teacher" using the > Socratic > > method. But we can all be teachers here and we can all be students. > Why not > > give answers as well as questions. Many of us would like to be > clearer on > > what you mean/believe, and we would be very happy if you were to > straight-out > > say what that might be. > > > > With metta, > > Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15125 From: Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 3:02pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati Hi all, Here's a coincidence. Four parts of miccha magga arise with every akusala state of consciousness: miccha-sankappa, miccha-vayama, miccha-sati, and miccha-samadhi. There are also four akusala universal cetasikas: delusion (moha), shamelessness (ahirika), fearlessness of wrong doing (anottappa), and restlessness (uddhacca). Larry 15126 From: yuzhonghao Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 3:37pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Hi Stephen, First of all, I should say "there are beings" instead of "there is being". Second, the word "self" is to be used as a reflexive pronoun. When one thinks that there is self, the word "self" loses its usage as reflexive pronoun and becomes a something that needs to be defined/delineated, either in terms of the aggregates or any thing such as "residual entity", "psycho-physical entity", or "soul", or whatever. The view "there is self" reflects/presupposes the assumption of what self is. When one learns and studies one is said to be a student. When one teaches as profession, one is said to be a teacher. Regarding human being, I find the following very interesting and insightful: "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Radha: when one is caught up (satta) there, tied up (visatta) there, one is said to be 'a being (satta).' "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling... perception... fabrications... "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for consciousness, Radha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a being.' ~Satta Sutta The terms "student", "teacher", "human being" are used for one's identity. These terms are defined in terms of what one does, not what one is. However, when one delineates a student, a teacher, or a human being in terms of five aggregates or any other thing, he or she falls into self-view. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > > Hello Victor, > Your position confuses me; it *appears* to be an untenable middle ground. On > one hand you have clearly stated that there are beings, especially human > beings, as the agents of moral responsibility. But, on the other hand, that > one should have no theory whatsoever about the concept 'self.' > Now why shouldn't we simply call a human being a 'person' or 'self,' as long > as it's understood this refers to a process, not an unchanging Self? This, I > believe, is just what the Buddha did. Do this and come over to my side, the > loyal opposition. > On the other hand if you reject using 'self' in this manner how do you > justify using human being and such; these are also simply the names of > dynamic processes. Same deal. So, to be consistent, reject the use of > 'beings' and go over to the dark side ;-) > I don't see how you can have it both ways. Can you clarify this? > metta, stephen 15127 From: Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 3:38pm Subject: ADL ch. 21 (4) http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 21 (4) Not all meditation subjects lead to jhana, some have only 'access concentration' as their result, such as the recollections of the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha. Some meditation subjects lead only to the first stage of rupa-jhana {Both rupa-jhana (material jhana) and arupa-jhana (immaterial where the meditation subject is no longer dependent on materiality) developed in different stages of jhana. When one is more advanced, can attain a higher stage of jhana. Arupa-jhana is more refined than rupa-jhana }, some to all stages of rupa-jhana. The meditation subject which is 'mindfulness of breathing' can lead to all stages of rupa-jhana. This meditation subject which is considered by many to be relatively easy, is one of the most difficult. One has to be mindful of one's in-breath and out-breath where they touch the tip of the nose or the upper-lip. This meditation subject is not learnt by sight, but by touch: the in-breath and the out-breath are the 'sign' (nimitta) one has to continue one's attention to. We read in the 'Visuddhimagga' (VIII, 208): For while other meditation subjects become clearer at each higher stage, this one does not: in fact, as he goes on developing it, it becomes more subtle for him at each higher stage, and it even comes to the point at which it is no longer manifest. Further on (Vlll, 210, 211) we read: ... This was why the Blessed One said: 'Bhikkhus, I do not say of one who is forgetful, who is not fully aware, (that he practises) development of mindfulness of breathing.' (Middle Length Sayings III, No. 118, 84) Although any meditation subject, no matter what, is successful only in one who is mindful and fully aware, yet any meditation subject other than this one gets more evident as he goes on giving it his attention. But this mindfulness of breathing is difficult, difficult to develop, a field in which only the minds of Buddhas, Pacceka Buddhas, and Buddhas' sons are at home. It is no trivial matter, nor can it be cultivated by trivial persons. In proportion as continued attention is given to it it becomes more peaceful and more subtle. So strong mindfulness and understanding are necessary here. Mindfulness of breathing is very difficult, 'it is no trivial matter'. When one continues to be mindful of breathing, the in-breaths and out-breaths become more and more subtle and thus harder to notice. We just read in the quotation that strong mindfulness and understanding are necessary here. Not only in vipassana, but also in samatha, mindfulness (sati) and understanding (panna) are necessary but the object of awareness in samatha is different from the object of awareness in vipassana. In samatha the object of awareness is the meditation subject and the aim is to develop calm. In vipassana the object of awareness is any nama or rupa which appears at the present moment through one of the six doors, in order to eradicate the wrong view of self and eventually all defilements. Through samatha the latent tendencies of defilements are not eradicated; when there are conditions akusala cittas arise again. We read in the 'Gradual Sayings' (Book of the Sixes, Ch. VI, par. 6, Citta Hatthisariputta) that even the monk who can attain jhana, may 'disavow the training' and return to the layman's life. We read that when the Buddha stayed near Varanasi in the Deer Park at Isipatana, a number of 'elders' had a talk on Abhidhamma. Citta Hatthisariputta interrupted their talk from time to time. Maha Kotthita said to him: 'Let not the venerable Citta Hatthisariputta constantly interrupt the elders' Abhidhamma talk; the venerable Citta should wait until the talk is over!' And when he had thus spoken, Citta's friends said : 'The venerable Maha Kotthita should not censure the venerable Citta Hatthisariputta. A wise man is the venerable Citta and able to talk to the elders on Abhidhamma.' 'It is a hard thing, sirs, for those who know not another person's ways of thought. Consider, sirs, a person who, so long as he lives near the Master or a fellow-teacher in the brahman life, is the most humble of the humble, the meekest of the meek, the quietest of the quiet; and who, when he leaves the Master or his fellow-teachers, keeps company with monks, nuns, lay-disciples, men and women, rajahs, their ministers, course-setters or their disciples. Living in company, untrammeled, rude, given over to gossip, passion corrupts his heart; and with his heart corrupted by passion, he disavows the training and returns to the lower life. . . Consider again a person who, aloof from sensuous appetites... enters and abides in the first jhana. Thinking: 'I have won to the first jhana', he keeps company ...living in company, untrammeled, rude, given over to gossip, passion corrupts his heart; and with his heart corrupted by passion, he disavows the training and returns to the lower life...' The same is said about the other stages of jhana. We then read that Citta Hatthisariputta disavowed the training and returned to the lower life. But not long after that he 'went forth' (became a monk) again. We read: And the venerable Citta Hatthisariputta, living alone, secluded, earnest, ardent, resolved, not long after, entered and abode in that aim above all of the brahman life--realizing it here and now by his own knowledge--for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from home to the homeless life: and he knew: 'Birth is destroyed, the brahman life is lived, done is what was to be done, there is no more of this.' And the venerable Citta Hatthisariputta was numbered among the arahats. Even if one can attain the highest stage of jhana, one's heart can still become 'corrupted by passion', as we read in the sutta. When Citta Hatthisariputta had attained arahatship, he had realized the 'aim above all of the brahman life'. The hindrances could not arise any more. Through vipassana, hindrances are eradicated in the successive stages of enlightenment. The sotapanna (who has attained the first stage of enlightenment) has eradicated the hindrance which is doubt (vicikiccha); the anagami (who has attained the third stage of enlightenment) has eradicated the sensuous desire (kamacchandha), ill-will (vyapada) and worry (kukkucca); the arahat has eradicated sloth and torpor (thina and middha) and restlessness (uddhacca), he has eradicated all defilements. Questions 1. Which paramattha dhamma are the jhana-factors? 2. Which khandha is the jhana-factor which is piti (rapture)? 3. Which khandha is the jhana-factor which is sukha (pleasant feeling)? 4. When seeing now, is there ekaggata cetasika? What is its function? 5. What is the function of ekaggata cetasika which arises with the jhanacitta? What is its object? 6. What is the function of ekaggata cetasika arising with the panna (wisdom) of the Eightfold Path which realizes a characteristic of nama or rupa? What is its object at that moment? 7. Why is mindfulness of breathing one of the most difficult subjects of meditation? 8. What is the difference between samma-sati (right mindfulness) in samatha and samma-sati in vipassana? What are their respective objects of awareness? 9. If one only develops samatha and not vipassana, why can the hindrances not be eradicated? 15128 From: kenhowardau Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 4:10pm Subject: Dhamma without abhidhamma : was: Pernicious view Dear Stephen, Did the Buddha teach anything you don't already know? In case that question sounds trivial or impertinent, I will try to explain my thinking: I once explained anatta to a friend of mine - a friend with no knowledge of Buddhism but with an education in science. He saw nothing new or extraordinary about it, and I had to agree with him. (Since atomism was replaced by quantum physics, there has been no serious, scientific belief in a self.) The difference between concepts and absolute realities though, had him completely stumped. He couldn't see past his, admittedly flawed, conventional view of the world. The Tathagatha's appearance in the world, together with the proclamation of his teaching, was an occasion like no other in history; I think it is said -- and I don't doubt it -- `the cosmos shook!' Without the explanation of absolute reality, what is there in the Buddha's teaching that is, even remotely, ground-breaking? Kind regards Ken H --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Robert, Christine, Victor, all > If I may jump back into this discussion I'd like attempt to disentangle > anatta from the other threads, especially whether beings exist. > Robert asked if I agreed with: > >"There is no doer of the deed, > >Or one who reaps the deed's result." VM XIX 19 > >"The mental (nama) and material (rupa) are really here, > >But here there is no human being to be found..." VM > The first, yes, in a way, but not the second. > The Buddha denied a self under certain descriptions, and these have been > clearly stated. For instance, in the Bhikkhu Bodhi quote, four: 1. The idea > of duration or lastingness; 2. Simplicity, incomposite entity; 3. > Unconditioned; 4. Susceptibility to control. (Though on #4 what the Buddha > said: one can't just, e.g., will to be handsome or healthy, not the > uncontrollability of flashes of consciousness.) Or, in another post, on what > the teachings deny: " A substantial ego entity, a lasting subject existing at > the core of the psycho-physical personality." This is anatta, and I > completely agree. But there is a self that doesn't have these properties, one > that is conditioned, and changing or insubstantial, and composite. > In rejecting a permanent substratum the Buddha was not rejecting the idea of > a continuing being. This concept is necessary to distinguish one stream of > being/consciousness from another, to account for the unity of personality > within a stream, and (key) as an agent of moral action*. This person is a > flux of conditioned processes, not a substantial entity or soul; so we can > say that such a person is a conventional usage. The self is the functional > unity of the five aggregates. > I reject the search for ultimate realities, for something hidden under > experience, both within (atta) and without (sabhava dhamma). ("The Buddha did > not analyze experience into discrete entities or momentary impressions and > then try to find a way of unifying them. Such an enterprise was undertaken by > his misguided disciples a few centuries later..." Kalupahana, The Principles > of Buddhist Psychology, p. 22) So you can see that I agree with the first > but, in accepting various and sundry beings, have problems with the second. > >If that situation is analyzed there was really no Buddha or Rahula. > Yes, there is; one should just not be deceived about what they are. > (I also have problems with positing two fundamental modes of being, material > and mental stuff, nama and rupa; with Cartesian dualism.) > (Further, I find the entire project of distinguishing paramattha dhammas / > pure experiences from panatti / concepts dubious at best. To quote Kalupahana > again: "Each one of our perceptions constitutes a mixed bag of memories, > concepts, and dispositions as well as the material elements...A pure percept > undiluted by such conditions is not recognized by the Buddha or any > subsequent Buddhist psychologist who has remained faithful to the Buddha. A > pure percept is as metaphysical as a pure a priori category." p. 18) > We are so far apart it's no wonder you didn't understand my position. > Perhaps, hopefully, we agree on anatta. > Otherwise I hope your trip to Bangkok is going well and that you are in good > health and spirits. > metta, stephen > *As I argued before, when this thread was focused on free will, one can't > build a moral agent out of paramattha dhammas. It's simply no good to say > it's mundanely or conventionally true, but in actuality false. Victor's > example of killing is exactly right; with no beings, it's just rupas > penetrating rupas. 15129 From: yuzhonghao Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 4:17pm Subject: Re: Pernicious view Not only when one think that there is self, but also when one think that there is no self, the the word "self" loses its meaning as reflexive pronoun and becomes a something that needs to be defined/delineated, either in terms of the aggregates or any thing such as "residual entity", "psycho-physical entity", or "soul", or whatever. Both the view "there is self" and "there is no self" reflects/presupposes the assumption of what self is. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Stephen, > > First of all, I should say "there are beings" instead of "there is > being". Second, the word "self" is to be used as a reflexive > pronoun. When one thinks that there is self, the word "self" loses > its usage as reflexive pronoun and becomes a something that needs to > be defined/delineated, either in terms of the aggregates or any thing > such as "residual entity", "psycho-physical entity", or "soul", or > whatever. The view "there is self" reflects/presupposes the > assumption of what self is. > > When one learns and studies one is said to be a student. When one > teaches as profession, one is said to be a teacher. Regarding human > being, I find the following very interesting and insightful: > > "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Radha: when one > is caught up (satta) there, tied up (visatta) there, one is said to > be 'a being (satta).' > > "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling... > perception... fabrications... > > "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for consciousness, Radha: > when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a > being.' > > ~Satta Sutta > > The terms "student", "teacher", "human being" are used for one's > identity. These terms are defined in terms of what one does, not > what one is. However, when one delineates a student, a teacher, or a > human being in terms of five aggregates or any other thing, he or she > falls into self-view. > > Metta, > Victor > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > > > > Hello Victor, > > Your position confuses me; it *appears* to be an untenable middle > ground. On > > one hand you have clearly stated that there are beings, especially > human > > beings, as the agents of moral responsibility. But, on the other > hand, that > > one should have no theory whatsoever about the concept 'self.' > > Now why shouldn't we simply call a human being a 'person' > or 'self,' as long > > as it's understood this refers to a process, not an unchanging > Self? This, I > > believe, is just what the Buddha did. Do this and come over to my > side, the > > loyal opposition. > > On the other hand if you reject using 'self' in this manner how do > you > > justify using human being and such; these are also simply the names > of > > dynamic processes. Same deal. So, to be consistent, reject the use > of > > 'beings' and go over to the dark side ;-) > > I don't see how you can have it both ways. Can you clarify this? > > metta, stephen 15130 From: yuzhonghao Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 4:54pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Robert, Yes, these questions were adopted, or, as you said, taken from the Kalama Sutta, and I am aware of the context in the discourse. People who hold strongly any assumption on what self is might ignore or avoid these questions all together. I think these questions can be a challenge to the much-cherished views. For people who are in doubt, these questions can serve as a means for reflection on whether the assumptions on what self is are beneficial or harmful. These questions are not so much about anatta than the assumptions on what self is. However, with any self-view or assumption on what self is, it is impossible to see what the Buddha taught: "Form is not self. Form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Victor, > > I have been silent on this ongoing stream because I am still trying > to figure this anatta thing out myself. > > Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that that many of the > questions that you are asking below were taken from the Kalama Sutta. > > Here is part of Bhikkhu Bodhi's commentary on the Kamala Sutta (full > commentary at > http://www.buddhistinformation.com/lecture_on_the_kalama_sutra.htm ) > > Now this passage, like everything else spoken by the Buddha, has > been stated in a specific context -- with a particular audience and > situation in view -- and thus must be understood in relation to that > context. The Kalamas, citizens of the town of Kesaputta, had been > visited by religious teachers of divergent views, each of whom would > propound his own doctrines and tear down the doctrines of his > predecessors. This left the Kalamas perplexed, and thus when "the > recluse Gotama," reputed to be an Awakened One, arrived in their > township, they approached him in the hope that he might be able to > dispel their confusion. From the subsequent development of the > Sutta, it is clear that the issues that perplexed them were the > reality of rebirth and kammic retribution for good and evil deeds. > > > In brief, I am not sure that the Buddha held up these questions to > be used as the litmus test for all aspects of the Dhamma as you are > applying them to anatta. Nonetheless, I don't have any better > questions and I certainly don't have any answers on anatta. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) 15131 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 4:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Herman, Sorry if u dont mind I asked, which branch of Buddhism is not phenomenology. Unless one reach the stage of Stream winner, what we learn in Buddhism is indeed limited by phenomenology. Even now, what we discuss in DSG is also phenomenology. Only through the right understanding of phenomenology, then we could lead the road to Nibbana. Without phenomenology as the base, Buddha could never explain Buddhism in the first place to the human beings. Kind regards Ken O > > Abhidhamma only makes sense as Abhidhamma, studied > within the > parameters of its domain, so to speak. The subject > matter of the > Abhidhamma is the "mechanics of the mind". > Comparisons between > Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, the periodic > table of > elements and Abhidhamma will add at least 33.2 aeons > to your samsaric > experience :-) > > I am about to score some brownie points with Howard > here, and I do so > unashamedly. Abhidhamma is pure phenomenology. I > stopped getting the > shits with Abhidhamma once I realised the limits and > extent of it's > subject matter. > And then, yes, the irreducibles, the parramatha > dhammas, make an > awful lot of sense. I do not doubt that from within > other systems of > thought colour, taste, sound, smell etc can be > further broken down, > but limited to the study of raw experience I think > the parramattha > dhammas are pretty spot on. > > My opinion only, of course :-) (My kids enjoyed > their stay at LA. > Thanks.) > > > > Herman 15132 From: yuzhonghao Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 5:55pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi Howard, You asked: What is the difference between human being and the true and real human being? My response: Well, it was you who made a distinction between human being and the true and real human being. I was trying to figure out what you meant. You asked: How would you speak ultimately about a sentient being killing sentient being? Would you say that ultimately, there is no sentient being, no killing? Would you say that conventionally, there was Holocaust, but ultimately, there was none? Would you say conventionally there is moral agent but ultimately there is none? Would you say that conventionally one reaps the consequence of his or her action but ultimately there is no one that reaps the result his or her own action? What would you say about killing ultimately? Is it ultimately "good", "bad", neither "good" nor "bad"? My response: I don't know how to speak ultimately. I am not sure how speaking ultimately would be. You said that speaking of moral agent is not completely nonsense, and now you ask: is it partly nonsense? My response: I am not sure. You asked whether I believe that 'truth' has only one sense? My response: I am not sure what you mean by "one sense". You ask whether I think there is any difference between the way things actually are and the way we speak about them. My response: Please tell me about the way things actually are. In particular, you ask whether I think there are any distinctions among the usages of 'self', and whether the Buddha condemned any of them. My response: I think you can check a dictionary on the word "self" and see for your self if there is any distinctions among the usages. Any assumption on what self is is not beneficial, not leading to the cessation of dukkha. As I see it, the Buddha disapproved self-view. You ask whether or not I think there might be *degrees* of reality, or whether all things are equally real. My response:........... Howard, please do what you see appropriate. Metta, Victor 15133 From: Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 3:30pm Subject: Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hello Ken, My apologies for so an incomplete reply, I'll attempt to put something substantial up on concepts V reality ;-) soon. >Did the Buddha teach anything you don't already know? Three things that come immediately to mind are anatta (and the fact that it's now widely accepted in psychology and possibly quantum physics, as you note, is a fairly recent confirmation—a good thing, wouldn't we agree?); thinking in terms of a/kusala or un/skillful actions instead of rights, duties, etc.; and a method, or methods (meditation, guarding the senses, etc.). I could go on: Right Livelihood pushes forward, paticcasamuppada... (Of course there's knowing, then there's actual insight.) Let me note that "paramattha," or the concept of ultimate realities does not occur in the suttas, and, furthermore (lets see if I can get into trouble here) does not even occur one time in the abhidhamma. It's a commentarial innovation that I see as at odds with both (though I'm not able to address the latter—and many would also say, also not the former ;-). >I once explained anatta to a friend of mine - a friend >with no knowledge of Buddhism but with an education in >science. He saw nothing new or extraordinary about >it, and I had to agree with him. (Since atomism was >replaced by quantum physics, there has been no >serious, scientific belief in a self.) This is the core, and possibly only, utterly new idea, of Buddhadhamma. >The difference between concepts and absolute realities >though, had him completely stumped. He couldn't see >past his, admittedly flawed, conventional view of the >world. Me too; I have no idea what 'degrees of reality' could mean. Perhaps I can say something soon about this, but I don't know if I'll be able to satisfy your next question: >Without the explanation of absolute reality, what is >there in the Buddha's teaching that is, even remotely, >ground-breaking? (How about: absolute reality is all around us but we can't see it, can't see things as they are, because of self-view and its entailed defilements of l obha/dosa? Which has nothing to do with concepts, or not.) metta, stephen 15134 From: Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 3:56pm Subject: Re: Let go Hello Herman, and Howard, and all >Abhidhamma only makes sense as Abhidhamma, studied within the >parameters of its domain, so to speak. The subject matter of the >Abhidhamma is the "mechanics of the mind". Comparisons between >Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, the periodic table of >elements and Abhidhamma will add at least 33.2 aeons to your samsaric >experience :-) Good deal; I guestimate it will take me 33.1 eons (give me a bit of spare time) to catch up on my reading, especially if people keep recommending things and I continue to accumulate faster than I read ;-) You do get to take your books with you, right? >I am about to score some brownie points with Howard here, and I do so >unashamedly. Abhidhamma is pure phenomenology. Perhaps so, depending on just how you mean the term. It need not, I think, mean the same as phenomenalism. >And then, yes, the irreducibles, the parramatha dhammas, make an >awful lot of sense. I do not doubt that from within other systems of >thought colour, taste, sound, smell etc can be further broken down, >but limited to the study of raw experience I think the parramattha >dhammas are pretty spot on. There's this story, perhaps apocryphal, about the joint appearance of Tibetan and Zen Buddhist. The Zen guy, typically, kept thrusting forward an orange, repeatedly demanding "What is this?" Finally the Tibetan asked his translator, "What's wrong with this fellow; hasn't he seen an orange before?" Well, there's something wrong with having to stay within a system (ditthi?); but, perhaps until we're enlightened, there's no choice. >My opinion only, of course :-) (My kids enjoyed their stay at LA. >Thanks.) I'm glad. metta, stephen PS, Howard, >Just for the record, that would be just fine and dandy with me!! I >have no commitment whatsoever to the particular inventory of "paramattha >dhammas" given in the Abhidhamma nor to the principle that they are not >further reducible. A thoroughgoing emptiness at levels beyond levels beyond >levels, yet at the very same time being exactly "the world" of our >experience, is very possibly the way things are, and bothers me not in the >slightest. It used to drive me crazy; I wanted a TOE, and in my lifetime. Hawking is right, I insisted! Now I love the idea that it won't happen, that it's emptiness all the way. (I note that Hawking is now starting his 20 year clock over.) >I do have a strong commitment (probably unshakeable) to both the >tilakkhana and patticcasamuppada (sp?), and a (slightly less) strong >commitment to phenomenalism and pragmatism. If I agree on 2 out of 4 (pragmatism! oh no...) that isn't too bad. I mean you're batting 500 Howard ;-) 15135 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 10:56pm Subject: Mr [Rob] Jeckyl and Mr [Rob] Hyde (was, Re: Perfections, Ch IV, Renunciation, no 6./Sati) Rob Hyde --- robmoult wrote: > Hi Rob, > > YOU'RE WRONG!!! WRONG, I TELL YOU!!! I'm sorry to say this, but I think Rob Jeckyl's post was quite in order in the first place ;-)). > Attachment to senses, ill will, sloth & torpor, restlessness & worry > and doubt are NOT "defilements"... they are "hindrances" to mental > development (bhavana). It is ignorance (avijja), kammic disposition > and current situation that determine the like / dislike / > indifference toward an object. But if we have wise attention (yoniso > manasikara), we can turn an unfavourable situation into kusala kamma. The term 'kilesa' is used to refer to all akusala dhammas in general (in addition to its use as one way of classifying akusala dhammas). So to refer to the hindrances as kilesas is not wrong at all, as I understand things. > DON'T EVER LET ME CATCH YOU AGAIN MAKING A QUICK REPLY WITHOUT > CHECKING YOUR SOURCES FIRST!!! Rob Hyde may need to consider this admonition, too;-)) > ... OTHERWISE, I WILL BAN YOU FROM THIS > DISCUSSION GROUP!!! And anyway, THERE'S NO NEED TO BE SO TOUGH on the poor guy -- he was only doing his best! > Thanks, > Rob :-( [My Mr. Hyde ;-)] Jon (and other friends of Rob Jeckyl) > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > > The paramattha (object of mindfulness) would become 'wrong' when > it > > is corrupted, covered over by papanca; an action of one of the > > latent defilements. The latent defilement of sensuous desire would ... 15136 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 11:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi, Stephen, and welcome to the list from me. With a subject heading like that, I just had to come in! --- oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Ken, > Let me note that "paramattha," or the concept of ultimate realities does > not > occur in the suttas, and, furthermore (lets see if I can get into > trouble > here) does not even occur one time in the abhidhamma. It's a > commentarial > innovation that I see as at odds with both (though I'm not able to > address > the latter—and many would also say, also not the former ;-). According to Nyanatiloka, the term does occur in the Abhidhamma pitaka -- see the extract pasted below. More importantly, though, is the point, also made in the extract, that while the term paramatha dhamma itself does not appear in the suttas, the suttas nevertheless contain numerous references to the importance of developing direct knowledge of paramattha dhammas as referred to by other names, such as 'khandhas'. So paramattha dhammas are there, and indeed I would say they run throughout the suttas. Thanks for your many intereseting comments of late. Jon From Nyanatiloka's 'Buddhist Dictionary' paramattha (-sacca, -vacana, -desaná): 'truth (or term, exposition) that is true in the highest (or ultimate) sense', as contrasted with the 'conventional truth' (vohára-sacca), which is also called 'commonly accepted truth' (sammuti-sacca; in Skr: samvrti-satya). The Buddha, in explaining his doctrine, sometimes used conventional language and sometimes the philosophical mode of expression which is in accordance whith undeluded insight into reality. In that ultimate sense, existence is a mere process of physical and mental phenomena within which, or beyond which, no real ego-entity nor any abiding substance can ever be found. Thus, whenever the suttas speak of man, woman or person, or of the rebirth of a being, this must not be taken as being valid in the ultimate sense, but as a mere conventional mode of speech (vohára-vacana). It is one of the main characteristics of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, in distinction from most of the Sutta Pitaka, that it does not employ conventional language, but deals only with ultimates, or realities in the highest sense (paramattha-dhammá). But also in the Sutta Pitaka there are many expositions in terms of ultimate language (paramattha-desaná), namely, wherever these texts deal with the groups (khandha), elements (dhátu) or sense-bases (áyatana), and their components; and wherever the 3 characteristics (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) are applied. The majority of Sutta texts, however, use the conventional language, as appropriate in a practical or ethical context, because it "would not be right to say that 'the groups' (khandha) feel shame, etc." It should be noted, however, that also statements of the Buddha couched in conventional language, are called 'truth' (vohára-sacca), being correct on their own level, which does not contradict the fact that such statements ultimately refer to impermanent and impersonal processes. The two truths - ultimate and conventional - appear in that form only in the commentaries, but are implied in a sutta-distinction of 'explicit (or direct) meaning' (nítattha, q.v.) and 'implicit meaning (to be inferred)' (neyyattha). Further, the Buddha repeatedly mentioned his reservations when using conventional speech, e.g. in D. 9: "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Perfect Qne (Tathágata) uses without misapprehending them." See also S. I. 25. The term paramattha, in the sense here used, occurs in the first para. of the Kathávatthu, a work of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (s. Guide, p. 62). (App: vohára). The commentarial discussions on these truths (Com. to D. 9 and M. 5) have not yet been translated in full. On these see K N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London, 1963), pp. 361ff. 15137 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Aug 22, 2002 11:37pm Subject: Samui update Hi All Just to report on a very pleasant meeting and chat with Erik and Eath yesterday morning, over an extended breakfast at our hotel's beachside restaurant. Among dhamma topics discussed too numerous to mention here were the meaning of knowing by direct experience the difference between kusala and akusala mind-states presently arising (and the relevance of this to mindfulness of breathing), and generally the conditions necessary for more awareness or understanding of the dhamma presently appearing whatever that dhamma may be. Erik was his usual enthusiastic and eloquent self, and I found the discussion both useful at the time and a cause for much reflection later on. In between the dhamma bits Eath had lots to say about her experiences settling into Thailand and studying two new or semi-new languages simultaneoulsy (and other developments -- expect a little announcement from the happy couple shortly). Jon 15138 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 0:33am Subject: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Dear Group, Nyanatiloka in his Buddhist Dictionary defines dhatu, ayatana and khandha as: http://www.budsas.org/ebud/bud-dict/dic_idx.htm dhátu: 'elements', are the ultimate constituents of a whole. (I) The 4 physical elements (dhátu or mahá-bhúta), popularly called earth, water, fire and wind, are to be understood as the primary qualities of matter. (II) The 18 physical and mental elements that constitute the conditions or foundations of the process of perception. áyatana: . The 12 'bases' or 'sources' on which depend the mental processes, consist of five physical sense-organs and consciousness, being the six personal (ajjhattika) bases; and the six objects, the so-called external (báhira) bases khandha: the 5 'groups (of existence)' or 'groups of clinging' (upádánakkhandha); alternative renderings: aggregates, categories of clinging's objects. These are the 5 aspects in which the Buddha has summed up all the physical and mental phenomena of existence, and which appear to the ignorant man as his ego, or personality. A few of the Sutta references: http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/022-alagagaddupama-sutta-e1.htm Majjhima Nikaya 22 Alagagadduupama Sutta - The Simile of the Snake http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/028-mahahatthipadopama-sutta- e1.htm Majjhima Nikaya 28 Mahaahatthipadopama Sutta - The Major Discourse on the Simile of the Elephant's Footprint http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/062-maha-rahulovada-e1.htm Majjhima Nikaya 62 Maharahulovada Sutta - Advice to Venerable Rahula - The Longer Discourse http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/109-mahapunnama-e.htm Majjhima Nikaya 109 Mahaapunnama Sutta - The Longer Discourse on the full moon night http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/112-chabbisodhana-e.htm Majjhima Nikaya 112 Chabbisodhana Sutta - The Six-Fold Examination http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/115-bahudhatuka-e.htm Majjhima Nikaya 115 Bahudhatuka Sutta - The Many Kinds of Elements http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/maj/mn140.htm Majjhima Nikaya 140 Dhatu-vibhanga Sutta - The Exposition of the Properties http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/148-chachakka-e.htm Majjhima Nikaya 148 Chachakka Sutta The Discourse of Six Sixes http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/149-mahasalayatanika-e.htm Majjhima Nikaya 149 Mahaasa.laayatanika Sutta - The Longer Discourse on the six spheres http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/sam/sn22-56.htm Samyutta Nikaya XXII.56 Parivatta Sutta - The (Fourfold) Round Samyutta Nikaya 'The Connected Discourses of the Buddha' beginning at page 627 Part III 14 Dhatu-samyutta (in The Book of Causation) beginning at page 853 Part III 22 Khandha-vagga The Book of the Aggregates beginning at page 1133 Part IV 35 Salayatana-vagga The Book of the Six Sense Bases ---------------------------- Some Visuddhimagga references: P.547 of Visuddhimagga 'The Path of Purification' XVm, 1 'Description of the Bases and Elements' P.552 of Visuddhimagga 'The Path of Purification' XV,17 ff 'Description of the Bases and Elements' P.649 of Visuddhimagga 'The Path of Purifiction' XVII, 203 [(v) The Sixfold Base] metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Hi, Stephen, and welcome to the list from me. > > With a subject heading like that, I just had to come in! > > --- oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Ken, > > Let me note that "paramattha," or the concept of ultimate realities does > > not > > occur in the suttas, and, furthermore (lets see if I can get into > > trouble > > here) does not even occur one time in the abhidhamma. It's a > > commentarial > > innovation that I see as at odds with both (though I'm not able to > > address > > the latterâ€"and many would also say, also not the former ;-). > > According to Nyanatiloka, the term does occur in the Abhidhamma pitaka -- > see the extract pasted below. > > More importantly, though, is the point, also made in the extract, that > while the term paramatha dhamma itself does not appear in the suttas, the > suttas nevertheless contain numerous references to the importance of > developing direct knowledge of paramattha dhammas as referred to by other > names, such as 'khandhas'. > > So paramattha dhammas are there, and indeed I would say they run > throughout the suttas. > > Thanks for your many intereseting comments of late. > > Jon > > From Nyanatiloka's 'Buddhist Dictionary' > > paramattha (-sacca, -vacana, -desaná): > 'truth (or term, exposition) that is true in the highest (or ultimate) > sense', as contrasted with the 'conventional truth' (vohára-sacca), which > is also called 'commonly accepted truth' (sammuti-sacca; in Skr: > samvrti-satya). > The Buddha, in explaining his doctrine, sometimes used conventional > language and sometimes the philosophical mode of expression which is in > accordance whith undeluded insight into reality. In that ultimate sense, > existence is a mere process of physical and mental phenomena within which, > or beyond which, no real ego-entity nor any abiding substance can ever be > found. Thus, whenever the suttas speak of man, woman or person, or of the > rebirth of a being, this must not be taken as being valid in the ultimate > sense, but as a mere conventional mode of speech (vohára-vacana). > > It is one of the main characteristics of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, in > distinction from most of the Sutta Pitaka, that it does not employ > conventional language, but deals only with ultimates, or realities in the > highest sense (paramattha-dhammá). But also in the Sutta Pitaka there are > many expositions in terms of ultimate language ( paramattha-desaná), > namely, wherever these texts deal with the groups (khandha), elements > (dhátu) or sense-bases (áyatana), and their components; and wherever the 3 > characteristics (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) are applied. The majority of Sutta > texts, however, use the conventional language, as appropriate in a > practical or ethical context, because it "would not be right to say that > 'the groups' (khandha) feel shame, etc." > > It should be noted, however, that also statements of the Buddha couched in > conventional language, are called 'truth' (vohára-sacca), being correct on > their own level, which does not contradict the fact that such statements > ultimately refer to impermanent and impersonal processes. > > The two truths - ultimate and conventional - appear in that form only in > the commentaries, but are implied in a sutta-distinction of 'explicit (or > direct) meaning' (nítattha, q.v.) and 'implicit meaning (to be inferred)' > (neyyattha). Further, the Buddha repeatedly mentioned his reservations > when using conventional speech, e.g. in D. 9: "These are merely names, > expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, > which the Perfect Qne (Tathágata) uses without misapprehending them." See > also S. I. 25. > > The term paramattha, in the sense here used, occurs in the first para. of > the Kathávatthu, a work of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (s. Guide, p. 62). (App: > vohára). > > The commentarial discussions on these truths (Com. to D. 9 and M. 5) have > not yet been translated in full. On these see K N. Jayatilleke, Early > Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London, 1963), pp. 361ff. 15139 From: egberdina Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 1:32am Subject: Re: Let go Hi Ken, I gather from recent posts that you have been away for a while. So have I. Now we are both back and I am happy to be writing to you. I use the term phenomenology to indicate the study of awareness. I think the Abhidhamma is pure phenomenology. There are no personal pronouns, reflexive or otherwise in the Abhidhamma. One cannot study things that are not there. I would not consider the cultural/religious practises that carry a Buddhist logo phenomenology. The rites and rituals that pervade the lives of hundreds of millions of people who claim to be ists of some variety attest to the complete opposite of phenomenology - no study of awareness. This is not intended as an attack on any religious or cultural group, merely as a description of what goes on in people's lives. All the best and very happy that we are both back :-) Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Herman, > > Sorry if u dont mind I asked, which branch of Buddhism > is not phenomenology. Unless one reach the stage of > Stream winner, what we learn in Buddhism is indeed > limited by phenomenology. Even now, what we discuss > in DSG is also phenomenology. Only through the right > understanding of phenomenology, then we could lead the > road to Nibbana. Without phenomenology as the base, > Buddha could never explain Buddhism in the first place > to the human beings. > > > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > > > > > > > Abhidhamma only makes sense as Abhidhamma, studied > > within the > > parameters of its domain, so to speak. The subject > > matter of the > > Abhidhamma is the "mechanics of the mind". > > Comparisons between > > Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, the periodic > > table of > > elements and Abhidhamma will add at least 33.2 aeons > > to your samsaric > > experience :-) > > > > I am about to score some brownie points with Howard > > here, and I do so > > unashamedly. Abhidhamma is pure phenomenology. I > > stopped getting the > > shits with Abhidhamma once I realised the limits and > > extent of it's > > subject matter. > > And then, yes, the irreducibles, the parramatha > > dhammas, make an > > awful lot of sense. I do not doubt that from within > > other systems of > > thought colour, taste, sound, smell etc can be > > further broken down, > > but limited to the study of raw experience I think > > the parramattha > > dhammas are pretty spot on. > > > > My opinion only, of course :-) (My kids enjoyed > > their stay at LA. > > Thanks.) > > > > > > > > Herman 15140 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 3:53am Subject: RE: [dsg] Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. 'Repaying One'sParents' Sumane Good to see you again. --- "Seylan Bank - DBD (Sumane Rathnasuriya)" wrote: > Yes Purnomo, > > Your gratitude is your action - your Kamma. Your gratitude may be on > account of one good action they may have done for you, at least in > bringing you to this world & help you see the world right and do good. > All the other bad they may be doing or have done, need not be your > problem, if you cannot accommodate them in your good kamma. Thanks for this common-sense suggestion. As you say, it is not necessary to dwell on the akusala. > What one should be worried about first is the nobility of one's own > action. Thereafter one may try help another, even one's own parents. If > possible, well and good. If not possible, it should not perturb the one > who tried. That worry itself is bad -akusala. Yes, it is the development of one's own kusala that is one's 'business', not anything else. I think here the Buddha is indicating another possible avenue of, or opportunity for, kusala moments in one's life. > He/she could make it to make bad parents good, his/her life's ambition > and try in various ways, use strategy OR discard that effort & devote to > some other good in this world. It is how you think & act. It is for you. > > Metta! > > Sumane Rathnasuriya Looking forward to seeing you again when you next have time to drop by. Jon > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Purnomo . [mailto:purnomo9@h...] > > Sent: 19 August 2002 13:12 > > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > > Subject: Re: [dsg] Anguttara Nikaya Book of Two's 15. > > 'Repaying One's Parents' > > > > > > if the parents is thieves or have bad attitude, should we > > gratitude them? > > > > > > metta, > > > > purnomo 15141 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 4:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] rupas out there Howard I'm impressed by the honesty and directness of your response below, Howard :-)). I think something that Herman said in a post to Stephen is appropriate here also. Herman said: "Abhidhamma only makes sense as Abhidhamma, studied within the parameters of its domain, so to speak. The subject matter of the Abhidhamma is the "mechanics of the mind". Comparisons between Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, the periodic table of elements and Abhidhamma will add at least 33.2 aeons to your samsaric experience :-)" The same could be said for trying to reconcile any other teaching or theory with the dhamma. There is bound to be a mismatch, despite superficial similarities, and hence problems in coming to a proper understanding of the dhamma. For example, does phenomenalism countenance the momentary arising and falling away of dhammas? Unless it does, then any apparent similarities will only go so far. Jon --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > In a message dated 8/20/02 7:35:32 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > I see you are still keen to find a way to reconcile phenomenalism with > the > > dhamma ;-)). May I ask what you would see as being the consequence of > > achieving, or not achieving, that reconciliation? > > > > > ========================= > The consequence would be a release of tension! ;-)) > They both seem true to me and mutually supportive. I would prefer > not > having to "give up" phenomenalism, as it helps me to understand the > Dhamma, > and, as a mathematician, I find it "lovely". So what's it all about? > Why, > clinging, of course, Jon! That's the bottom line. (But you knew that!! > ;-)) > > With metta, > Howard 15142 From: ranil gunawardena Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 7:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] There are people Dear Jon, Replace the word people with beings to get the correct version of the wording. However even if you say people heres how to derieve on whether a person will be enlighten or not. Once Buddha was asked a question. "Are all buddists going to attain Nirvana? " Buddha said, "Yes, the people (beings?) who do what I have said to do, No, the people who do not do what I have said to do" That was point 1. Point2, well all are in Sansara, and to get out... there is no where else other than sansara to be in :) ~meththa ranil >in this universe who are going to be, > > Maithree Buddha, his diciples, his son, his wife, his mother, his > > father, > > and there are people in this universe who are going to be, > > future Buddhas, Paceka Buddhas, Arhaths... > > > > And all this people are among us. with us. (why not) even us. > > > > The world is not so bad after all... :) > > > > ~with meththa > > ranil > >You seem to know something that the rest of us don't! What makes you so >sure that these future enlightened ones are among us now (and do you have >a way of identifying them)? > >Jon >Jon 15143 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 4:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi, Victor - In a message dated 8/22/02 8:57:29 PM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > You asked: What is the difference between human being and the true > and real human being? -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Huh? I do not recall ever having asked this! I don't even understand the question. I believe you are in error as to who may have asked this. I guess that perhaps what you are doing is taking your own questions, which I requested you answer, and starting to answer them. My point was for you to express your opinions instead of giving questions. But, in any case, I didn't initiate questions - you did. -------------------------------------------------------- > > My response: Well, it was you who made a distinction between human > being and the true and real human being. I was trying to figure out > what you meant. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Look, Victor - let me try to clarify my position: There are no human beings. (There! I said it straight out. I didn't use the word 'ultimate'.) What there do seem to be are coherent streams of ever-changing, interrelated psycho-physical elements that we conceptually treat as units and refer to as "human beings". The only such stream that I directly perceive the elements of is the one that I call "myself", but there is sufficient evidence for me to believe in others as well. BTW, when I say "me", do not think that there is any "me" that can be identified. There is a pattern of experience with which I associate the word 'me'. The thought/concept of 'me' arises as part of this psychophsical stream, conditioned by a multitude of experiences. If I take this 'me' seriously, think of it as a "thing", reify it, this is atta view. This is the way I see it. If you do not, okay - no problem. However, I don't really see how there is room for debate on this matter of your view vs my view. All that is possible, I think, is for us to clarify to the other how we see things. I am not yet clear on how *you* see things. What you understand a person to be - precisely, for example, is something that I don't understand. In any case, however you see matters, and however I see matters, presumably following the practice laid out by the Buddha will enable each of us to come to see matters as they actually are. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > You asked: How would you speak ultimately about a sentient being > killing sentient being? Would you say that ultimately, there is no > sentient being, no killing? Would you say that conventionally, there > was Holocaust, but ultimately, there was none? Would you say > conventionally there is moral agent but ultimately there is none? > Would you say that conventionally one reaps the consequence of his or > her action but ultimately there is no one that reaps the result his > or her own action? What would you say about killing ultimately? Is > it ultimately "good", "bad", neither "good" nor "bad"? > > My response: I don't know how to speak ultimately. I am not sure > how speaking ultimately would be. > > You said that speaking of moral agent is not completely nonsense, and > now you ask: is it partly nonsense? > > My response: I am not sure. > > You asked whether I believe that 'truth' has only one sense? > > My response: I am not sure what you mean by "one sense". ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Really! Okay. ----------------------------------------------- > > > You ask whether I think there is any difference between the way > things actually are and the way we speak about them. > > My response: Please tell me about the way things actually are. -------------------------------------------------- Howard: I have. You have not. -------------------------------------------------- > > In particular, you ask whether I think there are any distinctions > among the usages of 'self', and whether the Buddha condemned any of > them. > > My response: I think you can check a dictionary on the word "self" > and see for your self if there is any distinctions among the usages. > Any assumption on what self is is not beneficial, not leading to the > cessation of dukkha. As I see it, the Buddha disapproved self-view. > > You ask whether or not I think there might be *degrees* of reality, > or whether all things are equally real. > > My response:........... > > Howard, please do what you see appropriate. -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Okay. What I have written in this post is what I see as appropriate. ------------------------------------------------------- > > Metta, > Victor > > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15144 From: yuzhonghao Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 9:16am Subject: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi Howard, Are you a human being? Metta, Victor 15145 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 5:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] rupas out there Hi, Jon - In part of the following you write: "For example, does phenomenalism countenance the momentary arising and falling away of dhammas? Unless it does, then any apparent similarities will only go so far." As far as I know, phenomenalism, at least in general, simply doesn't address this issue. So it does not rule out arising and falling away of dhammas, and it is, thus, not incompatible with that. I make a couple more comments below, in context. In a message dated 8/23/02 7:30:34 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > > Howard > > I'm impressed by the honesty and directness of your response below, Howard > :-)). > > I think something that Herman said in a post to Stephen is appropriate > here also. Herman said: > > "Abhidhamma only makes sense as Abhidhamma, studied within the > parameters of its domain, so to speak. The subject matter of the > Abhidhamma is the "mechanics of the mind". Comparisons between > Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, the periodic table of > elements and Abhidhamma will add at least 33.2 aeons to your samsaric > experience :-)" > > The same could be said for trying to reconcile any other teaching or > theory with the dhamma. There is bound to be a mismatch, despite > superficial similarities, and hence problems in coming to a proper > understanding of the dhamma. > ------------------------------------------------ Howard: I think this is true. It becomes more and more true to the extent that the other teaching is filled in with great detail. My "phenomenalism", however, is not very detailed - it is just a general thrust, a perspective. If I were to adopt some existing fully detailed phenomenalist theory, it would surely be incompatible with the Dhamma at some points. ------------------------------------------------ > > For example, does phenomenalism countenance the momentary arising and > falling away of dhammas? Unless it does, then any apparent similarities > will only go so far. > > Jon > ==================================== With metta, Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > > > In a message dated 8/20/02 7:35:32 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > > > > I see you are still keen to find a way to reconcile phenomenalism with > > the > > > dhamma ;-)). May I ask what you would see as being the consequence of > > > achieving, or not achieving, that reconciliation? > > > > > > > > ========================= > > The consequence would be a release of tension! ;-)) > > They both seem true to me and mutually supportive. I would prefer > > not > > having to "give up" phenomenalism, as it helps me to understand the > > Dhamma, > > and, as a mathematician, I find it "lovely". So what's it all about? > > Why, > > clinging, of course, Jon! That's the bottom line. (But you knew that!! > > ;-)) > > > > With metta, > > Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15146 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 10:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: miccha sati Dear Kom and all, We should consider what wrong or false sati is. It must be something we take for sati, but it is akusala, false, wrong. What would it be? Now I refer to what Num formulated so well in the Path of Discrimination series: We have to be very sincere, the perfection of truthfulness is indispensable. It is very necessary to know what wrong mindfulness is, when we are on the wrong Path. It is not a specific cetasika, but the Buddha mentioned wrong mindfulness to show what the wrong Path is, as opposite to right mindfulness. When there is clinging to result or when we make ourselves believe that there is right mindfulness, there is in fact lobha. When there is wrong mindfulness there is akusala citta, but we have to think first of lobha-mula-citta. Rob M brought up the Q when sati is samma sati of the eightfold Path. Sati of satipatthana begins to be aware of nama and rupa, and then satipatthana becomes more developed. When we are still on the level of considering different characteristics of nama and rupa, when we are only beginning to learn more, we cannot say that this is already samma sati of the eightfold Path. When there can be direct awareness of one reality at a time and the characteristics of nama and rupa are distinguished from each other, samma sati begins to develop, and it develops on and on until it is samma sati of the Path which is lokuttara, supramundane. Recently I heard on a tape about the difference between seeing and visible object. Visible object appears all the time, and on account of it we think of shape and form. A. Sujin asked a monk whether seeing has an outward appearance, and he said, no. A. Sujin answered: then it is nama, which has no shape or form. These remarks can help us to have more understanding of the difference between nama and rupa, but it is a difficult subject. What do you think, Kom? Any helpful reminders for me :-) Something you heard on tapes? Best wishes from Nina. op 22-08-2002 10:04 schreef Kom Tukovinit op kom@a...: > > I think Larry understood what I said right, where I equated > micha-sati to lobha. The Buddha meant the > arising of the fake (artificial, untrue, etc.) sati. 15147 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 10:02am Subject: Re: Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata Dear Rob M Larry gave the definitions of tatramajjhattata, pointing out that indifferent feeling is not the same. As to the Brahma vihara of upekkha, here the word upekkha is used for tatramajjhattata, and in this case beings is the object: when we cannot help someone, if he is beyond help, we have no aversion, but we remember that beings are heirs to kamma. There are so many situations where we cannot help others, but instead of having dispair we better develop the brahma vihara of tatramajjhattata. Best wishes from Nina. op 22-08-2002 02:19 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@j...: > > What is the difference difference between upekkha and > tatramajjhattata? 15148 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 10:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] three characteristics Dear Larry, see below for answers. op 22-08-2002 01:22 schreef LBIDD@w... op LBIDD@w...: > > Could we at least say that insight could arise at any time, even while > attempting to practice jhana? N: Insight has as object only nama or rupa, a paramattha dhamma. The object of samatha is sometimes a paramattha dhamma, such as the four elements, but there is no development of understanding of these elements as they appear at the present moment, one at a time, through one of the six doors, with the aim to know them as non-self. Many subjects of samatha are concepts, such as the kasinas. L: Incidentally, it occured to me that panna that cognizes an object as not > self does not count as insight into the tilakkhana unless the object > could be seen as me or mine. N: You mean: when there is ignorance and worng view, we see a nama or rupa as self, but when insight arises it realizes a nama or rupa as non-self? You think of contrasts? L:For example, to observe that the breath is > impermanent and not self is not insight unless it is also seen that > there is, or could be, a belief that the breath is me or mine. The "me > or mine" adds the element of dukkha that makes it insight. Correct? N: I do not get it, why the element of dukkha? We read about the three characteristics, but we should not forget that the development of insight is a long way. First nama should be known as nama, different from rupa. There is awareness of seeing now, or visible object now, hearing, sound, feeling. Only in the course of the development of insight (even during many lives) there will be more understanding of realities as impermanent, dukkha and anatta. As Num reminded us in his series of the Path of Discrimination, there are several stages of insight, and at the stage of arising and falling away of realities their impermanence is understood. In the later stages of insight, there is more and more understanding of the three characteristics. It depends on the individual whether the characteristic of impermanence or dukkha or anatta is more prominent. Just before enlightenment is attained, the reality that appears is realized as impermanent, or dukkha, or anatta. Best wishes from Nina. 15149 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 6:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Pernicious view Hi, Victor - In a message dated 8/23/02 12:18:16 PM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Are you a human being? > > Metta, > Victor > ======================== I vaguely recall my wife asking me that once. ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15150 From: robmoult Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 0:46pm Subject: Inside the Thought Process Hi All, Does anybody know where I can find out more about the operation of the various cittas in the thought process? Let me take the "Determining" citta as an example. As I look through Bhikkhu Bodhi's "Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma", there are ten entries in the index where this citta is referenced. I have looked at them all, but at the end almost nothing is said about the operation of this citta. It says in the text that this citta, "determines / defines / discriminates". What does this really mean? What influences the function? What cetasikas are prominent during this stage? How to describe the state of mind before and after this citta? Does this citta behave differently in the thought process of an arahant? How about in jhanic states? I have similar questions about each of the cittas in the thought process. I think of each of the cittas in the thought process as a "black box", each with an incoming "state of mind", various influencing parameters, modes of operation, a transformation process, and an outgoing "state of mind". I am looking for a resource that provides details on each citta in the thought process. Does such a resource exist? Or am I asking one of those questions that should not be asked? Thanks, Rob M :-) 15151 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 0:48pm Subject: wrong view Hi all, here are a few lines fom Bhikkhu Bodhi and the Majjhima Nikaya on wrong view, apropos Victor's 'signature' thread: note 170: The view of being (bhavaditthi) is eternalism, the belief in an eternal self; the view of non-being (vibhavaditthi) is annihilationism, the denial of any principle of continuity as a basis for rebirth and kammic retribution... MN 117.4-.9 Mahacattarisaka Sutta: Bhikkhus, what is right view? I say right view is twofold. There is right view with desires to share merit, which mature as substratum*1).and right view, that is noble, without desires, transcends this world and is a feature of the path. What is right view with desires to share merit, which mature as substratum? There are results for gifts, sacrifices and offerings.There are results for good and bad actions. There is this world, another world, mother, father, spontaneously arisen beings, There are recluses and brahmins who realizing this world and the other world declare it. This is right view with desires, to share merit, which mature as substratum. Bhikkhus, what is right view, that is noble, without desires, transcending this world is a feature of the path? The noble mind's development of the enlightenment factor investigation of the Teaching without desires, together with the path factors of wisdom, the faculty of wisdom, the power of wisdom, is right view that is noble, transcending this world and is a feature of the path. He endeavours to dispel wrong view and gets established in right view, that becomes his right endeavour. He mindfully dispels wrong view and abides established in right view, that becomes his right mindfulness. Thus these three things follow each other, turning in a circle. Such as right view, right endeavour and right mindfulness. trans. Sister Upalavanna, http://metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/ note 1103: This definition [above] defines supramundane right view as the wisdom (panna) found among the requisites of enlightenment as a faculty, power, enlightenment factor, and path factor. The definition is formulated by way of the cognitive function rather than the objective content of the view. Elsewhere (MN 141.24) the right view of the path is defined as knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. We may understand that the conceptual comprehension of the four truths falls under mundane right view, while the direct penetration of the truths by realising Nibbana with the path constitutes supramundane right view. [notes from the 'Wisdom' edition of MN] 15152 From: robmoult Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 0:51pm Subject: Re: Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata Hi Nina (and others); Sorry, I am still confused. I must have taken a "stupid pill" this morning. Nina, normally your explanations are extremely clear to me. However, at this point, I am still scratching my head saying, "Huh?" Could you run the explanation past me again in slow motion? Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Rob M > Larry gave the definitions of tatramajjhattata, pointing out that > indifferent feeling is not the same. As to the Brahma vihara of upekkha, > here the word upekkha is used for tatramajjhattata, and in this case beings > is the object: when we cannot help someone, if he is beyond help, we have no > aversion, but we remember that beings are heirs to kamma. There are so many > situations where we cannot help others, but instead of having dispair we > better develop the brahma vihara of tatramajjhattata. > Best wishes > from Nina. > > op 22-08-2002 02:19 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@j...: > > > > What is the difference difference between upekkha and > > tatramajjhattata? 15153 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 0:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi Rob, look within. Larry ----------------- Rob: "I am looking for a resource that provides details on each citta in the thought process. Does such a resource exist?" 15154 From: robmoult Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 1:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi Larry, I was hoping to piggy-back on the efforts of somebody much smarter (and with clearer internal vision) than I. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Rob, look within. > > Larry > ----------------- > Rob: "I am looking for a resource that provides details on each citta in > the thought process. Does such a resource exist?" 15155 From: yuzhonghao Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 1:14pm Subject: Re: wrong view "Bhikkhus, what is wrong view? There are no results for gifts, sacrifices and offerings.There are no results for good and bad actions. There is no this world, no other world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously arisen beings, There are no recluses and brahmins who realizing this world and the other world declare it. Bhikkhus, this is wrong view." http://metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/Majjhima3/117- mahacattarisaka-e.htm --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi all, here are a few lines fom Bhikkhu Bodhi and the Majjhima Nikaya > on wrong view, apropos Victor's 'signature' thread: > > note 170: The view of being (bhavaditthi) is eternalism, the belief in > an eternal self; the view of non-being (vibhavaditthi) is > annihilationism, the denial of any principle of continuity as a basis > for rebirth and kammic retribution... > > MN 117.4-.9 Mahacattarisaka Sutta: > Bhikkhus, what is right view? I say right view is twofold. There is > right view with desires to share merit, which mature as > substratum*1).and right view, that is noble, without desires, transcends > this world and is a feature of the path. > What is right view with desires to share merit, which mature as > substratum? There are results for gifts, sacrifices and offerings.There > are results for good and bad actions. There is this world, another > world, mother, father, spontaneously arisen beings, There are recluses > and brahmins who realizing this world and the other world declare it. > This is right view with desires, to share merit, which mature as > substratum. > Bhikkhus, what is right view, that is noble, without desires, > transcending this world is a feature of the path? The noble mind's > development of the enlightenment factor investigation of the Teaching > without desires, together with the path factors of wisdom, the faculty > of wisdom, the power of wisdom, is right view that is noble, > transcending this world and is a feature of the path. He endeavours to > dispel wrong view and gets established in right view, that becomes his > right endeavour. He mindfully dispels wrong view and abides established > in right view, that becomes his right mindfulness. Thus these three > things follow each other, turning in a circle. Such as right view, right > endeavour and right mindfulness. > trans. Sister Upalavanna, > http://metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/ > > note 1103: This definition [above] defines supramundane right view as > the wisdom (panna) found among the requisites of enlightenment as a > faculty, power, enlightenment factor, and path factor. The definition is > formulated by way of the cognitive function rather than the objective > content of the view. Elsewhere (MN 141.24) the right view of the path is > defined as knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. We may understand that > the conceptual comprehension of the four truths falls under mundane > right view, while the direct penetration of the truths by realising > Nibbana with the path constitutes supramundane right view. > > [notes from the 'Wisdom' edition of MN] 15156 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 1:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: wrong view Thanks Victor, I just realized I forgot that bit. Here's a bigger chunk: MN 60.5 Apannaka Sutta: Householders, there are certain recluses and brahmins who have this view and declare it. There are no results for gifts, offerings, or sacrifices. There are no results for good and bad actions. There is no this world, no other world, no mother, no father. There are no spontaneously arisen beings and there are no recluses and brahmins in this world, who come to the right path, have realized this world and the other world and declare it. Householders, there are some other recluses and brahmins who have opposite views and declare. There are results for gifts, offerings, and sacrifices. There are results for good and bad actions. There is this and other world. There is mother, father. There are spontaneously arisen beings and recluses and brahmins in this world, come to the right path, have realized this world and the other world and declare it. Householders, do these two groups of recluses and brahmins bear completely opposite views and declare them?''They do venerable sir'. 'Householders, those recluses and brahmins who have this view and declare there are no results for gifts, offerings, or sacrifices. There are no results for good and bad actions, there is no this world, no other world, no mother, no father. There are no spontaneously arisen beings recluses and brahmins in this world, who come to the right path, have realized this world and the other world and declare it*2). We could expect this, they would abstain from these three things of merit such as good conduct by body, speech and mind, would observe these three things of demerit such as misconduct by body, speech and mind. What is the reason? These good recluses and brahmins do not see the dangers of demerit, the vile nature of defilements, the purity and the results of merit in giving up. There's another world*3. So their view there is no other world, becomes wrong view. Words that say, there is no other world, becomes wrong speech. The view, there is no other world, is completely opposite to what the noble ones say. The noble ones talk of another world. Their instructions, there is no other world, becomes wrong instructions, and the wrong teaching. Giving the wrong instructions, they praise themselves and disparage others. .By that they decrease in their virtues and accumulate various things of demerit, on account of wrong view. Such as wrong thoughts, wrong speech, giving instructions in the wrong teaching quite opposite to the noble one's teaching, and praising themselves and disparaging others. http://metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/ trans. Sister Upalavanna 15157 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 1:27pm Subject: Re: Inside the Thought Process Dear Rob M, Hope this is of some use. metta, Christine ----------------------- "Abhidhamma Papers Essay: The sense door thought process. Each time we perceive an object through the senses, a series of thought-moments occurs which constitute a process. These thought moments, or cittas, are according to abhidhamma, different 'minds' or states of mind. One follows another in rapid succession (usually too quickly to be perceived individually) and in a certain order. Normally for the perception of an object through one of the senses, seventeen thought-moments occur. These are: Past bhavanga (Resultant) Vibrating bhavanga (Resultant) Cutting off stream of bhavanga (Resultant) Turning to sense-door (Kiriya) Sense consciousness (Resultant) Receiving (Resultant) Investigating (Resultant) Determining (Kiriya) 9-15. Javana (Kamma) 16-17. Retention (Resultant) Each thought-moment serves a different function. 1. Bhavanga: Bhavanga or stream of being or subconscious state of mind is that which is below the threshold of consciousness. It may be compared to a state of deep, dreamless sleep. The nature of this 'mind' or 'citta' will depend on the individual and his past kamma, but in the case of human beings this will be skilful, since without a skilful state existing at the moment of re-linking of a past life with a present life, there would be no conditions for a human birth. 2. Vibrating bhavanga: Before an object can impinge on any of the senses, it first enters the stream of bhavanga causing it to vibrate slightly, in the same way as a sound might cause one to turn in one's sleep without waking up. 3. Cutting off the stream of bhavanga: The third thought-moment is the point at which the stream of bhavanga is interrupted or cut off, and may be compared to being woken up from sleep. The object (here, sound) is in no way known at this stage. 4. Turning to sense door: There is now a turning to the sense door concerned. That is to say, concerning an audible object there will be a turning to the ear door without there yet being any hearing. 5. Five-fold sense consciousness: Now there is, in the case of audible object, hearing; in the case of visible object, sight; odorous object, smell; sapid object, taste; and tangible object, touch. 6. Receiving: Here the object is passively received and may be distinguished as being agreeable or disagreeable, although as yet there is no reaction to this discernment. The feeling is neutral in either case. For example, if the sound is a harsh voice, it is not yet known as such so no judgement or dislike may yet arise. It is simply received passively. 7. Investigating: The object or sound is now examined and investigated, but decision as to the nature of the object has still not been made. 8. Determining: It is at the determining stage that discrimination is applied and the object is recognized. Thus the sound will be known as a harsh voice and consequent upon this determining will be the nature of the next and crucial stage of 9-15. Javana: This, in contrast to all the preceding states, is an active state, capable of creating further results or kamma. It is the dynamic reaction to what has been perceived. It is at this stage that a skilful or unskilful citta will occur. Thus after hearing harsh speech, a state of anger, dislike or rejection may arise. The citta that occurs here normally lasts for seven thought-moments. 16-17. Retention: These two final thought-moments do not always occur at the end of a thought process, but depend for their arising on the strength of the preceding javanas. Retention is performed by the investigating cittas, and its function is essentially to register what has been perceived in the 'memory'. Having described a thought process in its complete form, it is now necessary to explain that not all processes reach the retention stage. " <<>> (You may have to manually type this address into Google as it goes to a second line): http://www.samatha.demon.co.uk/publications/abhidhammapapers/ch3_2.htm l --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi All, > > Does anybody know where I can find out more about the operation of > the various cittas in the thought process? > > Let me take the "Determining" citta as an example. As I look through > Bhikkhu Bodhi's "Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma", there are ten > entries in the index where this citta is referenced. I have looked > at them all, but at the end almost nothing is said about the > operation of this citta. It says in the text that this > citta, "determines / defines / discriminates". What does this really > mean? What influences the function? What cetasikas are prominent > during this stage? How to describe the state of mind before and > after this citta? Does this citta behave differently in the thought > process of an arahant? How about in jhanic states? I have similar > questions about each of the cittas in the thought process. > > I think of each of the cittas in the thought process as a "black > box", each with an incoming "state of mind", various influencing > parameters, modes of operation, a transformation process, and an > outgoing "state of mind". I am looking for a resource that provides > details on each citta in the thought process. Does such a resource > exist? > > Or am I asking one of those questions that should not be asked? > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) 15158 From: robmoult Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 1:58pm Subject: Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi Christine, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > 8. Determining: It is at the determining stage that discrimination > is applied and the object is recognized. Thus the sound will be known > as a harsh voice and consequent upon this determining will be the > nature of the next and crucial stage of This is exactly the level of detail that I find in Bhikhu Bodhi's "A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma" - one sentence on each of the cittas. Even the Visuddhi Magga has only seven very brief references to the determining citta in the index. These references provide absolutely minimal information (except that I learn in VM IV n13, that the determining citta only appears in the commentaries). In VM I n16, it says "To expect to find in the Paramatthamanjusa an exposition of the 'cognitive series (citta-vithi)' , and some explanation of the individual members in addition to what is to be found in the Visuddhi-magga itself is to be disappointed. There are only fragmentary treatments." They are right - I am disappointed. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15159 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 10:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi, Christine - In a message dated 8/23/02 4:28:26 PM Eastern Daylight Time, cforsyth@v... writes: > > Dear Rob M, > > Hope this is of some use. > > metta, > Christine > ----------------------- > > "Abhidhamma Papers > ============================= Wow! At least at first glance this looks like quite a site! (http://www.samatha.demon.co.uk/publications/abhidhammapapers/) Thanks for passing it on. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15160 From: robmoult Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 2:35pm Subject: Registration Citta Hi All, As I was searching though other texts for references on "determining consciousness", I came across the following from PTS Abhidhammattha- Sangaha (1995 edition), III 6 n2 "Tad-arammana, or Tad-alambana (both forms appear in the manual), meaning literally, 'that object' is the curious scholastic term - apparently not found prior to Buddhaghosa - for the final phase in the registration of impression by way of sense." So how do we treat this? Do we differentiate between what was definitely referenced in the Suttas and what was apparently added on later? This is relevant to my quest to better understand the "determining" consciousness", as it appears as though "determining consciousness" may also have been a later addition. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15161 From: robmoult Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 2:46pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi Howard, I summarized the contents of this site in my class notes (pages 26 - 36). As I am still an apprentice teacher, before I distribute anything to by class, I show it to Bro. Teo. He went though my summary with a red marker highlighting many incorrect statements. I never distributed it to the class and I plan to incorporate Bro. Teo's comments into the text before "publishing" my class notes at the end of the year. (It is on my to-do list) Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > ============================= > Wow! At least at first glance this looks like quite a site! > (http://www.samatha.demon.co.uk/publications/abhidhammapapers/) > Thanks for passing it on. > > With metta, > Howard 15162 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 2:49pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process/ Howard Dear Howard, Guess who? metta, Chris "Born 1951 in county of Yorkshire, UK. Married, one child. Theravada Buddhist since time at Manchester University. Meditation teacher in the Samatha Trust tradition since 1976. The Samatha Trust has its roots in Thai Theravada Buddhism. It is a lay organization with around 80 teachers, mostly in the UK. It teaches a carefully structured form of mindfulness of breathing, along with a range of other meditations and Pali chanting. It explores a range of texts, Sutta, Abhidhamma and a few Mahayana texts to bring alive their relevance to contemporary practice. " --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Christine - > > In a message dated 8/23/02 4:28:26 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > cforsyth@v... writes: > > > > > > Dear Rob M, > > > > Hope this is of some use. > > > > metta, > > Christine > > ----------------------- > > > > "Abhidhamma Papers > > > ============================= > Wow! At least at first glance this looks like quite a site! > (http://www.samatha.demon.co.uk/publications/abhidhammapapers/) > Thanks for passing it on. > > With metta, > Howard 15163 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 1:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi, Rob - Good luck with it! :-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/23/02 5:47:25 PM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > I summarized the contents of this site in my class notes (pages 26 - > 36). As I am still an apprentice teacher, before I distribute > anything to by class, I show it to Bro. Teo. He went though my > summary with a red marker highlighting many incorrect statements. I > never distributed it to the class and I plan to incorporate Bro. > Teo's comments into the text before "publishing" my class notes at > the end of the year. (It is on my to-do list) > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > ============================= > > Wow! At least at first glance this looks like quite a site! > > (http://www.samatha.demon.co.uk/publications/abhidhammapapers/) > > Thanks for passing it on. > > > > With metta, > > Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15164 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 1:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process/ Howard Hi, Chris - In a message dated 8/23/02 5:50:29 PM Eastern Daylight Time, cforsyth@v... writes: > > Dear Howard, > > Guess who? > > metta, > > Chris > > "Born 1951 in county of Yorkshire, UK. > Married, one child. > Theravada Buddhist since time at Manchester University. Meditation > teacher in the Samatha Trust tradition since 1976. The Samatha Trust > has its roots in Thai Theravada Buddhism. It is a lay organization > with around 80 teachers, mostly in the UK. It teaches a carefully > structured form of mindfulness of breathing, along with a range of > other meditations and Pali chanting. It explores a range of texts, > Sutta, Abhidhamma and a few Mahayana texts to bring alive their > relevance to contemporary practice. " > =========================== Geez, I guess I oughta know. :-( Okay ... I give up! Who? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15165 From: Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 5:38pm Subject: Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hello Christine, Jon I don't find talk of 'reality' useful; in fact I find it goofy and mysterious. It's a confusing way of speaking. For instance, the Buddha rejected both being and non-being. ("...'everything exists' is one extreme, and 'nothing exists' is another extreme. The Tathagata expresses the MIddle Way that does not adhere to these two extremes..." S.III.134-35 [The passage then goes on to reference paticcasamuppada.]) In itself, this is nonsense: something either exists or it does not (there are no shades or graduations of reality). What it means, in context, is that he saw that the world consists of becoming, or processes (things exist in an interrelated way, depend on conditions, are impermanent, don't exist as independent substances or selves), not static/unchanging ('being' rejected) or somehow not real ('non-being' rejected). So it makes sense in the context of debate with contemporary opposing views of static realism or eternalism and nihilism; but 'being' is used here in a special sense. The processes of the world exist, are quite real, just not real in some odd, eternalist sense. (So the Buddha says: "When dukkha arises, it really arises; and when dukkha is extinguished, it is really extinguished." ibid.) The relevance of this is that perhaps we may agree, we're simply using "paramattha" and "reality" and such terms in different senses. I'll begin by noting that not one* of your many references refers to the word "paramattha." You do make many references to khandha, ayatana, the 18 dhathus, the 4 elements and such. If this is what paramattha means we agree, and it's merely a peccadillo that I don't use the word. >...the suttas nevertheless contain numerous references to the importance of >developing direct knowledge of paramattha dhammas as referred to by other names, >such as 'khandhas'. (& a second quote from Nyanatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary so using the term.) No problem for me here, but Paramattha dhammas are supposed to be elementary, "ultimate constituents of a whole"; but none of these are, each is further reducible. So I believe he's misusing the word, in order to find it in the suttas. In this sense we don't agree. [This further potential for reduction may not be true of the 4 elements. Here I suggest that if the Buddha meant by element certain experiential properties —e.g., earth = hardness— then good; but if it was meant as a theory of matter it's wrong, as persons are made of carbon, nitrogen, and such. This, of course, would pose no problem; the Buddha's meaning is unchanged, just that the body breaks down into in fact different items, still impersonal, than he supposed. So Dhamma can't be entirely separated from physics.] Consider vedana. It can be analyzed into endless types or classifications: 2 (bodily or mental), 3 (pleasant, painful, neutral), 5, 6, 18 in 3 subgroups, 36 in 6 subgroups, even 108! (Bahuvedaniya Sutta). Isn't it clear that the Buddha wasn't interested in ultimate categories or realties? That it was provisional, dependent on context? That it's a strategy to disengage from seeing things in personal ways by breaking them down into impersonal categories, not a search for ultimates? Vohara sacca, a sutta phrase, means, e.g., self refers not to some substantial entity but the functional unity of the khandhas; it's a convenient and conventional way of speaking. It doesn't mean that beings are unreal, it means they're not substantial, eternal. But this isn't what paramattha dhamma means. The latter contrasts conventional/conceptual meaning with ultimate truth. But conventional usage is simply the proper way of seeing beings, a simple sum over properties word from common usage. As such it is in no way invalid, false, or somehow less real. (The entire issue of concepts is a red herring.) When the Buddha said he used conventional speech without misapprehending them that's what he meant. This can be clearly seen in the Mulapariyaya sutta (which Christine recently discussed). Here is a large and hugely varied list of things or concepts: earth, air (paramattha dhammas?), beings, gods (Sammuti?), etc. They are not distinguished. None are said to be less real. The object, as seen in the four types of persons relative successes, is not to identify with them, to make them one's own, to allow 'self' to appear. There is no denial of conception. This approach misses the point. >...whenever the suttas speak of man, woman, or person...this must not be taken as >being valid in the ultimate sense, but as a mere conventional mode of speech. This is wrong, as noted above, and contradicts MN sutta 58. "Not valid" can only mean incorrect, untrue. In the sutta the Buddha discusses un/true or in/correct (T of F), un/benefical (B or U), and un/welcome or dis/agreeable statements(A or D). This gives 8 permutations: 1. T B D 2. T B A 3. T U D 4. T U A 5. F B D 6. F B A 7. F U D 8. F U A He then sequentially eliminates 7, then 3, accepts 1 at it's proper time, eliminates 8, then 4, concluding 'yes' on 2. 5 and 6, statements false and beneficial, aren't even considered; I take this to mean that there are none such. Sammuti would fall into one of these types (in fact, a species of upaya, in the Mahayana sense of skillful use of falsehood). The Buddha rejected the entire notion. Jeeze, what a long post! and I could yet babble on. Sorry, and thanks for the welcome Jon. (I suspect that a little doubting of the basic premises of the list will go a long way. Still, there's no better way to find out what one thinks than to write it out. Then see what's left standing ;-) *Wasn't the kathavatthu written long after the Buddha died? In any case, I stand corrected on that point. metta, stephen 15166 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 11:24pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process/ Howard Dear Howard, Arrghh! Howard - You give in too easily!..... And the answer is >>>>>> Peter Harvey - who is Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Sunderland, co-founder of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies, a meditation teacher in the Samatha Trust tradition, and author of An Introduction to Buddhism , The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism and An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Member of the Editorial Board of The Journal of Buddhist Ethics (and member of Buddha-L). As I recall, Samatha Trust was co-founded by Lance Cousins (Manchester University) who is also on the Editorial Board of The Journal of Buddhist Ethics, and fellow member of Buddha-L. http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/aboutjournal.html Howard, didn't you tell me once-upon-a-time that you had 'The Selfless Mind.....' ? Just that a review I read of it said that there was an Appendix on The Theory of the Process of Cittas, pp.252- 58 which may be of help to Rob M. If you have it, could you have a look and give a comment please? metta, Chris --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Chris - > > In a message dated 8/23/02 5:50:29 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > cforsyth@v... writes: > > > > > > Dear Howard, > > > > Guess who? > > > > metta, > > > > Chris > > > > "Born 1951 in county of Yorkshire, UK. > > Married, one child. > > Theravada Buddhist since time at Manchester University. Meditation > > teacher in the Samatha Trust tradition since 1976. The Samatha Trust > > has its roots in Thai Theravada Buddhism. It is a lay organization > > with around 80 teachers, mostly in the UK. It teaches a carefully > > structured form of mindfulness of breathing, along with a range of > > other meditations and Pali chanting. It explores a range of texts, > > Sutta, Abhidhamma and a few Mahayana texts to bring alive their > > relevance to contemporary practice. " > > > =========================== > Geez, I guess I oughta know. :-( Okay ... I give up! Who? > > With metta, > Howard 15167 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Aug 23, 2002 11:31pm Subject: Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi Rob M, "What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly; it is dearness only that gives everything its value." (Thomas Payne) - nothing worth knowing comes easily. (Though it would be good if the info. was more accessible :). I know you will have searched widely on this topic. It may be that there won't be one text with it neatly laid out - you may have to get a bit from here, a para from there, and gain a little understanding from Admirable Friends as well, over a fair period of time. Have you read 'A Survey of Paramattha Dhammas' by K. Sujin? On one of RobK's sites - http://www.abhidhamma.org/contents.htm Nina says in the Preface "A Survey of Paramattha Dhammas" is a masterwork , written by Acharn Sujin Boriharnwanaket with great patience and a sense of urgency to help others to understand reality. The whole book, in which she explains in all details about citta, consciousness, cetasika, mental factors, and rúpa, physical phenomena, eradiates abundant mettå, loving kindness. Acharn Sujin stresses time and again that theoretical understanding, only knowing realities by name, is not sufficient, although it can be a foundation for direct knowledge. The real purpose of the study of the Dhamma is: seeing that this very moment is dhamma, non-self. All realities, dhammas, have to be known now, when they occur, so that the wrong view of self can be eradicated. Acharn Sujin is the wise friend in Dhamma who untiringly explains the practice leading to the direct experience of realities. She has been explaining the Dhamma for over forty years and her lectures are broadcast daily all over Thailand; they can also be heard in Cambodia, Laos and Malaysia. This book is based on her lectures. " Something in Part 4 Ch. 9 'A process of cittas' Part 4 Ch. 10 'Functions of cittas' Part 5 Ch. 11 'The Duration of different Processes' may be helpful. metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > 8. Determining: It is at the determining stage that > discrimination > > is applied and the object is recognized. Thus the sound will be > known > > as a harsh voice and consequent upon this determining will be the > > nature of the next and crucial stage of > > This is exactly the level of detail that I find in Bhikhu Bodhi's "A > Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma" - one sentence on each of the > cittas. > > Even the Visuddhi Magga has only seven very brief references to the > determining citta in the index. These references provide absolutely > minimal information (except that I learn in VM IV n13, that the > determining citta only appears in the commentaries). In VM I n16, it > says "To expect to find in the Paramatthamanjusa an exposition of > the 'cognitive series (citta-vithi)' , and some explanation of the > individual members in addition to what is to be found in the > Visuddhi-magga itself is to be disappointed. There are only > fragmentary treatments." They are right - I am disappointed. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) 15168 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 0:20am Subject: Re: Nutriment (was, Kalapas According to Nyanatiloka) Howard Responding first on your questin about the rupa of nutriment. --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - ... > > Nyanatiloka's 'Buddhist Dictionary' > > > > rúpa-kalápa: > > 'corporeal group', material unit, designates a combination of several > > physical phenomena constituting a temporary unity. > > > > Thus, for instance, the so-called 'dead matter' forms the most > primitive > > group, consisting only of 8 physical phenomena, called the 'pure > eightfold > > unit' or 'octad' (suddhatthakakalápa), to wit: the 4 elements (the > solid, > > fluid, heat, motion); colour, smell, taste, nutriment (pathaví, ápo, > tejo, > > váyo; vanna, gandha, rasa, ojá). > > [In Vis.M., and elsewhere, it is also called ojatthamaka-kalápa, 'the > > octad with nutriment as the 8th factor'.] > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > What, exactly, is the kalapa of "nutriment"? > -------------------------------------------------------------- (Just on a point of terminology, 'kalapa' refers to the groups of rupas; the individual constituent dhammas are each rupas.) Every rupa has its characteristic. In the case of nutriment, that characteristic is that which can sustain life by being food. You will find a detailed description in Nina's book 'Rupas' available online at the link below. I have extracted part of the text. Jon http://www.zolag.co.uk/rupas.txt Nutrition is another kind of rúpa which has to arise with every kind of materiality. It can be exerienced only through the mind-door. The "Dhammasangaùi" (§ 646) mentions food such as boiled rice, sour gruel, flour, etc., which can be eaten and digested into the "juice" by which living beings are kept alive. The "Atthasåliní" (II, Book II, Ch III, 330) explains that there is foodstuff, the substance which is swallowed (kabaîinkåro åhåro, literally, morsel-made food), and the "nutritive essence"(ojå). The foodstuff which is swallowed fills the stomach so that one does not grow hungry. The nutritive essence present in food preserves beings, keeps them alive. The nutritive essence in gross foodstuff is weak, and in subtle foodstuff it is strong. After eating coarse grain one becomes hungry after a brief interval. But when one has taken ghee (butter) one does not want to eat for a long time (Atthasåliní, 331). 15169 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 0:27am Subject: Re: Kalapas According to Nyanatiloka Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > With regard to the following, which you provided, I have a few > questions, the primary one of which is how you, personally, as a 21st > century > person who accepts experience-independent matter, evaluate this. I will > insert more particular questions in context. I am intrigued by your reference to 'a 21st century person who accepts experience-independent matter'. Are you perhaps suggesting that the notion of 'experience-independent matter' is contrary to current scientific thinking? (BTW, I don't think I've expressed any thoughts of my own on the matter -- just my reading of the Buddha's position as found in the texts.) > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > Also, when there are no "sentient beings" around in this material > realm, no one to smell or taste or see, what do you suppose will > constitute > the kalapas of smell, taste, and colour? What does "taste" mean when > there is > no possibility of tasting? Is it a subjunctive potentiality? That is, if > there were in effect the conditions described as 'a sentient being with > tasting capacity being present', then taste would be experienced? That > would > make some sense to me. But, otherwise, I wonder at what the kalapa of > taste, > in itself, is supposed to be. Disembodied taste, co-occurring with other > similar disembodied characteristics such as solidity, smell, and > nutriment > strike me as a rather poor substitute for both the realist view of > actual > external things with characteristics of hardness etc and also for the > phenomenalist view. Perhaps it is much better than it seems, but for me > to see that, I would need to have much more of an explanation. > -------------------------------------------------------------- I personally don't share your difficulty in conceptualising a rupa without the consciousness that experiences it. Think for example of the rupas that make up the hair on the back of your head, or the inside of your body. Although they are normally not the object of any citta, and many of them would never be the object of a citta during the whole of one's life, that doesn’t to me make their arising any less viable. I've noticed in earlier posts of yours a tendency to talk about the experiencing of rupa as a single event, and I am wondering if there is a connection here. I do not find the 'single event' perspective a particularly helpful one, since the reality of that moment is 2 separate and distinct dhammas, only 1 of which can be the object of awareness or understanding at any given time. Although those 2 dhammas are momentarily interdependent in certain respects, they in fact arise from different causes and conditions and have different natures. The 'single event' treatment is not one I recall seeing in the texts. Jon 15170 From: Deanna Shakti Johnson Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 2:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] help - lots of mail Dear Christine, Thank you so much for the help and information. My inbox isnt so jammed all the time. I did as you said and I am happy to read emails from the group when I have time. I am getting ready for a trip where I won't have access to a computer for 3 weeks so I will have alot ot catching up to do. Thanks again, Shakti christine_forsyth wrote:Hi Deanna (and Azita), I solved the problem of the procession of non-stop emails from choking up my inbox by going to: http://groups.yahoo.com/mygroups Click on "Edit my Groups" - change any lists (especially those with heavy email traffic) to "no mail" by selecting under "message delivery", click on "save changes" and then read at the website at your leisure by returning anytime to the link above and clicking on the Group Name in the left hand column. Like Frank, I don't always read all posts or all threads immediately. Azita - I just remembered we were also discussing this subject at Noosa.:) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > Deanna, you can set up your yahoo email account filter > (search for "dsg") and put it into a separate folder > for starters so it doesn't get mixed up with other > email. > > The desire to maintain orderliness and read every > single message in dsg is a nonobvious type of dukkha. > Dukkha should be understood. When dukkha is seen, it's > easier to let it go. > > I realized a while back that there is no law that > demands that once I start reading a book or email that > I have to finish it. Quite liberating insight and > frees up loads of time. > > -fk 15171 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 3:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] help - lots of mail Dear Shakti, Glad it was helpful ... :) I hope everything is going smoothly with the plans for your trip. I'm not sure exactly where you are going...Nepal? And you have been before, I think? I wonder if the extremely heavy rains in parts of the area recently will have an effect on where you can go? I was looking at photos of a friend's trek on the Annapurna Circuit yesterday. Very beautiful and exotic ... A couple of the women at work are planning to go again later this year, despite memories of sore knees. They laughed at the pictures of signs outside remote tourist accommodation - and explained that these seemed to have been copied from brochures on western hotels with no relation to actual conditions there, especially the parts about hot showers, modern toilets, and wide choice of western meals .... :) Have an enjoyable and safe trip Shakti, and maybe put a photo or two on the List when you get back.... (sorry, couldn't help myself! :)) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Deanna Shakti Johnson wrote: > > Dear Christine, > Thank you so much for the help and information. My inbox isnt so jammed all the time. I did as you said and I am happy to read emails from the group when I have time. I am getting ready for a trip where I won't have access to a computer for 3 weeks so I will have alot ot catching up to do. Thanks again, Shakti > christine_forsyth wrote:Hi Deanna (and Azita), > > I solved the problem of the procession of non-stop emails from > choking up my inbox by going to: > http://groups.yahoo.com/mygroups > Click on "Edit my Groups" - change any lists (especially those with > heavy email traffic) to "no mail" by selecting under "message > delivery", click on "save changes" and then read at the website at > your leisure by returning anytime to the link above and clicking on > the Group Name in the left hand column. Like Frank, I don't always > read all posts or all threads immediately. > > Azita - I just remembered we were also discussing this subject at > Noosa.:) > > metta, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > > Deanna, you can set up your yahoo email account filter > > (search for "dsg") and put it into a separate folder > > for starters so it doesn't get mixed up with other > > email. > > > > The desire to maintain orderliness and read every > > single message in dsg is a nonobvious type of dukkha. > > Dukkha should be understood. When dukkha is seen, it's > > easier to let it go. > > > > I realized a while back that there is no law that > > demands that once I start reading a book or email that > > I have to finish it. Quite liberating insight and > > frees up loads of time. > > > > -fk 15172 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 7:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Herman >One cannot study things that are not there. It is there just that we cannot see it. What we see are only the manifestation of what we cannot see. To me, it is indeed very difficult to grasp something that is not there and it is very hard to believe in a system that is not being able to be seen. Similarly, the scientific knowledge of gravity, it is there and we cannot see it but we can see the manifestation of gravity and prove it is there. Just like Abhidhamma, it has prove itself to be very useful even though it cannot be actually seen/aware presently by our minds. In my personal opinion, Abidhamma is an eye opener for me and has been very helpful in the understanding of the workings of the consciouness and anatta. Lots to be gain and nothing to lose in studying this *cannot be see* doctrine. I encourage you to investigate and challenge it :). Thanks and indeed it is wonderful to see you here too. kind regards Ken O 15173 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 8:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] wrong view All, I'd like to point out that the passages that outline the Buddha's position on nihilism (vibhava) are implicitly anti phenomenalism and pro free will. There is no point in preserving the integrity of ethics if there is no free will, and if we say because of impermanence there are no khandhas, then there is nothing to be ethical with. Or if we say the khandas exist relatively because of impermanence, then we have to say the 'self' exists relatively because of impermanence. The consequence of that is there is no end of suffering and we have again lost ethics. I fully agree there are other passages that support phenomenalism and no free will. So how to resolve this dilemma? We could go down the road of relative and absolute truth, but absolute truth is relativity. And "relativity" sounds a lot like "relative truth". This brings us back to phenomenalism and no ethics. So the question is, how to establish an ontological basis for ethics. Any ideas? Did the Buddha offer a solution? Larry 15174 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 8:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: miccha sati Hi Nina there is no such thing as wrong sati or wrong compassion. If we start distinguishing kusala as right or wrong, to me is not the correct notion and could lead to confusion. Any kusala cetasika that associated with lobha is moha bc sati and panna is not at work to know it. We should be cautioned not to associated sati or any kusala by an akusala and not abt right or wrong. to Kom (I hope I am right) > about the quest for a shortcut of practice for both > samadhi and vipassana.> k: There is one, look at the Maha-Satipatthana sutta. Its been there for 2500 years, why quest for another one. Why beat abt the bush, when the bush is already there and developed by Buddha himself 2,500 years ago. Anyway, the quest for a shortcut is already has lobha as paccaya. Hence we will always be back to where we started, we will never reach the goal for a shortcut for both samadhi and vipassana :). Furthermore even if we do find a shortcut, are we sure it is correct. Unless one is an Arahat, what we quest for could be detrimental. kind rgds Ken O --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Kom and all, > We should consider what wrong or false sati is. It > must be something we take > for sati, but it is akusala, false, wrong. What > would it be? Now I refer to > what Num formulated so well in the Path of > Discrimination series: > about the quest for a shortcut of practice for both > samadhi and vipassana. > It > usually is a well-disguised form of our own subtle > lobha, clinging to an > idea of > getting quickest possible result.> > > We have to be very sincere, the perfection of > truthfulness is indispensable. > It is very necessary to know what wrong mindfulness > is, when we are on the > wrong Path. It is not a specific cetasika, but the > Buddha mentioned wrong > mindfulness to show what the wrong Path is, as > opposite to right > mindfulness. When there is clinging to result or > when we make ourselves > believe that there is right mindfulness, there is in > fact lobha. > When there is wrong mindfulness there is akusala > citta, but we have to think > first of lobha-mula-citta. > Rob M brought up the Q when sati is samma sati of > the eightfold Path. Sati > of satipatthana begins to be aware of nama and rupa, > and then satipatthana > becomes more developed. When we are still on the > level of considering > different characteristics of nama and rupa, when we > are only beginning to > learn more, we cannot say that this is already samma > sati of the eightfold > Path. When there can be direct awareness of one > reality at a time and the > characteristics of nama and rupa are distinguished > from each other, samma > sati begins to develop, and it develops on and on > until it is samma sati of > the Path which is lokuttara, supramundane. > Recently I heard on a tape about the difference > between seeing and visible > object. Visible object appears all the time, and on > account of it we think > of shape and form. A. Sujin asked a monk whether > seeing has an outward > appearance, and he said, no. A. Sujin answered: then > it is nama, which has > no shape or form. These remarks can help us to have > more understanding of > the difference between nama and rupa, but it is a > difficult subject. What do > you think, Kom? Any helpful reminders for me :-) > Something you heard on > tapes? > Best wishes > from Nina. 15175 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 4:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi, Stephen (and Christine, and Jon) - I find myself partly agreeing with what you write below, Stephen, and partly disagreeing. I'll insert a few comments below in context. In a message dated 8/24/02 12:38:44 AM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > > Hello Christine, Jon > I don't find talk of 'reality' useful; in fact I find it goofy and > mysterious. It's a confusing way of speaking. For instance, the Buddha > rejected both being and non-being. ("...'everything exists' is one extreme, > > and 'nothing exists' is another extreme. The Tathagata expresses the MIddle > > Way that does not adhere to these two extremes..." S.III.134-35 [The > passage > then goes on to reference paticcasamuppada.]) > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Everything that exists only exists in a "middle way" mode of existing. But, in addition to that, some alleged things don't exist at all but are only imagined, and, among those things that *do* exist, I believe there are variations in their manner of existence. To use an example from meteorology: a rainbow exists, but it does not exist in the same way as the water droplets and sunlight which are conditions for it - it seems to have a more derivative, indirect, and tenuous mode of existence. (Actually, I seem to recall that the Tibetans sometimes use a rainbow as metaphor for all our experience in that without the observer, there is no rainbow. Often, Tibetan Buddhists characterize *all* conditioned dharmas as concept-only. Their position is, I think, that there are no observed objects that have not been created, at least in part, by mental-conceptual constructive activity.) ------------------------------------------------------------- > In itself, this is nonsense: something either exists or it does not (there > are no shades or graduations of reality). > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: While there may or may not be degrees of existence, and that, I think depends on how we divide and subdivide (generally how we "parse") the *notion* of existence, I don't think that we should rule out alternative *modes* of existing. To exist as a mental construct would be a different mode than to exist as a particular visual image. We look outside and see a particular image - the mind then does some rapid construction work and we say "I see a tree". The image exists in one way (as directly apprehended via the sense of sight and our discernment), but the tree exists in a different manner. Now, of course, you want to infer an externally existing, independently existing "tree-in-itself". But if there is such a thing, we do not know what it might be "in itself" - we only know it *as apprehended*, and that involves a great deal of conceptual construction. So, if we put our assumptions about external, independent existence aside, there is a difference in the mode of existence of what we directly see (the image) and what we mentally construct (the tree), and this, I think, is a difference between an actuality (something directly observed - paramattha dhamma) and a c onstruct (pa~n~natti). This distinction, however, I believe, only makes sense from the phenomenological (if not the phenomenalist) perspective. From an objectivist perspective, I don't think it makes sense at all. This is, in part, why I say that Abhidhamma, if not the Dhamma in general, is phenomenological, and possibly even a form of phenomenalism. ------------------------------------------------------ What it means, in context, is that > > he saw that the world consists of becoming, or processes (things exist in > an > interrelated way, depend on conditions, are impermanent, don't exist as > independent substances or selves), not static/unchanging ('being' rejected) > > or somehow not real ('non-being' rejected). So it makes sense in the > context > of debate with contemporary opposing views of static realism or eternalism > and nihilism; but 'being' is used here in a special sense. The processes of > > the world exist, are quite real, just not real in some odd, eternalist > sense. > (So the Buddha says: "When dukkha arises, it really arises; and when dukkha > > is extinguished, it is really extinguished." ibid.) The relevance of this > is > that perhaps we may agree, we're simply using "paramattha" and "reality" > and > such terms in different senses. > > I'll begin by noting that not one* of your many references refers to the > word > "paramattha." You do make many references to khandha, ayatana, the 18 > dhathus, the 4 elements and such. If this is what paramattha means we > agree, > and it's merely a peccadillo that I don't use the word. > >...the suttas nevertheless contain numerous references to the importance > of > >developing direct knowledge of paramattha dhammas as referred to by other > names, >such as 'khandhas'. > (& a second quote from Nyanatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary so using the > term.) > No problem for me here, but > > Paramattha dhammas are supposed to be elementary, "ultimate constituents of > a > whole"; but none of these are, each is further reducible. So I believe he's > > misusing the word, in order to find it in the suttas. In this sense we > don't > agree. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, of course the khandhas are further divisible, because they are, exactly, aggregates. But what they are aggregates *of* are, or are intended to be, irreducible (though fleeting and conditioned) direct elements of experience, as opposed to being mental constructs (which have, as I see it, derivative modes of existence). ------------------------------------------------------ > [This further potential for reduction may not be true of the 4 elements. > Here > I suggest that if the Buddha meant by element certain experiential > properties > —e.g., earth = hardness— then good; but if it was meant as a theory of > matter it's wrong, as persons are made of carbon, nitrogen, and such. This, > > of course, would pose no problem; the Buddha's meaning is unchanged, just > that the body breaks down into in fact different items, still impersonal, > than he supposed. So Dhamma can't be entirely separated from physics.] > Consider vedana. It can be analyzed into endless types or classifications: > 2 > (bodily or mental), 3 (pleasant, painful, neutral), 5, 6, 18 in 3 > subgroups, > 36 in 6 subgroups, even 108! (Bahuvedaniya Sutta). Isn't it clear that the > Buddha wasn't interested in ultimate categories or realties? That it was > provisional, dependent on context? That it's a strategy to disengage from > seeing things in personal ways by breaking them down into impersonal > categories, not a search for ultimates? ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I think he was interested in ultimate, irreducble *experiences*, but was not interested in chemistry. His approach was phenomenological because his goal was soteriological. [I am not claiming here that he was a phenomenalist - that's a different issue. But distinguishing concept from reality (in the sense of what is actually and directly observed) was an essential part of the Buddha's project to liberate people from ignorance and suffering.] --------------------------------------------------------- > > Vohara sacca, a sutta phrase, means, e.g., self refers not to some > substantial entity but the functional unity of the khandhas; it's a > convenient and conventional way of speaking. It doesn't mean that beings > are > unreal, it means they're not substantial, eternal. But this isn't what > paramattha dhamma means. The latter contrasts conventional/conceptual > meaning > with ultimate truth. But conventional usage is simply the proper way of > seeing beings, a simple sum over properties word from common usage. As such > > it is in no way invalid, false, or somehow less real. (The entire issue of > concepts is a red herring.) When the Buddha said he used conventional > speech > without misapprehending them that's what he meant. This can be clearly seen > > in the Mulapariyaya sutta (which Christine recently discussed). Here is a > large and hugely varied list of things or concepts: earth, air (paramattha > dhammas?), beings, gods (Sammuti?), etc. They are not distinguished. None > are > said to be less real. The object, as seen in the four types of persons > relative successes, is not to identify with them, to make them one's own, > to > allow 'self' to appear. There is no denial of conception. This approach > misses the point. ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Of course there was no denial of conception nor of its necessity for thought and communication. But what *did* the Buddha mean when he said that he was not fooled by conventional speech? It seems to me that both Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana are all pretty much in agreement that our speech conventions, all of them, are a major source of error in understanding how things really are. (Read the Diamond Sutra for example, where all sorts of "things" are considered to lack the existence we normally ascribe to them.) -------------------------------------------------------- > > >...whenever the suttas speak of man, woman, or person...this must not be > taken as >being valid in the ultimate sense, but as a mere conventional > mode > of speech. > This is wrong, as noted above, and contradicts MN sutta 58. "Not valid" can > > only mean incorrect, untrue. In the sutta the Buddha discusses un/true or > in/correct (T of F), un/benefical (B or U), and un/welcome or dis/agreeable > > statements(A or D). > This gives 8 permutations: > 1. T B D > 2. T B A > 3. T U D > 4. T U A > 5. F B D > 6. F B A > 7. F U D > 8. F U A > He then sequentially eliminates 7, then 3, accepts 1 at it's proper time, > eliminates 8, then 4, concluding 'yes' on 2. 5 and 6, statements false and > beneficial, aren't even considered; I take this to mean that there are none > > such. Sammuti would fall into one of these types (in fact, a species of > upaya, in the Mahayana sense of skillful use of falsehood). The Buddha > rejected the entire notion. > > Jeeze, what a long post! and I could yet babble on. Sorry, > and thanks for the welcome Jon. (I suspect that a little doubting of the > basic premises of the list will go a long way. Still, there's no better way > > to find out what one thinks than to write it out. Then see what's left > standing ;-) > > *Wasn't the kathavatthu written long after the Buddha died? In any case, I > stand corrected on that point. > > metta, stephen > > ================================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15176 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 4:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process/ Howard Hi, Chris - In a message dated 8/24/02 2:25:48 AM Eastern Daylight Time, cforsyth@v... writes: > Dear Howard, > > Arrghh! Howard - You give in too easily!..... > And the answer is >>>>>> Peter Harvey - who is Professor of Buddhist > Studies at the University of Sunderland, co-founder of the UK > Association for Buddhist Studies, a meditation teacher in the Samatha > Trust tradition, and author of An Introduction to Buddhism , The > Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early > Buddhism and An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Member of the > Editorial Board of The Journal of Buddhist Ethics (and member of > Buddha-L). > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Gosh, I didn't even think of him! :-( ------------------------------------------------------- As I recall, Samatha Trust was co-founded by Lance > > Cousins (Manchester University) who is also on the Editorial Board of > The Journal of Buddhist Ethics, and fellow member of Buddha-L. > http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/aboutjournal.html > ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: Ahh. I much admire him. (A while back I had had some brief e-mail correspondence with him. He's a very nice guy for an academic! ;-)) ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard, didn't you tell me once-upon-a-time that you had 'The > Selfless Mind.....' ? Just that a review I read of it said that > there was an Appendix on The Theory of the Process of Cittas, pp.252- > 58 which may be of help to Rob M. If you have it, could you have a > look and give a comment please? > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Yes, I do have that book, and it is one of my top favorites. (I own his book on ethics also.) And yes, there is a discussion on the process of cittas included that is *very* easy to understand, very clear. That section and the book as a whole are unusually well written, and I strongly recommend this book to everyone! -------------------------------------------------------- > > metta, > Chris > ============================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15177 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 8:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Christine, To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of Buddhism. It always leads to difficult questions, like "is there a free will and if there is no free will how do we practise in the first place." Pple who believe in no free will is I said b4 a few months ago is extremist. Remember there is always a choice. If there is no choice, the power to choose then Budhha will be wasting his time teaching us. We might as well sit below the bodhi tree and do nothing :). I don't understand why free will must be associated with a self. I think this is a concept developed by the West (no offence please). We always forget that there is a cetana that acts who itself is anatta. Isn't this a wonderful paradox :). Cheers and kind regards Ken O 15178 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 5:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Nutriment (was, Kalapas According to Nyanatiloka) Hi, Jon - Thank you for the following information. I must say, though - this business strikes me as 1) a mixing of actuality and concept, and 2) pseudo-scientific from the modern perspective. With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/24/02 3:21:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Howard > > Responding first on your questin about the rupa of nutriment. > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Jon - > ... > > > Nyanatiloka's 'Buddhist Dictionary' > > > > > > rúpa-kalápa: > > > 'corporeal group', material unit, designates a combination of several > > > physical phenomena constituting a temporary unity. > > > > > > Thus, for instance, the so-called 'dead matter' forms the most > > primitive > > > group, consisting only of 8 physical phenomena, called the 'pure > > eightfold > > > unit' or 'octad' (suddhatthakakalápa), to wit: the 4 elements (the > > solid, > > > fluid, heat, motion); colour, smell, taste, nutriment (pathaví, ápo, > > tejo, > > > váyo; vanna, gandha, rasa, ojá). > > > [In Vis.M., and elsewhere, it is also called ojatthamaka-kalápa, 'the > > > octad with nutriment as the 8th factor'.] > > ------------------------------------------------ > > Howard: > > What, exactly, is the kalapa of "nutriment"? > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > (Just on a point of terminology, 'kalapa' refers to the groups of rupas; > the individual constituent dhammas are each rupas.) > > Every rupa has its characteristic. In the case of nutriment, that > characteristic is that which can sustain life by being food. You will > find a detailed description in Nina's book 'Rupas' available online at the > link below. I have extracted part of the text. > > Jon > > http://www.zolag.co.uk/rupas.txt > Nutrition is another kind of rúpa which has to arise with every kind > of materiality. It can be exerienced only through the mind-door. The > "Dhammasangaùi" (§ 646) mentions food such as boiled rice, sour gruel, > flour, etc., which can be eaten and digested into the "juice" by which > living beings are kept alive. The "Atthasåliní" (II, Book II, Ch III, > 330) explains that there is foodstuff, the substance which is > swallowed (kabaîinkåro åhåro, literally, morsel-made food), and the > "nutritive essence"(ojå). The foodstuff which is swallowed fills the > stomach so that one does not grow hungry. The nutritive essence > present in food preserves beings, keeps them alive. The nutritive > essence in gross foodstuff is weak, and in subtle foodstuff it is > strong. After eating coarse grain one becomes hungry after a brief > interval. But when one has taken ghee (butter) one does not want to > eat for a long time (Atthasåliní, 331). /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15179 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 5:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Kalapas According to Nyanatiloka Hi, Jon - In a message dated 8/24/02 3:28:25 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > > > With regard to the following, which you provided, I have a few > > questions, the primary one of which is how you, personally, as a 21st > > century > > person who accepts experience-independent matter, evaluate this. I will > > insert more particular questions in context. > > I am intrigued by your reference to 'a 21st century person who accepts > experience-independent matter'. Are you perhaps suggesting that the > notion of 'experience-independent matter' is contrary to current > scientific thinking? > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: No, not at all. Quite the contrary in fact. (Although certain interpretations of quantum mechanics may point away from such objectivism.) --------------------------------------------------- (BTW, I don't think I've expressed any thoughts of> > my own on the matter -- just my reading of the Buddha's position as found > in the texts.) > > > ------------------------------------------------ > > Howard: > > Also, when there are no "sentient beings" around in this material > > realm, no one to smell or taste or see, what do you suppose will > > constitute > > the kalapas of smell, taste, and colour? What does "taste" mean when > > there is > > no possibility of tasting? Is it a subjunctive potentiality? That is, if > > there were in effect the conditions described as 'a sentient being with > > tasting capacity being present', then taste would be experienced? That > > would > > make some sense to me. But, otherwise, I wonder at what the kalapa of > > taste, > > in itself, is supposed to be. Disembodied taste, co-occurring with other > > similar disembodied characteristics such as solidity, smell, and > > nutriment > > strike me as a rather poor substitute for both the realist view of > > actual > > external things with characteristics of hardness etc and also for the > > phenomenalist view. Perhaps it is much better than it seems, but for me > > to see that, I would need to have much more of an explanation. > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > I personally don't share your difficulty in conceptualising a rupa without > the consciousness that experiences it. Think for example of the rupas > that make up the hair on the back of your head, or the inside of your > body. > ------------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: As external, mind-independent entities, rupas are mere concept, Jon! They are only hypothesized, not observed. The hair, from the Abhidhammic perspective, is mere pa~n~natti. So, WHERE are these "external", mind-independent rupas? (They don't exist in the hair or as part of the hair, since the hair is mere pa~n~natti.) If one adopts neither a realist (objectivist) standpoint nor a phenomenalist one, I don't see how to answer such a question. [For a realist, the hair is real and out there, with the so-called rupas being mere characteristics of that hair or physical parts of it. For the Buddhist phenomenalist, the rupas are internal - the objective aspects/poles of moments of experience, and the hair is conceptually constructed from these rupas.] ------------------------------------------------------------- Although they are normally not the object of any citta, and many of> > them would never be the object of a citta during the whole of one's life, > that doesn’t to me make their arising any less viable. > > I've noticed in earlier posts of yours a tendency to talk about the > experiencing of rupa as a single event, and I am wondering if there is a > connection here. I do not find the 'single event' perspective a > particularly helpful one, since the reality of that moment is 2 separate > and distinct dhammas, only 1 of which can be the object of awareness or > understanding at any given time. Although those 2 dhammas are momentarily > interdependent in certain respects, they in fact arise from different > causes and conditions and have different natures. The 'single event' > treatment is not one I recall seeing in the texts. > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: I do see experience as consisting of single events - discernings of objects. The discernment operation (vi~n~nana) and its object co-occur, arise together, and are mutually dependent. This is the mutual dependence of vi~n~nana and namarupa, likened to two mutually supporting sheaves. Whether or not there exist rupas that are more than mere potentialities for being objects of discernent, that are self-existing, independent things is unknowable - for only what is observable is truly knowable. ----------------------------------------------------- > > Jon > > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15180 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 10:01am Subject: Mindfulness of Breathing We should go back to the first tetrad of the Anapana Sati Sutta: (I) Breathing in long, he knows ³I breathe in long²; or breathing out long, he knows ³I breathe out long². (II) Breathing in short, he knows ³I breathe in short²; or breathing out short, he knows ³I breathe out short². (III) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in experiencing the whole body²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out experiencing the whole body². (IV) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in tranquillizing the bodily activity²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out tranquillizing the bodily activity², at that time, monks, the monk is faring along contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly conscious (of it), mindful (of it) having put away the covetousness and dejection in the world. I say, monks, that of bodies, this is (a certain) one, that is to say breathing-in and breathing-out. That is why, on that occasion, monks, the monk is faring along contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly conscious (of it), mindful (of it) having put away the covetousness and dejection in the world. In the word commentary to the above quoted sutta the Visuddhimagga (VIII, 223-226) mentions with regard to the first tetrad (group of four clauses, marked I-IV) of the sutta the different stages of insight-knowledge which are developed after emerging from jhåna. We read Vis. 223 < On emerging from the attainment he sees that the in-breaths and out-breaths have the physical body and the mind as their origin; and that just as, when a blacksmith¹s bellows are being blown, the wind moves owing to the bag and to the man¹s appropriate effort, so too, in-breaths and out-breaths are due to the body and the mind. Next he defines the in-breaths and out-breaths and the body as materiality, and the consciousness and the states associated with the consciousness as the immaterial... Having defined nama-rupa in this way, he seeks its condition...> The Visuddhimagga then mentions all the different stages of insight (Visuddhimagga VIII, 223 -225). We then read: In the Papancasudani, the Co to the Anapanasati sutta, there is more explanation on rupas which should be objects of awareness after the meditator has emerged from jhana. As we read at the end of the first tetrad, The Commentary explains, this is a certain body, kåya~n~natara: N: Breath is rupa, and it can be understood as such when it appears through the bodysense, at the nosetip or upperlip. It can appear as solidity or motion or temperature. It can be known as only rupa, not my breath, as non-self. Contemplating the Body in the Body: now we go to the Co to Satipatthana Sutta (Middle length Sayings, I, 10, translated by Ven. Soma): As to the words: , this Co explains that the world is the five khandhas. Covetousness stands for sense desire and grief stands for ill will, which are, as the Co states, the principal hindrances. We read: Nina: I heard in a tape that A. Sujin explained that all the different sections in the contemplation of the body, in the Satipatthana Sutta, be it mindfulness of breathing, the cemetery contemplations, the parts of the body, the elements, the postures, are a means to remind us to be aware of rupa we take for my body. When we are breathing, walking, sitting, we think of ourselves doing these things, but in reality there are only dhammas. ***** Nina 15181 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 11:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Rob, here's a thought. You might poke around in Ledi Sayadaw's writings. If you do, please pass along anything you find in the way of a bibliography for him. There are several brief comments by him in "A Comprehensive Manual..." which go into unusual depth of the citta process. Larry 15182 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 11:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] wrong view Hi, Larry - In a message dated 8/24/02 11:38:46 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > All, > > I'd like to point out that the passages that outline the Buddha's > position on nihilism (vibhava) are implicitly anti phenomenalism and pro > free will. > ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Why are phenomenalism and free will related or unrelated? Also, what is free will supposed to be? Something unconditioned? Isn't nibbana the only unconditioned thing? ----------------------------------------------- There is no point in preserving the integrity of ethics if> > there is no free will, and if we say because of impermanence there are > no khandhas, then there is nothing to be ethical with. > -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Something is impermanent in case it doesn't last. That doesn't mean that it is nothing whatsoever. There *is* a middle way. -------------------------------------------------- Or if we say the> > khandas exist relatively because of impermanence, then we have to say > the 'self' exists relatively because of impermanence. ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: That's not what the Indians meant by self, and it isn't what the Buddha criticized. What was taken to be self, and what the Buddha denied, was a permanent, personal, core/essence in or associated with the khandhas. ---------------------------------------------------- The consequence of > > that is there is no end of suffering and we have again lost ethics. > > I fully agree there are other passages that support phenomenalism and no > free will. So how to resolve this dilemma? We could go down the road of > relative and absolute truth, but absolute truth is relativity. And > "relativity" sounds a lot like "relative truth". This brings us back to > phenomenalism and no ethics. > ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Larry, you've gotta be like me and join the Ethical Phenomenalist Society! ;-)) -------------------------------------------------- > > So the question is, how to establish an ontological basis for ethics. > Any ideas? Did the Buddha offer a solution? ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't think the buddha was a philosopher. (He was a Buddha! ;-) ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Larry > ============================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15183 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 4:54pm Subject: [dsg] Re: miccha sati > > there is no such thing as wrong sati or wrong > compassion. If we start distinguishing kusala as > right or wrong, to me is not the correct notion and > could lead to confusion. Any kusala cetasika that > associated with lobha is moha bc sati and panna is not > at work to know it. We should be cautioned not to > associated sati or any kusala by an akusala and not > abt right or wrong. > >============= Dear Ken, Anguttara Nikaya Book of the tens XI (iii) 103 Wrongness From wrong view proceeds wrong thinking; from that wrong speech. From wrong speech, wrong action. From wrong action, wrong living; from that wrong effort. From wrong effort proceeds WRONG MINDFULNESS; from that wrong concentration. From wrong concentration proceeds wrong knowledge. From wrong knowledge proceeds wrong release...... 103. "Micchatta.m, bhikkhave, aagamma viraadhanaa hoti, no aaraadhanaa. Katha~nca, bhikkhave, micchatta.m aagamma viraadhanaa hoti, no aaraadhanaa? Micchaadi.t.thikassa, bhikkhave, micchaasa"nkappo pahoti, micchaasa"nkappassa micchaavaacaa pahoti, micchaavaa cassa micchaakammanto pahoti, micchaakammantassa micchaa- aajiivo pahoti, micchaa-aajiivassa micchaavaayaamo pahoti, micchaavaayaa massa micchaasati pahoti, MICCHASATIssa micchaasamaadhi pahoti, micchaasamaadhissa micchaa~naa.na.m pahoti, micchaa~naa.nissa ‚ micchaavimutti pahoti. Dear Ken, In the Abhidhamma, as you say, there is no wrong sati. Miccha-sati is actually lobha (not sati, not kusala at all) but it is given the name miccha-sati in some suttas to show that it is part of the wrong path. As Kom said it is easy to take the wrong path for the right one and then one may carry on to take unusual experiences(that arise because of wrong concentration) for insight and even come to the stage where there is miccha-vimutti (wrong release), imitation nibbana. And it all begins because of wrong view . We may be trying to get something, to add something to experience, alter it rather than understand it. But perhaps it can be helpful to think of sati as more like a subtraction - a taking away of the subtle lobha that wants things to be other than they are at this moment. Robert 15184 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 5:07pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Let go Hi Ken O, and All, I think that so much revolves around the meaning of particular words to particular individuals, whether in ancient times or nowadays, whether words are used technically or in a general everyday sense and whether the Buddha meant them in the everyday usage applicable right now in the 21st century C.E. of America, Asia, Australia or any other areas. A quick look in the dictionary gives its definition of 'free will' as: Free will: the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies. <<<>>>> I am one of those who are very slow to understand these points .... I agree that anatta is a difficult, deep doctrine. I only understand a little of it - on rare occasions, and when the wind is blowing from the north :) I like to imagine that if I had been a 'born buddhist' living in a buddhist country, and didn't have the western mental baggage of living in a society that is outcomes oriented, being taught to believe in a soul, and God as first cause etc., that understanding anatta would be much easier. I gather from list members with those very 'qualifications' that this may not necessarily be the case .... So much about 'freewill' depends on our understanding of anatta, and conditionality - paticcasamuppada. The Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines states that "paticcasamuppáda: 'dependent origination', is the doctrine of the conditionality of all physical and psychical phenomena, a doctrine which, together with that of impersonality (anattá q.v.), forms the indispensable condition for the real understanding and realization of the teaching of the Buddha. It shows the conditionality and dependent nature of that uninterrupted flux of manifold physical and psychical phenomena of existence conventionally called the ego, or man, or animal, etc. Whereas the doctrine of impersonality, or anattá, proceeds analytically, by splitting existence up into the ultimate constituent parts, into mere empty, unsubstantial phenomena or elements, the doctrine of dependent origination, on the other hand, proceeds synthetically, by showing that all these phenomena are, in some way or other, conditionally related with each other. In fact, the entire Abhidhamma Pitaka, as a whole, treats really of nothing but just these two doctrines: phenomenality - implying impersonality and conditionality of all existence. The former or analytical method is applied in Dhammasangani, the first book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka; the latter or synthetical method, in Patthána, the last book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka." In this excerpt from 'Fundamentals of Buddhism' below, Ven. Nyanatiloka Mahathera suggests that questions on Freewill are in the category of those which are 'wrongly put' and therefore 'unanswerable'. He says that the only admissible question would be: "Is the arising of will independent of conditions, or is it conditioned?" metta, Christine "According to Buddhism, the present rebirth is the result of the craving, clinging and kamma volitions in the past birth. And the craving, clinging and kamma volitions in this present birth are the cause of future rebirth. But just as in this ever-changing mental and physical process of existence nothing can be found that passes even from one moment to the next, just so no abiding element can be found, no entity, no ego, that would pass from one birth to the next. In this ever repeated process of rebirth, in the absolute sense, no ego-entity is to be found besides these conditionally arising and passing phenomena. Thus, correctly speaking, it is not myself and not my person that is reborn; nor is it another person that is reborn. All such terms as "person" or "individual" or "man" or "I" or "you" or "mine," etc., do not refer to any real entity; they are merely terms used for convenience sake, in Pali //vohara- vacana//, "conventional terms"; and there is really nothing to be found beside these conditionally arising and passing mental and physical phenomena. Therefore the Buddha has said: To believe that the doer of the deed will be the same, as the one who experiences its result (in the next life): this is the one extreme. To believe that the doer of the deed, and the one who experiences its result, are two different persons: this is the other extreme. Both these extremes the Perfect One has avoided and taught the truth that lies in the middle of both, that is: Through ignorance the kamma-formations are conditioned; through the kamma-formations, consciousness (in the subsequent birth); through consciousness, the mental and physical phenomena; through the mental and physical phenomena, the six bases; through the six bases, impression; through impression, feeling; through feeling, craving; through craving, clinging; through clinging, the life-process; through the (kammic) life-process, rebirth; through rebirth, decay and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair. Thus arises this whole mass of suffering. This phenomenality and egolessness of existence has been beautifully expressed in two verses of the Visuddhmagga: No doer of the deeds is found, No one who ever reaps their fruits. Empty phenomena roll on. This only is the correct view. No god nor Brahma can be called The maker of this wheel of life: Empty phenomena roll on, Dependent on conditions all. In hearing that Buddhism teaches that everything is determined by conditions, someone might come to the conclusion that Buddhism teaches some sort of fatalism, or that man has no free will, or that will is not free. Now, with regard to the two questions: (1) "Has man a free will?" and (2) "Is will free?" the Buddhist will say that both these questions are to be rejected for being wrongly put, and therefore unanswerable. The first question "Has man a free will?" is to be rejected for the reason that, beside these ever-changing mental and physical phenomena, in the absolute sense no such thing or entity can be found that we could call "man," so that "man" as such is merely a name without any reality. The second question "Is will free?" is to be rejected for the reason that "will" is only a momentary mental phenomenon, just like feeling, consciousness, etc., and thus does not yet exist before it arises, and that therefore of a non-existent thing -- of a thing which is not -- one could, properly speaking, not ask whether it is free or unfree. The only admissible question would be: "Is the arising of will independent of conditions, or is it conditioned?" But the same question would equally apply also to all the other mental phenomena, as well as to all the physical phenomena, in other words, to everything and every occurrence whatever. And the answer would be: Be it "will," or "feeling," or any other mental or physical phenomenon, the arising of anything whatsoever depends on conditions; and without these conditions, nothing can ever arise or enter into existence.According to Buddhism, everything mental and physical happens in accordance with laws and conditions. wheel394.zip, 60 KB, 'Fundamentals of Buddhism' by Nyanatiloka Mahathera. http://www.buddhanet.net/ftp03.htm --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Christine, > > To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of > Buddhism. It always leads to difficult questions, > like "is there a free will and if there is no free > will how do we practise in the first place." > > Pple who believe in no free will is I said b4 a few > months ago is extremist. Remember there is always a > choice. If there is no choice, the power to choose > then Budhha will be wasting his time teaching us. We > might as well sit below the bodhi tree and do nothing > :). > > I don't understand why free will must be associated > with a self. I think this is a concept developed by > the West (no offence please). We always forget that > there is a cetana that acts who itself is anatta. > Isn't this a wonderful paradox :). > > > Cheers and kind regards > Ken O 15185 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 9:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Putting the Anapanasati Sutta into practice Howard (and Victor) My apologies for not getting back sooner on this interesting post. -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: <<... Mindfulness of breathing *as taught* in the Anapanasati Sutta and as elucidated upon by many, including, for example, Bhikkus U Silananda and Buddhadasa, is a complete system of meditative practice, but it could also be used in lesser, partial ways, most particularly only for samatha bhavana. Developing awareness of the breath strictly as a concentration on the breath, as a focussing technique, might bring the jhanas, but, by itself, would not fully implement vipassana. The instructions in the Anapanasati Sutta, that title being rendered by Buddhadasa as "Mindfulness while [not 'of'] Breathing", are quite explicit.>> -------------------------------------------------------- You (and I think Victor also) see the Anapanasati Sutta as 'instructional' in the sense of laying out a course of practice to be followed by anyone who wishes to develop insight. I would like to try and explain why I do not share that view. As in the case of any sutta, one needs to ask the question, 'What exactly is the message being conveyed here, and to/for whom?'. Nina has already given us a lot of material from the commentarial texts, which to me give a clear answer to those questions. However, as I know you have reservations about the authenticity of the commentaries, I would like to make one or two observations based on the text of the sutta alone, taking the first part of the passage quoted by you below as an example. 1/. A closer look at the wording of the text. The structure of the passage is rather complex, so I think it helps to break it down a little. Here’s my breakdown-- (a) Now, on whatever occasion a monk breathing in [or out] long [or short] discerns that he is breathing in [or out] long [or short]; (b) trains himself to breathe in or out sensitive to the entire body, or calming bodily fabrication: (c) On that occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- subduing greed & distress with reference to the world. (d) I tell you, monks, that this -- the in-&-out breath -- is classed as a body among bodies, which is why the monk on that occasion remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. … (e) This is how mindfulness of in-&-out breathing is developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination. To me, the words 'on whatever occasion' in par. (a) indicate that what immediately follows is not meant to be ‘instructional’, but to describe a situation that may occur. I see that expression as equivalent to present-day ‘in the case where’. The key to the whole passage seems to be par. (c), because it is here that the first reference to mindfulness is found. Note, however, that par. (c) does not tell us *how* mindfulness is to be developed, but seems to refer to *mindfulness arising and taking a specific object, namely the body (i.e., rupas)*. So my reading of the whole passage would be something like this: *If* there is mindfulness of rupa as rupa ['the body in and of itself', in par. (c)] while focussing on the breath [as described in par. (a) and (b)] then this is mindfulness of breathing for the purposes of satipatthana [par. (d)]. 2/. The preliminary/underlying assumptions In the sutta, the whole passage on mindfulness of breathing, including the part quoted in your post, is preceded by the following: "Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination? "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out..." This sets the context for what follows, including the passage discussed at 1/. above. I would like to focus on some particular aspects of this introductory section. Again, a breakdown may be helpful: (a) *There is the case where* a monk, (b) *having gone to the wilderness*, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, (c) and *sets mindfulness to the fore*. (d) *Always mindful*, he breathes in…" Again, this is a "case where" situation, not a "do this" passage [par. (a)]. To my reading, it refers to a particular class of monk, namely one who is not only leading the homeless life but is doing so in the manner recommended by the Buddha for those who wish to develop samatha to a high degree [par. (b)], and in whom both samatha with breath as object and mindfulness/satipatthana are well developed [par. (c) and (d)]. Who else could 'set mindfulness to the fore' and be 'always mindful' when breathing? It is to such a person that the rest of the sutta is pitched. Howard, I hope these comments give you some idea as to why I do not read the sutta as a general exhortation to practise mindfulness of breathing as a means of developing satipatthana, but rather as being directed to those with already-developed samatha where breath is the object. (I am of course not saying the sutta has no relevance or application to the rest of us, but simply that it has to be understood in its proper context.) Jon ************************************************ <<(The Four Frames of Reference) "[1] Now, on whatever occasion a monk breathing in long discerns that he is breathing in long; or breathing out long, discerns that he is breathing out long; or breathing in short, discerns that he is breathing in short; or breathing out short, discerns that he is breathing out short; trains himself to breathe in... &... out sensitive to the entire body; trains himself to breathe in... &... out calming bodily fabrication: On that occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- subduing greed & distress with reference to the world. I tell you, monks, that this -- the in-&-out breath -- is classed as a body among bodies, which is why the monk on that occasion remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. "[2] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... "[3] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... "[4] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... "This is how mindfulness of in-&-out breathing is developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination ...">> ****************************************************** 15186 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 9:37pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Putting the Anapanasati Sutta into practice Victor --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hi Jon, > > Again, the Buddha pointed out the benefit of developing the > mindfulness of in-&-out breathing and gave the instruction on it in > Anapanasati Sutta. It is up to one to put the instruction into > practice. > > If you don't see that you can put the instruction into practice, then > perhaps you might want to find out what hinders you from developing > the mindfulness of in-&-out breathing. > > I look forward to discussing with you on any issue you have regarding > anapanasati after you start developing the mindfulness of in-&-out > breathing. > > Regards, > Victor Thanks for offering to discuss this sutta further, from the point of view of 'putting the instruction into practice'. You will have seen the post I just sent to Howard, and you may have already anticipated my question. It relates to the very beginning of the 'instruction' on mindfulness of breathing: "Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination? "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out. ..." My question is, how does a person get to be within the ambit of this introductory passage, i.e. of being a person who -- (a) having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, has sat down folding his legs crosswise and holding his body erect, (b) has *set mindfulness to the fore*, and (c) is *always mindful* as he breathes in…" I would be interested to hear your thoughts on each of these factors as prerequisites to the actual 'practice' of mindfulness of breathing. Thanks. Jon 15187 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 6:03pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Putting the Anapanasati Sutta into practice Hi, Jon - I will insert some comments below. But as an advance summary: I do not see matters as you do here. In a message dated 8/25/02 12:31:56 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Howard (and Victor) > > My apologies for not getting back sooner on this interesting post. > > -------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > <<... Mindfulness of breathing *as taught* in the Anapanasati Sutta > and as elucidated upon by many, including, for example, Bhikkus U > Silananda and Buddhadasa, is a complete system of meditative practice, but > it could also be used in lesser, partial ways, most particularly only for > samatha bhavana. > Developing awareness of the breath strictly as a concentration on > the breath, as a focussing technique, might bring the jhanas, but, by > itself, would not fully implement vipassana. The instructions in the > Anapanasati Sutta, that title being rendered by Buddhadasa as "Mindfulness > while [not 'of'] Breathing", are quite explicit.>> > -------------------------------------------------------- > > You (and I think Victor also) see the Anapanasati Sutta as 'instructional' > in the sense of laying out a course of practice to be followed by anyone > who wishes to develop insight. I would like to try and explain why I do > not share that view. > > As in the case of any sutta, one needs to ask the question, 'What exactly > is the message being conveyed here, and to/for whom?'. Nina has already > given us a lot of material from the commentarial texts, which to me give a > clear answer to those questions. However, as I know you have reservations > about the authenticity of the commentaries, I would like to make one or > two observations based on the text of the sutta alone, taking the first > part of the passage quoted by you below as an example. > > 1/. A closer look at the wording of the text. > The structure of the passage is rather complex, so I think it helps to > break it down a little. Here’s my breakdown-- > (a) Now, on whatever occasion a monk breathing in [or out] long [or > short] discerns that he is breathing in [or out] long [or short]; > (b) trains himself to breathe in or out sensitive to the entire body, or > calming bodily fabrication: > (c) On that occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself > -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- subduing greed & distress with reference to > the world. > (d) I tell you, monks, that this -- the in-&-out breath -- is classed as > a body among bodies, which is why the monk on that occasion remains > focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting > aside greed & distress with reference to the world. > … > (e) This is how mindfulness of in-&-out breathing is developed & pursued > so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination. > > To me, the words 'on whatever occasion' in par. (a) indicate that what > immediately follows is not meant to be ‘instructional’, but to describe a > situation that may occur. I see that expression as equivalent to > present-day ‘in the case where’. > > The key to the whole passage seems to be par. (c), because it is here that > the first reference to mindfulness is found. Note, however, that par. (c) > does not tell us *how* mindfulness is to be developed, but seems to refer > to *mindfulness arising and taking a specific object, namely the body > (i.e., rupas)*. > > So my reading of the whole passage would be something like this: *If* > there is mindfulness of rupa as rupa ['the body in and of itself', in par. > (c)] while focussing on the breath [as described in par. (a) and (b)] then > this is mindfulness of breathing for the purposes of satipatthana [par. > (d)]. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I would direct your attention to the following phrases in what you quoted above: "trains himself" "subduing greed" "putting aside greed & distress" "developed & pursued" -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > 2/. The preliminary/underlying assumptions > In the sutta, the whole passage on mindfulness of breathing, including the > part quoted in your post, is preceded by the following: > > "Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as to > bring the four frames of reference to their culmination? > "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, to the > shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs > crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. > Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out..." > > This sets the context for what follows, including the passage discussed at > 1/. above. I would like to focus on some particular aspects of this > introductory section. Again, a breakdown may be helpful: > (a) *There is the case where* a monk, > (b) *having gone to the wilderness*, to the shade of a tree, or to an > empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body > erect, > (c) and *sets mindfulness to the fore*. > (d) *Always mindful*, he breathes in…" > > Again, this is a "case where" situation, not a "do this" passage [par. > (a)]. To my reading, it refers to a particular class of monk, namely one > who is not only leading the homeless life but is doing so in the manner > recommended by the Buddha for those who wish to develop samatha to a high > degree [par. (b)], and in whom both samatha with breath as object and > mindfulness/satipatthana are well developed [par. (c) and (d)]. Who else > could 'set mindfulness to the fore' and be 'always mindful' when > breathing? It is to such a person that the rest of the sutta is pitched. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Whoever the person is, he/she must "go to the wilderness", must "sit down folding his legs crosswise", must "hold his body erect", must "set mindfulness to the fore". These things don't just happen! They are willful, Jon. They constitute deliberate practice, deliberate *training* (just as the Buddha said that the forest monk "trains himself"). The Anapanasati Sutta is not mere description of an event somehow occurring. It is prescription by way of description. It's like one person asking how to bake a cake, and getting the answer: "When a cake is being baked, first the ingredients are assembled, including flour, eggs, shorthening, and yeast, then ... " This is a method of instruction. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > > Howard, I hope these comments give you some idea as to why I do not read > the sutta as a general exhortation to practise mindfulness of breathing as > a means of developing satipatthana, but rather as being directed to those > with already-developed samatha where breath is the object. > > (I am of course not saying the sutta has no relevance or application to > the rest of us, but simply that it has to be understood in its proper > context.) > > Jon > ============================= So - we agree to disagree on this one, Jon. With metta, Howard > > > ************************************************ > <<(The Four Frames of Reference) > "[1] Now, on whatever occasion a monk breathing in long discerns that he > is breathing in long; or breathing out long, discerns that he is breathing > out long; or breathing in short, discerns that he is breathing in short; > or breathing out short, discerns that he is breathing out short; trains > himself to breathe in... &... out sensitive to the entire body; trains > himself to breathe in... &... out calming bodily fabrication: On that > occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, > alert, & mindful -- subduing greed & distress with reference to the world. > I tell you, monks, that this -- the in-&-out breath -- is classed as a > body among bodies, which is why the monk on that occasion remains focused > on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside > greed & distress with reference to the world. > "[2] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... > "[3] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... > "[4] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... > "This is how mindfulness of in-&-out breathing is developed & pursued so > as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination ...">> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15188 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 10:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] wrong view Hi Howard, how about this: We could dispense with free will in ethics by saying there is a conditioned, no-control ethics in which good deeds produce good results; saying "you should do this" or "I want to do that" or thinking about something is a condition conditioned by many conditions and it will contribute to (partially cause) many results, now and in the future. So much for free will; now all we have to do is establish the reality status of these causes and results. What confused me was that "impermanence" is used to establish the non existence of 'self' and the dependent existence of the khandhas. I thought because impermanence was the basis of both arguments, they were the same argument, but they aren't. The Buddha asserts that the only possible candidate for the self is one or more of the khandhas, but the self is believed, either psychologically or metaphysically, to be eternal. The khandhas are impermanent, so the khandhas are not a self. The khandhas are, however, dependently existent because they arise dependently, abide dependently and subside dependently. In other words, they are not independent (aka 'ultimately existent'). This is all due to the process nature of impermanence. This logic also applies to 'wholes'. So I could give a nice scientific definition of an emotional human being and we (you and I) could agree that it is truly, dependently existent in process but it has a mistaken belief in a non-existent eternal self. Plus it fails to recognize that its wholeness is dependent on countless parts (results) and conditions and is 'in process'. Instead of saying that the belief in a self is personal, I think I would prefer to say it is based on desire. This is a little tricky because it is almost like self and desire are the same thing, but they aren't. Desire is real. The impersonal nature of identifying desire when it arises is due to the kusala nature of satipatthana. But one could also say desire has shifted from being subject to being object. Instead of looking on desire with satipatthana, however, one could view it with regret, for example. This would still be desire as subject (regret) and a basis of belief in a self. For this particular argument I don't think it makes a difference whether the ultimate stuff of existence is matter or consciousness or a mix of the two. Larry 15189 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 10:25pm Subject: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Dear Group, As an ordinary person (puthujjana), still possessing all of the ten fetters, and so bound to the round of rebirths, from time to time I get a little concerned about the shortness and uncertainty of life, particularly after the death of someone I know. Most people seem totally unprepared for death, even those of great age, seem shocked if they know about it in advance. Many people say that they are not concerned with death, but with the dying - whether they will die in unrelieved pain, or alone. My concern, when it arises, is with the fact that those of us who are not Sotapannas (Stream Enter-ers) are in grave danger when it comes - firstly to death at any time, and secondly to where Rebirth will occur. It is only Stream Entry that ensures that there is no more to rebirth in woeful states, and human birth being so very rare. Entry into the Stream is marked by the elimination of three fetters. 1. Sakkaya-ditthi (Personality Belief) 2. Vicikiccha (Doubt) 3. Silabbata-paramasa.(Attachment to mere Rule and Ritual). Stream Entry also ensures that there will be (a maximum of) seven more cycles through the round of rebirths. Given that these laws are relentless and inexorable, and are not nullified by lack of believing in rebirth, it seems like a good thing to energetically follow the Path to safety. To me, it seems the hardest fetters to eliminate are the first two - understanding of Anatta, and the elimination of Doubt.... Could it be that they are not as hard as portrayed? or could it be that I am deceiving myself by thinking the other eight fetters are easier (at least, seven of them)? It seems that the first two concern understanding the Dhamma - realising about not-self, and developing unquestioning confidence in the Word of the Buddha, while the next seven involve working away at behavioural characteristics. And then there is Avijja ..... The Ten Fetters that bind us to the wheel of becoming: Doubt (vicikiccha) Attachment to mere Rule and Ritual (siilabbata-paraamasa) Sensual Lust (kamaraga) Ill-Will (vyapada) Craving for Fine-Material Existence (rupa-raga) Craving for Immaterial Existence (arupa-raga) Conceit (mana) Restlessness (uddhacca) Ignorance (avijja). Mostly, I don't aim at anything but eliminating my defilements - but maybe I should get more organised and have a Grand Plan with an Expected Date of Completion. metta, Christine 15190 From: Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 6:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] wrong view Hi, Larry - In a message dated 8/25/02 1:09:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Howard, how about this: > > We could dispense with free will in ethics by saying there is a > conditioned, no-control ethics in which good deeds produce good results; > saying "you should do this" or "I want to do that" or thinking about > something is a condition conditioned by many conditions and it will > contribute to (partially cause) many results, now and in the future. > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: Okay. Also, while the notion of free will as unconditioned choice makes no sense in the Buddhist context, that does not say that there is no willing at all. There *is* willing, there *is* the exercise of volition. That, in fact, is exactly kamma. --------------------------------------------------- > > So much for free will; now all we have to do is establish the reality > status of these causes and results. What confused me was that > "impermanence" is used to establish the non existence of 'self' and the > dependent existence of the khandhas. I thought because impermanence was > the basis of both arguments, they were the same argument, but they > aren't. The Buddha asserts that the only possible candidate for the self > is one or more of the khandhas, but the self is believed, either > psychologically or metaphysically, to be eternal. The khandhas are > impermanent, so the khandhas are not a self. --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Mmm - I'm not completely sure that the only candidates for self are one or more of the khandhas. There is also the notion of 'self' as some principle *underlying* the khandhas, a kind of unmoved mover, and agent which, itself, is the "true being", unchanging, eternal ... soul. Vedanta, for example, viewed the khandhas and all aspects of the world as illusory except for the atman, the "reality" which underlies the individual, illusory "person" and is identical with Brahman, the "reality" underlying all of maya. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > The khandhas are, however, dependently existent because they arise > dependently, abide dependently and subside dependently. In other words, > they are not independent (aka 'ultimately existent'). This is all due to > the process nature of impermanence. This logic also applies to 'wholes'. > So I could give a nice scientific definition of an emotional human being > and we (you and I) could agree that it is truly, dependently existent in > process but it has a mistaken belief in a non-existent eternal self. > Plus it fails to recognize that its wholeness is dependent on countless > parts (results) and conditions and is 'in process'. > > Instead of saying that the belief in a self is personal, I think I would > prefer to say it is based on desire. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I think it is based both on desire and illusion. ------------------------------------------------------ This is a little tricky because it> > is almost like self and desire are the same thing, but they aren't. > Desire is real. > -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. Desire occurs. But there is no self. -------------------------------------------------- The impersonal nature of identifying desire when it> > arises is due to the kusala nature of satipatthana. But one could also > say desire has shifted from being subject to being object. Instead of > looking on desire with satipatthana, however, one could view it with > regret, for example. This would still be desire as subject (regret) and > a basis of belief in a self. > > For this particular argument I don't think it makes a difference whether > the ultimate stuff of existence is matter or consciousness or a mix of > the two. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I think that's true. -------------------------------------------------------- > > Larry > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15191 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 10:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness of Breathing Dear Nina, thank for this continuation of the discussion on Anapanasati. Best, Robert Ep. ============ --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > We should go back to the first tetrad of the Anapana Sati Sutta: > (I) Breathing in long, he knows 3I breathe in long2; or breathing out long, > he knows 3I breathe out long2. > (II) Breathing in short, he knows 3I breathe in short2; or breathing out > short, he knows 3I breathe out short2. (III) He trains thus 3I shall breathe > in experiencing the whole body2; he trains thus 3I shall breathe out > experiencing the whole body2. (IV) He trains thus 3I shall breathe in > tranquillizing the bodily activity2; he trains thus 3I shall breathe out > tranquillizing the bodily activity2, at that time, monks, the monk is faring > along contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly conscious (of it), > mindful (of it) having put away the covetousness and dejection in the world. > I say, monks, that of bodies, this is (a certain) one, that is to say > breathing-in and breathing-out. That is why, on that occasion, monks, the > monk is faring along contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly > conscious (of it), mindful (of it) having put away the covetousness and > dejection in the world. > > In the word commentary to the above quoted sutta the Visuddhimagga (VIII, > 223-226) mentions with regard to the first tetrad (group of four clauses, > marked I-IV) of the sutta the different stages of insight-knowledge which > are developed after emerging from jhåna. We read Vis. 223 > < On emerging from the attainment he sees that the in-breaths and > out-breaths have the physical body and the mind as their origin; and that > just as, when a blacksmith1s bellows are being blown, the wind moves owing > to the bag and to the man1s appropriate effort, so too, in-breaths and > out-breaths are due to the body and the mind. ... 15192 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 10:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Nutriment (was, Kalapas According to Nyanatiloka) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > Thank you for the following information. I must say, though - this > business strikes me as 1) a mixing of actuality and concept, and 2) > pseudo-scientific from the modern perspective. > > With metta, > Howard > > In a message dated 8/24/02 3:21:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > jonoabb@y... writes: > > Every rupa has its characteristic. In the case of nutriment, that > > characteristic is that which can sustain life by being food. You will > > find a detailed description in Nina's book 'Rupas' available online at the > > link below. I have extracted part of the text. Hi Jon, Hope you'll forgive me for jumping in like this, but how can 'the ability to sustain life by being food' possibly be a characteristic in the moment apart from thought? Surely, one can only encounter a characteristic that is actually present in the rupa itself, not something that has to be adduced of it? How can one perceive in the moment that an object is capable of being food? And an even bigger problem: how is it possible for a rupa to present 'being food' in as the characteristic of its single quality? A rupa such as hardness, softness, brightness, or whatever other single quality it may have, can never contain a characteristic as complex as 'being food' which is several concepts removed from the moment in which it is apprehended. A rupa which is potentially food can be 'seen in the moment' but cannot be seen as food, that is a concept. A rupa which is potentially food can be tasted in the moment *as* an actual food being eaten, but even then, the idea of food and the idea of eating are complex concepts that go well beyond the rupa itself. So how can a rupa possibly have the characteristic of what is surely a concept, 'being able to sustain life by being food'? This seems to me to be a conceptual imposition upon the rupa. Not only that, it puts distinct rupas, each of which is single, into a grouped category that stands outside all of them and categorizes them as if they were real objects, the opposite of the rupa in my understanding. Best, Robert Ep. 15193 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 10:59pm Subject: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Christine, > > To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of > Buddhism. It always leads to difficult questions, > like "is there a free will and if there is no free > will how do we practise in the first place." > > Pple who believe in no free will is I said b4 a few > months ago is extremist. Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. Not = no. No self. Atta is self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You can argue that anatta is applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's personal self, but if that is the case there is really no difference between Hinduism and Buddhism. Hinduism also teaches total non-clinging and non-identification with external objects of desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of the mind leads to cessation of the continued round of birth and death. The non-existence of Atta or Atman [the inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] is the radical difference between most schools of Hinduism and all of Buddhism. Remember there is always a > choice. Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a different moment right now? Or do you merely experience what arises as consciousness? Answer according to your actual experience, and you will have a hard time finding where you can choose. In the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? When you make the final decision, is there some way in which you finally decide, or does it just happen when it does? Choice apart from what happens is actually an illogical conceptual construct. If there is no choice, the power to choose > then Budhha will be wasting his time teaching us. We > might as well sit below the bodhi tree and do nothing > :). who's to say that's not the right thing to do? > I don't understand why free will must be associated > with a self. If there is no self, who needs the concept of free will? Who chooses freely? When consciousness arises and engages in an act it is spontaneous. Where's the will? It is unnecessary to postulate 'will' unless one wants to add a separate moment in which the self makes a separate decision about what to do. If there is only consciousness arising there is not only no free will, but will itself is redundant of the act of consciousness itself. If the will to do x or y arises in the moment as it is acted upon with no intervening self, it does not make much sense to talk about whether it is 'willed' or not, since there is nothing else that could possibly be taking place, and there is no decision of any kind. I think this is a concept developed by > the West (no offence please). We always forget that > there is a cetana that acts who itself is anatta. > Isn't this a wonderful paradox :). 'who itself is anatta' sounds like it is a kind of self-concept to me. Best, Robert Ep. 15194 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 11:02pm Subject: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) By the way ken, I should have said 'hi' and 'nice to see you' before starting to pick on your post! hi! Best, Robert Ep. --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Christine, > > To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of > Buddhism. 15195 From: kenhowardau Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 11:38pm Subject: Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi Stephen, I asked: >>Did the Buddha teach anything you don't already know? to which you replied: ---------------- > Three things that come immediately to mind are anatta (and the fact that it's now widely accepted in psychology and possibly quantum physics, as you note, is a fairly recent confirmationâ€"a good thing, wouldn't we agree?); -------------------- Well, I'm not sure we do agree. Anicca, dukkha and anatta are characteristics of paramattha dhammas. The objects known to science are concepts (pannatti), not parramattha dhammas, they don't have characteristics (sabhava) -- they aren't anicca, dukkha, anatta. (I must admit though, that even concepts are to be understood as anatta. This was explained on dsg a few months ago, I forget the exact reasoning.) So when scientists say that matter lasts only a trillionth of a second and is devoid of substance, they are, `so close and yet so far.' ---------------------- > thinking in terms of a/kusala or un/skillful actions instead of rights, duties, etc.; ------------------------ What's ground-breakingly different about thinking in this way? Couldn't any philosopher come up with that? (I'd suggest many have.) ------------------------ > and a method, or methods (meditation, guarding the senses, etc.). -------------------------- A method that is practiced by paramattha dhammas (by, e.g., samma-ditthi, samma-sati,), can be attributed to the Buddha, all other methods were `old hat' even back then. ---------------------- > I could go on: Right Livelihood pushes forward, --------------------- You'd have to say more on that for me. ------------------ > paticcasamuppada... --------------------- Yes, perhaps,but I wonder -- without the understanding of how it operates in absolute reality, how is it different from other, merely clever, theories? --------------------- >(Of course there's knowing, then there's actual insight.) --------------------- Insight can be explained as consciousness (citta), in which certain rare, precious, mental factors (cetasikas), arise, all of which cognise another nama or rupa. How else can satiaptthana be seen as fundamentally different from ordinary knowing? I'll steer clear of your bit on "paramattha dhamma" being a commentorial innovation. I'm out of my depth there, but I see Jon has answered it. And I'll snip my bit on anatta (re quantum science), to which you replied: ----------------------- > This is the core, and possibly only, utterly new idea, of Buddhadhamma. ------------------ Once we have begun to accept anatta -- that is, once we can intellectually agree that reality is only the present nama and rupa, then the whole Buddhadhamma is brilliant and like nothing else we've ever heard. On the day when we directly know these Dhammas -- i.e., when we have entered the Eightfold Path of the Ariyans, then I think we really will feel the cosmos shake. I asked my opening question again but in a different way: >>Without the explanation of absolute reality, what is there in the Buddha's teaching that is, even remotely, ground-breaking? to which you replied: ------------------ > How about: absolute reality is all around us but we can't see it, can't see things as they are, because of self-view and its entailed defilements of lobha/dosa? ------------------ Exactly what I've been saying! Who's side are you on? :-) ----------------- >Which has nothing to do with concepts, or not. ------------------- Oh, I see. Well, yes it has (according to the Pali Canon), because miccha-ditthi, atta-sanna, lobha and dosa are paramattha dhammas, they are not those things we worldlings know as wrong view, perception of self, greed and hate. These conventional counterparts are just a lot of thinking(concepts, pannatti), they are not real and they can't be objects of satipatthana -- the Middle Way. Kind regards Ken H 15196 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sat Aug 24, 2002 11:55pm Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi Robert k: It always nice to see u here :) > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. > Not = no. No self. Atta is > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You > can argue that anatta is > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's > personal self, but if that is > the case there is really no difference between > Hinduism and Buddhism. k: If you argue in this way, there will be no end. Just like impermenance is the opposite of permanent. Anatta is applied to everything not just objects. By the way when you mention about Hinduism, are these Hinduism concepts exist before when Buddha is around or evolve after Buddha enters Nibbana. I don't think earlier Hindusim (Vedaism - hope I get the spelling right) talks abt non-clinging. It is more likely, these concepts abt non clinging are borrowed from Buddhism (no offense please). Hinduism > also teaches total non-clinging and > non-identification with external objects of > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of > the mind leads to cessation of > the continued round of birth and death. The > non-existence of Atta or Atman [the > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] > is the radical difference > between most schools of Hinduism and all of > Buddhism. k: Why "non-clinging and non-identification with external objects of desire", since everything is inside. If Hinduism taught that by non clinging to external objects is the way then they have a big problem bc I dont believe in blaming external things for my weaknesses. It is all inside :). But I dont think I know Hinduisim concepts very well, even if it is similar, we should not be worry :). But there is one thing Hinduisim dont talk as much as Buddha, the consistent method in the eradication of moha. > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a > different moment right now? Or do > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? > Answer according to your > actual experience, and you will have a hard time > finding where you can choose. In > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? > When you make the final > decision, is there some way in which you finally > decide, or does it just happen > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is > actually an illogical conceptual > construct. > k: Good questions and difficult to answer :). As I said before, if there is no choice why are you reading DSG mails :). If you said you are conditioned by your lobha or panna (to learn more), your actions are conditined by other cetasikas - you are not wrong. But if there is no power to choice then we might as well dont learn Buddhism at all since there is nothing we could choose to change our present and future state R: Do we choose to choose K: Definitely we choose to choose :) Is that a self that choose, if we are conditioned by moha yes there is a self, if we are conditoined by pana, there is no self involved (just like Arahats) :) R: Who chooses freely? k: We cannot choose freely bc we are conditioned, but remembers that does not imply we cannot choose to choose :) Dont take cetana as a self, bc it takes many more cetasikas before cetana could decide. Maybe I should said there is no such thing as free will but there is such a thing as the power of choice/volition. As I said b4, it is a wonderful paradox :). kind rgds Ken O 15197 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 0:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] The purpose of samatha (was, Right Concentration) Dear Jon, Let me ask, if samatha-jhana has no relation to the development of insight, then why does the Buddha state that developing insight with jhana is preferable to just developing insight alone? And why does the Buddha put any emphasis on samatha/jhana at all, if it is not necessary or desireable towards the development of insight, which is the doorway of enlightenment? In other words, if samatha/jhana are inconsequential towards the development of insight, what is the role of samatha/jhana in the path to enlightenment? I know they are kusala, but that is not enough to establish a specific role, which they clearly seem to have. Best, Robert Ep. =========== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > < the purpose of samatha is to aid discernment both through calm and perhaps > by suppressing defilements, although I'm not sure that suppression of > defilements takes place below the level of jhana. > > < interested if you disagree -- and at the level of jhana defilements are > suppressed so that insight may arise without their obstruction. > > Interested to hear your comments.>> > > [Jon:] > My understanding is that while there is a correlation between the > development of samatha and the suppression of the hindrances, there is no > necessary correlation between the development of samatha and the > development of insight. > > That is to say, a person may develop samatha, even to the attainment of > the jhanas, without at the same time developing insight into the true > nature of dhammas (this indeed is what happens during times when the > teachings have disappeared completely) and, conversely, insight into the > true nature of dhammas can be developed by anyone regardless of their > present level of development of samatha. > > This also means that insight can be developed regardless of the fact that > the hindrances have not been suppressed. This I believe is absolutely > fundamental to the understanding of the Satipatthana Sutta (and please > note in particular the passage "... a bhikkhu understands consciousness > with lust, as with lust... with hate, as with hate ... with ignorance, as > with ignorance ..."). > > The idea that once the hindrances are suppressed insight may freely arise > is, in my view, mistaken. It seems to ignore the fact that insight can > only arise to the extent that it has actually been developed, in other > words, to the extent that the direct experience of dhammas has been > cultivated, and dhammas here includes dhammas of all kinds (i.e., rupas > and unwholesome mental states also), not just wholesome mental states. > The cultivation of mundane jhana and the direct experience of dhammas are > completely different skills. > > Jon > > PS I think this is the last post of yours in this series (phew!). Don't > dare check my inbox in case you've had one of your bursts and replied to > my weekend's work in a single sitting! 15198 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 0:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] The value of samatha (was, Right Concentration) thank. you've answered some of my questions in the last post. Best, Robert Ep. ====== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep (again!) > > You suggest in the post below that the obvious explanation for the > frequent mention in the suttas of the cultivation of samatha is the fact > that it leads directly to greater understanding (in your view). Well, I > think there are a number of other possible explanations for this. > > First, the Buddha taught extensively about all kinds of kusala, whether or > not the kusala was capable of leading one out of samsara. The importance > of developing kusala regardless of its level cannot be overestimated. > Samatha in fact is a very high degree of kusala, the jhanas themselves > being a condition for rebirth in planes available only to those who > develop the jhanas (a sort of exclusive jhana-club). > > Secondly because, being kusala that is performed through the mind door > alone, samatha can be developed by an individual living a solitary life, > for whom generally speaking there will be large parts of the day when > there are not likely to be opportunities for other forms of kusala (dana > and sila). > > Thirdly, there are a number of suttas (the Anapanasati Sutta among them) > where the Buddha gave instruction to monks already well-practised in > samatha on how insight could be developed in conjunction with the > development of samatha. The reason why this was necessary is I believe > that insight cannot be developed at actual moments of jhana, and without > this instruction monks who have already attained the jhanas, or are > potential contenders for jhana, would not have known how to attain the > higher goal of insight based on jhana. > > Jon > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > < would a rather arbitrary state. If only for efficiency, Buddha would not > choose an arbitrary object. He would choose it not only for being a > kusala state, but one which had a special characteristic that was > necessary for enlightenment. > > < the special value of peacefulness in the noble eightfold path? If there > is none, then it is very strange that samatha is hanging around there, > with no special purpose other than being a kusala state. Even stranger > that samatha is so highly valued among Buddhists, if it has no real > importance. > > < higher attainment than enlightenment without it? There's got to be a good > reason, and it will point to the intrinsic value of samatha as a support > or facilitator of wisdom.>> > 15199 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 0:40am Subject: Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Group, >Mostly, I don't aim at anything but eliminating my defilements - but > maybe I should get more organised and have a Grand Plan with an > Expected Date of Completion. Dear Chris, This sort of thinking is very normal. It is what the mind does: desire and plan and intend. If the thinking is underlaid with lobha (looking fwd to being a sotapanna) then it will be associated with pleasant or neutral feeling and if it is associated with dosa(fear of rebirth or worry about how long it will take) then it will come with unpleasant feeling. I think as far as the path is concerned whatever type of thinking arises doesn't make that much difference; the crux is whether it is seen as thinking. If it is not then the concepts that are object of the thinking may be given more importance and 'reality' than they deserve. While if they are seen as concept then they may still occur but there will be less attachment to them. ) "For any priests or contemplatives endowed with wrong view, wrong resolve, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong effort, wrong mindfulness, & wrong concentration: If they follow the holy life even when having made a wish [for results], they are incapable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when having made no wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when both having made a wish and having made no wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when neither having made a wish nor having made no wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. Why is that? Because it is an inappropriate way of obtaining results... "But as for any priests or contemplatives endowed with right view, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, & right concentration: If they follow the holy life even when having made a wish, they are capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when having made no wish, they are capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when both having made a wish and having made no wish, they are capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when neither having made a wish nor having made no wish, they are capable of obtaining results. Why is that? Because it is an appropriate way of obtaining results." Robert 15200 From: egberdina Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 0:59am Subject: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi guys and gals, As a reminder to myself (oh, that word again :-), I sometimes use the following phrase to discount the idea of self. I think this phrase is valid and can be verified as such at which ever level one is investigating. There is no thing which is it's own cause. All the best Herman BTW I am relishing the spirit in which the many discussions in this forum are taking place. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Robert > > k: It always nice to see u here :) > > > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. > > Not = no. No self. Atta is > > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You > > can argue that anatta is > > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's > > personal self, but if that is > > the case there is really no difference between > > Hinduism and Buddhism. > > k: If you argue in this way, there will be no end. > Just like impermenance is the opposite of permanent. > Anatta is applied to everything not just objects. By > the way when you mention about Hinduism, are these > Hinduism concepts exist before when Buddha is around > or evolve after Buddha enters Nibbana. I don't think > earlier Hindusim (Vedaism - hope I get the spelling > right) talks abt non-clinging. It is more likely, > these concepts abt non clinging are borrowed from > Buddhism (no offense please). > > > Hinduism > > also teaches total non-clinging and > > non-identification with external objects of > > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of > > the mind leads to cessation of > > the continued round of birth and death. The > > non-existence of Atta or Atman [the > > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] > > is the radical difference > > between most schools of Hinduism and all of > > Buddhism. > > > k: Why "non-clinging and non-identification with > external objects of desire", since everything is > inside. If Hinduism taught that by non clinging to > external objects is the way then they have a big > problem bc I dont believe in blaming external things > for my weaknesses. It is all inside :). But I dont > think I know Hinduisim concepts very well, even if it > is similar, we should not be worry :). But there is > one thing Hinduisim dont talk as much as Buddha, the > consistent method in the eradication of moha. > > > > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a > > different moment right now? Or do > > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? > > Answer according to your > > actual experience, and you will have a hard time > > finding where you can choose. In > > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? > > When you make the final > > decision, is there some way in which you finally > > decide, or does it just happen > > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is > > actually an illogical conceptual > > construct. > > > > k: Good questions and difficult to answer :). As I > said before, if there is no choice why are you reading > DSG mails :). If you said you are conditioned by your > lobha or panna (to learn more), your actions are > conditined by other cetasikas - you are not wrong. > But if there is no power to choice then we might as > well dont learn Buddhism at all since there is nothing > we could choose to change our present and future state > > R: Do we choose to choose > > K: Definitely we choose to choose :) Is that a self > that choose, if we are conditioned by moha yes there > is a self, if we are conditoined by pana, there is no > self involved (just like Arahats) :) > > R: Who chooses freely? > > k: We cannot choose freely bc we are conditioned, > but remembers that does not imply we cannot choose to > choose :) Dont take cetana as a self, bc it takes > many more cetasikas before cetana could decide. Maybe > I should said there is no such thing as free will but > there is such a thing as the power of choice/volition. > As I said b4, it is a wonderful paradox :). > > > > > kind rgds > Ken O 15201 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 1:10am Subject: Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Thanks Rob - The Bhumija Sutta is a great sutta. I can really relate to trying to get milk out of a newly calved cow the Wrong way :), and the churning of butter and the starting of a fire in both the Right and Wrong ways as well. I can see that the Buddha would have had an impact when he explained things to people using the everyday happenings in their lives. Everyone would know that you could try those things forever in the Wrong Way and they would never produce a good result. Whereas whether you wanted a result or not, if it was done in the Right Way, a good result would inevitably follow. metta, Chris --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear Group, > >Mostly, I don't aim at anything but eliminating my defilements - but > > maybe I should get more organised and have a Grand Plan with an > > Expected Date of Completion. > > Dear Chris, > This sort of thinking is very normal. It is what the mind does: > desire and plan and intend. If the thinking is underlaid with lobha > (looking fwd to being a sotapanna) then it will be associated with > pleasant or neutral feeling and if it is associated with dosa(fear of > rebirth or worry about how long it will take) then it will come with > unpleasant feeling. I think as far as the path is concerned whatever > type of thinking arises doesn't make that much difference; the crux > is whether it is seen as thinking. If it is not then the concepts > that are object of the thinking may be given more importance > and 'reality' than they deserve. While if they are seen as concept > then they may still occur but there will be less attachment to them. > ) > > "For any priests or contemplatives endowed with wrong view, wrong > resolve, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong effort, > wrong mindfulness, & wrong concentration: If they follow the holy > life even when having made a wish [for results], they are incapable > of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when having > made no wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. If they follow > the holy life even when both having made a wish and having made no > wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. If they follow the > holy life even when neither having made a wish nor having made no > wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. Why is that? Because > it is an inappropriate way of obtaining results... > > "But as for any priests or contemplatives endowed with right view, > right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right > effort, right mindfulness, & right concentration: If they follow the > holy life even when having made a wish, they are capable of obtaining > results. If they follow the holy life even when having made no wish, > they are capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life > even when both having made a wish and having made no wish, they are > capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when > neither having made a wish nor having made no wish, they are capable > of obtaining results. Why is that? Because it is an appropriate way > of obtaining results." > Robert 15202 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Stephen Thanks for sharing your views. Lots to talk about here. I am going to be selective, otherwise I'll never get a reply finished! << I don't find talk of 'reality' useful; in fact I find it goofy and mysterious. It's a confusing way of speaking.>> You are not alone in having difficulty with the terms 'reality' and 'paramattha dhamma'. However, we don't all have to use the same particular term. It is what is being referred to that is important. Here, the point being made is that, according to the teachings, what we perceive as being 'real' or 'the world' at the present moment is in fact not the way that the world is actually experienced, and that our misconception of the way things really are is attributable to our accumulated ignorance and wrong view. At any given moment, according to the teaching, the world as experienced is merely a moment of consciousness arising at one or other of the sense-doors or the mind door. The truth of this proposition can be tested by anyone over time. I'm sure there is nothing new to you so far. Now, the object experienced at any of the sense-doors is, as Herman pointed out in his recent post to you, irreducible in terms of that moment of experience (or any other moment of experience). This also is something that can be verified by each person for themselves in due course. The *apparent* reducibility in conventional terms of these sense-door objects is beside the point. Experientially, they are not capable of further reduction. As soon as you start to talk about the component parts of a sense-object it is no longer the sense-object as object of a moment of consciousness, but it is a concept/mental construct of the conventional idea of that sense-object. It is useful to have some generic term to refer to these 'things' that, in terms of moment-to-moment experience, are 'ultimates' or 'absolutes' or whatever you like to call them. We can use the more neutral term 'dhammas', which occurs frequently in the suttas, and which some find more acceptable than 'realities'. Do you have a preferred term? <> It's my understanding that in the suttas the terms khandhas, ayatanas and dhatus all refer to the same dhammas, and that these are the same dhammas that are referred to by the term 'paramattha dhamma'. << Paramattha dhammas are supposed to be elementary, "ultimate constituents of a whole"; but none of these are, each is further reducible. ... Consider vedana. It can be analyzed into endless types or classifications: 2 (bodily or mental), 3 (pleasant, painful, neutral), 5, 6, 18 in 3 subgroups, 36 in 6 subgroups, even 108! (Bahuvedaniya Sutta). Isn't it clear that the Buddha wasn't interested in ultimate categories or realties? That it was provisional, dependent on context? That it's a strategy to disengage from seeing things in personal ways by breaking them down into impersonal categories, not a search for ultimates?>> As far as the different enumerations of feeling are concerned, I think you'll find if you examine the texts carefully that this is simply different ways of classifying the same dhammas, for the benefit of listeners with different propensities for understanding. Stephen, the rest of your message deals with the Mulapariyaya and other suttas, so if you don't mind, I'll leave that for a later post, as I will need to do some reading before I can comment on your points. I hope you find something of interest in the discussion so far. Jon PS BTW, the question (also discussed in your post) of whether things exist or don't exist etc addresses a different point to the true nature of the present moment of experience, and is not directly relevant to the discussion on that topic. The nature of the present moment of experience is common to all, and can be discussed independently of any view of existence, being or the like. --- oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Christine, Jon > I don't find talk of 'reality' useful; in fact I find it goofy and > mysterious. It's a confusing way of speaking. For instance, the Buddha > rejected both being and non-being. ("...'everything exists' is one > extreme, > and 'nothing exists' is another extreme. The Tathagata expresses the > MIddle > Way that does not adhere to these two extremes..." S.III.134-35 [The > passage > then goes on to reference paticcasamuppada.]) > In itself, this is nonsense: something either exists or it does not > (there > are no shades or graduations of reality). What it means, in context, is > that > he saw that the world consists of becoming, or processes (things exist > in an > interrelated way, depend on conditions, are impermanent, don't exist as > independent substances or selves), not static/unchanging ('being' > rejected) > or somehow not real ('non-being' rejected). So it makes sense in the > context > of debate with contemporary opposing views of static realism or > eternalism > and nihilism; but 'being' is used here in a special sense. The processes > of > the world exist, are quite real, just not real in some odd, eternalist > sense. > (So the Buddha says: "When dukkha arises, it really arises; and when > dukkha > is extinguished, it is really extinguished." ibid.) The relevance of > this is > that perhaps we may agree, we're simply using "paramattha" and "reality" > and > such terms in different senses. > > I'll begin by noting that not one* of your many references refers to the > word > "paramattha." You do make many references to khandha, ayatana, the 18 > dhathus, the 4 elements and such. If this is what paramattha means we > agree, > and it's merely a peccadillo that I don't use the word. > >...the suttas nevertheless contain numerous references to the > importance of > >developing direct knowledge of paramattha dhammas as referred to by > other > names, >such as 'khandhas'. > (& a second quote from Nyanatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary so using the > term.) > No problem for me here, but > > Paramattha dhammas are supposed to be elementary, "ultimate constituents > of a > whole"; but none of these are, each is further reducible. So I believe > he's > misusing the word, in order to find it in the suttas. In this sense we > don't > agree. > [This further potential for reduction may not be true of the 4 elements. > Here > I suggest that if the Buddha meant by element certain experiential > properties > —e.g., earth = hardness— then good; but if it was meant as a theory > of > matter it's wrong, as persons are made of carbon, nitrogen, and such. > This, > of course, would pose no problem; the Buddha's meaning is unchanged, > just > that the body breaks down into in fact different items, still > impersonal, > than he supposed. So Dhamma can't be entirely separated from physics.] > Consider vedana. It can be analyzed into endless types or > classifications: 2 > (bodily or mental), 3 (pleasant, painful, neutral), 5, 6, 18 in 3 > subgroups, > 36 in 6 subgroups, even 108! (Bahuvedaniya Sutta). Isn't it clear that > the > Buddha wasn't interested in ultimate categories or realties? That it was > > provisional, dependent on context? That it's a strategy to disengage > from > seeing things in personal ways by breaking them down into impersonal > categories, not a search for ultimates? 15203 From: Sarah Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:33am Subject: “People....People who need People.......” Dear All, In the Brahmajaala Sutta (and commentaries) we read in detail about all the possible wrong views. We read that the idea of an ‘existent being’ is the real crux of the various views. For example, this is the first of the annihilationist views (which I quoted in an earlier post): ..... (p.79 B.Bodhi trans.) “ ‘Herein, bhikkhus, some recluse or brahmin asserts the following doctrine and view: ‘The self, good sir, has material form; it is composed of the four primary elements and originates from father and mother. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way some proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.’” ..... The other 6 kinds of annihilation view all end with the same last sentence about the belief in the ‘extermination of an existent being’. ..... In the sub-commentary notes (p.182), we read: “Since the destruction of the non-existent (asato) is impossible, the words ‘(annihilation) of an existent being’ are given signifying annihilation based on existence (atthibhaavanibandhano upacchedo). The word ‘being’ (sattassa) is used in order to show the following. The specific-natured dhammas occurring as causes and effects included in a single (multi-life) continuum exhibit a certain distinction as they may belong to different (individual life) continuities (within that single multi-life continuum). Misapplying the method of diversity (naanattanaya), these theorists misapprehend the real differentiatiation between the causes and the effects, and arrive at the conclusion that the differentiation is absolute, as though (the causal and resultant continuities) belonged to completely different continua (bhinnasantaana)...........” ..... A little later (p.183): “..For the assumption of a being arises when the compact of aggregates occurring in the form of a coninuum is not dissected (into its components). And since it is held that ‘the self exists so long as it is not annihilated,’ the assumption of annihilationism is based on the asumption of a being.’ “ (“Santaanavasena hi vattamaanesu khandhesu ghanavinibbhogaabhaavena sattagaaho, sattassa ca atthibhaavagaahanibandhano ucchedagaaho yaavaaya”m attaa na ucchijjati, taavaaya”m vijjati yevaa ti gaha.nto.”) ***** Victor quoted from the excellent Satta Sutta, SN,Khandhavagga, p985 (Bodhi transl) “One is stuck, Radha, tightly stuck, in desire, list, delight, and craving for form; therefore one is called a being.” In a footnote here, B,Bodhi explains this is a pun between satta, meaning ‘being’ and also ‘attached’ from ‘sajati’. . “One is stuck, tightly stuck, in desire, lust, delight, and craving for feeling...for perception...for volitional formations...for consciousness; therefore one is called a being....” ***** Back to the Brahmajala Sutta and the question of killing which has been discussed recently on DSG. We read in the sutta: “ “Having abandoned the destruction of life, the recluse gotama abstains from the destruction of life....” Commentary. The word ‘life’ (paa.na) signifies, in conventional discourse, a living being (satta); in the ultimate sense, it is the faculty of life (jivitindriya). the ‘destruction of life” (paa.naatipaata) is the volition of killing in one who perceives a living being as such, when this volition issues forth through the door of either body or speech and occasions an act cutting off the life-faculty of that living being...... “Sub.Cy. query: when formations are subject by nature to constant cessation from moment to moment, who kills and who is killed?..... ‘Reply: the ‘killer’ is the assemblage of formations (sankhaaraana”m pu~nja) conventionally called a ‘being’, containing the aforementioned volition of killing. That which ‘is killed’ by him is the aggregation of material and immaterial dhammas that would have been capable of arising (in continued succession) if the aforementioned means of killing had not been applied, but which now continues as a bare procession (of material dhammas) conventionally termed ‘dead’, deprived of vital warmth, consciousness, and the life-faculty due to the application of the means of killing by the killer...........................Though formations lack personal initiative, nevertheless the conventional designation of agency is applicable to causes which are effective through their contiguity, and are fixed in their capacity to give results adequate to themselves, just as in the statements ‘the lamp illuminates’ and ‘the moon brings in the night’ (agency is ascribed to the lamp and to the moon). “The act of destroying life must be recognized to pertain not only to the aggregation of consciousness and mental concomitants existing simultaneously with the intention of killing, but must also be admitted to apply to the (entire sequence of states) which endures by way of (the unity and the indiviuality of) the continuum. Just as the accomplishment of activity is senen in the case of lamps, etc, which likewise exist by way of continuity, so too there certainly does exist one who is bound by the kamma of destroying life.” ***** In the commentary and sub commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta, we read in detail about what is meant by conventional terms when it is said “in looking straight on” or “in wearing the shoulder-cloak” and so on. We can see from the following detail, how useful some understanding of abhidhamma is when we read the suttas and these conventional terms. Clear comprehension (sati and panna) should be developed at any time. The following is from Soma Thera’s translation: “Within, it is said, there certainly is no self or soul which looks straight on or looks away from the front. Still, at the arising of the thought "I shall look straight on," and with that thought the process of oscillation (vayo dhatu) originating from mind, [citta samutthana] bringing into being bodily expression [viññatti] arises. Thus owing to the diffusion of the process of oscillation born of mental activity [cittakiriyavayodhatu vipphara], the lower eyelid goes down and the upper eyelid goes up. Surely there is no one who opens with a contrivance. "Thereupon, eye-consciousness arises fulfilling the function of sight [tato cakkhu viññanam dassana kiccam sadhentam uppajjati], it is said. Clear comprehension of this kind here is indeed called the clear comprehension of non-delusion [evam sampajananam panettha asammoha sampajaññam nama]. Further, clear comprehension of non-delusion should be also understood, here, through accurate knowledge of the root (mula pariñña), through the casual state (agantuka bhava) and through the temporary state [tavakalika bhava]. First (is the consideration) by way of the accurate knowledge of the root: -- "There is (first) the mental state of the life-continum, And (then) there are adverting, seeing, receiving, Considering, determining, and impulsion Which is seventh (in cognition's course). [bhavangavajjanañceva dassanam sampaticchanam santiranam votthapanam javanam bhavati sattamam]. " ***** During our stay in Koh Samui, I was reading Nina’s “Conditions”, an introduction to the Patthana (the last book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka) more carefully and considering further the interplay of the various paccaya and paccayupana (conditioning and conditioned dhammas). Understanding more about conditions helps us to understand that what we take for people are a variety of conditioned namas and rupas. “Each reality which arises does so because of a concurrence of different conditions which operate in a very intricate way” For example, under jhana paccaya, we learn that the jhana factors may be wholesome or unwholesome: “When someone commits an unwholesome deed, such as killing, nåma and rúpa which arise because of conditions perform their functions. The dosa-múla-citta is accompanied by vitakka which is in this case thought of violence, by vicåra which is occupied with the object, by unpleasant feeling and by concentration which causes the citta to be firmly fixed on the object. The akusala citta and the accompanying cetasikas and also the mind-produced rúpa are conditioned by akusala jhåna-factors,“strength-givers” or intensifying factors, by way of jhåna-condition. When we perform a generous deed, the kusala citta and accompanying cetasikas and also the mind produced rúpa are conditioned by sobhana jhåna-factors by way of jhåna-condition. These dhammas are also conditioned by root-condition, by faculty-condition and by several other conditions. Thus, as we have seen, jhåna-factors are not only operating while one cultivates jhåna, they are conditions which function time and again in daily life, no matter whether we perform wholesome or unwholesome deeds.” We also learn how rupa -jivitindriya (physical life faculty) maintains rupas produced by kamma “as a wet-nure does a prince” (Vism X1V,59). As Nina writes: “Life faculty is a condition for distinguishing kamma-produced rupa from other kinds of rupa. We cling to the body which is alive, we cling to eyesense and earsense and take them for self. they are only elements maintained by life faculty, a kind of rupa which is not self.” Nama-jivitindriya is also life faculty, but in this case a cetasika (mental factor) arising with every citta, controlling and maintaining the life of the other namas and rupas. While there is life faculty, there will be feelings. In other words, by understanding more about the various dhammas we learn more about what ‘people’ really are. I find the following comments in the last chapter of Nina’s book very helpful and I apologise for making a long post longer (though I've just reduced it by half;-)): ..... “We are so used to the idea of seeing living beings, people and animals, and we do not realize that we are deluded about reality because of our accumulated ignorance and wrong view. When we watch T.V. and we see people moving, we know that there are no people there. There are rapidly changing projected images on a screen and this gives us the illusion that there are people who are acting. These images are merely different colours which appear through the eyesense and then we know the meaning of what we see, we think of concepts on account of what we see. The same happens in real life. There is seeing of visible object and then we take what we see for people or things which last. Persons are not real in the ultimate sense, no matter whether we see them on a screen or in the world around us............ “The Buddha and the arahats also thought of concepts but they were not deluded about them, they had no defilements on account of them. If we cling to concepts and take them for things which really exist, which are permanent or self, we are deluding ourselves. Clinging to concepts of person or self leads to many other kinds of defilements, it leads to a great deal of sorrow. When someone has lost a person who was dear to him he seems to live with his memories of the person he loved, he lives with his dreams, with an illusion. However, also when a beloved person is still alive we live with our dreams; we take the person we believe we see, hear or touch for reality. Someone who is in love with another person is actually in love with his own concept of that person, with an idealized image he has of that person. He does not have understanding of realities, of the different cittas which arise because of their approriate conditions. When he finds out that the image he has of another person is completely different from reality he may experience disillusion. We may have idealized images of other people and have expectations about them which cannot be realised. We have learnt about nåma and rúpa and about the conditions for their arising, but theoretical understanding is not enough. We should consider ultimate realities in daily life. We tend to forget that seeing is only a conditioned reality and that visible object is only a conditioned reality, and therefore we are easily carried away by sense impressions..... “ If there can be mindfulness of one reality as it appears through one of the six doors, we will know the difference between the moments of mindfulness of a reality and the moments there is thinking of an image of a “whole”, a person or a thing. By being mindful of just visible object or sound we learn to distinguish between the objects appearing through the five sense-doors and the mind-door. When there is right understanding of a reality as it appears one at a time, we do not expect other people to behave according to an idealized image. Someone may insult us, but if we can see that there is nobody who can hurt us we will be less inclined to take unjust treatment personally. When words of praise and blame are spoken to us, the hearing is result produced by kusala kamma or akusala kamma. When we think about the meaning of the words which were spoken to us defilements tend to arise. We take what we hear very seriously and we forget that what is experienced by hearing is only sound. Depending on our accumulations we may be afflicted on account of what is heard, we think about it for a long time. We are so affected by what others say or do to us because of clinging to ourselves. Life is short, a moment of experiencing an object is very short. If there were no citta which experiences an object the world and everything in it would not appear. The sotåpanna who has no more wrong view about person or self understands that there are only conditioned nåma and rúpa, no people.” ***** The song (from memory) says that “People who need people are the luckiest people alive”.....We can see that the study of paramatha dhammas goes against the conventional flow of ideas and this is why the Buddha reminded us that the truth is so very ‘hard to see’. Sarah ==== 15204 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 6:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Putting the Anapanasati Sutta into practice Hi Jon, I would be glad to discuss with you on any issue you have regarding anapanasati after you have started developing the mindfulness of in-&- out breathing. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Victor > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hi Jon, > > > > Again, the Buddha pointed out the benefit of developing the > > mindfulness of in-&-out breathing and gave the instruction on it in > > Anapanasati Sutta. It is up to one to put the instruction into > > practice. > > > > If you don't see that you can put the instruction into practice, then > > perhaps you might want to find out what hinders you from developing > > the mindfulness of in-&-out breathing. > > > > I look forward to discussing with you on any issue you have regarding > > anapanasati after you start developing the mindfulness of in-&- out > > breathing. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > Thanks for offering to discuss this sutta further, from the point of view > of 'putting the instruction into practice'. > > You will have seen the post I just sent to Howard, and you may have > already anticipated my question. It relates to the very beginning of the > 'instruction' on mindfulness of breathing: > "Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as to > bring the four frames of reference to their culmination? > "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, to the > shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs > crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. > Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out. ..." > > My question is, how does a person get to be within the ambit of this > introductory passage, i.e. of being a person who -- > (a) having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty > building, has sat down folding his legs crosswise and holding his body > erect, > (b) has *set mindfulness to the fore*, and > (c) is *always mindful* as he breathes in…" > > I would be interested to hear your thoughts on each of these factors as > prerequisites to the actual 'practice' of mindfulness of breathing. > Thanks. > > Jon 15205 From: Sarah Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 7:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi Stephen, I've really appreciated yours and all the other posts while we've been away. Like Herman, 'relishing the spirit...' (Ken O, good to see you around again....) --- oreznoone@a... wrote: > I don't find talk of 'reality' useful; in fact I find it goofy and > mysterious. It's a confusing way of speaking. ..... Reminds me of Alice turning up at the Mad Hatter's tea party;-) ..... >For instance, the Buddha > rejected both being and non-being. ("...'everything exists' is one > extreme, > and 'nothing exists' is another extreme. The Tathagata expresses the > MIddle > Way that does not adhere to these two extremes..." S.III.134-35 ..... SN 111 is Khandhavagga....What is the name of the sutta? I'm having trouble finding the reference. Thanks. Sarah ===== [The > passage > then goes on to reference paticcasamuppada.]) > In itself, this is nonsense: something either exists or it does not > (there > are no shades or graduations of reality). What it means, in context, is > that > he saw that the world consists of becoming, or processes (things exist > in an > interrelated way, depend on conditions, are impermanent, don't exist as > independent substances or selves), not static/unchanging ('being' > rejected) > or somehow not real ('non-being' rejected). So it makes sense in the > context > of debate with contemporary opposing views of static realism or > eternalism > and nihilism; but 'being' is used here in a special sense. The processes > of > the world exist, are quite real, just not real in some odd, eternalist > sense. > (So the Buddha says: "When dukkha arises, it really arises; and when > dukkha > is extinguished, it is really extinguished." ibid.) The relevance of > this is > that perhaps we may agree, we're simply using "paramattha" and "reality" > and > such terms in different senses. 15206 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 7:21am Subject: Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Hi Christine, One becomes a stream enterer not by eliminating the first three fetter. The elimination of the first three fetter is a mark of stream entry. How is one a stream enterer? You might want to refer to http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an05-179.html I hope it is helpful to your Grand Plan, and I hope that after checking for your self with the discourse, you will realize you are already a stream enterer, and if you are not one yet, you are not far from being one. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Group, > > As an ordinary person (puthujjana), still possessing all of the ten > fetters, and so bound to the round of rebirths, from time to time I > get a little concerned about the shortness and uncertainty of life, > particularly after the death of someone I know. Most people seem > totally unprepared for death, even those of great age, seem shocked > if they know about it in advance. Many people say that they are not > concerned with death, but with the dying - whether they will die in > unrelieved pain, or alone. My concern, when it arises, is with the > fact that those of us who are not Sotapannas (Stream Enter-ers) are > in grave danger when it comes - firstly to death at any time, and > secondly to where Rebirth will occur. It is only Stream Entry > that ensures that there is no more to rebirth in woeful states, and > human birth being so very rare. > > Entry into the Stream is marked by the elimination of three > fetters. 1. Sakkaya-ditthi (Personality Belief) 2. Vicikiccha > (Doubt) 3. Silabbata-paramasa.(Attachment to mere Rule and Ritual). > Stream Entry also ensures that there will be (a maximum of) seven > more cycles through the round of rebirths. Given that these laws > are relentless and inexorable, and are not nullified by lack of > believing in rebirth, it seems like a good thing to energetically > follow the Path to safety. > > To me, it seems the hardest fetters to eliminate are the first two - > understanding of Anatta, and the elimination of Doubt.... Could it be > that they are not as hard as portrayed? or could it be that I am > deceiving myself by thinking the other eight fetters are easier (at > least, seven of them)? It seems that the first two concern > understanding the Dhamma - realising about not-self, and developing > unquestioning confidence in the Word of the Buddha, while the next > seven involve working away at behavioural characteristics. And then > there is Avijja ..... > > The Ten Fetters that bind us to the wheel of becoming: > > Doubt (vicikiccha) > Attachment to mere Rule and Ritual (siilabbata-paraamasa) > Sensual Lust (kamaraga) > Ill-Will (vyapada) > Craving for Fine-Material Existence (rupa-raga) > Craving for Immaterial Existence (arupa-raga) > Conceit (mana) > Restlessness (uddhacca) > Ignorance (avijja). > > Mostly, I don't aim at anything but eliminating my defilements - but > maybe I should get more organised and have a Grand Plan with an > Expected Date of Completion. > > metta, > > Christine 15207 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 7:24am Subject: Perfections, Ch 4, Renunciation, no 7 Perfections, Ch 4, Renunciation, no. 7. We read in the Commentary to the ³Susíma Jåtaka²: This thought occurred to the Bodhisatta during a past life when King Brahmadatta was reigning in Vårånasí. The Bodhisatta was at that time the son of the King¹s priest and his name was young Susíma. The King¹s son was named young Brahmadatta. The two boys grew up together and learnt all sciences at Takkasíla, and when they had accomplished their studies they came home again. Young Brahamadatta became viceroy, and at his father¹s death he became King and made young Susíma his advisor and priest. One day the King went around the city in procession seated on the shoulder of an elephant while he made the priest sit on the back of the elephant. The queen- mother, when she stood and looked out from the royal window, saw the priest sitting behind the King. She fell in love with him and did not want to eat anymore. The King went to see her and asked what ailed her, but the queen- mother did not want to tell him because she was ashamed. Thereupon the King sent his chief queen, and the queen-mother spoke about what had happened. The King entreated the priest to become King and he made the queen-mother his chief queen while he himself became the viceroy. From then on the Bodhisatta was disenchanted with the household life. The queen spoke to him in many ways and used several tricks with him so that he would enjoy his reign, but the Bodhisatta taught Dhamma, he showed the delight and the misery of the sense pleasures, and he returned the kingdom to the viceroy. He became an ascetic sage and cultivated the attainments of jhåna and the supranatural powers, so that he became destined for the Brahma world. At the end of this Jåtaka the Buddha explained that the chief queen was Råhula¹s mother, the king was Ånanda and king Susíma was the Buddha himself. The Buddha explained by relating his past lives that nobody can know the force of lobha, nor in what way it will arise in each life. Renunciation from sense pleasures is most difficult, and going forth from the household life to become a monk is even more difficult, because the monk should take careful consideration of the rules of the Vinaya. But anyway, if one wishes to give up sense pleasures, clinging to the sense objects, it is necessary to renounce them by the development of pannå. One should know the characteristics of realities as not a being, not a person, not self. There may be attachment, aversion, seeing, hearing, jealousy, conceit or thinking of the importance of self, all these phenomena are realities that we refer to as different cittas and cetasikas, as different conditions, as realities that through their arising condition one another. All this is complex and deep in meaning. Pannå should be able to penetrate the true nature of dhammas at this very moment and realize them as not a being and not self. ***** 15208 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 7:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: miccha sati and Path of Discrimination. Dear Ken O, It is good to have you back. We all agree that sati can only be sobhana cetasika. But, when the Buddha taught what is the wrong Path he referred to each of the eight factors as miccha. We know that there is not a cetasika which is miccha sati, but, this term represents what people mistakenly take for sati. One can be deluded as to the right Path. Num, in his second report on the Path of Discrimination (you were not there, Ken) wrote: that right understanding according to the P. of D. knows each of the right factors as right (samma) and each of the wrong factors as wrong (miccha). That knowledge is sammaditthi, right understanding. Thus, it is most important to know when one is on the wrong Path, to know exactly when one is on the wrong Path and when on the right Path. Both may be possible within one minute, or less! Ken, I like what you wrote to Kom at the end: op 24-08-2002 17:38 schreef Kenneth Ong op ashkenn2k@y...: > > there is no such thing as wrong sati or wrong > compassion. If we start distinguishing kusala as > right or wrong, to me is not the correct notion and > could lead to confusion. Any kusala cetasika that > associated with lobha is moha bc sati and panna is not > at work to know it. We should be cautioned not to > associated sati or any kusala by an akusala and not > abt right or wrong. > Anyway, the quest for a shortcut is already has lobha > as paccaya. 15209 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 3:49am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi, Robert (and Kenneth) - In a message dated 8/25/02 2:01:10 AM Eastern Daylight Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Christine, > > > > To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of > > Buddhism. It always leads to difficult questions, > > like "is there a free will and if there is no free > > will how do we practise in the first place." > > > > Pple who believe in no free will is I said b4 a few > > months ago is extremist. > > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. Not = no. No self. > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, there are differences of opinion among scholars and among real Buddhists (just kidding, any Buddhist scholars out there!) on that. Some say that 'anatta' is just an adjective meaning 'not self' in the sense of 'impersonal' and 'insubstantial' which gets applied to all dhammas and thus, to me, inasmuch as all dhammas are all there is, implies that there is *no* self - but, somehow, not everyone agrees with that last conclusion. -------------------------------------------------- Atta is > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You can argue that > anatta is > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's personal self, but if > that is > the case there is really no difference between Hinduism and Buddhism. > Hinduism > also teaches total non-clinging and non-identification with external > objects of > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of the mind leads to > cessation of > the continued round of birth and death. The non-existence of Atta or Atman > [the > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] is the radical > difference > between most schools of Hinduism and all of Buddhism. > > Remember there is always a > > choice. > > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a different moment right now? > Or do > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? Answer according to > your > actual experience, and you will have a hard time finding where you can > choose. In > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? When you make the final > decision, is there some way in which you finally decide, or does it just > happen > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is actually an illogical > conceptual > construct. > > If there is no choice, the power to choose > > then Budhha will be wasting his time teaching us. We > > might as well sit below the bodhi tree and do nothing > > :). > > who's to say that's not the right thing to do? > > > I don't understand why free will must be associated > > with a self. > > If there is no self, who needs the concept of free will? Who chooses > freely? > When consciousness arises and engages in an act it is spontaneous. Where's > the > will? It is unnecessary to postulate 'will' unless one wants to add a > separate > moment in which the self makes a separate decision about what to do. If > there is > only consciousness arising there is not only no free will, but will itself > is > redundant of the act of consciousness itself. If the will to do x or y > arises in > the moment as it is acted upon with no intervening self, it does not make > much > sense to talk about whether it is 'willed' or not, since there is nothing > else > that could possibly be taking place, and there is no decision of any kind. --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't understand the notion of *free* will, but volition (cetana) is admitted by the Buddha in the Sutta Pitaka (it is the chief sankhara) and most certainly it is countenanced in the Abhidhamma. Evidently, cetana serves as kind of a needed motive force (but only in the sense of a necessary condition, not as a substantial "force"). It seems to be the vehicle by which craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma. (In the case of an arahant, the cetana is replaced by a kind of neutral functional consciousness (kiriya citta) expressing neutral chanda and which is condition for an ensuing kammically neutral action.) In fact, cetana (and kiriya citta for an arahant) seems to be close to synonymous with 'chanda'. Nyanatiloka defines cetana as follows: > cetaná: 'volition', will, is one of the seven mental factors (cetasika, > q.v.) inseparably bound up with all consciousness, namely sensorial or > mental impression (phassa), feeling (vedaná), perception (saññá), volition > (cetaná), concentration (samádhi), vitality (jívita), advertence > (manasikára). Cf. Tab. II, III. Now, I myself have, from time to time, puzzled over the "need" for cetana, inasmuch it only arises when the conditions for its arising have all appeared. (Why not go directly from those conditions to the action, without the intervening cetana?) But this question could arise for *every* link in a "causal stream" - it seems that links cannot be skipped. It seems to me that conditionality is a far more complex matter than we think, a much deeper one. As a matter of fact, our notion of 'causal stream' as the direct source of causality is faulty. The reality is probably closer to a causal network which is a complex confluence of causal streams inasmuch as no dhamma arises with a single precondition. --------------------------------------------------------- > > I think this is a concept developed by > > the West (no offence please). We always forget that > > there is a cetana that acts who itself is anatta. > > Isn't this a wonderful paradox :). > > 'who itself is anatta' sounds like it is a kind of self-concept to me. > ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Sounds like a Freudian slip to me, Ken! ;-)) --------------------------------------------- > > Best, > Robert Ep. > ========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15210 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 8:14am Subject: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi all, "Body is not self" means that "Body is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" "Feeling is not self" means that "Feeling is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" "Perception is not self" means "Perception is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" "Fabrications are not self" means "Fabrications are to be seen as they actually are with right discernment thus: 'These are not mine. These I am not. These are not my self.'" "Consciousness is not self" means "Consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" Seeing thus, one grows disenchanted with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with consciousness. Be very careful about the specious reasoning that since every dhamma is not self, thus there is no self. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert (and Kenneth) - > > In a message dated 8/25/02 2:01:10 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > > Hi Christine, > > > > > > To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of > > > Buddhism. It always leads to difficult questions, > > > like "is there a free will and if there is no free > > > will how do we practise in the first place." > > > > > > Pple who believe in no free will is I said b4 a few > > > months ago is extremist. > > > > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. Not = no. No self. > > > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, there are differences of opinion among scholars and among real > Buddhists (just kidding, any Buddhist scholars out there!) on that. Some say > that 'anatta' is just an adjective meaning 'not self' in the sense of > 'impersonal' and 'insubstantial' which gets applied to all dhammas and thus, > to me, inasmuch as all dhammas are all there is, implies that there is *no* > self - but, somehow, not everyone agrees with that last conclusion. > -------------------------------------------------- > Atta is > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You can argue that > > anatta is > > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's personal self, but if > > that is > > the case there is really no difference between Hinduism and Buddhism. > > Hinduism > > also teaches total non-clinging and non-identification with external > > objects of > > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of the mind leads to > > cessation of > > the continued round of birth and death. The non-existence of Atta or Atman > > [the > > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] is the radical > > difference > > between most schools of Hinduism and all of Buddhism. > > > > Remember there is always a > > > choice. > > > > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a different moment right now? > > Or do > > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? Answer according to > > your > > actual experience, and you will have a hard time finding where you can > > choose. In > > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? When you make the final > > decision, is there some way in which you finally decide, or does it just > > happen > > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is actually an illogical > > conceptual > > construct. > > > > If there is no choice, the power to choose > > > then Budhha will be wasting his time teaching us. We > > > might as well sit below the bodhi tree and do nothing > > > :). > > > > who's to say that's not the right thing to do? > > > > > I don't understand why free will must be associated > > > with a self. > > > > If there is no self, who needs the concept of free will? Who chooses > > freely? > > When consciousness arises and engages in an act it is spontaneous. Where's > > the > > will? It is unnecessary to postulate 'will' unless one wants to add a > > separate > > moment in which the self makes a separate decision about what to do. If > > there is > > only consciousness arising there is not only no free will, but will itself > > is > > redundant of the act of consciousness itself. If the will to do x or y > > arises in > > the moment as it is acted upon with no intervening self, it does not make > > much > > sense to talk about whether it is 'willed' or not, since there is nothing > > else > > that could possibly be taking place, and there is no decision of any kind. > > --------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't understand the notion of *free* will, but volition (cetana) is > admitted by the Buddha in the Sutta Pitaka (it is the chief sankhara) and > most certainly it is countenanced in the Abhidhamma. Evidently, cetana serves > as kind of a needed motive force (but only in the sense of a necessary > condition, not as a substantial "force"). It seems to be the vehicle by which > craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma. (In > the case of an arahant, the cetana is replaced by a kind of neutral > functional consciousness (kiriya citta) expressing neutral chanda and which > is condition for an ensuing kammically neutral action.) In fact, cetana (and > kiriya citta for an arahant) seems to be close to synonymous with 'chanda'. > Nyanatiloka defines cetana as follows: > > > cetaná: 'volition', will, is one of the seven mental factors (cetasika, > > q.v.) inseparably bound up with all consciousness, namely sensorial or > > mental impression (phassa), feeling (vedaná), perception (saññá), volition > > (cetaná), concentration (samádhi), vitality (jívita), advertence > > (manasikára). Cf. Tab. II, III. > > Now, I myself have, from time to time, puzzled over the "need" for > cetana, inasmuch it only arises when the conditions for its arising have all > appeared. (Why not go directly from those conditions to the action, without > the intervening cetana?) But this question could arise for *every* link in a > "causal stream" - it seems that links cannot be skipped. It seems to me that > conditionality is a far more complex matter than we think, a much deeper one. > As a matter of fact, our notion of 'causal stream' as the direct source of > causality is faulty. The reality is probably closer to a causal network which > is a complex confluence of causal streams inasmuch as no dhamma arises with a > single precondition. > --------------------------------------------------------- I'm a seeking a Enter city or ZIP Age: to Show only profiles with photos 15211 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 4:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi, Ken (and Stephen) - In a message dated 8/25/02 2:38:54 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: > Hi Stephen, > > I asked: > >>Did the Buddha teach anything you don't already > know? > to which you replied: > ---------------- > > Three things that come immediately to mind are > anatta (and the fact that it's now widely accepted in > psychology and possibly quantum physics, as you note, > is a fairly recent confirmationâ€"a good thing, > wouldn't we agree?); > -------------------- > Well, I'm not sure we do agree. Anicca, dukkha and > anatta are characteristics of paramattha dhammas. > The objects known to science are concepts (pannatti), > not parramattha dhammas, they don't have > characteristics (sabhava) -- they aren't anicca, > dukkha, anatta. > ----------------------------------------------- Howard: They do have characteristics in the same way that they exist - conventionally. Trees have bark, and roots, and leaves. They grow, old leaves drop off and new ones appear. Well, I could go on and on - these are characteristics of trees. (Of course, there is no static, unitary thing which is a tree - not really, but conventionally there is, and it is quite nice to sit in the shade of one of these conventioanl trees. There *are* different levels of discourse and of "reality".) ----------------------------------------------- (I must admit though, that even> > concepts are to be understood as anatta. This was > explained on dsg a few months ago, I forget the exact > reasoning.) So when scientists say that matter lasts> > only a trillionth of a second and is devoid of > substance, they are, `so close and yet so far.' > ---------------------- > > thinking in terms of a/kusala or un/skillful actions > instead of rights, duties, etc.; > ------------------------ > What's ground-breakingly different about thinking in > this way? Couldn't any philosopher come up with that? > (I'd suggest many have.) > ------------------------ > > and a method, or methods (meditation, guarding the > senses, etc.). > -------------------------- > A method that is practiced by paramattha dhammas (by, > e.g., samma-ditthi, samma-sati,), can be attributed to > the Buddha, all other methods were `old hat' even back > then. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: What do you mean by a "method that is practiced by paramattha dhammas"? The notion of practice is a conventional one. People practice. Moments of discernment, hardness, aversion, etc do not. --------------------------------------------------- > ---------------------- > > I could go on: Right Livelihood pushes forward, > --------------------- > You'd have to say more on that for me. > ------------------ > > paticcasamuppada... > --------------------- > Yes, perhaps,but I wonder -- without the understanding of how it > operates in absolute reality, how is it different from other, merely > clever, theories? > --------------------- > >(Of course there's knowing, then there's actual > insight.) > --------------------- > Insight can be explained as consciousness (citta), in > which certain rare, precious, mental factors > (cetasikas), arise, all of which cognise another nama > or rupa. How else can satiaptthana be seen as > fundamentally different from ordinary knowing? > > I'll steer clear of your bit on "paramattha dhamma" > being a commentorial innovation. I'm out of my depth > there, but I see Jon has answered it. > > And I'll snip my bit on anatta (re quantum science), > to which you replied: > ----------------------- > > This is the core, and possibly only, utterly new > idea, of Buddhadhamma. > ------------------ > Once we have begun to accept anatta -- that is, once > we can intellectually agree that reality is only the > present nama and rupa, then the whole Buddhadhamma is > brilliant and like nothing else we've ever heard. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Anatta is not (merely) the fact that there is only the present nama and rupa. Anatta is the emptiness of all dhammas, their impersonality and insubstantiality (their lack of core). All conditioned dhammas arise in dependence on other equally empty dhammas, making them thoroughly empty, and the one unconditioned dhamma, nibbana, is the ultimate emptiness, being empty of all conditions. -------------------------------------------------------- On> > the day when we directly know these Dhammas -- > i.e., when we have entered the Eightfold Path of the > Ariyans, then I think we really will feel the cosmos > shake. > > I asked my opening question again but in a different > way: >>Without the explanation of absolute reality, > what is there in the Buddha's teaching that is, even > remotely, ground-breaking? > to which you replied: > ------------------ > > How about: absolute reality is all around us but we > can't see it, can't see things as they are, because of > self-view and its entailed defilements of lobha/dosa? > > ------------------ > Exactly what I've been saying! Who's side are you > on? :-) > ----------------- > >Which has nothing to do with concepts, or not. > ------------------- > Oh, I see. Well, yes it has (according to the Pali > Canon), because miccha-ditthi, atta-sanna, lobha and > dosa are paramattha dhammas, they are not those things > we worldlings know as wrong view, perception of self, > greed and hate. These conventional counterparts are > just a lot of thinking(concepts, pannatti), they are > not real and they can't be objects of satipatthana > -- the Middle Way. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: One thing bothers me about this. How can there be *anything* that is unknowable by wisdom? How would a Buddha know the relative unreality of pa~n~natti without being able to examine pa~n~natti with insight? In fact, when we investigate the breath, for example, and our mindfulness and focus intensify, we can detect the elements that comprise the breath - the softness, the motion, the "texture" (relative roughness and smoothness), the warmth, the moisture. The breath is pa~n~natti. Insight into it amounts to directly seeing its components/aspects (and their having the tilakkhana). ----------------------------------------------------- > > Kind regards > Ken H > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15212 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:26am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi, all - In a message dated 8/25/02 10:50:49 AM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Howard: > I don't understand the notion of *free* will, but volition (cetana) > is > admitted by the Buddha in the Sutta Pitaka (it is the chief sankhara) and > most certainly it is countenanced in the Abhidhamma. Evidently, cetana > serves > as kind of a needed motive force (but only in the sense of a necessary > condition, not as a substantial "force"). It seems to be the vehicle by > which > craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma. (In > the case of an arahant, the cetana is replaced by a kind of neutral > functional consciousness (kiriya citta) expressing neutral chanda and which > > is condition for an ensuing kammically neutral action.) In fact, cetana > (and > kiriya citta for an arahant) seems to be close to synonymous with 'chanda'. > > =============================== In the foregoing I wrote "It seems to be the vehicle by which craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma." That unintelligible sentence was the result of changing horses in midstream. Please ignore the middle section of it, and take it to just read "It seems to be the vehicle by which craving and aversion express themselves as kamma." Sorry. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15213 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:31am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi, Victor - In a message dated 8/25/02 11:15:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > Be very careful about the specious reasoning that since every dhamma > is not self, thus there is no self. > > ========================= There is nothing specious in that reasoning if one also takes as a premiss "Everything is a dhamma." If there is nothing but dhammas and no dhammas are self, then nothing is self. (And "a self", by ordinary use of language, means something that is self. So, to say that nothing is self is the same as saying that there is no self.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15214 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:41am Subject: Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? (Sarah) Hello Sarah, >SN 111 is Khandhavagga....What is the name of the sutta? I'm having >trouble finding the reference. Thanks. Well, at least one question / response that I can actually answer! I took the reference from Payutto's "Buddhadhamma," so it was Grant Olsen's translation (p.137). Here are two web references: Neither Existence Nor Non-Existence and Project South Asia This is from Henry Clark Warren's "Buddhism in Translations" which I think has some problems. There are probably better sources but at least it's a clearer reference. metta, stephen 15215 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:53am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? (Sarah) Hi, Stephen (and Sarah) - In a message dated 8/25/02 12:42:18 PM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > Hello Sarah, > >SN 111 is Khandhavagga....What is the name of the sutta? I'm having > >trouble finding the reference. Thanks. > Well, at least one question / response that I can actually answer! > I took the reference from Payutto's "Buddhadhamma," so it was Grant Olsen's > > translation (p.137). > Here are two web references: > Neither Existence > Nor Non-Existence > and > > > > HREF="http://www.mssc.edu/projectsouthasia/religions/primarydocs/Buddhism/Midd > > leDoctrine.htm">Project South Asia > This is from Henry Clark Warren's "Buddhism in Translations" which I think > has some problems. There are probably better sources but at least it's a > clearer reference. > metta, stephen > > ============================== Ahh, I recognize the sutta. It is the Kaccayanagotta Sutta, one of my very favorites, and a probable primary input to the work of Nagarjuna. The link to it on Access to Insight is http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-015.html With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15216 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 1:03pm Subject: Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Hi Victor, and all, Thank you for this post and the reference. It is very comforting. I have read the Gihi Sutta, and will look at the suttas and Stream Entry Study Guide (I don't know why that makes me smile:)) listed at the foot of the page as soon as possible. I am surprised. Stream Entry always seemed such a significant step - like conquering Mt. Everest. Could it be this simple? Shouldn't one 'know' if one had entered the Stream - feel different in some way? .... you know, sort of ... enlightened? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > One becomes a stream enterer not by eliminating the first three > fetter. The elimination of the first three fetter is a mark of > stream entry. > > How is one a stream enterer? You might want to refer to > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an05-179.html > > I hope it is helpful to your Grand Plan, and I hope that after > checking for your self with the discourse, you will realize you are > already a stream enterer, and if you are not one yet, you are not far > from being one. > > Metta, > Victor > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear Group, > > > > As an ordinary person (puthujjana), still possessing all of the ten > > fetters, and so bound to the round of rebirths, from time to time > I > > get a little concerned about the shortness and uncertainty of life, > > particularly after the death of someone I know. Most people seem > > totally unprepared for death, even those of great age, seem shocked > > if they know about it in advance. Many people say that they are > not > > concerned with death, but with the dying - whether they will die in > > unrelieved pain, or alone. My concern, when it arises, is with the > > fact that those of us who are not Sotapannas (Stream Enter-ers) are > > in grave danger when it comes - firstly to death at any time, and > > secondly to where Rebirth will occur. It is only Stream Entry > > that ensures that there is no more to rebirth in woeful states, > and > > human birth being so very rare. > > > > Entry into the Stream is marked by the elimination of three > > fetters. 1. Sakkaya-ditthi (Personality Belief) 2. Vicikiccha > > (Doubt) 3. Silabbata-paramasa.(Attachment to mere Rule and > Ritual). > > Stream Entry also ensures that there will be (a maximum of) seven > > more cycles through the round of rebirths. Given that these laws > > are relentless and inexorable, and are not nullified by lack of > > believing in rebirth, it seems like a good thing to energetically > > follow the Path to safety. > > > > To me, it seems the hardest fetters to eliminate are the first > two - > > understanding of Anatta, and the elimination of Doubt.... Could it > be > > that they are not as hard as portrayed? or could it be that I am > > deceiving myself by thinking the other eight fetters are easier (at > > least, seven of them)? It seems that the first two concern > > understanding the Dhamma - realising about not-self, and > developing > > unquestioning confidence in the Word of the Buddha, while the next > > seven involve working away at behavioural characteristics. And then > > there is Avijja ..... > > > > The Ten Fetters that bind us to the wheel of becoming: > > > > Doubt (vicikiccha) > > Attachment to mere Rule and Ritual (siilabbata-paraamasa) > > Sensual Lust (kamaraga) > > Ill-Will (vyapada) > > Craving for Fine-Material Existence (rupa-raga) > > Craving for Immaterial Existence (arupa-raga) > > Conceit (mana) > > Restlessness (uddhacca) > > Ignorance (avijja). > > > > Mostly, I don't aim at anything but eliminating my defilements - > but > > maybe I should get more organised and have a Grand Plan with an > > Expected Date of Completion. > > > > metta, > > > > Christine 15217 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 9:49am Subject: Duration of Dhammas Hi, all - I have, possibly erroneously, gotten the impression that conditioned dhammas (cittas, cetasikas, and rupas) are supposed to have no duration, to be instantaneous point-events. But I question this: It seems to me that all experience (not counting the experience of the unconditioned) requires duration. For example, the air element is sometimes described as the principle of motion. But motion requires being in different positions or states at different times. Comments anyone? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15218 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 10:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Hi, Christine - In a message dated 8/25/02 4:07:46 PM Eastern Daylight Time, cforsyth@v... writes: > Hi Victor, and all, > > Thank you for this post and the reference. It is very comforting. I > have read the Gihi Sutta, and will look at the suttas and Stream > Entry Study Guide (I don't know why that makes me smile:)) listed at > the foot of the page as soon as possible. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Reminds you of The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Universe? (Only in this case it is a guide to the end of the universe? ;-)) ------------------------------------------------------ > I am surprised. Stream Entry always seemed such a significant step - > like conquering Mt. Everest. Could it be this simple? Shouldn't > one 'know' if one had entered the Stream - feel different in some > way? .... you know, sort of ... enlightened? > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I suspect that stream entry is not as "hard" as is often thought, but is also not as easy as a cursory reading of this sutta might suggest. The " four pleasant mental abidings" mentioned are to be obtained "at will, without difficulty, without hardship". How does that come about? Moreover, the fourth of these is to be "endowed with virtues that are appealing to the noble ones: untorn, unbroken, unspotted, unsplattered, liberating, praised by the wise, untarnished, leading to concentration." Exactly what are these "virtues"? This is not stated. In other places in the Sutta Pitaka, there is mentioned the path and fruit of stream entry, but that is not discussed here. This sutta seems to make it appear that stream entry might be easier for a layperson than is usually indicated for a monk! Something strikes me as "fishy" here. > > metta, > Christine > > ================================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15219 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 10:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Duration of Dhammas In a message dated 8/25/2002 1:50:39 PM Pacific Daylight Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Hi, all - > > I have, possibly erroneously, gotten the impression that conditioned > dhammas (cittas, cetasikas, and rupas) are supposed to have no duration, to > be instantaneous point-events. But I question this: It seems to me that all > experience (not counting the experience of the unconditioned) requires > duration. For example, the air element is sometimes described as the > principle of motion. But motion requires being in different positions or > states at different times. > Comments anyone? > > With metta, > Howard > Hi Howard, The idea that things arise and immediately pass away (as if by some sort of independent nature) to me is a misunderstanding of impermanence and I see no support for that notion in the suttas. The Buddha said that things arise, persist while altering, then cease. This threefold description of the nature of change might apply to something for a fraction of a second or billions of years. A conscious moment might be something that occurs over a minute fraction of a second; while an asteroid floating in space may maintain a similar form for billions of years. Although things are changing moment by moment, at least in a positional sense, to say that they arise and immediately afterward cease seems over stated and phenomenologically useless. I think it is the relative interaction of the Four Great Elements that causes things to alter. In short, contacts between the forces and structures of nature (the Four Great Elements) alters form and wears things away. The speed by which things (objects or states) alter depends on the current dynamic interactions of the Four Great Elements affecting those things. TG 15220 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 3:08pm Subject: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi all, "Every dhamma is not self" means that "Every dhamma is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" Seeing thus, one grows disenchanted with every dhamma. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Victor - > > In a message dated 8/25/02 11:15:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > Be very careful about the specious reasoning that since every dhamma > > is not self, thus there is no self. > > > > > ========================= > There is nothing specious in that reasoning if one also takes as a > premiss "Everything is a dhamma." If there is nothing but dhammas and no > dhammas are self, then nothing is self. (And "a self", by ordinary use of > language, means something that is self. So, to say that nothing is self is > the same as saying that there is no self.) > > With metta, > Howard 15221 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 11:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Duration of Dhammas Hi, TG - In a message dated 8/25/02 5:32:22 PM Eastern Daylight Time, TGrand458@a... writes: > > In a message dated 8/25/2002 1:50:39 PM Pacific Daylight Time, > upasaka@a... writes: > > > > Hi, all - > > > > I have, possibly erroneously, gotten the impression that > conditioned > > dhammas (cittas, cetasikas, and rupas) are supposed to have no duration, > to > > be instantaneous point-events. But I question this: It seems to me that > all > > experience (not counting the experience of the unconditioned) requires > > duration. For example, the air element is sometimes described as the > > principle of motion. But motion requires being in different positions or > > states at different times. > > Comments anyone? > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > Hi Howard, > > The idea that things arise and immediately pass away (as if by some sort of > > independent nature) to me is a misunderstanding of impermanence and I see > no > support for that notion in the suttas. > ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Then, at least in this respect, you and I read the suttas in the same way. The suttas seem to suggest a continuity to experience, whereas (a certain reading of) the Abhidhamma seems to paint a pointillist picture. -------------------------------------------------- The Buddha said that things arise, > > persist while altering, then cease. This threefold description of the > nature > of change might apply to something for a fraction of a second or billions > of > years. > -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. It seems that Abhidhamma pays obeisance to this to some extent in its dividing a citta into three stages, arising, maintaining, and ceasing (if I have that right). ------------------------------------------------- A conscious moment might be something that occurs over a minute > > fraction of a second; while an asteroid floating in space may maintain a > similar form for billions of years. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. I agree. I mainly am directing my question toward the so-called paramattha dhammas instead of conventional objects, and my motivation is phenomenological. It seems to me that, as Kalupahana and William James (before him) suggest, our moments of consciousness are not truly moments, but more like "saddle points". So the so-called present, the empirical present, is not a single point, but is closer to being a fuzzy interval. -------------------------------------------------- Although things are changing moment by > > moment, at least in a positional sense, to say that they arise and > immediately afterward cease seems over stated and phenomenologically > useless. > ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I tend to agree. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > I think it is the relative interaction of the Four Great Elements that > causes > things to alter. In short, contacts between the forces and structures of > nature (the Four Great Elements) alters form and wears things away. The > speed by which things (objects or states) alter depends on the current > dynamic interactions of the Four Great Elements affecting those things. > > TG ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15222 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 3:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Duration of Dhammas Hi TG and all, The notion of arising and immediately passing away is not the characteristic of being impermanent is about. Eye is impermanent. Ear is impermanent. Nose is impermanent. Tongue is impermanent. Body is impermanent. Mind is impermanent. It is impermanent in the sense that it is decaying, disintegrating. So, yes, the idea that things arise and immediately pass away is a misunderstanding of impermanence. The idea of, say, citta arising and passing away millions (or billions) times in a second is meaningless. Metta, Victor > The idea that things arise and immediately pass away (as if by some sort of > independent nature) to me is a misunderstanding of impermanence and I see no > support for that notion in the suttas. The Buddha said that things arise, > persist while altering, then cease. This threefold description of the nature > of change might apply to something for a fraction of a second or billions of > years. A conscious moment might be something that occurs over a minute > fraction of a second; while an asteroid floating in space may maintain a > similar form for billions of years. Although things are changing moment by > moment, at least in a positional sense, to say that they arise and > immediately afterward cease seems over stated and phenomenologically useless. > > I think it is the relative interaction of the Four Great Elements that causes > things to alter. In short, contacts between the forces and structures of > nature (the Four Great Elements) alters form and wears things away. The > speed by which things (objects or states) alter depends on the current > dynamic interactions of the Four Great Elements affecting those things. > > TG 15223 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 11:36am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi, Victor - Please explain to me how the following constitutes a response to what I wrote, and also what it is about your reply that is not already well understood by most of us here. To me this post of yours appears cryptic and uninformative. Are you unwilling to say more? Won't you expound on this to the point that we actually get what you are driving at? Are you saying that there may really be an "I" or "self", but that nothing we can ever know *is* that thing? Are you saying that 'not self' is merely a "liberation strategy"? Or are you saying something totally different from each of these? I ask, because I truly do not know. With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/25/02 6:10:04 PM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hi all, > > "Every dhamma is not self" means that "Every dhamma is to be seen as > it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This > I am not. This is not my self.'" > > Seeing thus, one grows disenchanted with every dhamma. > > Metta, > Victor > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Victor - > > > > In a message dated 8/25/02 11:15:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > > > > Be very careful about the specious reasoning that since every > dhamma > > > is not self, thus there is no self. > > > > > > > > ========================= > > There is nothing specious in that reasoning if one also > takes as a > > premiss "Everything is a dhamma." If there is nothing but dhammas > and no > > dhammas are self, then nothing is self. (And "a self", by ordinary > use of > > language, means something that is self. So, to say that nothing is > self is > > the same as saying that there is no self.) > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15224 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 6:04pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Dear Rob, First of all, my apology for having assumed that you authored most sections (pages 94-101) in your class note. I see that a lot of materials come from B. Buddharakkhita's translation of the pali, his telling of the details from the commentaries, and his analysis on the particular topic. I have studied the Karaniya Metta sutta from the note and from the Thai Tipitaka with the commentaries, with the questions that I asked you in mind, plus other questions including: 1) Is radiation of Metta real? What does the text mean when the word "radiation" is used? 2) I was told (not by you) that the radiation of metta is only possible in the Jhana absorption, so as long as one isn't there, then such radiation is impossible. I haven't studied the specific practices that B. Buddharakkhita listed, which I assumed he took from Vissuddhimagga (Chapter IX, on Metta meditation). Unfortunately, what I have studied so far don't conclusively answer the questions, but it was an interesting reading, so I would like to share some of it with you, and also to ask you some other clarifications. a) (paragraph 1, from note) "The mind becomes universal by identifying its own interest with the interest of all". I wondered what he meant by this. The mind can't be universal except in the Jhanic states. Even the Buddha's mind isn't universal in being constant in having metta toward others. He also had karuna, mudita, and upekkha, which are distinct states from Metta. I think if one doesn't read this statement carefully, it is easy to mistake that if one develops metta (meditation) alone, the mind can become liberated and "universal". b) (paragraph 2) "Today, metta is a pragmatic necessity". Necessity for whom? There are many who don't develop metta! c) I think it is important to keep in mind that the Buddha gave this teaching in the following contexts: i) For forrest-dwelling Bikkhus who are inclined towards tranquil meditation ii) Given the teachings for two purposes: for protection from the deva, and for being Kammathana for the bikkhus. d) (from the hym) Who seeks to promote his welfare. The Thai version and the commentaries explain this to be "for those kula-putta (generally means bikkhus and bikkhunis) who are skilled in what is beneficial/useful". One is skilled if one upholds the sila with abstention, upholds the patimokkha with saddha, guards the 5 senses with sati, develops metta via samadhi, and at *foremost* becomes liberated from knowing that the jhana states as what they are: as sankhara dhammas. e) "Having glimpsed" the state of "perfect peace". Having glimpsed is explained to be i) seeking nibbana ii) knowing nibbana with mundane wisdom and develop the different factors to reach it. Perfect peace is nibbana. f) "Should be able". The Thai version says one should develop the tri-sikkha (sila, samadhi, and panna. And besides being honest and upright, one should also be malleable (teachable, advisable...). g) "let him be prudent". The commentaries explained this to be wisdom in keeping sila, in using the daily pacaya, etc. h) "weak or strong". The comentaries explaine dthis to be the contrast between "those not well established, and those well established", those not having reached the arahatship and those having. i) The born and those seeking rebitrh. The born means the arahats since they were born but is not longer seeking rebirth. j) "Let all-embracing thoughts for all beings be yours". Yours here means those who is skilled in what is beneficial/useful. k) As you stand walk, sit, or lie. You here means those kula-putta (bikkhus) are are developing metta. l) It is deemed the Divine State here. Here means in the dhamma vinyya of the Ariyans. k) The last 4 stanzas here are the most intersting because B. Buddharakkhita doesn't stress it. It appears to me that that he implies that these are the benefits of developing metta. However, the commentaries clearly say that, because it is easy to have wrong views (sattata dithi --- the view of permanence) as a result of metta development, the Buddha added this to prevent such wrong views. This last part, I think, specifically means satipathana development which is in addition to metta development. The buddha gave the advice to the particular bikkhus to develop *both* samatha (metta meditation) and vipassana (to eliminate wrong views, to have vision for the ultimate, to overcome all sensual desire, and the never become born in a womb again) The tellings of the background of the metta more or less matches the commentaries. Comparing to that told in the Thai commentaries (which explained the Karaniya Metta Sutta, I didn't look elsewhere which may have more details), it is more embellished than the Thai versions. For example, the exact wordings such as "Each monk selected a tree to meditate" under is not ever mentioned in the Thai version, although it says that the monks sat under the trees putting forth the efforts, although it does not say specifically what the effort is. The second one is "As the monks neared their forest dwellings reciting the Metta Sutta". This also doesn't appear in the Thai version. The commentaries mentioned that the Buddha advised the monk to recite this sutta 8 times a month, and to keep in mind the development of metta always. There is no explicit implication that one should develop metta by *reciting* the sutta, as I have got the impression from B. Buddharakkhita's telling of the story. "They materialized themselves in human from": this also isn't in the Thai commentaries. "Made sure that they place was comletely free from any noise. Enjoying perfect silence". This is not in the commentaries either. B. Buddharakkhita's analysis brings up more questions for me. He mentioned lines 3 to 10 cover the aspects which require a thorough and systematic application of loving kindess. I somehow don't see that those particular aspects are completely in the realm of metta development. For example, one should be able, honest and upright. The thai translation puts "able" as "persevere". Honest and upgright means for both others and for oneselves. I think the meaning of being honest and upright are even more subtle than what the commentaries allude to. For me, it also means being honest with what appears, so that we don't take akusala as kusala, don't take anatta for atta. He said line 11-20 express loving-kindeness as distinct technique. I see them as enumerating the objects of the metta development. The commentaries mentioned 3 different sets of objects: some are limited, and some are unlimited. I don't think the specific "techniques" are explicitly mentioned until the texts from Vissudhimagga. He said line 20-40 underline a total commitment to the philosophy of universal love ... For me, it seems that the Buddha encouraged the monks in questions to develop both metta bhavana and vipassana as their way toward liberation, not just metta development. The last paragraph in the "Three Aspects of Metta" seems on the first glance as rather broadly sweeping to me. I would reather see more references that allow one to come to this conclusion rather than taking this conclusion at face values. I found the paragraph "Ability is not just mere efficiency or skil..." quite to my liking... This doesn't mean if it is any more right or wrong than the other paragraphs, of course. Living a simple life as an expression of metta. Again I found this lacking in specifics. I seems to me that one lives a simple life because one knows that attachments toward complicated living only brings more troubles. I don't see how he comes to this conclusion. "Mental cuture through meditation for such a person becomes natural and effortless: hence the attribute "tranquil in his senses." My thought in this area is how he comes to this relationship (between metta development) and tranquil in his senses. Tranquil in his senses, (Indariya samvara), appears to be a function of sati and panna. How is it related to metta? He interpreted "not brazen, nor fawning on families" as a warning against self-righteousness. The commentaries have very detailed explanation about this part, both on being blazen, and being involved/attached to a family, and it doesn't have anything to do with self-righteousness. "Transformed by metta, the mind is no longer haunted by greed, hatred, lust, jealousy...". Only lokuttara magga can do this function, and the leading factor to lokkuttara magga is wisdom, not metta. "Objectively, metta as a thought force...." is the first part ever that "radiation" is specifically discussed. In the sutta, all those different types of sattas are mentioned as objects of the meditations. There is no mention of somebody doing specific "radiation" for the benefits of others. He mentioned that the recitation of paritta can help one cure diseases and misfortunes. I found this to be quite troubling... What happened to the "one receives what one sowns", and the law of kamma? "Metta is a "solvent" that "melts" not only one's own psychic pollutants of angers..., but also those of others...". I found this to be quite dangerous to simply believe in . We can see the effects of metta in one's own mind, but how do we see it in others except through bodily/verbal expressions and inferences? Making a jump to this conclusion, and to develop metta so that it "melts" other people's resentment is a dangerous belief. I am not saying that this isn't true, but one should take this carefully... The ultimate purpose of metta is to attain transcental insight. I again am not sure how he comes to this conclusion. Metta development and samatha bhavana's ultimate goal is to reside in the devine abode. Only the path and satipatthana can brings one to the "transcental insight". His conclusion that metta development brings about "holding no more to wrong beliefs" are simply not supported in the commentaries, where it appears that the Buddha explicitly added the last 4 stanzas to correct the normal mich-dithi that can come with samatha bhavana: the wrong view of permanence. "The remote enemy can easily be distinguished so one need not be afraid of it, but one should overcome it by projecting a higher force, that of love." I think this statement understates the latency, the dangers, and the difficulities in getting rid of attachments and ignorance. The remote enemy is easier to spot in relatives to the near enemy, but for an ignorant fool, like some of us are, the remote enemy might as well be near enemies, because our ignorance are so thick that we sometimes take being "righteous", being "straight-forward", and being "truthful" as kusala while in fact they are anger and resentment. "The buddha taught that the entire mental world is developed...." I found this again to be broadly sweeping (or not having enough info/specifics). Would love to see a reference on this. "Made the foundation of one's life"....making one's refuge in the Dhamma reality. I personally think, truly, wisdom, kusala dhammas, and ultimately the 9 lokkutara dhammas can only be one's refuge. There is no "psychic lightning" that jumps from the meditating mind that impacts another person. After all these dicussions, I am actually not sure if there isn't some sort of psychic force! Seriously, thought, I think it would benefit one to develop metta, with limited and unlimited objects, but one shouldn't worry to much about "radiating" the metta to other beings and environments. Developing metta has clear benefits to oneself, trying to effect others and the surroundings via radiation can be just wishful thinkings and can lead to all sort of problems, such as believing in one's "supernormal" power even if there isnt' one. You know, some people thinks of some Thais as highly superstitious. There is the practice of asking the Emeral Buddha for things, and sometimes when their wishes come true, they offer eggs to the emerald Buddhas as a return. So if I radiate metta through this recitation, and it happens to work in that particular circumstance, is it because of the metta "radiation", or is it because of something else? The section on planning the response in Metta in daily life wouldn't work too well if one bakes the cookies with the thoughts that I am doing this out of my metta, or because I need to show the worlds that I am a person with metta. Unless one knows oneself (with sati and wisdom), then it is really hard to respond to situations with kusala intentions. To seriously develop kusala dhammas, panna must lead first. Otherwise, we may be just following rules and rituals that doesn't bring the results (gasp! more lobha!) that we would like... After the Reponse: remembering the pleasant feeling... Now, I remember plenty of pleasant feelings mostly akusala, and some kusala. I think it is best to remember the benefits of kusala and the disadvantages of akusala! I will work on the third reference you gave some more. As far as vissudhimagga and the specific practices, that seems a bit farther away at the moment. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2002 2:46 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States > > > Hi Kom, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Kom Tukovinit" > wrote: > > Dear Rob M, > > I would be interested in hearing more about the > practice of > radiating metta > > and karuna (etc) to other beings. What do you > think are relevant > > references? When can we do it? Why would we > want to do? How do > we do it? > > What are the causes and conditions for such events? > > > > kom > > I summarized the writings in a BPS Wheel > publication 365 on the > subject of Metta in my class notes (available in > the Files section) > pages 94-101 and added some of my own ideas on > page 102 of my class > notes. The full Wheel publication is at: > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/whee l365.html 15225 From: dark knight Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 11:16pm Subject: Hi ! Hi, Iam a new member of this group. Iam from India. I was lucky to get an oppurtunity to read the Budda's words.I am interested in learing more and diving deep into His Wisdom. I look forward this an oppurtunity to do so. With Metta, Krishnan. 15226 From: Sarah Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 0:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hi ! Hi Krishnan, Welcome to DSG and like you, I think we're all very fortunate to have a chance to read and learn more here. We'll look forward to any of your comments or questions. I don't think there are any other active members from India and I'd be glad to hear whereabouts you're from sometime and anything else you care to share about how you became interested in Buddhism. Best wishes, Sarah ===== --- dark knight wrote: > Hi, > Iam a new member of this group. Iam from India. > I was lucky to get an oppurtunity to read the Budda's > words.I am interested in learing more and diving deep > into His Wisdom. I look forward this an oppurtunity to > do so. 15227 From: Sarah Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 0:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? (Sarah) Hi Stephen (& Howard), > Ahh, I recognize the sutta. It is the Kaccayanagotta Sutta, one > of my > very favorites, and a probable primary input to the work of Nagarjuna. > The > link to it on Access to Insight is > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-015.html Thanks, Howard. I was confused by the first reference and not sure if this sutta was intended. Stephen, as I mentioned in my marathon post, all the wrong views are included in the Brahmajala sutta, in the ‘net of views’, including those concerned with annhihilation and eternalism. Both views are inherently wrapped up in an idea of ‘self’ or identity in the ‘uninterrupted continuum’. In an earlier post I quoted some Sutta and commentary notes from B.Bodhi’s translation of the Kaccaanagotta Sutta (SN 11, Nidaanavagga, 15(5) . I’ll just repeat 2 paragraphs here which I think clearly clarify this point and put the more detailed notes at the end of the post as you may find them interesting and may not have read them before: ..... > Com notes (Spk-p.t): > “The annihilationist view might arise in regard to the world of formations > thus: ‘On account of the annihilation and perishing of beings right where > they are, there is no persisting being or phenomenon.’ It also includes > the wrong view, having these formations as its object, which holds: ‘There > are no beings who are reborn.’ That view does not occur in him; for one > seeing with right understanding the production and origination of the > world of formations in dependence on such diverse conditions as kamma, > ignorance, craving, etc, that annihilationist view does not occur, since > one sees the uninterrupted production of formations.” > Com notes (Spk-p.t): > “The eternalist view mght arise in regard to the world of formations, > taking it to exist at all times, owing to the apprehension of identity in > the uninterrupted coninuum occurring in a cause-effect relationship. But > that view ‘does not occur in him’; because he sees the cessation of the > successively arisen phenomena and the arising of succesively new > phenomena, the eternalist view does not occur.” ..... As you point out, the Kaccanagotta talks about the middle way, avoiding these wrong views with regard to ‘being’ or ‘identity’. You wrote: ..... >The > passage > then goes on to reference paticcasamuppada.]) > In itself, this is nonsense: something either exists or it does not > (there > are no shades or graduations of reality). What it means, in context, is > that > he saw that the world consists of becoming, or processes (things exist > in an > interrelated way, depend on conditions, are impermanent, don't exist as > independent substances or selves), not static/unchanging ('being' > rejected) > or somehow not real ('non-being' rejected) ..... I think we’re in agreement (hopefully not on the dark side;-)). We can talk about the momentary ‘existence’ of eye consciousness, visible ofject or other realities (without shades or graduations), but these ‘existing realities’ are dependent on conditions, interrelated and anatta as you say. Slowly, by understanding more about all the various namas and rupas (mental and physical phenomena) i.e paramattha dhammas, gradually ‘we’ can begin to understand a little more about paccaya (conditions) and paticca samuppada (dependent origination), even if it’s mostly intellectual understanding in the beginning. We read in the Visuddhimagga about the understanding of the conditioned nature of dhammas: ..... "After discerning the material body's conditions in this way, he again discerns the mental body in the way beginnng: 'due to eye and to visible object eye-consciousness arises' (Sii72, Mi,111). When he has thus seen that the occurrence of mentality-materiality is due to conditions, then he sees that, as now, so in the past too its occurrence was due to conditions, and in the future too its occurrence will be due to conditions. When he sees it in this way, all his uncertainty is abandoned, that is to say, the five kinds of uncertainty about the past stated thus: "Was I in the past.......... and also the five kinds of uncertainty about the future stated thus: "Shall I be in the future?...., and also the six kinds of uncertainty about the present stated thus: "Am I?..."(Mi,8) (end quote from Vism XIX,5) ***** Sarah ==== Notes from B.Bodhi’s translation of the Kaccaanagotta Sutta : ..... From the Sutta (SN 11, Nidaanavagga, 15(5) )we read: “This world, Kaccaana, for the most part depends upon a duality - upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence “ (Dvayanissito khvaaya.m Kaccaana loko yebhuyyena atthita~n c’eva natthita~n ca.) ..... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘For the most part’ (yebhuyyena) means for the great multitude, with the exception of the noble individuals (ariyapuggala). The notion of existence (atthitaa) is eternalism (sassata); the notion of nonexistence (natthitaa) is annihilationism (uccheda).” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The notion of existence is eternalism because it maintains that the entire world (of personal existence) exists forever. The notion of nonexistence is annihilationism because it maintains that the entire world does not exist (forever) but is cut off.” ..... Back to the Sutta: “ But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.” .... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘The origin of the world’: the production of the world of formations. ‘There is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world’: there does not occur in him the annihilationist view that might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding ‘They do not exist.” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The annihilationist view might arise in regard to the world of formations thus: ‘On account of the annihilation and perishing of beings right where they are, there is no persisting being or phenomenon.’ It also includes the wrong view, having these formations as its object, which holds: ‘There are no beings who are reborn.’ That view does not occur in him; for one seeing with right understanding the production and origination of the world of formations in dependence on such diverse conditions as kamma, ignorance, craving, etc, that annihilationist view does not occur, since one sees the uninterrupted production of formations.” ..... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘The cessation of the world’: the dissolution (bhanga) of formations. ‘There is no notion of existence in regard to the world’; There does not occur in him the eternalist view which might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding ‘They exist’.” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The eternalist view mght arise in regard to the world of formations, taking it to exist at all times, owing to the apprehension of identity in the uninterrupted coninuum occurring in a cause-effect relationship. But that view ‘does not occur in him’; because he sees the cessation of the successively arisen phenomena and the arising of succesively new phenomena, the eternalist view does not occur.” ******* 15228 From: egberdina Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 0:52am Subject: Re: Duration of Dhammas Hi Howard and everybody, My two pennies worth :-) There are no absolute measurements. Measures of size, speed, duration etc require at least one other point of reference. So that would negate the possibility of any kind of measured state being a parramattha dhamma. The description of a single state cannot include it's arising, being and passing. Only the description of a state relative to another one can. Medieval theology had two notions of the present moment - nunc fluens and nunc stans. The flowing now and the static now. They are both valid, but from the nunc stans one cannot see the nunc fluens, and vice versa. As to motion, could I be Victoresque and ask: Would you ascribe motion to what is seen on a TV screen? I'll now revert to being Hermanesque and give you my take on this question. There is no motion, just the arising and passing of the pixels. Now see what happens when you just go willy-nilly asking for comments ? :-) All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all - > > I have, possibly erroneously, gotten the impression that conditioned > dhammas (cittas, cetasikas, and rupas) are supposed to have no duration, to > be instantaneous point-events. But I question this: It seems to me that all > experience (not counting the experience of the unconditioned) requires > duration. For example, the air element is sometimes described as the > principle of motion. But motion requires being in different positions or > states at different times. > Comments anyone? > > With metta, > Howard 15229 From: egberdina Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 1:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] wrong view Hi Larry, Running throughout your post I read the following argument. "There has to be ethics, there just has to be ethics." Have I read this correctly, and if I have then I ask why do there have to be ethics? As an aside, I read all DSG posts on the web, not as email. For the last few weeks all the messages have been adorned with some advertising which includes an image of a very caucasian Jesus in a white robe. But today we have the following promise : Enlarge your penis in just three weeks. Doctor discovers pill to enlarge your penis. I think it is hilarious :-). All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > All, > > I'd like to point out that the passages that outline the Buddha's > position on nihilism (vibhava) are implicitly anti phenomenalism and pro > free will. There is no point in preserving the integrity of ethics if > there is no free will, and if we say because of impermanence there are > no khandhas, then there is nothing to be ethical with. Or if we say the > khandas exist relatively because of impermanence, then we have to say > the 'self' exists relatively because of impermanence. The consequence of > that is there is no end of suffering and we have again lost ethics. > > I fully agree there are other passages that support phenomenalism and no > free will. So how to resolve this dilemma? We could go down the road of > relative and absolute truth, but absolute truth is relativity. And > "relativity" sounds a lot like "relative truth". This brings us back to > phenomenalism and no ethics. > > So the question is, how to establish an ontological basis for ethics. > Any ideas? Did the Buddha offer a solution? > > Larry 15230 From: robmoult Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 2:19am Subject: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi Kom, Wow!! What a message. :-) Just as it is important to place each of the Suttas in context (who the Buddha was speaking to, etc.), it is important to put my "Class Notes" into context as well. I am teaching a beginners' class of non- academics. Each week, I have to research and prepare a 75 minute lecture that will inspire and educate the class (in addition to my roles as employee, husband and father). I am now going through each of the kusala cetasikas. Each week, I locate an on-line publication (typically, though not always, from Bhikkhu Bodhi and BPS). I download the publication and edit it down to a size that my audience would be willing to read (they don't like to read). I typically delete non-familiar Pali words and Sutta references to make the material faster to read (I don't want to create an impression of academic rigour). It is extremely important to me that I do not mislead the class, but I do not consider strict scriptural adherence a must. You have obviously gone through this subject quite thoroughly. This is great! I welcome your advice on what should be changed in Bikkhu Buddharakkhita's text if you feel that it may mislead the class. I define "misleading the class" as meaning "leading to wrong view"; not merely a poor translation or inadequate commentary. At some point in the future, I hope to develop myself to the point that I can freely quote from the Suttas, Vissudhimagga, etc. (perhaps even in Pali!). For the moment, this is where I am - editing downloaded stuff from the Internet (though I try to be selective). It is my intention to update the "Class Notes" document each month as I add in new material and fix mistakes found in the exisiting material. In other words, my "Class Notes" is a living, evolving document. I welcome input from you (and all DSGrs) on any changes to the "Class Notes" that may be necessary to prevent wrong view. I am particularly interested in comments on stuff that I wrote myself (did not download). You asked a number of questions in your message. Here are my humble opinions (without references to the scriptures :-) ): 1) Is radiation of Metta real? What does the text mean when the word "radiation" is used? In daily life (kamavacara), I see "radiation" as a metaphor; I visualize sending metta to a person or group that I also visualize. 2) I was told (not by you) that the radiation of metta is only possible in the Jhana absorption, so as long as one isn't there, then such radiation is impossible. Actual "radiation" (i.e. psychic lightning) might be possible as a supramundane power in a jhanic state; I don't know and it is not of great concern to me at the moment because my focus is on daily life. 3) "The mind becomes universal by identifying its own interest with the interest of all". I wondered what he meant by this. At times, I visualize myself as a "black box". Bad stuff happens to me (vipaka) as an input. My reaction to what happens to me is the output. When I think in terms of "When bad happens to me and I react badly, I am perpetuating bad, both for my kammic stream and those whom I may influence. When bad happens to me and I do not react, I am stopping the progression of bad, not only for me, but also for those whom I may influence. When bad happens to me and I react with good, then I am changing a bad current into a good current, for me and for those whom I may influence. In other words, I make the WORLD a better place when I exercise wise attention. What I say/do has a direct influence on my kammic stream and an indirect influence on the rest of the world, starting with those closest to me and emanating outwards (like ripples when a stone is dropped in a pond) as those closest to me influence other people." When I think in this way (I don't always), my mind becomes universal by identifying its own interest with the interest of all. 4) "Today, metta is a pragmatic necessity". Necessity for whom? There are many who don't develop metta! I agree 100%. Normally, I try to edit out all social commentary from what I download. (Bhikkhu Bodhi isn't too bad on this, many others are terrible). This slipped by. Sorry about that. As it probably doesn't lead to "wrong view", I may leave it in. 5) The section on planning the response in Metta in daily life wouldn't work too well if one bakes the cookies with the thoughts that I am doing this out of my metta, or because I need to show the worlds that I am a person with metta. Why did I volunteer to teach the beginners' Abhidhamma class? There were two main factors: - I felt it would be a great way for me to learn the Dhamma (and Abhidhamma) much better (this is kusala) - I felt that I could do a better job of it than my classmates (conceit - definitely akusala) What motivates me each week to put in the hours of preparation required for the class? There are two main factors: - I am inspired by a genuine love of the Dhamma (this is kusala) - I am afraid of looking foolish in front of the class if I am not prepared (fear and conceit - definitely akusala) Akusala is so pervasive in our lives. If we use the energy from akusala to start us on a kusala path, then so much the better. I still have to pay for all that akusala, but at least I also have some kusala as well. At my stage of development, it is not practical to insist that my thoughts must be PURE kusala. I accept that there is some akusala as well. As one bakes the cookies, etc. it is unavoidable that akusala thoughts may arise. But the kusala thoughts "outweigh" them. Did you see the movie, "Monsters Inc."? At the end, the monsters discovered that laughter has ten times the energy of screams. I used that analogy in class and my kids (aged 10 and 12) loved it. 6) After the Response... I think it is best to remember the benefits of kusala and the disadvantages of akusala! Agreed. I will tweak the document to include remembering the disadvantages of akusala. Kom, my friend, I sincerely appreciate your input. I have not copied your entire message: your long message + my long reply = too much. Please let me know if I have inadvertently skipped one of your questions that you wanted me to reply to. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15231 From: Sarah Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 2:44am Subject: Anders, are you still there? Hi Anders, Sorry or the delay and hope you’re still around;-) Actually, I have a few posts in front of me and I’m going to try and just extract the main points where we have a different understanding, trying to spare everyone from another marathon..... 1.”..if we had never heard of the Buddhadhamma, our understanding would still be in accord with the Buddha’s Dhamma.” ..... As I mentioned before, all but the Buddhas need to hear the dhamma. In the case of a few particular disciples such as Sariputta or Bahiya, a few lines were sufficient. I don’t think there are many details about Bahiya, but in the case of Sariputta, his previous lives are written about extensively in the Jatakas and in them we read about the development of noble qualities and lives after lives spent with the Bodhisattva (I could give you a dozen references easily). In other words, there were special conditions to be born in the time and place of the Buddha and these disciples were ‘ripe’ for enlightenment. We read in the texts that now there are only be those types of individual who need to hear a lot of detail (neyya) to become enlightened or who cannot attain even with this detail (padaparama). Anders, this is my experience and observation, i.e. without hearing a lot of detail, there is no way anyone’s understanding will be “in accord with the Buddha’s Dhamma”. 2. “True understanding of the dhamma relies on neither , it is free of concepts and words.” While it is true that at a moment of panna at the level of satipatthana which directly knows reality, there are no concepts or words involved, there are many levels and degrees of panna. In the first place, there has to be clear intellectual right understanding and this certainly involves words. This is why we are encouraged to listen, hear and consider over and over again. Without pariyatti (intellectual right view) there won’t be any patipatti (direct rt understanding). You suggest that this is not my “direct experience” but rather my “faith” in what the Buddha said in this regard. I’d say it’s a combination of both. Saddha (confidence) in the Teachings grows along with the develpment of panna, even from the very beginning. 3. “Then what is your understanding.......It is just this understanding that needs to be examined, observed, released, and through that, comprehended, in order to move forward.” Any understanding now is not mine or yours. It’s anatta. It arises very briefly and knows a characteristic of reality and then it’s gone. It’s not anything lasting that can be released. If it’s merely at the intellectual level, the momentary thinking can also be known as a nama distinct from the concepts. You suggest that those who talk about anatta are “taking up the notion of not-self, adding another delusional layer”. On the contrary, I think that even when there is wise consideration of realities as anatta it is a beginning step to direct understanding of realities at this moment. 4. “You shouldn’t believe that you have no self......You make the effort to be mindful of notions of self associated with the khandhas, mindful of letting them go...” Anders, this sounds like more ‘self’ belief when you suggest doing X and not doing Y. Who is there to believe anything, to make an efoort or be mindful? I think that if we both have a different experience of the taste of an apple, we should look at what a detailed textbook (in our case the Tipitaka and commentaries) say about the taste. If you introduce any such texts in support of your comments, I’d be happy to discuss them. 5. Right view vs Wrong view. We’ve discussed many of the (wrong) views mentioned in Sutta Nipata and I’ve been writing about further wrong views in recent posts. Larry recently quoted from the Apannaka Sutta (MN 60) and Mahacattarisaka Sutta (MN117) about wrong views and right views and about mundane and supramundane right views. The Buddha only talks about wrong views with regard to danger and need for abandoning. As we know, wrong views arise with lobha and can be very enticing. Only panna can see them as wrong. I also agree that any clinging to the Teachings or any kind of views is unwholesome and to be seen for what it is. You suggest that we “have not seen the Dhamma directly for yourself, yet cling to the belief that your Dhamma is right, cling to it as your understanding and thus it becomes delusional”. In the end, Anders, only panna can know the reality at this moment and know whether it is lobha or ditthi or thinking that is arising. I agree that it’s important not to overestimate the level of understanding and to see the dangers of wrong view. I also think that by underestimating the value of the Teachings available to us and determining that all views are wrong views and to be discarded along with any Scriptures not directly understood, is a very unhelpful approach. 6. “Maintain a humble attitude towards your understanding, not clinging to your understanding as ‘right’, not craving for your understanding to be right......Better test it through practising the Dhamma.” Agreed as long as there isn’t any suggestion here of ‘own’ understanding. I still have very little idea of what you mean by ‘practising the Dhamma’. I certainly agree the Teachings are there to be tested and proved. You also ask how I know the ‘Buddha is enlightened’. All I can say is that the more testing and proving there is, the more confidence and the less doubt there is about the Teachings. Also, I’d say, the more testing and proving the less distinction I find in the suttanta, vinaya, abhidhamma or commentaries. Whatever I read reflects the Buddha’s Teaching on anatta and the development of satipatthana. This may seem to prove some delusional views or misguided blind faith, but I think in this case we’ll need to look at the references for the tastes of the ‘apples’ again. 7. “*I* do not distinguish an Absolute reality, because ignorance is still present.....I may infer an absolute reality based on my own experience, but this is not seeing actual absolute reality.” I’d really be glad to discuss more on absolute realities which can be known at this moment, which can be tested and proved at this moment. I think this is far more useful than trying to analyse others blind faith;-) Firstly, realities don’t last. Although there is the latent tendency of ignorance at each moment, when there is any level of understanding, there is no ignorance arising with the citta (consciousness). Inferring is thinking and as you say, not the same as directly understanding an absolute reality. So what are the absolute realities which can be known right now? No need to think of ‘own’ or ‘other’ experience. 8. You asked where the Buddha’s ‘realisation came from’. I understand that the answer is they have heard the Teachings from the previous Buddha and in countless lifetimes develop the parami (Perfections) before the life in which they become the Buddha. I don’t know these details very well at all, but in ‘The Birth Stories of the Ten Bodhisattas’ we read about the Elder Ajita and the Bodhisattas in the future. The Elder Ajita will be the next Buddha named Metteya. We also read about his previous lives, back to former Buddha eras, I believe. Someone else, like Rob K, would be able to give you more details or I could check later. 9. Finally, you always stress that you only ever ‘speak according to my (i.e. your) own understanding’ and that if one day I or we taste the apple (i.e Buddha’s Dhamma) and know the taste for myself or ourselves, we will know it is exactly as you described. With all due respect, Anders, when there is ignorance or a need to understand better, I prefer to look at how the Buddha describes the taste whilst appreciating any explanations from you or anyone else here. If I find your explanations different or unusual, then I like to consider the ancient commentaries. Having said that, I know you are very sincere in your concern and offers of assistance and the emphasis you put on really testing what is understood and what is just being repeated blindly. I also think you’d benefit tremendously by considering the texts and particularly the abhidhamma in more detail. Look forward to any further suttas or Pali Canon texts you wish to discuss or to hearing any further comments on these points. Sarah ===== 15232 From: Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 4:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Duration of Dhammas Hi, Herman - In a message dated 8/26/02 3:53:15 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > > Hi Howard and everybody, > > My two pennies worth :-) > > There are no absolute measurements. Measures of size, speed, duration > etc require at least one other point of reference. So that would > negate the possibility of any kind of measured state being a > parramattha dhamma. The description of a single state cannot include > it's arising, being and passing. Only the description of a state > relative to another one can. ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: Mmm. I get your point. I agree that duration is only relative. I guess the point is more a question of discreteness vs continuity when I speak of points vs intervals. But this leads back to another problem - *where* is the observing done? For example, where is the counting of rupas done: Up to 17 cittas for a given object I believe the rule is; but there is nothing outside of or "standing behind" the cittas to count their passage! It is said that cittas pass quickly. The appropriate response seems to me to be "As compared to what, and as measured from where?" Perhaps a later single process of cittas, using memory, can review and analyze (and count!), but it cannot be done by "looking on" as one looks at a movie or television screen, because there is no onlooker or outside vantage point. Of course, perhaps the Abhidhammic analysis is of only limited correctness in that maybe more than one rupa (or one rupa-kalapa) can actually arise at a time and parallel processing of multiple dhammas is possible. But to presume that is to give up on the "Abhidhamma enterprise". I would sooner press on to see what defenses can be brought to the fore within the principles of Abhidhamma itself. Much of the *detail* of Abhidhamma raises many more questions for me than answers, and I have much doubt about that detail, but the general thrust of Abhidhamma holds great appeal for me and is of great value to me, and I am interested in seeing to what extent the further details can be made persuasive. --------------------------------------------------------------- > > Medieval theology had two notions of the present moment - nunc fluens > and nunc stans. The flowing now and the static now. They are both > valid, but from the nunc stans one cannot see the nunc fluens, and > vice versa. > ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Mmm. The "flowing now" is what I have in mind when I speak of a fuzzy interval. I *suspect* that it is all that we actually experience, and that the "static now", the "point now", is mere concept albeit quite useful. -------------------------------------------------- > > As to motion, could I be Victoresque and ask: Would you ascribe > motion to what is seen on a TV screen? I'll now revert to being > Hermanesque and give you my take on this question. There is no > motion, just the arising and passing of the pixels. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: This is a good and valid point. Nothing moves. There is this now, and later there is that, which we interpret as "This has changed into that". Likewise, there is no rebirth! Nothing is reborn! Certain conditions hold now which result in later conditions arising. (But the matter of discreteness vs continuity still remains.) As far as your TV screen example is concerned, however, are the pixels single-point occurrences without duration and without any variation (say in brightness)? I suspect not. I suspect it only seems that way from a perspective of relatively gross analysis, and this seeming will be dispelled by finer analysis. I suspect that the point-occurrence view is concept-only and without empirical reality. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > > Now see what happens when you just go willy-nilly asking for > comments ? :-) > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I'm very glad I did ask, because your reply added *much* and it also managed to elicit from me some larger "problems" I have. -------------------------------------------------------- > > All the best > > > Herman > > ========================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15233 From: Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 6:00am Subject: In "Defense" of Abhidhamma (Re: [dsg] Re: Duration of Dhammas) Hi again, Herman (and all) - A couple more "random" thoughts on this matter in the direction of "defending" Abhidhamma - The idea that a citta is more of a fuzzy-interval event than a point event does not in any way destroy the notion of citta. In fact the Abhidhammic notion of the three stages of a citta [which I think we might picture as kind of a cosine wave, with intensity growing, peaking, and decreasing] already indicates that a citta is *not* a single-point phenomenon. Also, the fact that there are no gaps between cittas in Theravada Abhidhamma (as opposed to Sautrantika), also establishes a continuity to perception. Moreover, there *is* a kind of parallelism countenanced by the Abhidhamma. While a single mind-moment (citta) only involves a single arammana (be it rupa or a mental object), it also involves the function of discernment plus a good number of concomitant operations (cetasikas), all co-occurring. Moreover, one citta leads into the next without gap, with a citta boundary marked by the cessation of a one or more cetasikas, the addition of one or more cetasikas, and/or the replacement of one arammana by another, this last also marking a process boundary. This is, I must say, a very sophisticated "theory" which seems to admit elements of both continuity and discreteness. So, the bottom line, as I see it, is that while some elements of Abhidhamma appear less plausible than others, there is much of enormous value here which, perhaps, is fully realized only when one presses forward with doubts and questions looking for answers with an open mind. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15234 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 10:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata Dear Rob M, I shall paste from A. Sujin's Dhamma in Cambodia: The term upekkhå, equanimity, has several meanings . Upekkhå can refer to the feeling that is neither happy nor unhappy, to indifferent feeling; thus, it can be the cetasika that is feeling, vedanå. It can also refer to paññå cetasika in the development of vipassanå, paññå that is neutral towards the realities arising because of conditions. Therefore, when we have equanimity, this can be indifferent feeling or it can be tatramajjhattatå cetasika, or it can be paññå in the development of vipassanå. We should know that the dhammas that arise together have many different degrees and that they perform each their own function. See Acharn Sujin¹s ³Survey of Paramattha Dhammas, Appendix to Cetasika, where it has been explained that there are ten kinds of equanimity, upekkhå (Visuddhimagga IV, 156-1660). It can refer, for example, to tatramajjhattatå, to indifferent feeling, to equanimity of effort, viriya, that is neither overstrenuous nor lax in mental development. It can refer to paññå that is equanimity in vipassanå. Paññå is neutral as it investigates the object that arises because of the appropriate conditions. As to the Brahma Vihara of upekkha, this has, just as in the case of the other Brahma Viharas, living beings as object. It is Tatram, but it is called upekkha. Is this slow motion enough ? :-) Best regards from Nina. op 23-08-2002 21:51 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@j...: >>> What is the difference difference between upekkha and >>> tatramajjhattata? > > Sorry, I am still confused. > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: >> Dear Rob M >> Larry gave the definitions of tatramajjhattata, pointing out that >> indifferent feeling is not the same. As to the Brahma vihara of > upekkha, >> here the word upekkha is used for tatramajjhattata, and in this > case beings >> is the object 15235 From: Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 6:56am Subject: A Question on Visual Image Processing Hi, Abhidhamma experts - I have a question with regard to visual rupas. As I understand the Abhidhamma on this, what are actually and directly seen are colors and shades of varying brightness. My question is the following: It seems that we see, at one shot, a scene, an entire panorama which is composed of areas of varying colors and brightness. Do we actually see an entire scene, an undifferentiated color-image, which is then further processed, with sa~n~na carving out the various "colored areas", or do we, in fact, directly see individual colors, sequentially, which are subsequently combined into a "scene". What are the paramattha dhammas here? What elements are primary? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15236 From: christine_forsyth Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 11:54am Subject: Questioning Arahants and Abhidhamma Dear Group, From my limited understanding of studies on Abhidhamma, I believed it to be an analysis of the realm of consciousness, a systematisation of the whole of reality showing the way, from an ethical and psychological viewpoint, to the liberation from suffering. Sometimes I find posts on dsg very disturbing. Intellectually, I don't have the type of academic background to understand the terms and concepts discussed by other members in maths, physics, philosophy. I don't have the capacity to judge whether some are sceptical of the validity of the whole Tipitaka or Abhidhamma or just selected unpalatable bits here and there of both, and whether such scepticism is justified. Though I don't understand the Abhidhamma, I had been taking it on Trust because it was mentioned in Suttas by the Buddha and the expanded explanations were accepted by the Arahats in the Councils. But then, another question that arises is 'Who decides who is an arahat, and what is the extent of their knowledge on *all* subjects? And is their approval of a teaching to be the unquestioned Hallmark of truth?' And let's not go into which translations can be trusted, or what the True Dhamma *really* consists of, and what the Buddha *really* meant by certain terms and words ..... Is the Abhidhamma truth, and is it the explanation of reality? If not - what are all of us on dsg doing - Which of us has the precious time in this uncertain life to be living in a 'Let's Pretend' Land of imagination, delighting in intellectual games and duelling with abstractions? My apologies if this is offensive to anyone - it's very late here, or very early, and maybe I'm overtired ... metta, Christine 15237 From: Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 8:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Questioning Arahants and Abhidhamma Hi, Christine - In a message dated 8/26/02 2:55:29 PM Eastern Daylight Time, cforsyth@v... writes: > > Dear Group, > > From my limited understanding of studies on Abhidhamma, I believed > it to be an analysis of the realm of consciousness, a systematisation > of the whole of reality showing the way, from an ethical and > psychological viewpoint, to the liberation from suffering. > > Sometimes I find posts on dsg very disturbing. Intellectually, I > don't have the type of academic background to understand the terms > and concepts discussed by other members in maths, physics, > philosophy. I don't have the capacity to judge whether some are > sceptical of the validity of the whole Tipitaka or Abhidhamma or just > selected unpalatable bits here and there of both, and whether such > scepticism is justified. Though I don't understand the Abhidhamma, I > had been taking it on Trust because it was mentioned in Suttas by > the Buddha and the expanded explanations were accepted by the Arahats > in the Councils. But then, another question that arises is 'Who > decides who is an arahat, and what is the extent of their knowledge > on *all* subjects? And is their approval of a teaching to be the > unquestioned Hallmark of truth?' And let's not go into which > translations can be trusted, or what the True Dhamma *really* > consists of, and what the Buddha *really* meant by certain terms and > words ..... > Is the Abhidhamma truth, and is it the explanation of reality? If > not - what are all of us on dsg doing - Which of us has the precious > time in this uncertain life to be living in a 'Let's Pretend' Land > of imagination, delighting in intellectual games and duelling with > abstractions? > My apologies if this is offensive to anyone - it's very late here, > or very early, and maybe I'm overtired ... > > metta, > Christine > > ============================ Why not keep the Kalama Sutta and other such writings in mind, accept those parts of the Tipitaka and the commentaries we can understand and seem "true" to us, investigate the rest as best we can, and, meanwhile accept that the central thrust of the Buddha's teaching is the truth of suffering, its cause, the fact of the possibility of its ending, and the noble eightfold path which is the means to that cessation? Above all, the Buddha certainly didn't want us to obsess about formulations, interpretratations, and details of theory - he wanted us to follow his lead in the development of sila, samadhi, and pa~n~na. If our "practice" leads to greater suffering, we are doing something wrong. We must not grasp onto theories, claims, views, and "understandings". Let us tread the path lightly, with joy in the Dhamma and the confidence that the Buddha achieved what it is said he achieved and that his path of practice can enable us to do the same. Sure, we can think about things - but if we tend to be compulsive in our thinking and in our search for "intellectual truth", then we should soft-peddle that, and spend more of our time on guarding the senses, ongoing mindfulness, and formal meditation, which, among other things, can provide the wonderful, magnificent gift of tranquillity. Recently I've been doing a better job in not slacking off on my formal meditation practice, taking two one-hour meditations each day. It is helpful to me. The meditations themselves are directly helpful in fostering calm and equanimity, but also, there is considerable pleasure in realizing that I am doing what needs to done (as I understand the teaching). I am not as fastidious in maintaining ongoing mindfulness and guarding the senses. I have a harder time with that, and I need to apply more effort there. I will. (But if I'm "less than perfect", well, so be it. "Nuthin' to get hung about! ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15238 From: frank kuan Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 0:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Questioning Arahants and Abhidhamma Hi Chris, I think the validity of Abidhamma is something you have to decide for yourself. Maybe not even validity, but just whether it helps you progress on your path. The only thing I know for sure about Buddhism is that it brings a radical reduction of suffering, commensurate with the level of your realization of impermanence, dukkha, and anatta. That's something everyone on the list has experienced and it's why we have confidence in the teachings. Whether a COMPLETE cessation of dukkha and end to the round of rebirths is possible, one can't be sure until it's personally experienced. There's a dukkha infested spiritual craving we all have of wanting to be sure that the path we're following is the right one, and leads to complete liberation. That craving should be recognized and abandoned. Even if the Buddhadhamma is incomplete and doesn't bring final deliverance, it's BY FAR the best religion out there and the best system to build on (if necessary). And if the Buddha turns out to be correct, BONUS! So far, I have no reason to doubt that buddhism leads to complete cessation of dukkha. I do have doubts about the validity of parts of the tipitaka, but it's a healthy doubt. I don't have any illusion that any doctrine, no matter how perfect, can remain pristine and avoid having superfluous or erroneous parts tacked on to it from later generations. -fk 15239 From: frank kuan Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 1:03pm Subject: practice makes perfect Re: [dsg] Questioning Arahants and Abhidhamma > Recently I've been doing a better job in not > slacking off on my formal > meditation practice, taking two one-hour meditations > each day. It is helpful > to me. Wow, that's great Howard! Especially since you have a full time job, wife and kids. I feel like a real slacker now :) I'll have to match your effort and raise it up a couple of notches :) The founder of Astanga Yoga likes to say, "Do your practice, and all is coming." When I do my one hour sittings, even when it's hard, I always find joy in knowing that consistent practice gives wisdom an opportunity to blossom. If I get sleepy in the evening sitting, I stand up for a while, and if that doesn't stop drowsiness and dull state of mind, then I switch to walking meditation. But I set that alarm and make sure that at least for one hour, there is a strong effort to cultivate wholesome qualities of the mind. -fk -fk 15240 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 3:13pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Dear Rob M, Thanks for the response and the explanation of the circumstances. I wouldn't expect anybody to always check the scripture references before they speak or write down dhammas. Otherwise, we wouldn't hear anything from anybody! I think I was trying to illustrate why we may want to check if what the speakers say are in accordance with the dhamma, or in case we can't figure out what the dhamma is, the scripture references. Otherwise, there may be additional elements (great or small) introduced into the teachings, and when the additional elements are further spinned, may lead to wrong views. For example, if I don't read B. Buddharakkhita carefully, then I would end up thinking that metta development leads to final liberation... > -----Original Message----- > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > > Just as it is important to place each of the Suttas in context (who > the Buddha was speaking to, etc.), it is important to put my "Class > Notes" into context as well. I am teaching a beginners' class of non- > academics. Each week, I have to research and prepare a 75 minute > lecture that will inspire and educate the class (in addition to my > roles as employee, husband and father). I am now going through each > of the kusala cetasikas. Each week, I locate an on-line publication > (typically, though not always, from Bhikkhu Bodhi and BPS). I > download the publication and edit it down to a size that my audience > would be willing to read (they don't like to read). I typically > delete non-familiar Pali words and Sutta references to make the > material faster to read (I don't want to create an impression of > academic rigour). Yes, tough to get everything to be completely in line with the Buddha's teachings, given the time constraint and the ranges of materials (and their qualities) being available on the net. > > It is extremely important to me that I do not mislead the class, but > I do not consider strict scriptural adherence a must. You have > obviously gone through this subject quite thoroughly. This is great! I did go through the particular sutta multiple times. To thoroughly understand the subject, I think I am way off... > I welcome your advice on what should be changed in Bikkhu > Buddharakkhita's text if you feel that it may mislead the class. I > define "misleading the class" as meaning "leading to wrong view"; > not merely a poor translation or inadequate commentary. If I were to do the editing, I personally would at least more clearly differentiate the samatha (metta) development, and vipassana development which are both mentioned in the sutta: I think this is the most important point that didn't come across in the Bikkhu's analysis. Further than that, I might tune down the Bikkhu's analysis of metta, but this point is truly tough, is my wrong view (subtle or great) better than his wrong view? Neither are good. How do you know which one is wrong view? Dough! (as in Homer Simpson's...). I also would tone down his embellishment (I think) of the story (if you have the time to look at the commentaries yourself). > 1) Is radiation of Metta real? What does the text mean when the > word "radiation" is used? > > In daily life (kamavacara), I see "radiation" as a metaphor; I > visualize sending metta to a person or group that I also visualize. This is the part that I don't get. When one is kind toward another person, one has the person as the object. When we are kind to this person, we are not thinking about sending out kindness to the person: one is simply kind (thinking kindly, say kind things, do kind things) to the person. Without examining Vissudhimagga, it seems rather unusual to me that metta development involves sending out kindness to other beings. How about just thinking kindly about them without trying to send anything? I know this sounds hair-splitting, but "sending" kindness does strongly evoke the image of the the psychic force. BTW, another details from the commentaries I didn't mention in the last message. The commentaries mentioned that in case of having all beings as the objects (unlimited), if the meditator thinks of a specific being or a group of being (like to all the females in the universes), this is already limited. One doesn't develop unlimited metta by enumerating all the beings, but rather having all the beings as the consciousness' object. > > 3) "The mind becomes universal by identifying its own interest with > the interest of all". I wondered what he meant by this. > > At times, I visualize myself as a "black box". Bad stuff happens to > me (vipaka) as an input. My reaction to what happens to me is the > output. When I think in terms of "When bad happens to me and I react > badly, I am perpetuating bad, both for my kammic stream and those > whom I may influence. When bad happens to me and I do not react, I > am stopping the progression of bad, not only for me, but also for > those whom I may influence. When bad happens to me and I react with > good, then I am changing a bad current into a good current, for me > and for those whom I may influence. In other words, I make the WORLD > a better place when I exercise wise attention. What I say/do has a > direct influence on my kammic stream and an indirect influence on > the rest of the world, starting with those closest to me and > emanating outwards (like ripples when a stone is dropped in a pond) > as those closest to me influence other people." When I think in this > way (I don't always), my mind becomes universal by identifying its > own interest with the interest of all. What do you define as "universal?" A mind is universal when it treats all equally with kindness (metta?)? Other definition? > 4) "Today, metta is a pragmatic necessity". Necessity for whom? > There are many who don't develop metta! > > I agree 100%. Normally, I try to edit out all social commentary from > what I download. (Bhikkhu Bodhi isn't too bad on this, many others > are terrible). This slipped by. Sorry about that. As it probably > doesn't lead to "wrong view", I may leave it in. I agree. B. Bodhi do have his own comments, but he tends to differentiate them better than many (like, the commentaries say this, but I think the commentaries don't make sense on this point, etc..). > 5) The section on planning the response in Metta in daily life > wouldn't work too well if one bakes the cookies with the thoughts > that I am doing this out of my metta, or because I need to show the > worlds that I am a person with metta. > > Why did I volunteer to teach the beginners' Abhidhamma class? There > were two main factors: > - I felt it would be a great way for me to learn the Dhamma (and > Abhidhamma) much better (this is kusala) > - I felt that I could do a better job of it than my classmates > (conceit - definitely akusala) > > What motivates me each week to put in the hours of preparation > required for the class? There are two main factors: > - I am inspired by a genuine love of the Dhamma (this is kusala) > - I am afraid of looking foolish in front of the class if I am not > prepared (fear and conceit - definitely akusala) > > Akusala is so pervasive in our lives. If we use the energy from > akusala to start us on a kusala path, then so much the better. I > still have to pay for all that akusala, but at least I also have > some kusala as well. At my stage of development, it is not practical > to insist that my thoughts must be PURE kusala. I accept that there > is some akusala as well. > As one bakes the cookies, etc. it is unavoidable that akusala > thoughts may arise. But the kusala thoughts "outweigh" them. Did you > see the movie, "Monsters Inc."? At the end, the monsters discovered > that laughter has ten times the energy of screams. I used that > analogy in class and my kids (aged 10 and 12) loved it. I think this is great stuff, and if your students understand this point too, it would work really well. Otherwise, it would be easy to think "I am a good preson" because I do this and this. Are you teaching dhammas to 10-12 year-olds? Or do you mean your own kids like this analogy? kom 15241 From: egberdina Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 3:34pm Subject: In "Defense" of Abhidhamma (Re: [dsg] Re: Duration of Dhammas) Hi Howard, I agree strongly with your position, namely, those things in the Abhidhamma that make very incisive and revealing sense to me are enough reason for me to have a little faith that those things that I do not yet understand are also founded in wisdom. In times past I may have taken an opposite view, that if a thesis appeared flawed in some parts, I may have discarded the whole lot. Yes, I agree that questioning with an open mind is a very useful process. All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi again, Herman (and all) - > > A couple more "random" thoughts on this matter in the direction of > "defending" Abhidhamma - > The idea that a citta is more of a fuzzy-interval event than a point > event does not in any way destroy the notion of citta. In fact the > Abhidhammic notion of the three stages of a citta [which I think we might > picture as kind of a cosine wave, with intensity growing, peaking, and > decreasing] already indicates that a citta is *not* a single-point > phenomenon. > Also, the fact that there are no gaps between cittas in Theravada > Abhidhamma (as opposed to Sautrantika), also establishes a continuity to > perception. Moreover, there *is* a kind of parallelism countenanced by the > Abhidhamma. While a single mind-moment (citta) only involves a single > arammana (be it rupa or a mental object), it also involves the function of > discernment plus a good number of concomitant operations (cetasikas), all > co-occurring. Moreover, one citta leads into the next without gap, with a > citta boundary marked by the cessation of a one or more cetasikas, the > addition of one or more cetasikas, and/or the replacement of one arammana by > another, this last also marking a process boundary. This is, I must say, a > very sophisticated "theory" which seems to admit elements of both continuity > and discreteness. So, the bottom line, as I see it, is that while some > elements of Abhidhamma appear less plausible than others, there is much of > enormous value here which, perhaps, is fully realized only when one presses > forward with doubts and questions looking for answers with an open mind. > > With metta, > Howard 15242 From: Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 4:04pm Subject: ADL ch. 22 (1) http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 22 (1) JHANACITTAS The many different kinds of cittas arising in our daily life experience objects through the five sense-doors and through the mind-door. We see, hear, receive impressions through the other doors and think about these objects. Both in the sense-door process and in the mind-door process of cittas there are javana-cittas which are in the case of the non-arahat either kusala cittas or akusala cittas. The javana-cittas are most of the time akusala cittas because we cling to all the objects which are experienced through the sense-doors and through the mind-door. We cling to visible object and seeing, to sound and hearing, to all the objects we experience. We cling to life; we want to go on living and receiving sense-impressions. We may not notice when there is clinging after the seeing or hearing, especially when we do not feel particularly glad about what was seen or heard. But there may be lobha-mula-cittas with indifferent feeling. There are likely to be many moments of clinging which pass unnoticed, both in the sense-door processes and in the mind-door processes. Time and again an object is experienced through a sense-door and then through the mind-door and there are also mind-door processes of cittas which think of concepts such as people, animals or things. Clinging to concepts is likely to arise very often and thus we think most of the time with akusala citta. When we do not apply ourselves to dana, sila or bhavana, thinking is done with akusala citta. Even when we perform good deeds there are bound to be akusala cittas shortly after the kusala cittas since there is seeing and hearing time and again and after the seeing or hearing attachment or aversion on account of what we experience may arise. The kusala cittas and akusala cittas, all the cittas which arise in our daily life are of the 'sensuous plane of consciousness' or kamavacara cittas. Cittas which experience sense-impressions are bound up with defilements and therefore wise people, even those who lived before the Buddha's time, who saw the disadvantages of sense-impressions, developed jhana in order to be temporarily freed from sense-impressions. Jhanacittas are not kamavacara cittas, they are of another plane of consciousness; these cittas experience with absorption a meditation subject through the mind-door. At the moment of jhana one is freed from sense-impressions and from the defilements which are bound up with them. Jhanacittas comprise rupavacara cittas (rupa-jhanacittas) and arupavacara cittas (arupa-jhanacittas). Arupa-jhana is more refined than rupa-jhana, since the meditation subjects of arupa- jhana are no longer dependent on materiality. Later on I will deal with their differences. Apart from the planes of citta which are kamavacara cittas, rupavacara cittas and arupavacara cittas, there is still another plane of citta: the lokuttara cittas (translated as supramundane cittas) which have nibbana as their object. Those who attain enlightenment have lokuttara cittas, experiencing nibbana. As regards jhanacitta, jhanacittas do not have as their object, visible object, sound, or any other sense- impression. Jhanacittas arise in a process of cittas experiencing a meditation subject through the mind-door. In this process there are first kamavacara cittas which experience the meditation subject and then, in that same process, the jhanacitta arises. The process is as follows: kamavacara-cittas: mano-dvaravajjana-citta or mind-door-adverting-consciousness parikamma or preparatory consciousness upacara, which means: proximatory or access anuloma or adaptation gotrabhu, which means: that which overcomes the sense-sphere, or 'change of lineage' jhana-citta: appana or absorption (the moment of citta which attains jhana) For some, 'parikamma' (preparatory consciousness) is not necessary, and in this case there are, after the mind-door-adverting-consciousness, only three kamavacara cittas arising, instead of four, before the jhanacitta arises. Gotrabhu (which 'overcomes' the sense-sphere) is the last citta in that process which is kamavacara citta. In the 'Visuddhimagga' (IV, 74) we can read about the process of cittas in which jhana occurs for the first time. The 'Visuddhimagga' (IV, 78) states that only one single moment of jhanacitta arises, which is then succeeded by the bhavanga-citta (life-continuum). After that there is a process of kamavacara cittas, reviewing, through the mind-door, the jhana which has just occurred. Further on (IV, 123 ff. ) we read that absorption can 'last' only when it is absolutely purified of states which obstruct concentration. One must first completely suppress lust by reviewing the dangers of sense desires and also suppress the other 'hindrances'. Jhanacittas are kusala kamma of a high degree. When jhana has been attained the hindrances of sensuous desire, ill-will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and worry, and doubt are temporarily eliminated. Thus one is truly calm, at least at that moment. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the person who wants to cultivate samatha so as to be able to attain jhana, has to develop the five jhana-factors, which can inhibit the hindrances, namely: applied thinking (vitakka), sustained thinking (vicara), rapture (piti), happy feeling (sukha), concentration (samadhi). Jhana is developed in stages, with each succeeding stage being more refined than the preceding one. There are five stages of rupa-jhana in all. For the first stage of rupa-jhana it is still necessary that all five jhana- factors arise with the jhanacitta, but at each higher stage, when one has become more advanced, jhana- factors are successively abandoned. When one attains to the rupa-jhana of the second stage, one does not need the jhana-factor which is 'applied thinking' (vitakka). At this point the jhanacitta can experience the meditation subject without vitakka (which has the characteristic of directing the mind unto an object and the function of 'touching' the object). The other jhana-factors still arise with the jhanacitta of the second stage. 15243 From: egberdina Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 4:31pm Subject: Re: Questioning Arahants and Abhidhamma Dear Christine and everyone, This post is dripping with mirth. Please read it accordingly. Would you question an arahat if he spoke the following words to you as he handed you a bowl with a dark yellow fluid in it?. "A bhikkhu's life depends on fermented urine as medicine. So he should take fermented urine as medicine and make an effort to practise dhamma. But there are special allowances: they are ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey and molasses. Having formally accepted them, he is to take them as medicine within seven days at most. On the seventh day he shall give them away. However, he may use them externally after the seventh day." :-) :-) (Couldn't resist it. Sorry :-) Now for the serious section. The realities of the present moment are the only absolutes, and even they are transient. If there is happiness, this is what one can know. If there is sadness, fear or whatever, this is what one can know. If a book helps you to understand the present moment, good and well. If it doesn't, don't worry about it. Be well Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Group, > > From my limited understanding of studies on Abhidhamma, I believed > it to be an analysis of the realm of consciousness, a systematisation > of the whole of reality showing the way, from an ethical and > psychological viewpoint, to the liberation from suffering. > > Sometimes I find posts on dsg very disturbing. Intellectually, I > don't have the type of academic background to understand the terms > and concepts discussed by other members in maths, physics, > philosophy. I don't have the capacity to judge whether some are > sceptical of the validity of the whole Tipitaka or Abhidhamma or just > selected unpalatable bits here and there of both, and whether such > scepticism is justified. Though I don't understand the Abhidhamma, I > had been taking it on Trust because it was mentioned in Suttas by > the Buddha and the expanded explanations were accepted by the Arahats > in the Councils. But then, another question that arises is 'Who > decides who is an arahat, and what is the extent of their knowledge > on *all* subjects? And is their approval of a teaching to be the > unquestioned Hallmark of truth?' And let's not go into which > translations can be trusted, or what the True Dhamma *really* > consists of, and what the Buddha *really* meant by certain terms and > words ..... > Is the Abhidhamma truth, and is it the explanation of reality? If > not - what are all of us on dsg doing - Which of us has the precious > time in this uncertain life to be living in a 'Let's Pretend' Land > of imagination, delighting in intellectual games and duelling with > abstractions? > My apologies if this is offensive to anyone - it's very late here, > or very early, and maybe I'm overtired ... > > metta, > Christine 15244 From: Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 4:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] wrong view Hi Herman, You are correct. I am interpreting the Buddha as saying there are consequences to ones actions which extend into future lives. And I am calling this ethics; maybe that isn't the best word. To my understanding, Buddhist ethics is the arising of bad (painful) and good (non-painful) feelings (vedana) proceeding from volitional activity initiated by intention conditioned by accumulations according to a closed (uninterferable) mechanism of cause and effect. In other words, citta process or paticcasamupadda. There is no choice, but there are influences. So what you think and say makes a difference. I imagine there is room for considerable debate on what constitutes good and bad, kusala and akusala. What's your take on it? Larry _______________ Herman: "Hi Larry, Running throughout your post I read the following argument. "There has to be ethics, there just has to be ethics." Have I read this correctly, and if I have then I ask why do there have to be ethics?" 15245 From: Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 3:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Questioning Arahants and Abhidhamma Hi, Frank - Sadhu, sadhu, sadhu! (Or otherwise put - Here, here!! ;-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/26/02 3:58:40 PM Eastern Daylight Time, fcckuan@y... writes: > > Hi Chris, > I think the validity of Abidhamma is something you > have to decide for yourself. Maybe not even validity, > but just whether it helps you progress on your path. > The only thing I know for sure about Buddhism is > that it brings a radical reduction of suffering, > commensurate with the level of your realization of > impermanence, dukkha, and anatta. That's something > everyone on the list has experienced and it's why we > have confidence in the teachings. Whether a COMPLETE > cessation of dukkha and end to the round of rebirths > is possible, one can't be sure until it's personally > experienced. > There's a dukkha infested spiritual craving we all > have of wanting to be sure that the path we're > following is the right one, and leads to complete > liberation. That craving should be recognized and > abandoned. Even if the Buddhadhamma is incomplete and > doesn't bring final deliverance, it's BY FAR the best > religion out there and the best system to build on > (if necessary). And if the Buddha turns out to be > correct, BONUS! So far, I have no reason to doubt that > buddhism leads to complete cessation of dukkha. I do > have doubts about the validity of parts of the > tipitaka, but it's a healthy doubt. I don't have any > illusion that any doctrine, no matter how perfect, can > remain pristine and avoid having superfluous or > erroneous parts tacked on to it from later > generations. > > -fk /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15246 From: robmoult Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 7:18pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi Kom, I have inserted some brief comments. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Kom Tukovinit" wrote: > > In daily life (kamavacara), I see "radiation" as a metaphor; I > > visualize sending metta to a person or group that I also visualize. > > This is the part that I don't get. When one is kind toward another person, > one has the person as the object. When we are kind to this person, we are > not thinking about sending out kindness to the person: one is simply kind > (thinking kindly, say kind things, do kind things) to the person. Without > examining Vissudhimagga, it seems rather unusual to me that metta > development involves sending out kindness to other beings. How about just > thinking kindly about them without trying to send anything? I know this > sounds hair-splitting, but "sending" kindness does strongly evoke the image > of the the psychic force. I go back to the context of the Metta Sutta; there was definitely "sending kindness" there. If I understand correctly, Devas are able to sense our mental states, so "sending" to a Deva is redundant (sharing with a Deva might be more appropriate). Perhaps a "kind thought" is more the kusala cetasika adosa. > What do you define as "universal?" A mind is universal when it treats all > equally with kindness (metta?)? Other definition? I think of "universal" as a metaphor as meaning not just limited to my own stream of kamma, but impacting many other people's as well. The Suttas use the numbers 84,000 and 500 quite often. I don't takes these numbers literally but treat them as "figures of speech" to mean "a really, big number" and "a big number". > > I think this is great stuff, and if your students understand this point too, > it would work really well. Otherwise, it would be easy to think "I am a > good preson" because I do this and this. The topic has come up multiple times and I have repeatedly "confessed" to the class of the existence of kusala drivers (fear, conceit, etc.) behind my motivation to deliver a good talk. > > Are you teaching dhammas to 10-12 year-olds? Or do you mean your own kids > like this analogy? My kids do attend the class. There may be a couple of others in the 25 - 30 age range, the others are all older, some much older. It appears as though a taste for Abhidhamma doesn't develop until a bit later in life. There are probably not too many teenagers part of this Dhamma Study Group. The Christians say, "The family that prays together, stays together." In my case, "The family that studies Abhidhamma together... (can't think of a rhyme)" My wife really enjoys the Abhidhamma class and my kids tolerate it. Who knows how much sinks in? After each class, I ask them to remember and they are able to repeat a couple of points, so I think it is beneficial. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15247 From: robmoult Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 7:22pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata Hi Nina, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Is this slow motion enough ? :-) Y e s ! T h a n k y o u ! :-) I think that the "stupid pill" is wearing off. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15248 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 10:44pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Dear Rob, > -----Original Message----- > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > > I go back to the context of the Metta Sutta; there was > definitely "sending kindness" there. If I Which part of the metta sutta do you think discusses sending out kindness to other beings? > understand correctly, > Devas are able to sense our mental states, so There are definitely many stories in the tipitakas to support this hypothesis, although I haven't seen the texts that say *all* devas can sense other people's thought.. > Perhaps a "kind thought" is more the kusala > cetasika adosa. Metta is said to be the same as adosa, with a being as its object (instead of other objects, like paramatha dhamma, which can be the object of metta). > I think of "universal" as a metaphor as meaning > not just limited to > my own stream of kamma, but impacting many other > people's as well. > The Suttas use the numbers 84,000 and 500 quite > often. I don't takes > these numbers literally but treat them as > "figures of speech" to > mean "a really, big number" and "a big number". So you mean, when metta is developed, the consciousness becomes "universal", i.e, merges with the stream of consciousness with other people? > > The Christians say, "The family that prays > together, stays > together." In my case, "The family that studies > Abhidhamma > together... (can't think of a rhyme)" My wife > really enjoys the > Abhidhamma class and my kids tolerate it. Who > knows how much sinks > in? After each class, I ask them to remember and > they are able to > repeat a couple of points, so I think it is beneficial. That's fantastic. Anumoddhana... kom 15249 From: robmoult Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 11:33pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi Kom, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Kom Tukovinit" wrote: > Which part of the metta sutta do you think discusses sending > out kindness to other beings? I meant the context of the Sutta; the Buddha sending the 500 monks back to meditate and recite the Metta Sutta to calm the Devas. > > There are definitely many stories in the tipitakas to > support this hypothesis, although I haven't seen the texts > that say *all* devas can sense other people's thought.. I have been told (please don't ask me to quote a reference) that only the two lowest Deva realms take any notice of humans (the earth- bound, Catummaharajika, and the sky-bound, Tavatimsa; the realm of 33 Gods where the Buddha preached the Abhidhamma for his mother). > > I think of "universal" as a metaphor as meaning > > not just limited to > > my own stream of kamma, but impacting many other > > people's as well. > > So you mean, when metta is developed, the consciousness > becomes "universal", i.e, merges with the stream of > consciousness with other people? > No, I mean that when I recognize that, as a worldling, dealing with worldlings, my actions have an indirect impact on other's kammic streams. If I walk around with a sour face all day long, then it is bound to impact those close to me. If, as a result of my sour face, they get into a bad mood, then I see myself as impacting their bad kamma / vipaka. We are responsible for our own kammic stream but can also have an indirect impact (no merging) on other's kammic stream. When I only think about my own kammic stream, then I am not being "universal". When I consider the kammic streams of others that I may impact (and the impact that they have on others by extention), then I am being "universal". This my own definition to suit the way that I think. Try saying this to your wife, "You are 100% responsible for your own hapiness. I have no role, no responsibility to make you happy. If my actions make you unhappy, that is your problem. It is your vipaka and your reaction to your vipaka that is making you unhappy." If you don't think "universally", then you might even make statements such as this (and your marriage won't last long). Thanks, Rob M :-) 15250 From: kenhowardau Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 11:54pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Ken (and Stephen) - > > In a message dated 8/25/02 2:38:54 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > kenhowardau@y... writes: > >Howard: They do have characteristics in the same way > that they exist - conventionally. Trees have bark, and > roots, There *are* different > levels of discourse and of "reality".) ----------------------------------------------- You were referring to my comment that concepts don't have characteristics (I incorrectly called them sabhava, by the way), but I wonder, what is the point in learning conventional characteristics? When you say,"There are different levels of discourse and of reality," are you of the opinion that the Buddha taught conventional truth to some people and absolute truth to others? (I have seen that asserted elsewhere.) Personally, I doubt it. In fact, to sit on a cushion, contemplating the breath (concept), and seeing it as impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self, strikes me as a denial of anicca, dukkha and anatta. The cushion, the person sitting on it, the breath etc., are all concepts, the products of thinking -- they don't exist and they never have -- how can they form part of the Buddhadhamma? ---------------------------------------------------- > What do you mean by a "method that is practised by paramattha dhammas"? The notion of practice is a conventional one. People practice. Moments of discernment, hardness, aversion, etc do not. > --------------------------------------------------- Remember, I was responding to Stephen's assertion that the Buddha taught methods. With my `fundamentalist' outlook, I could only concede `Buddhist methods' in so far as they referred to real (not illusory), activities. If panna conditions right effort and other right cetasikas to arise with it, then I suppose that's a method. If panna is accumulated in all subsequent cittas, to condition the recurrence of panna (the cetasika), when all the conditions allow, then that might be a method too. Sorry if I'm stretching things a bit far, there. :-) ------------------------------------------------------ > Howard: Anatta is not (merely) the fact that there is only the present nama and rupa. > -------------------------------- No, I didn't say that, what I said was, "Once we have begun to accept anatta -- that is, once we can intellectually agree that reality is only the present nama and rupa, then . . . ." But anyway, your point was: --------------------------- > Anatta is the emptiness of all dhammas, their impersonality and insubstantiality (their lack of core). > --------------------------- Is it? I have trouble with the notion of emptiness. Perhaps I misunderstand, but isn't this what has made it so hard for you to accept paramattha dhammas over the last couple of years? I notice that, in a message following the one I am answering now, you are beginning to accept that dhammas have their own, separate existence. Have you finally softened your stance on `the continuous, seamless flow of experience?' Have you come to accept that dhammas are not empty of their own intrinsic nature (sabhava)? Reading on, I see that you are still keen on the notion of emptiness: ---------------------- > All conditioned dhammas arise in dependence on other equally empty dhammas, making them thoroughly empty, and the one unconditioned dhamma, nibbana, is the ultimate emptiness, being empty of all conditions. > ------------------------------------------------------ Again, seeing anatta as emptiness just doesn't do much for me; we won't know until we're enlightened but in the meantime, I like to understand anatta as the absence of `anything more.' So, e.g., a citta is merely a citta, it is not my citta or your citta. (That's probably not the accepted definition.) Returning to the present discussion: I was saying, "These conventional counterparts are just a lot of thinking(concepts, pannatti), they are not real and they can't be objects of satipatthana -- the Middle Way."; to which you replied: ---------------------------------------------------- > One thing bothers me about this. How can there be *anything* that is unknowable by wisdom? How would a Buddha know the relative unreality of pa~n~natti without being able to examine pa~n~natti with insight? > ---------------------------------- (He knew them as anatta; I don't know whether other ariyans do.(?)) Concepts can be cognized by nama but not directly known. They don't exist. We can conceptualise a flying pink elephant but needless to say, we can't directly know it. The same applies to all the other concepts. I think pannatti can be known by just about every cetasika apart from panna.(?) But when we are seeing a concept with intelligence, my guess is, we're just thinking about it. The thinking (vitakka and vicara), is conditioned in line with our accumulated tendencies and it may be kusala or akusala. You continued: --------------------------------- > In fact, when we investigate the breath, for example, and our mindfulness and focus intensify, we can detect the elements that comprise the breath - the softness, the motion, the "texture" (relative roughness and smoothness), the warmth, the moisture. The breath is pa~n~natti. Insight into it amounts to directly seeing its components/aspects (and their having the tilakkhana). > ---------------------- BUT, the softness, the motion, the texture, the moisture that we worldlings can detect, are no more paramattha dhammas than the breath is. Only ariyans know paramatta dhammas; we're stuck with concepts. Thanks for the conversation Howard; after minor surgery on Monday, my nose has swelled up to the size of a small, rugby football and it was comforting to see, through my watery, blackened eyes, that someone had addressed a message to me. :O) Kind regards Ken H 15251 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 11:58pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Dear Rob M, > -----Original Message----- > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Kom Tukovinit" > wrote: > > Which part of the metta sutta do you think > discusses sending > > out kindness to other beings? > > I meant the context of the Sutta; the Buddha > sending the 500 monks > back to meditate and recite the Metta Sutta to > calm the Devas. Here again we are back to that hair-splitting point about "sending out" metta to beings or having the beings (or all beings) as the objects of metta. As far as I can tell from the sutta and the commentaries, it is the latter. Of course, there might be other suttas about truly radiating metta, but from this particular sutta, I still don't see the context where the monks *intended* to send metta to the deva, but they certainly had the devas included as the objects of metta meditation. Hmm... Maybe I leave this particular point for now. A. Sujin is coming here in a week, and I may have an opportunity to ask her this question. > I have been told (please don't ask me to quote a > reference) that > only the two lowest Deva realms take any notice > of humans (the earth- > bound, Catummaharajika, and the sky-bound, > Tavatimsa; the realm of > 33 Gods where the Buddha preached the Abhidhamma > for his mother). Do you know why? Proximity? Or the person doing the telling didn't mention? > No, I mean that when I recognize that, as a > worldling, dealing with > worldlings, my actions have an indirect impact on > other's kammic > streams. If I walk around with a sour face all > day long, then it is > bound to impact those close to me. If, as a > result of my sour face, > they get into a bad mood, then I see myself as > impacting their bad > kamma / vipaka. We are responsible for our own > kammic stream but can > also have an indirect impact (no merging) on > other's kammic stream. > When I only think about my own kammic stream, > then I am not > being "universal". When I consider the kammic > streams of others that > I may impact (and the impact that they have on > others by extention), > then I am being "universal". This my own > definition to suit the way > that I think. Ah, I see... Thanks for explaining. > > Try saying this to your wife, "You are 100% > responsible for your own > hapiness. I have no role, no responsibility to > make you happy. If my > actions make you unhappy, that is your problem. > It is your vipaka > and your reaction to your vipaka that is making > you unhappy." Although I am not married, I certainly don't think it is wise to try this approach. This is like throwing some oil in fire! > If you don't think "universally", then you might > even make > statements such as this (and your marriage won't > last long). > If you live, that is... ;-) kom 15252 From: egberdina Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 1:57am Subject: Re: wrong view Hi Larry, Thanks for your reply, and I have no prob with the way you use the word "ethics". My understanding of Buddhist ethics is pretty much in line with your description. But I think it goes a bit further. If I may expand on my take a little. The problem is not so much of "how to live", but "that one lives". Devas are in samsara, just the same as hungry ghosts. The ultimate problem is not the quality of the accomodation one has on this ride, but that one is on the ride. Given this, I appreciate very much the Buddha's statement that jhana is the highest kusala. In a manner of speaking, as one ascends the jhana staircase, less and less kamma is produced. Until the mind is virtually extinguished. I do not discount other possibilities. I know some people have jhana recipes, others have insight recipes, but if there is no baking of cakes then it is all academic. Thank you for all your posts All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Herman, > > You are correct. I am interpreting the Buddha as saying there are > consequences to ones actions which extend into future lives. And I am > calling this ethics; maybe that isn't the best word. > > To my understanding, Buddhist ethics is the arising of bad (painful) and > good (non-painful) feelings (vedana) proceeding from volitional activity > initiated by intention conditioned by accumulations according to a > closed (uninterferable) mechanism of cause and effect. In other words, > citta process or paticcasamupadda. There is no choice, but there are > influences. So what you think and say makes a difference. I imagine > there is room for considerable debate on what constitutes good and bad, > kusala and akusala. > > What's your take on it? > > Larry > _______________ > Herman: "Hi Larry, > Running throughout your post I read the following argument. "There has > to be ethics, there just has to be ethics." > Have I read this correctly, and if I have then I ask why do there have > to be ethics?" 15253 From: Sarah Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 2:20am Subject: Right and Wrong Path and Jhana Factors Dear All, There has been some discussion recently on right and wrong path factors and on samma and micha sati. I’d like to add a little more to the other helpful comments and also relate it to right and wrong jhana factors as I personally find it a very useful topic for consideration. Mostly I’m just quoting from Nina’s ‘Conditions’ which can be found at: http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Amongst the 24 paccaya (conditions), there are magga paccaya (path condition) and jhana paccaya (jhana condition). I think it’s very helpful to consider the wrong factors as well as the right ones as wrong view will lead to the taking of the wrong ones for the right ones. Nina writes in the chapter on Path Condition: ..... “Path-factors can be akusala cetasikas which constitute the wrong path, or they can be sobhana cetasikas which constitute the right path. The path-factors of the wrong path lead downwards, to an unhappy rebirth, and the path-factors of the right path lead to a happy rebirth, or, when they are constituents of the noble eightfold Path, they lead to deliverance from the cycle of birth and death. In the “Dialologues of the Buddha” (III, no. 33, The Recital, VIII) the path-factors of the wrong path are summed up as follows: Eight wrong factors of character and conduct, to wit, wrong views, thinking, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, concentration. Wrong speech, wrong action and wrong livelihood are not cetasikas, but they are unwholesome actions motivated by akusala cetanå, unwholesome volition, which accompanies akusala citta. Neither is wrong mindfulness a cetasika, but it designates lack of attention to kusala, lack of mindfulness which is a property of akusala citta. The cetasika mindfulness, sati, can only accompany sobhana citta, it cannot be akusala. Since the four factors of wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood and wrong mindfulness are not cetasikas they are not conditioning factors of path-condition. The other four factors of the wrong path are akusala cetasikas, namely: wrong view, wrong thinking, wrong effort and wrong concentration. Thus, they are conditioning factors of path-condition. We read in the “Paììhåna” (Faultless Triplet, VII, Investigation Chapter, § 432, IV): Faulty state (akusala dhamma) is related to faulty state by path-condition. Faulty path-factors are related to their associated khandhas 1 by path-condition. Wrong view (micchå-diììhi) is an akusala cetasika arising with four types of lobha-múla-citta 2. There can be wrong view about kamma and vipåka, one may believe that good and bad deeds do not produce their appropriate results. It is wrong view to take realities for permanent or for “self”. Wrong view conditions wrong practice of the Dhamma, it conditions taking the wrong path for the right path....” ***** In a similar way, we read about right and wrong jhana factors and how the wrong factors can very easily be taken for right factors if there isn’t the development of understanding which clearly knows the difference between wholesome and unwholesome mental factors. We discussed this topic in Koh Samui with Erik with regard to anapanasati, but it is relevant for any development of samatha. Again I’m quoting from ‘Conditions’, this time from the chapter ‘Jhana condition’: ..... “The jhåna-factors which are developed in samatha are sobhana cetasikas, they have to be developed together with paññå which knows the way to develop calm, so that absorption can be attained. However, jhåna-factors can also be taken in a wider sense, they can even be akusala. That is why the “Dhammasangaùi” mentions in the “Summary” jhåna-factors arising not only with the mahå-kusala cittas which are accompanied by paññå, but also with those which are unaccompanied by paññå, ñåùa-vippayutta, as well as with each of the akusala cittas 3. Not only kusala citta but also akusala citta needs jhåna-factors which assist the citta to be firmly fixed on an object. Even when someone performs evil deeds he needs jhåna-factors which accompany the akusala citta, so that he is concentrated on the object of aksusala; these jhåna-factors condition the akusala citta by way of jhåna-condition. We read in the “Paììhåna” (Faultless Triplet, VII, Investigation Chapter, § 431) that akusala jhåna-factors are related to their associated aggregates ( the other nåma-kkhandhas 4) by jhåna-condition. Without the assistance of the jhåna-factors good or evil deeds cannot be performed.” ...... As Nina writes below, we read in the various texts about how the jhana factors operate with unwholesome cittas: ..... "Vitakka, applied thinking, “touches” the object which is experienced, it leads citta to the object (Vis. IV, 88). When vitakka is akusala it is wrong thinking. As to vicåra, sustained thinking, this has the characteristic of “continued pressure” on the object, it keeps citta “anchored” on it (Vis. IV, 88). Vitakka and vicåra accompany all cittas of the sense sphere, except the sense-cognitions (dvi-pañcaviññåùas, seeing, hearing, etc.) and they condition citta by way of jhåna-condition, so that it is firmly fixed on the object it experiences. Píti, rapture, interest or enthousiasm, takes an interest in the object, it “refreshes” citta and cetasikas (Vis. IV, 94). In the case of cittas of the sense sphere, kåmåvacara cittas, it arises with all cittas which are accompanied by pleasant feeling. When it is akusala it accompanies lobha-múla-citta. As to sukha, in this context it is the same as somanassa, pleasant feeling. Domanassa, unpleasant feeling, can only accompany dosa-múla-citta, citta rooted in aversion, thus, it is a jhåna-factor which is always akusala; it asists the akusala citta to be fixed on the object in an unwholesome way. Upekkhå, indifferent feeling, can be kusala, akusala, or indeterminate (avyåkata); when it is indeterminate it can be vipåka or kiriya 5. Samådhi, concentration, is the cetasika which is one-pointedness (ekaggatå). It has the function of focussing on one object and it accompanies every citta; it can be kusala, akusala, vipåka or kiriya. It causes the citta to be concentrated on the object it experiences....” ..... I quoted the example in my long post about the akusala jhana factors operating at the time of killing. They also operate at times of concentrating on meditation objects, such as breath, when there is no understanding of the distinction between kusala and akusala cittas with calm. It’s very easy to take the latter for the former and one cannot be guided by the pleasant or indifferent feelings. For example, as I know well, at the end of a yoga practice when one lies down or practices pranayama, it feels very calm and relaxing, but mostly this is lobha and concentration not connected with bhavana (i.e unwholesome concentration). Erik and I watched Eath intently picking up frangipanni flowers from the lawn to make a garland. I asked him whether it was kusala or akusala concentration. “It must be kusala because it’s so harmless” he replied. "Who knows?", I asked. If it’s not a moment of dana, sila or bhavana, it’s bound to be akusala. We begin to see there’s far more akusala than kusala in a day, whatever the activity, whether we’re making a garland, baking cookies or concentrating on a meditation object, I think. To quote a little more from ‘conditions’: ..... “Someone may mistakenly believe that there is calm when he just sits and for example looks for a long time at a kasina (disk) which is among the meditation subjects of samatha. Instead of true calm which is wholesome there is clinging to quietness. Not merely intellectual understanding of the jhåna-factors is needed for the development of calm but there must also be right understanding which discerns precisely their different characteristics. When one underestimates the difficulty of the development of jhåna there is bound to be wrong concentration. It is difficult to distinguish between different jhåna-factors such as vitakka and vicåra. While we are thinking, there are vitakka and vicåra performing their functions, they arise together; but do we discern their different characteristics? Do we know the characteristic of píti, rapture, and can we distinguish it from sukha, pleasant feeling? When we find out for ourselves how difficult it is to distinguish between these jhåna-factors, we will understand that a high degree of paññå is needed for the development of the jhåna-factors.” ***** I fully appreciate that what I’m writing and quoting will not appeal to many. We’d all like to think that there is a lot of kusala in a day and understanding more about the wrong factors and ‘cheating’ dhammas should apply to others and not to 'our' practice. Even as I type now, there are many path and jhana factors act as paccaya (condition),such as concentration, thinking, pleasant feeling and so on. Of course as I’m writing about dhamma, I’d like to think they are all wholesome. Truly, when there is a little understanding and I’m honest about it, I know that there are many, many moments of lobha, moha, unwholesome concentration and thinking, as well as the fewer more noble qualities. And in between all these are many moments of seeing, hearing, sensations through the body-sense and so on. The understanding always comes back to the present moment and the sincerity in 'our' practice. Sarah ==== 15254 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 3:10am Subject: Re: A Question on Visual Image Processing --- Dear Howard, Each moment of seeing is vipaka - the result of either kusala or akusala kamma from the past. Take the example of seeing a very beautiful diamond side by side with a piece of dung. In this case the kusala vipaka and akusala vipaka moments are alternating rapidly even though the seeing may seem to be taking in both at the same time. Robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Abhidhamma experts - > > I have a question with regard to visual rupas. As I understand the > Abhidhamma on this, what are actually and directly seen are colors and shades > of varying brightness. My question is the following: It seems that we see, at > one shot, a scene, an entire panorama which is composed of areas of varying > colors and brightness. Do we actually see an entire scene, an > undifferentiated color-image, which is then further processed, with sa~n~na > carving out the various "colored areas", or do we, in fact, directly see > individual colors, sequentially, which are subsequently combined into a > "scene". What are the paramattha dhammas here? What elements are primary? > > With metta, > Howard 15255 From: Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 1:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi, Ken - In a message dated 8/27/02 2:55:18 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Ken (and Stephen) - > > > > In a message dated 8/25/02 2:38:54 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > > kenhowardau@y... writes: > > > > > > > >Howard: They do have characteristics in the same way > > that they exist - conventionally. Trees have bark, and > > roots, > > There *are* different > > levels of discourse and of "reality".) > ----------------------------------------------- > > You were referring to my comment that concepts don't > have characteristics (I incorrectly called them > sabhava, by the way), but I wonder, what is the point > in learning conventional characteristics? > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: As worldlings, conventional objects and their characteristics are where we start - they are overwhelmingly what we deal with. -------------------------------------------------- > > When you say,"There are different levels of discourse > and of reality," are you of the opinion that the > Buddha taught conventional truth to some people and > absolute truth to others? (I have seen that asserted > elsewhere.) Personally, I doubt it. In fact, to sit > on a cushion, contemplating the breath (concept), and > seeing it as impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self, > strikes me as a denial of anicca, dukkha and anatta. > -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Then the Buddha of the Sutta Pitaka denied anicca, dukkha, and anatta. Certainly 95% of what the Buddha talked about there was conventional truth. And all language is conventional language - though it can be used to point beyond the conventional. -------------------------------------------------- > > The cushion, the person sitting on it, the breath > etc., are all concepts, the products of thinking -- > they don't exist and they never have -- how can they > form part of the Buddhadhamma? > ---------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Riiight! Scratch the Anapanasat Sutta. In fact, scratch the Sutta Pitaka and Vinaya Pitaka entirely, keeping only the Abhidhamma Pitaka (except the part dealing with hungry ghosts and the Kathavatthu - scratch them too). -------------------------------------------------------------- > > > What do you mean by a "method that is practised by > paramattha dhammas"? The notion of practice is a > conventional one. People practice. Moments of > discernment, hardness, aversion, etc do not. > > --------------------------------------------------- > > Remember, I was responding to Stephen's assertion that > the Buddha taught methods. With my `fundamentalist' > outlook, I could only concede `Buddhist methods' in so > far as they referred to real (not illusory), > activities. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Then the Buddha never taught anyone anything at all unless they were already ariyans, although how they became ariyans is a mystery - good luck, I guess. ------------------------------------------------------- If panna conditions right effort and> > other right cetasikas to arise with it, then I suppose > that's a method. If panna is accumulated in all > subsequent cittas, to condition the recurrence of > panna (the cetasika), when all the conditions allow, > then that might be a method too. Sorry if I'm > stretching things a bit far, there. :-) > ------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: What you seem to be saying is that ariyans appear randomly, and that there is no "need" for Buddhas, because there is no practice. What will happen, will happen - somehow. ----------------------------------------------------------------- > > > Howard: Anatta is not (merely) the fact that there > is only the present nama and rupa. > > -------------------------------- > > No, I didn't say that, what I said was, "Once we have > begun to accept anatta -- that is, once we can > intellectually agree that reality is only the present > nama and rupa, then . . . ." --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, you said "Once we have begun to accept anatta -- that is, once we can intellectually agree that reality is only the present nama and rupa, then . . . ." The words "that is" tell me that you are defining "accepting anatta" to mean "intellectually agreeing that reality is only the present nama and rupa." ----------------------------------------------------------- > > But anyway, your point was: > --------------------------- > > > Anatta is the emptiness of all dhammas, their > impersonality and insubstantiality (their lack of > core). > > --------------------------- > > Is it? I have trouble with the notion of emptiness. > Perhaps I misunderstand, but isn't this what has made > it so hard for you to accept paramattha dhammas over > the last couple of years? ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I still do not accept paramattha dhammas if they are to be self-existing things with their *own* being. That is the notion I objected to, and I still do. I however have no problem in distinguishing paramattha dhammas as directly experienced conditions/events (still dependently arisen, and thus not self-existent) from mind-constructed dhammas which we mistakenly think are directly experienced. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > I notice that, in a message following the one I am > answering now, you are beginning to accept that > dhammas have their own, separate existence. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Dhammas such as hardness and visual images appear and can be distinguished from other dhammas, but they are not separate and independent. They are conditions which arise dependently, and are not self-existent. ----------------------------------------------------------- Have you> > finally softened your stance on `the continuous, > seamless flow of experience?' Have you come to accept > that dhammas are not empty of their own intrinsic > nature (sabhava)? -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: No. -------------------------------------------------------- > > Reading on, I see that you are still keen on the > notion of emptiness: > ---------------------- > > All conditioned dhammas arise in dependence on other > equally empty dhammas, making them thoroughly empty, > and the one unconditioned dhamma, nibbana, is the > ultimate emptiness, being empty of all conditions. > > ------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: You bet! ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Again, seeing anatta as emptiness just doesn't do much > for me; we won't know until we're enlightened but in > the meantime, I like to understand anatta as the > absence of `anything more.' > ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: But even without being enlightened, you know all about paramattha dhammas? You somehow directly see things as they are, as they have come to be? I don't think so. For a worldling, *this* is all mere concept, because it is unexperienced! It seems that you accept the entire presentation of the Abhidhamma, and all its details, without ever experiencing any of it. Don't you think that a full-blown theory of "ultimate reality" that has to be accepted on faith alone is surely not the centerpiece of the Buddha's teaching? We can attend only to what we can observe. No worlding apprehends individual cittas. And taking them on faith is not liberative. To be aware of directly observable, non-mind-constructed elements of experience, we need to attend to what we can initially observe, and those things *are* mind-constructed. If a physicist told you to "look at the quarks over there", pointing to a table, wouldn't you think he was certifiable? And, BTW, in the suttas, did the Buddha tell his followers that they should see fundamental self-existing realities, or did he tell them to see all dhammas as impermanent, unsatisfactory, impersonal and insubstantial, dependently arisen, and (thank you, Victor) as not me and not mine? --------------------------------------------------------- So, e.g., a citta is> > merely a citta, it is not my citta or your citta. > (That's probably not the accepted definition.) > > Returning to the present discussion: I was saying, > "These conventional counterparts are just a lot of > thinking(concepts, pannatti), they are not real and > they can't be objects of satipatthana -- the Middle > Way."; to which you replied: > ---------------------------------------------------- > > > One thing bothers me about this. How can there be > *anything* that is unknowable by wisdom? How would a > Buddha know the relative unreality of pa~n~natti > without being able to examine pa~n~natti with insight? > > > ---------------------------------- > > (He knew them as anatta; I don't know whether other > ariyans do.(?)) > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Arahants (perhaps even lesser ariyans) know all dhammas as anatta, or so I am led to believe. ----------------------------------------- > > Concepts can be cognized by nama but not directly > known. They don't exist. We can conceptualise a > flying pink elephant but needless to say, we can't > directly know it. The same applies to all the other > concepts. > -------------------------------------------- Howard: The concept of "flying pink elephant", AS A THOUGHT, is directly experienceable, but that thought is a groundless concept, having no observable referent. Being a groundless concept makes it a poor example. The concept of ' the keyboard on which I'm typing' is a better example. It is a well grounded concept, which has a referent. But the referent is not observable without involvement of mental-construction. The referent is an excellent example of a "real" pa~n~natti! (This sounds contradictory, but is not. The point is that I can deal with that "keyboard" in multiple ways, but there is no flying pink elephant to deal with in any way.) If we look *very carefully*, we can, to some extent, get to directly apprehend (to separate out) the sights, sounds, touchings, etc that the mind combines to form that keyboard. But this combining is not an arbitrary matter, because those components are truly interrelated. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > I think pannatti can be known by just about every > cetasika apart from panna.(?) But when we are seeing > a concept with intelligence, my guess is, we're just > thinking about it. The thinking (vitakka and vicara), > is conditioned in line with our accumulated tendencies > and it may be kusala or akusala. > > You continued: > --------------------------------- > > > In fact, when we investigate the breath, for > example, and our mindfulness and focus intensify, we > can detect the elements that comprise the breath - the > softness, the motion, the "texture" (relative > roughness and smoothness), the warmth, the moisture. > The breath is pa~n~natti. Insight into it amounts to > directly seeing its components/aspects (and their > having the tilakkhana). > > ---------------------- > > BUT, the softness, the motion, the texture, the > moisture that we worldlings can detect, are no more > paramattha dhammas than the breath is. Only ariyans > know paramatta dhammas; we're stuck with concepts. -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: We start where we are, Ken, else we start nowhere and at no time, and the Dhamma is useless. Also, I believe you overstate here. Certainly we can and do detect softness, motion, warmth, coolness, and moisture "in" the breath. I know that I can, and I have no doubt that you can as well. This may not be at the finest, "microscopic" level of discernment, but it does occur. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks for the conversation Howard; after minor > surgery on Monday, my nose has swelled up to the size > of a small, rugby football > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm very sorry to hear that, Ken. I hope it improves quickly. ---------------------------------------------------------- and it was comforting to> > see, through my watery, blackened eyes, that someone > had addressed a message to me. ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I'm truly pleased that you found this to be something pleasant. (You may also take comfort in knowing that your nose and the swelling of it are just pa~n~natti! ;-) ------------------------------------------------------------ > :O) > > Kind regards > Ken H > > ============================= Feel better soon, Ken. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15256 From: Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 2:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A Question on Visual Image Processing Hi, Robert - In a message dated 8/27/02 6:11:02 AM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Dear Howard, > Each moment of seeing is vipaka - the result of either > kusala or akusala kamma from the past. > Take the example of seeing a very beautiful diamond side by > side with a piece of dung. In this case the kusala vipaka > and akusala vipaka moments are alternating rapidly even > though the seeing may seem to be taking in both at the same > time. > Robert > ============================== Thank you for the reply. With regard to my question: << Do we actually see an entire scene, an undifferentiated color-image, which is then further processed, with sa~n~na carving out the various "colored areas", or do we, in fact, directly see individual colors, sequentially, which are subsequently combined into a "scene" >>, your answer seems to suggest that my second scenario (of seeing individual "parts" sequentially which are then mentally combined) is closer to the Abhidhammic understanding. Interestingly (to me ;-), my *first* scenario seems more intuitive, but, then, all our errors seem quite intuitive! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15257 From: frank kuan Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 6:40am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) In my case, "The family that studies > > Abhidhamma > > together... (can't think of a rhyme)" Cures insomnia together? :) -fk 15258 From: robmoult Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 8:58am Subject: Was Sariputta capable of lying? Hi All, I am preparing for this week's class, which will be a summary of "Dying to Live - The Role of Kamma in Dying and Rebirth". Here is the link: http://www.geocities.com/ekchew.geo/dying2live.htm The following story is told in this text which states that Sariputta decided to decieve a person. I thought that as an Arahant, Sariputta was incapable of lying. Please help me out. Does anybody know the story? Any explanation on Sariputta's lying? Here is the context: --------------------------------- Another example is the story of the public executioner. He had been a robber and murderer before he was appointed by the king to be a public executioner. After 55 years of service, on the day of his retirement, he was dressed in his best, had prepared his favourite food, and was about to eat it when Venerable Sariputta, who had just emerged from his absorption, stood at his door, begging for alms. He thought it was very befitting that the Venerable Sariputta should come on such an auspicious occasion. So he invited the Venerable Sariputta in, offered him his favourite food and stood by his seat fanning the Thera while he was eating. At the end of the meal, the Venerable Sariputta gave him a Dhamma talk. But he was unable to pay attention because he kept remembering all those people whom he had executed. The Venerable Sariputta noticed that and asked, "why are you not paying attention?" He told him the reason. The Venerable Sariputta thought, "I shall deceive him." Then he asked, "Did you do it out of your own choice or did someone order you to do it?" "The king ordered me to do it, Bhante," he replied. "Now, upasaka [Buddhist layman], if that is the case, was it unwholesome?" The former executioner was a slow-witted fellow. When he heard the Thera's question, he felt relieved and said, "No, it wasn't unwholesome. Then carry on with your Dhamma talk, Bhante." Now that his conscience had been appeased, he could concentrate on the Dhamma talk. In fact, as he listened to the talk, he developed insight knowledge until sankharupekkhanana, just short of the first stage of enlightenment. After the Dhamma talk, he accompanied Venerable Sariputta outside along the street but on his way back was gored by a cow. When the monks heard about his death, they asked the Buddha where he was reborn. The Buddha replied that because of the insight knowledge he had attained while listening to Venerable Sariputta's talk, he had been reborn in Tusita Heaven. --------------------------------- Thanks, Rob M :-) 15259 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 10:00am Subject: the Perfections by A. Sujin, Ch 5, Wisdom, no. 1 Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no. 1 The Commentary to the ³Basket of Conduct² defines the perfection of wisdom as follows: Wisdom (pannå) has the characteristic of penetrating the real specific nature (of dhammas), or the characteristic of sure penetration, like the penetration of an arrow shot by a skilful archer; its function is to illuminate the objective field, like a lamp; its manifestation is non-confusion, like a guide in a forest; concentration or the four (noble) truths, is its proximate cause. Through the study of the Dhamma we gradually come to have more understanding of the vicissitudes of the world, of gain and loss, honour and dishonour, praise and blame, wellbeing and pain. We shall understand that the pleasant ³worldly conditions² of gain, honour, praise and wellbeing only lead to dukkha, suffering, if there is no pannå that knows the causes and their appropriate results in life. If someone truly sees the value of paññå and intends to develop kusala, he will not wish for pleasant sense objects as result, but he will aim for the growth of pannå until it has become keen and accomplished to the degree that it can completely eradicate defilements. Satipatthåna, right understanding of the mental phenomena and physical phenomena of our life, cannot be developed without pannå. No matter how many other excellent qualities someone may have, his defilements cannot be eradicated if pannå does not develop and becomes keener, if pannå does not clearly see the true nature of the realities that are naturally appearing. Thus, we should see the incomparable value of pannå and we should apply ourselves to its development so that it can become fully accomplished. If we develop satipaììhåna time and again paññå will be gradually accumulated so that it becomes keener, and reaches the degree of a perfection which realizes the four noble Truths. We read in the ³Khuddhaka Nikåya² in the Commentary to the ³Basket of Conduct², the ³Conduct of Yudañjaya², about the beginning of the development of paññå during the life the Bodhisatta was young Yudañjaya 1) : In the life when the Bodhisatta was Yudañjaya, he was the eldest son of the King and had the rank of the viceroy. He fulfilled every day mahå-dåna 2), the giving of an abundance of gifts. One day when he visited the royal park he saw the dewdrops hanging like a string of pearls on the tree-tops, the grass-tips, the end of the branches and on the spiders¹ webs. The prince enjoyed himself in the royal park and when the sun rose higher all the dewdrops that were hanging there disintegrated and disappeared. He reflected thus: ³These dewdrops came into being and then disappeared. Evenso are conditioned realities, the lives of all beings; they are like the dewdrops hanging on the grass-tips.² He felt a sense of urgency and became disenchanted with worldly life, so that he took leave of his parents and became a recluse. From this story we can learn that people have different degrees of understanding. We may see dew drops hanging on grass-tips, but who has paññå to the degree of causing a sense of urgency and disenchantment when he compares his own life with the evanescent dew? We read: The Bodhisatta realized the impermanence of the dewdrops and made this predominant in accumulating a sense of urgency and disenchantment; it arose once and then became a condition leading to its arising very often. When right understanding with a sense of urgency arises we should not let it pass by without paying attention to it. We should reflect on the conditions for this sense of urgency so that it can arise more often. The thought of death or impermanence can be a condition for further developing the perfections. Footnotes 1. See Jåtaka no. 460. 2. The word mahå-dåna is mostly used for the great offering of gifts to the Sangha. 15260 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 10:00am Subject: Karaniya Metta Sutta Dear Kom, I read your post on metta with great interest, it did not even seem a long post. I liked your personal remarks, especially on satipatthana. I found the English text of the Co in PTS: Minor Readings and Illustrator, Ch 9. With appreciation, Nina. 15261 From: The Last Bard Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 10:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] Was Sariputta capable of lying? The Venerable Sariputta noticed that and asked, "why are you not paying attention?" He told him the reason. The Venerable Sariputta thought, "I shall deceive him." Then he asked, "Did you do it out of your own choice or did someone order you to do it?" "The king ordered me to do it, Bhante," he replied. "Now, upasaka [Buddhist layman], if that is the case, was it unwholesome?" >> Well, truthfully Sariputta never decieved him since each line was a question. He was wanting the man to come to his own conclusions to allow him to hear the teachings, because after hearing the teachings it doesn't matter what had happened; he was on the steps to enlightenment. ===== The Phoenix is the only thing that rises and does not descend, and while everything changes. Nothing is truly lost. 15262 From: robmoult Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 3:24pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Was Sariputta capable of lying? Hi Bard, I considered that option, but rejected it on two counts: - It puts Sariputta in the category of lawyers and an ex-President - The conditions for "false speech" are as follows: 1. An untrue thing 2. Intention to deceive 3. Corresponding effort 4. Other person believes untruth In this story, all of these conditions are met, so Sariputta technically told a lie. As an Arahant, Sariputta would have eliminated conditions for any of the akusala cetasikas to arise. Is it possible to lie without any akusala cetasika arising? As I examine the situation, I can't see any obvious akusala cetasikas, but it doesn't seem right that Sariputta could be capable of lying. Does anybody know of any other cases of Arahants lying? Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., The Last Bard wrote: > The Venerable Sariputta noticed that and asked, "why > are you not > paying attention?" > > He told him the reason. The Venerable Sariputta > thought, "I shall > deceive him." Then he asked, "Did you do it out of > your own choice > or did someone order you to do it?" > > "The king ordered me to do it, Bhante," he replied. > > "Now, upasaka [Buddhist layman], if that is the case, > was it > unwholesome?" > >> > > Well, truthfully Sariputta never decieved him since > each line was a question. He was wanting the man to > come to his own conclusions to allow him to hear the > teachings, because after hearing the teachings it > doesn't matter what had happened; he was on the steps > to enlightenment. > > ===== > > The Phoenix is the only thing that rises and does not descend, and while everything changes. > > Nothing is truly lost. 15263 From: Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 3:29pm Subject: ADL ch. 22 (2) http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 22 (2) At the third stage of jhana 'sustained thinking' (vicara) is abandoned. At this stage one does not need vitakka or vicara any longer in order to become absorbed in the meditation subject. Now there are three factors remaining: rapture (piti), happy feeling (sukha) and concentration (samadhi). At the fourth stage rapture (piti) is abandoned. There is still happy feeling accompanying the jhana-citta, but piti does not arise. Without piti, the jhanacitta is more quiet, more refined. At the fifth stage happy feeling (sukha) too is abandoned and there is neutral feeling (upekkha vedana) accompanying the jhanacitta instead of happy feeling. At this stage one is no longer attached to happy feeling. The jhana-factor which is concentration (samadhi) remains. Some people can, at the second stage of jhana, abandon both 'applied thinking' and 'sustained thinking' (vitakka and vicara). Consequently, they can, in the third stage, abandon rapture (piti) and in the fourth stage happy feeling (sukha). Thus for them there are only four stages of jhana instead of five. That is the reason why rupa-jhanas can be counted as four stages or as five stages (the fourfold system or the fivefold system). When we read in the suttas about four stages of jhana, the fourfold system is referred to. There can be up to five stages of rupa-jhana in all and thus there are five types of rupavacara kusala cittas (rupa-jhana kusala cittas). Jhanacitta is kusala kamma of a high degree and thus its result is kusala vipaka of a high degree. Jhanacittas do not produce vipaka in the same lifespan: their result is rebirth in higher planes of existence: rebirth in rupa-brahma planes. If rupavacara kusala citta is to produce the next rebirth, there are rupavacara kusala cittas arising shortly before the dying-consciousness. The patisandhi-citta of the next life is rupavacara vipakacitta which arises in the appropriate rupa-brahma plane. It experiences the same meditation subject as the rupavacara kusala cittas arising shortly before the dying-consciousness of the preceding life. The five types of rupavacara kusala cittas produce five types of rupavacara vipakacittas. Rupavacara vipakacitta can only perform the function of patisandhi, bhavanga and cuti. There are five types of rupavacara kiriyacittas which are the cittas of the arahats who attain rupa-jhana. They do not have kusala cittas but kiriyacittas instead. Thus there are fifteen rupavacara cittas in all. Summarizing them, they are: 5 rupavacara kusala cittas 5 rupavacara vipakacittas 5 rupavacara kiriyacittas Those who have attained to the highest stage of rupa-jhana and see the disadvantages of rupa-jhana which is still dependent on materiality, might want to cultivate arupa-jhana or 'immaterial jhana'. There are four stages of arupa-jhana. The first stage of arupa-jhana is the 'Sphere of Boundless Space' (akasanancayatana). In order to attain this stage of arupa-jhana one has to attain first the highest stage of rupa-jhana in any one of the kasina meditations (The kasina meditations are among the meditation subjects of rupa-jhana. They are, for example, coloured disks or a piece of earth.) excepting the 'kasina of limited space' and achieve mastery in it. We read in the 'Visuddhimagga' (X, 6): When he has seen the danger in that [fine-material fourth jhana (The fourth rupa-jhana. Here the counting is according to the 'fourfold system.')] in this way and has ended his attachment to it, he gives attention to the 'Base consisting of Boundless Space' as peaceful. Then, when he has spread out the kasina to the limit of the world-sphere, or as far as he likes, he removes the kasina (materiality) by giving his attention to the space touched by it, (regarding that) as 'space' or 'boundless space'. As regards the 'Sphere of Boundless Space', the 'Visuddhimagga' (X, 6) explains the 'removing' of the kasina: And when the kasina is being removed, it does not roll up or roll away. It is simply that it is called 'removed' on account of his non-attention to it, his attention being given to 'space, space'. This is conceptualized as the mere space left by the removal of the kasina (materiality) ... In this way he can surmount the materiality of the kasina and attain the first arupa-jhana, the Sphere of Boundless Space'. The second stage of arupa-jhana is: the 'Sphere of Boundless Consciousness' (vinnanancayatana). The meditation subject of this stage of arupa-jhana is the consciousness which is the first arupa-jhana. The person who wants to attain this stage of arupa-jhana should first achieve 'mastery' in the 'Sphere of Boundless Space'; he should see the disadvantages of this stage and end his attachment to it. We read in the 'Visuddhimagga' (X, 25): ...So having ended his attachment to that, he should give his attention to the base consisting of boundless consciousness as peaceful, adverting again and again as 'Consciousness, consciousness', to the consciousness that occurred pervading that space (as its object)... The third stage of arupa-jhana is the 'Sphere of Nothingness' (akincannayatana). We read in the 'Visuddhimagga' (X, 32) that the person who wants to attain this stage should give his attention to the present non-existence of the past consciousness which pervaded the 'boundless space' and which was the object of the second stage of arupa-jhana, the 'Sphere of Boundless Consciousness'. We read (X, 33): Without giving further attention to that consciousness, he should (now) advert again and again in this way 'There is not, there is not', or 'Void, void', or 'Secluded, secluded', and give his attention to it, review it, and strike at it with thought and applied thought. Further on (X, 35) we read: ...he dwells seeing only its non-existence, in other words its departedness when this consciousness has arisen in absorption. The fourth arupa-jhana is the 'Sphere of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception' (n'eva-sanna-n'asannayatana). The object of this jhana is the third stage of arupa-jhana. We read in the 'Visuddhimagga' (X, 49): The word meaning here is this: that jhana with its associated states neither has perception nor has no perception because of the absence of gross perception and presence of subtle perception, thus it is 'neither perception nor non-perception' (n'eva-sanna-n'asannam). Further on (X, 50) we read: ...Or alternatively: the perception here is neither perception, since it is incapable of performing the decisive function of perception, nor yet non-perception, since it is present in a subtle state as a residual formation, thus it is 'neither-perception-nor-non-perception'... It is also explained that the feeling arising with this jhana-citta is 'neither-feeling-nor-non-feeling' (since it is present in a subtle state as a residual formation); the same applies to consciousness, contact (phassa) and the other cetasikas arising with the jhanacitta. 15264 From: robmoult Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 9:03pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi All, It looks as though this is a tough subject to research. I really need your help on this one! This week, I will go over "Kamma in Dying and Rebirth". Next week, I will do a review of the past few weeks (all the kusala cetasikas). On September 15th, I want to review the functions of the universal cetasikas and I would like to do this by doing a detailed analysis of the thought process, showing when each of the universal cetasikas become prominent, when they play a supporting role and when they are present but dormant. When a universal cetasika is prominent or supporting, I will use that as an opportunity to describe the nature of the cetasika and, by extension, the functioning of the thought process. My first pass guess is as follows (I know that there are many mistakes and I am hoping that somebody can help me): Bhavanga - Prominent: Life Faculty - Supporting: Energy ??? Adverting - Prominent: Attention - Supporting: One-Pointedness ??? Eye Consciousness - Prominent: Contact - Supporting: Initial Application ??? Receiving - Prominent: Feeling - Supporting: Desire ??? Investigating - Prominent: Perception - Supporting: Initial Application ??? Determining - Prominent: Attention - Supporting: Decision ??? Javana - Prominent: Volition - Supporting: Zest ??? Registration - Prominent: Perception - Supporting: Sustained Application ??? Larry, in response to your message below, I found the following site which gives a biography and bibliography of Ledi Sayadaw. http://www.ubakhin.com/ledi/biograph.htm I downloaded the ten english language publications available from this site but, after a very, very quick scan, did not find a detailed analysis of the thought process as I had hoped. I will review the materials more carefully. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Rob, here's a thought. You might poke around in Ledi Sayadaw's writings. > If you do, please pass along anything you find in the way of a > bibliography for him. There are several brief comments by him in "A > Comprehensive Manual..." which go into unusual depth of the citta > process. > > Larry 15265 From: egberdina Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 9:15pm Subject: Re: A Question on Visual Image Processing Hi Howard, Gestalt psychology also maintains that perceptions are in chunks (gestalts). I do not think gestalt theory goes down to an elemental seeing that is somehow prior to perception. Kind Regards Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 8/27/02 6:11:02 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > Dear Howard, > > Each moment of seeing is vipaka - the result of either > > kusala or akusala kamma from the past. > > Take the example of seeing a very beautiful diamond side by > > side with a piece of dung. In this case the kusala vipaka > > and akusala vipaka moments are alternating rapidly even > > though the seeing may seem to be taking in both at the same > > time. > > Robert > > > ============================== > Thank you for the reply. With regard to my question: << Do we actually > see an entire scene, an undifferentiated color-image, which is then further > processed, with sa~n~na carving out the various "colored areas", or do we, > in fact, directly see individual colors, sequentially, which are subsequently > combined into a "scene" >>, your answer seems to suggest that my second > scenario (of seeing individual "parts" sequentially which are then mentally > combined) is closer to the Abhidhammic understanding. Interestingly (to me > ;-), my *first* scenario seems more intuitive, but, then, all our errors seem > quite intuitive! ;-)) > > With metta, > Howard 15266 From: ashkenn2k Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 9:39pm Subject: Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi Kom and Rob M After revisiting this topic, I would to say to Kom that this is a wonderful piece of article. Rob M - I think we should stick to the ancient commentaries. If everyone start their own opinions into the sutta, the meaning of it will not be authentic and worse may affect the original meaning of the sutta. And imagine what will happen in another ten generations. Everyone could opinion on the Buddhist sutta but it is dangerous. I feel unless one is an Arahat, we should refrain from opinioning on a sutta less aside citing facts from ancient commentaries. I think Kom has put a very good point > "Metta is a "solvent" that "melts" not only one's own > psychic pollutants of angers..., but also those of > others...". I found this to be quite dangerous to simply > believe in . We can see the effects of metta in one's own > mind, but how do we see it in others except through > bodily/verbal expressions and inferences? Making a jump to > this conclusion, and to develop metta so that it "melts" > other people's resentment is a dangerous belief. I am not > saying that this isn't true, but one should take this > carefully... > > The ultimate purpose of metta is to attain transcental > insight. I again am not sure how he comes to this > conclusion. Metta development and samatha bhavana's > ultimate goal is to reside in the devine abode. Only the > path and satipatthana can brings one to the "transcental > insight". His conclusion that metta development brings > about "holding no more to wrong beliefs" are simply not > supported in the commentaries, where it appears that the > Buddha explicitly added the last 4 stanzas to correct the > normal mich-dithi that can come with samatha bhavana: the > wrong view of permanence. kind regards Ken O 15267 From: Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 9:44pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Thanks Rob, Larry ----------------------- Rob: "Larry, in response to your message below, I found the following site which gives a biography and bibliography of Ledi Sayadaw. http://www.ubakhin.com/ledi/biograph.htm I downloaded the ten english language publications available from this site but, after a very, very quick scan, did not find a detailed analysis of the thought process as I had hoped. I will review the materials more carefully. Thanks, Rob M :-)" 15268 From: robmoult Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 10:49pm Subject: Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi Kom (and others); I would like to reiterate my appreciation and admiration on your research. I agree that we should, as much as possible, limit ourselves to the Suttas and ancient commentaries. On the other hand, I am sure that five years after the Vissudhimagga was written, some contemporaries dismissed it as "revolutionary, not fully supported by the Suttas". It is amazing how much authority a few centuries can give :-) I think that I have a way of addressing this problem with my class notes. I will add an extended footnote at the beginning of this section warning the reader that not all of the author's positions can be supported by the Suttas or ancient commentaries. Please let me know if there are any other "offending sections" in my Class Notes. Again, I ask anybody to propose changes the Class Notes to ensure that they do not lead to "wrong views". Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: To answer your question on why only the lowest two Deva realms interact with humans, it was due to proximity (both physical and mental). Again, no supporting references to Suttas or commentaries provided. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "ashkenn2k" wrote: > Hi Kom and Rob M > > After revisiting this topic, I would to say to Kom that this is a > wonderful piece of article. > > Rob M - I think we should stick to the ancient commentaries. If > everyone start their own opinions into the sutta, the meaning of it > will not be authentic and worse may affect the original meaning of > the sutta. And imagine what will happen in another ten generations. > Everyone could opinion on the Buddhist sutta but it is dangerous. I > feel unless one is an Arahat, we should refrain from opinioning on a > sutta less aside citing facts from ancient commentaries. > > I think Kom has put a very good point > > > "Metta is a "solvent" that "melts" not only one's own > > psychic pollutants of angers..., but also those of > > others...". I found this to be quite dangerous to simply > > believe in . We can see the effects of metta in one's own > > mind, but how do we see it in others except through > > bodily/verbal expressions and inferences? Making a jump to > > this conclusion, and to develop metta so that it "melts" > > other people's resentment is a dangerous belief. I am not > > saying that this isn't true, but one should take this > > carefully... > > > > The ultimate purpose of metta is to attain transcental > > insight. I again am not sure how he comes to this > > conclusion. Metta development and samatha bhavana's > > ultimate goal is to reside in the devine abode. Only the > > path and satipatthana can brings one to the "transcental > > insight". His conclusion that metta development brings > > about "holding no more to wrong beliefs" are simply not > > supported in the commentaries, where it appears that the > > Buddha explicitly added the last 4 stanzas to correct the > > normal mich-dithi that can come with samatha bhavana: the > > wrong view of permanence. > > > kind regards > Ken O 15269 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 11:10pm Subject: [dsg] Re: A Question on Visual Image Processing --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 8/27/02 6:11:02 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > Dear Howard, > > Each moment of seeing is vipaka - the result of either > > kusala or akusala kamma from the past. > > Take the example of seeing a very beautiful diamond side by > > side with a piece of dung. In this case the kusala vipaka > > and akusala vipaka moments are alternating rapidly even > > though the seeing may seem to be taking in both at the same > > time. > > Robert > > > ============================== > Thank you for the reply. With regard to my question: << Do we actually > see an entire scene, an undifferentiated color-image, which is then further > processed, with sa~n~na carving out the various "colored areas", or do we, > in fact, directly see individual colors, sequentially, which are subsequently > combined into a "scene" >>, your answer seems to suggest that my second > scenario (of seeing individual "parts" sequentially which are then mentally > combined) is closer to the Abhidhammic understanding. Interestingly (to me > ;-), my *first* scenario seems more intuitive, but, then, all our errors seem > quite intuitive! ;-)) > > With metta, > Howard > ======== Dear Howard, Perhaps you can think of it as a middle path between your original statement in that many colours or shades of colours may comprise one visible object (e.g. the diamond). Sometimes seeing may take a complete face as visible object, at other moments a tiny feature of the face- depending different conditions. Robert 15270 From: The Last Bard Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 11:20pm Subject: Re : Was sariputta capable of lying? dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com From: "robmoult" | This is Spam | Add to Address Book Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2002 22:24:52 -0000 Subject: Re: [dsg] Was Sariputta capable of lying? Hi Bard, I considered that option, but rejected it on two counts: - It puts Sariputta in the category of lawyers and an ex-President - The conditions for "false speech" are as follows: 1. An untrue thing 2. Intention to deceive 3. Corresponding effort 4. Other person believes untruth In this story, all of these conditions are met, so Sariputta technically told a lie.// Hmm, interesting, but this puts to question. A) Was it an untrue thing? Since the Sariputta Never actually told him anything. (Lie or other-wise) but had the man come to his own conclusion, how could one lie? B) The intention was there, oddly enough. C) Effort, he really never pointed him in any direction, instead he just gave him foundation questions... D) Again, is this un-true? Each person comes to their own conclusions. There was never a solid statement in the tale that the Sariputta said, it was all the Executioner. ===== The Phoenix is the only thing that rises and does not descend, and while everything changes. Nothing is truly lost. 15271 From: dark knight Date: Tue Aug 27, 2002 11:33pm Subject: Re:Re: Hi Hi Sarah, Thanks for giving me a warm welcome to this group. The topics discussed in this forum are very interesting. I am sure to benefit from these discussions. Regarding myself, I hail from a state at the southern most tip of India, called Kerala, famous for it's landscapes and greenery. I am doing a PhD in Chemical Engineering. I was exposed to many spiritual/religious schools early in my life. But only when I heard the Buddhas words, I got a glimpse of what all others were trying to say, and which Buddha clearly said. It is sad that it is difficult to come across His original words in India now.I was first introduced to His words through the book "Old Paths White Clouds" by Ven. Thich Nat Hanh. Luckily me and a friend of mine found a Theravada monastry in my city (which is a rarity in India now) , the Maha Bodhi Soceity founded by Ven. Acharya Buddharakkhita. There I found many books of many great seers of this path. I can only claim that I have had just an introduction to the great message of the Buddha. I intend to practice sincerily and understand the Dhamma as much as I can in this life. Thanks once again for welcoming me into this group were I can find like-minded people. With Metta , Krishnan. From: Sarah Subject: Re: Hi ! Hi Krishnan, Welcome to DSG and like you, I think we're all very fortunate to have a chance to read and learn more here. We'll look forward to any of your comments or questions. I don't think there are any other active members from India and I'd be glad to hear whereabouts you're from sometime and anything else you care to share about how you became interested in Buddhism. Best wishes, Sarah 15272 From: kenhowardau Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 0:03am Subject: [dsg] Re: Perversions, to Rob and Ken Dear Nina, Instead of posting a simple `thank you,' I decided to take the time to come up with some intelligent questions. But the more I think about what you have told me, the happier I am with it - thank you. Kind regards Ken H --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Robert K and Ken H, > Ken: When you say it doesn't arise often, do you mean only > >> once or twice per day or do you mean only once or > >> twice per milli-second? > >> > >> Millions of paramattha dhammas come and go in the > >> blink of an eye; I had assumed that there would be > >> conditions for just about all of them to appear in > >> that time, some in more significant proportions than > >> others, of course. Have I picked up a wrong > >> impression there? > Nina: So long as we are not sotapannas, we still have the latent tendency of > wrong view. It can condition its arising together with lobha-mula- citta at > any time. Panna has to be keen to discern it, and also, we have to be very > sincere, we need the perfection of truthfulness. There can easily be the > form of ditthi which is wrong practice. For example, when we take thinking > of nama and rupa for right mindfulness. Are we trying to have mindfulness, > just a little trying, or do we imagine that when in a Dhamma situation with > Dhamma discussions, there is more mindfulness? Do we want more? Do we want > to promote sati? We cannot catch the moments of ditthi, nor could we ever > count them. We know ditthi is bound to arise, but it depends on panna > whether such moments are known as only nama. Otherwise we get stuck. > Best wishes from Nina. 15273 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 0:09am Subject: Robert Ep's threads... Dear Friends: I am having trouble reading through all the posts, and want to keep up with the threads I'm involved in. If you would be kind enough to put my name in the header when a post is directed to me, I would be grateful. I am going to have to focus on a few threads at a time at this point. I really enjoy the high-quality discussions here, and the seriousness [and humor] of everyone here. I'll try to keep up as best I can. Thanks, Robert Ep. 15274 From: kenhowardau Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 0:10am Subject: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Howard, Just as Shakespeare's Hamlet knew that something was `rotten in the state of Denmark,' so too, you and I are aware of our own ignorance. Hamlet's reaction was: "Oh curs'ed spite, That ever I was born to set it right." That's the way you we would all feel if the Buddha hadn't taught that the `setting right' was done by paramattha dhammas, realities that are devoid of self. Unfortunately, there is an adulterated form of the Dhamma, a Dhamma without Abhidhamma, that propounds a [temporary] self who can, and should, set things right. On other lists, more so than on dsg, we see opinions on how `we temporary beings' should be doing the hard yards; we should be sitting for hours painfully cross-legged, we should be renouncing our favourite pastimes, we should be ever vigilant, etc., etc.; in short, we have an obligation to `go out there and get enlightened!' (Considering the magnitude of that obligation, Hamlet had it easy.) If we feel obligated by the Buddha's teaching, then we are doing him a disservice. He offered the Middle Way as a perfect gift, "lovely at the beginning, lovely in the middle and lovely at the end;"* let's accept it. :-) Kind regards Ken H *Chachakka-sutta --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Ken - > > > Remember, I was responding to Stephen's assertion that > > the Buddha taught methods. With my `fundamentalist' > > outlook, I could only concede `Buddhist methods' in so > > far as they referred to real (not illusory), > > activities. > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Then the Buddha never taught anyone anything at all unless they were > already ariyans, although how they became ariyans is a mystery - good luck, I > guess. > ------------------------------------------------------- > If panna conditions right effort and> > > other right cetasikas to arise with it, then I suppose > > that's a method. If panna is accumulated in all > > subsequent cittas, to condition the recurrence of > > panna (the cetasika), when all the conditions allow, > > then that might be a method too. Sorry if I'm > > stretching things a bit far, there. :-) > > ------------------------------------------------------ > > ----------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > What you seem to be saying is that ariyans appear randomly, and that > there is no "need" for Buddhas, because there is no practice. What will > happen, will happen - somehow. > ----------------------------------------------------------------- snip 15275 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 0:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Questioning Arahants and Abhidhamma --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Is the Abhidhamma truth, and is it the explanation of reality? If > not - what are all of us on dsg doing - Which of us has the precious > time in this uncertain life to be living in a 'Let's Pretend' Land > of imagination, delighting in intellectual games and duelling with > abstractions? Dear Christine, Thanks for your honest questions. If we can't express our doubts and uncertainties as well as understandings, we can't get very far or really clear up those doubts. I hope we aren't going to go around feeling that where we really are on the path is somehow unacceptable to others, this subject is too important, so I'm glad you brought it out in this group. I do not consider myself an Abhidhammist, and I'm sure you can tell from my posts that I have doubts about some of the formulations of Abhidhamma. But I also have great respect for the analysis of reality that Abhidhamma puts forward, and to the seriousness of its practitioners. I have learned a lot about Theravada in general by being in this group, and I feel the support and friendship of its members. That's a lot. Remember, the name of this group is 'dhamma' study group. It is for anyone who has a sincere dedication to understanding and applying the Buddha's teaching, as expressed in the Pali Canon. Though the group is heavily focussed on issues of Abhidhamma, I have been assured on repeated occasions that there is no requirement to accept or believe any particular doctrine in order to participate. I hope that through being challenged by the knowledge and understanding of others here, and by challenging what doesn't make sense to me, that I am involved in a dialogue that helps clarify the teachings for all of us. It's a long process. And I have found that the good people here, at least 25% of which seem to be strong dissenters from Abhidhamma, make a very strong community in which to consider the dhamma. Don't worry about your own beliefs and whether they match those of others. Keep investigating for yourself, and I would say, enjoy the company of your spiritual friends here, whether you always agree with them or not. It's a long path and we have to do a lot of it alone, but I for one appreciate the company. Best, Robert Ep. 15276 From: Sarah Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 0:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] Robert Ep's threads... Hi Rob Ep, --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Friends: > I am having trouble reading through all the posts, and want to keep up > with the > threads I'm involved in. If you would be kind enough to put my name in > the header > when a post is directed to me, I would be grateful. ..... Just take it for granted that every post I write is for you;-)) so if you see my name as the sender, regardless of the subject matter, it means it's to be read;-)) I realize everyone else may jump on the bandwaggon and say the same..... Seriously, I appreciated a couple of posts you wrote on anatta while we were away and I hope you read the post I wrote yesterday on right and wrong jhana factors....... Even more seriously, why not find something else in your life that can be given up relatively easily (eg other lists, TV, sleep-ins, a meal or two) to give ALL the posts the attention they deserve??? I might also remind you that Christine has relieved you of your duties as Keeper of the Photo Album, so that clears a bit more time too;-) Always good to see you around, Rob, and we all understand, even if we forget to obey;-) Sarah ===== 15277 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 0:37am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Duration of Dhammas --- egberdina wrote: > Hi Howard and everybody, > > My two pennies worth :-) > > There are no absolute measurements. Measures of size...require at least one other > point of reference. So that would > negate the possibility of any kind of measured state being a > paramattha dhamma. Herman, Are you talking about enlarging the penis again? You've got to let that ad go! Robert Ep. P.S. It really does work! : ) 15278 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 0:54am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert (and Kenneth) - > > In a message dated 8/25/02 2:01:10 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > > Hi Christine, > > > > > > To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of > > > Buddhism. It always leads to difficult questions, > > > like "is there a free will and if there is no free > > > will how do we practise in the first place." > > > > > > Pple who believe in no free will is I said b4 a few > > > months ago is extremist. > > > > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. Not = no. No self. > > > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, there are differences of opinion among scholars and among real > Buddhists (just kidding, any Buddhist scholars out there!) on that. Some say > that 'anatta' is just an adjective meaning 'not self' in the sense of > 'impersonal' and 'insubstantial' which gets applied to all dhammas and thus, > to me, inasmuch as all dhammas are all there is, implies that there is *no* > self - but, somehow, not everyone agrees with that last conclusion. Hi Howard. Yeah, I'm not absolutely sure about how anatta applies to the personal self. I think your logic is good if you go the 'dhamma = anatta' route, and when you come around to the human object, it can't have a self either. I believe that consciousness, like all the kandhas, also has anatta applied to it, although I vaguely recall some of the higher factors such as panna not having anatta apply to it? Can't remember how that works. I wish my mind were more highly functional! The way I tend to apply anatta to the 'self' is to see that 'self' is only a concept, rather than a reality. This is I guess a product of consciousness and is different than looking at the objects of clinging and seeing that they are unsatisfactory, impermanent and not really connected to one. This idea that objects are 'not self' in the sense of these three characteristics is arcane in a way, as though the Buddha were really saying to detach from objects of clinging, rather than really defining them as 'not having a self' in their own right. It makes me think that the idea of something being 'not of the self' had a different sense to it at the time of the Buddha's preaching than it does for us now. > -------------------------------------------------- > Atta is > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You can argue that > > anatta is > > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's personal self, but if > > that is > > the case there is really no difference between Hinduism and Buddhism. > > Hinduism > > also teaches total non-clinging and non-identification with external > > objects of > > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of the mind leads to > > cessation of > > the continued round of birth and death. The non-existence of Atta or Atman > > [the > > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] is the radical > > difference > > between most schools of Hinduism and all of Buddhism. > > > > Remember there is always a > > > choice. > > > > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a different moment right now? > > Or do > > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? Answer according to > > your > > actual experience, and you will have a hard time finding where you can > > choose. In > > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? When you make the final > > decision, is there some way in which you finally decide, or does it just > > happen > > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is actually an illogical > > conceptual > > construct. > > > > If there is no choice, the power to choose > > > then Budhha will be wasting his time teaching us. We > > > might as well sit below the bodhi tree and do nothing > > > :). > > > > who's to say that's not the right thing to do? > > > > > I don't understand why free will must be associated > > > with a self. > > > > If there is no self, who needs the concept of free will? Who chooses > > freely? > > When consciousness arises and engages in an act it is spontaneous. Where's > > the > > will? It is unnecessary to postulate 'will' unless one wants to add a > > separate > > moment in which the self makes a separate decision about what to do. If > > there is > > only consciousness arising there is not only no free will, but will itself > > is > > redundant of the act of consciousness itself. If the will to do x or y > > arises in > > the moment as it is acted upon with no intervening self, it does not make > > much > > sense to talk about whether it is 'willed' or not, since there is nothing > > else > > that could possibly be taking place, and there is no decision of any kind. > > --------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't understand the notion of *free* will, but volition (cetana) is > admitted by the Buddha in the Sutta Pitaka (it is the chief sankhara) and > most certainly it is countenanced in the Abhidhamma. Evidently, cetana serves > as kind of a needed motive force (but only in the sense of a necessary > condition, not as a substantial "force"). Well, I may be splitting hairs but I am more comfortable with 'volition' than 'will' or especially 'free will'. Free will especially seems to me to be a conceptual construct, since free and conditional are extremes to each other. What would a choice have to be to be truly 'free'? When you start talking about free will in that way you really are neck deep into concepts. If you talk about volition, that means to me that there is a desire to do something. That to me is much less implicative of a 'self' that is making a decision. Volition, the desire to do something or the intent to do something can arise as a product of consciousness and not necessarily imply the existence of a separate self-entity who is working it all out. Whereas 'free will' definitely implies that there is 'someone' who is free from conditions. So that would be my main distinction. It seems to be the vehicle by which > craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma. (In > the case of an arahant, the cetana is replaced by a kind of neutral > functional consciousness (kiriya citta) expressing neutral chanda and which > is condition for an ensuing kammically neutral action.) In fact, cetana (and > kiriya citta for an arahant) seems to be close to synonymous with 'chanda'. > Nyanatiloka defines cetana as follows: > > > cetaná: 'volition', will, is one of the seven mental factors (cetasika, > > q.v.) inseparably bound up with all consciousness, namely sensorial or > > mental impression (phassa), feeling (vedaná), perception (saññá), volition > > (cetaná), concentration (samádhi), vitality (jívita), advertence > > (manasikára). Cf. Tab. II, III. > > Now, I myself have, from time to time, puzzled over the "need" for > cetana, inasmuch it only arises when the conditions for its arising have all > appeared. (Why not go directly from those conditions to the action, without > the intervening cetana?) But this question could arise for *every* link in a > "causal stream" - it seems that links cannot be skipped. It seems to me that > conditionality is a far more complex matter than we think, a much deeper one. > As a matter of fact, our notion of 'causal stream' as the direct source of > causality is faulty. The reality is probably closer to a causal network which > is a complex confluence of causal streams inasmuch as no dhamma arises with a > single precondition. I think this makes sense, and a moment of volition that arises from a confluence of other conditions does not imply a self or actor; it is part of the analysis of what arises in consiousness; cittas and cetasikas, and therefore is much more embedded in the whole analysis of co-dependent origination. You would have to say that if you tried to install 'free will' in the middle of a causal chain, it would break the chain. Because there is no possibility of 'free' will being codependently arisen with anything. To be free, it has to be self-initiating, and that is why I find it particularly pernicious in terms of Buddhist analysis, a mental construct that obstructs understanding of the nature of cause and effect. Best, Robert Ep. 15279 From: Sarah Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 1:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi Rob M, Always great to see your questions, enthusiasm for dhamma and comments from your classes. The following are just a few personal comments on a subject I know very little about;-) --- robmoult wrote: > Hi All, > > Does anybody know where I can find out more about the operation of > the various cittas in the thought process? ..... I think most the texts like Abhid.Sangaha and books like ADL have been mentioned. It’s a bit like a jigsaw puzzle and as Chris said, often a matter of considering bits from here and there, I find. I never try to remember the details, but with a little reflection and logic, some pieces become a little clearer. ..... > Let me take the "Determining" citta as an example. As I look through > Bhikkhu Bodhi's "Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma", there are ten > entries in the index where this citta is referenced. I have looked > at them all, but at the end almost nothing is said about the > operation of this citta. It says in the text that this > citta, "determines / defines / discriminates". What does this really > mean? What influences the function? What cetasikas are prominent > during this stage? How to describe the state of mind before and > after this citta? Does this citta behave differently in the thought > process of an arahant? How about in jhanic states? I have similar > questions about each of the cittas in the thought process. ..... These are not easy questions.Let me tell you what I consider when I read these kinds of questions: Firstly, for others who don’t know what we’re talking about, in a sense door process, after the bhavanga cittas (life continuum consciousness), there is the sense door consciousness such as seeing or hearing, followed by the receiving consciousnes, the investigating consciousnes and then the determining consciousness you refer to (votthapanna citta) before the javana cittas which are wholesome or unwholesome. Finally there are the registering consciousness. All these cittas have the same object such as a visible object or sound. Back to the “Determining” citta and your qus: -The votthapana (determining) citta arises in the sense door process before the javana cittas as indicated -It is actually the mind-door adverting citta which performs this function of ‘determining’ in the sense door. -It’s a kiriya citta. This means it’s not a ‘result’ citta like seeing or hearing and it’s not a ‘cause’ citta like the kusala and akusala cittas in the javana process.It is ‘inoperative’. -It determines the object after it’s seen or heard and it will then depend on our accumulations as to whether kusala or akusala cittas follow. Without this ‘determining’ the others couldn’t perform their tasks. -It is ahetuka, without roots and this means that it is not accompanied by any of the akusala or sobhana cetasikas. So there’s no liking or disliking at this stage.There cannot be panna, even for an arahat and so on. - All cittas are accompanied by the ‘universal cetasikas’, so it has to be accompanied by phassa (contact), vedana (feeling). sanna (perception), cetana (intention), ekaggata (concentration), jivitindriya (vitality) and manasikara (attention). It will also be accompanied by some of the ‘particulars’ such as vitakka (applied thinking) and vicara (sustained thinking), which accompany all but the dvi-panca vinnanas (seeing, hearing etc) in the sense realms. It will also, I think, be accompanied by viriya (energy) and adhimokkha (determination), but not by piti(entusiasm) or chanda (zeal) I believe.I don’t think we could say any cetasikas are predominant as they are in a javana process. They are ‘inoperative’like the citta.I assume the feeling must be neutral, - with regard to what influences the function, the answer would have to be the interplay of various paccaya (conditions). If there were not the sense consciousness and other cittas in the process, ther would not be the determining consciousness. If there were not the eye base and visible object and contact, there would not be the adverting consciousness and seeing consciousness at the beginning of the process. -This is a ‘rootless’ citta and so I don’t understand that there could be any difference in its nature or function in the arahat. -As for the state of mind before and after...before are the preceding sense door consciousness cittas and after are the javana cittas. -In jhana states there is no sense door experience and so I don’t see that there would be these cittas. -I don’t expect this citta to ever be known directly, but by understanding these details, as Num replied to another question, it helps to understand more about the complexity of citta, of conditions and to eliminate wrong views. For example, we learn how short are the moments of seeing and hearing and how happiness or anger on accouny of what is seen or heard also only last for a few moments. In between are other cittas such as these and in between the processes are bhavanga cittas. The details helps us to understand realities as elements and not self. We can also see how even for an arahat, there can be panna arising at each moment and so on. ..... > I think of each of the cittas in the thought process as a "black > box", each with an incoming "state of mind", various influencing > parameters, modes of operation, a transformation process, and an > outgoing "state of mind". I am looking for a resource that provides > details on each citta in the thought process. Does such a resource > exist? > > Or am I asking one of those questions that should not be asked? ..... I’d be interested to know why this particular citta is of special interest or whether it’s just an example. Any questions are valid. Perhaps ‘determining’ is confusing, because in a sense, the real determining is done by the kusala and akusala cittas which ‘determine’ any kamma patha and accumulations for the future, but it’s a little beyond me;-) It certainly can be helpful to know the jati (nature), the function and so on. Each citta and accompanying cetasikas are conditioned by so many factors to be just the way they are and in turn, condition other states. We can just glimpse a little but only a Buddha will really understand all the intricacies of conditions. Just a few ideas......I’ll rely on others to let me know if there are any errors here. I apologise for usually running late on your threads. Sarah ===== 15280 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 2:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi Sarah, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > I'd be interested to know why this particular citta is of special interest > or whether it's just an example. I am interested in all cittas in the thought process (in preparation for my upcoming class on September 15), but this particular citta is of special interest to me because, according to Narada's "Manual of Abhidhamma", this is where free will is exercised. This is the one citta between the vipaka and the kamma parts of the thought process. I believe that this is where "wise attention" (Yoniso Manasikara) is applied. I therefore suspect that attention (Manasikara) might be the predominant cetasika. I am particularly keen to understand how past accumulations arise and impact the "decision making process" at this point. I liked your summary of points on this citta and would like to add one: - The thought process for a "slight object" can terminate with either two or three determining cittas (no javana cittas). This process does not create kamma. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15281 From: Sarah Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 3:32am Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi Rob M, --- robmoult wrote: > I am interested in all cittas in the thought process (in preparation > for my upcoming class on September 15), but this particular citta is > of special interest to me because, according to Narada's "Manual of > Abhidhamma", this is where free will is exercised. This is the one > citta between the vipaka and the kamma parts of the thought process. > I believe that this is where "wise attention" (Yoniso Manasikara) is > applied. .... Now I get your interest and seem to remember you mentioning this point which I’d forgotten. O.K., let me add a little more about manasikara (attention). As we know, this is a universal cetasika arising with every citta -kusala, akusala, vipaka and kiriya. It ‘turns’ or ‘controls’ the citta to the object. It has it’s own function which joins seeing to visible object or thinking to concept or determining consciousness to whatever object is being experienced in the sense door process. “It has the characteristic of driving associated states towards the object, the function of joining (yoking) associated states to the object...”Vism. It cannot be ‘wise attention’ however, unless it accompanies a sobhana citta in the javana series. Likewise, it cannot be ‘unwise attention’ (ayoniso manasikara) unless it accompanies an akusala citta. With regard to ‘free will’, this has been discussed quite a lot in our absence;-))). I’ve just fished out a quote I liked that Andrew gave from an article by B.Dhammapala: “......Just as there is no entity like the world to be either eternal or not, for the world is only a passing process of unsubstantial phenomena to which such attributes are not applicable - so there is no entity like a will to be either determined or free, for the will is only a process of willing which arises and passes away in dependence on arising and passing conditions and which, therefore, can be neither determined nor free.” ..... Cetana cetasika(intention) also arises with each citta, but again it is only in the javana series that it can perform the function of kamma: “The function of ‘willing’ is only in moral (kusala) and immoral (akusala) states.....It has directing as manifestation, like the chief disciple, the chief carpenter, etc who fulfil their own and others’ duties.” Atthasalini. In conclusion, I think ‘free-will’ is misleading in any context and as a translation of vottapana citta is unhelpful. I’m thinking of the question you were asked in the Chinese restaurant about the core ‘belief’. I don’t think any ‘belief’ is necessary, but would suggest the understanding of anatta is the core essential teaching. With a little understanding of anatta, there is no question of freewill arising at any point in the process as B.Dhammapala points out. ..... >I therefore suspect that attention (Manasikara) might be > the predominant cetasika. I am particularly keen to understand how > past accumulations arise and impact the "decision making process" at > this point. ..... These would be more apparent during the javana process and in particular with moments of thinking in the mind-door process. That’s another thread. ..... > I liked your summary of points on this citta and would like to add > one: > - The thought process for a "slight object" can terminate with > either two or three determining cittas (no javana cittas). This > process does not create kamma. .... Thank you.....I didn’t know this. I think we should call it the sense-door process (rather than thought process) so as not to confuse it with the mind-door process. I admire your interest and willingness to explore this difficult areas and I know you are encouraging us all with your Abhidhamma studies. Time to rush and join Jon for an evening walk;-) Sarah ===== 15282 From: egberdina Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 4:20am Subject: Re: Duration of Dhammas (directed at Robert Epstein) Dear Robert Epstein, I always enjoy your posts, but this one has been extremely valuable indeed. It turns out I'm not an arahant, because after reading your post, there was more than just the slightly upturned corner of the lip. And some gutteral sounds emanated from my belly region. Looks like I've got a way to go. Good one :-) :-) Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- egberdina wrote: > > Hi Howard and everybody, > > > > My two pennies worth :-) > > > > There are no absolute measurements. Measures of size...require at least one > other > > point of reference. So that would > > negate the possibility of any kind of measured state being a > > paramattha dhamma. > > Herman, > Are you talking about enlarging the penis again? You've got to let that ad go! > > Robert Ep. > > P.S. It really does work! : ) 15283 From: Sarah Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 5:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Rob M, A typo I wish to correct in my first post to you in case of any confusion: >....... We can also see how > even for an arahat, there can be panna arising at each moment and so on. should read: CANNOT be panna..........etc (The ahetuka (rootless) vipaka cittas (result) and ahetuka kiriya cittas (inoperative), such as the determining consciousness being discussed, cannot be accompanied by the sobhana (beautiful) mental factors.) S. p.s.Your questions and some of your comments about why you have an interest in this area have really helped me to understand why it's important to know some of these details as otherwise it's easy to follow a wrong track. 15284 From: frank kuan Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 6:58am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Not sure who was saying this, so in addition to rudely butting in, I'll rudely address the anonymous speaker without referencing a proper name. Speaker won't mind probably because of anatta, and because of anatta, I'm not actually that rude. Yeah, that's the ticket. Rationalize the rudeness. > since free [will] and conditional [will] are > extremes to each other. What > would a choice have to be to be truly 'free'? When > you start talking about free > will in that way you really are neck deep into > concepts. Absolute free will and completely deterministic fate are more like extremes of each other. Conditional will (or volition if that word suits you better) simply says to me that there is a relative degree of free will dependent on conditions that allows options. Without this relative free will, how would escape from samsara be possible? -fk p.s. "Free will" is nothing compared to my favorite pet peeve, the bogus expression "unconditional love". Especially romantic lovers who use it to describe their exclusive, defiled, "romantic" love which is just dripping with stipulations, conditions, delusion. Even Mother Theresa's love (while admirable in many ways) is not unconditional love. Even a master of jhana radiating metta and suffusing the whole world in loving kindness is not generating unconditional love, but at least it's close, or as close as anyone can get. Whenever someone says "unconditional love", a "specific aversion" arises in my mind. Why not "noble love", or "higher love"? The inability for humans to use language in a realistic way just shows how deep the grip of delusion binds. "unconditional love"... To me, that phrase is much more offensive than the crudest slang. You could walk up to me right now and say, "Shut up shithead", and I'll look back at you with an equanimous expression. But speak of "unconditional love", and I'm going to show you some "unconditional" slapping upside the head. 15285 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 7:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi Sarah, Please don't be so hard on "Free Will". It was "Free Will" that brought us together !! :-) When we met in HK, you asked how I discovered the DSG. I told you that it was as a result of a web search. I had typed Abhidhamma "Free Will" into Google search engine and the first entry was a DSG discussion from early December 2001. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15286 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 7:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Stephen Let me try and respond on the rest of your post to Christine and me. --- oreznoone@a... wrote: ... <> I kind of see what you are saying, but I wonder if it would help to discuss separately vohara sacca and paramattha sacca as one topic, and paramattha dhamma and samutti dhamma as another. To my understanding, vohara sacca refers to truths expressed in conventional terms, that is, what is said is in accordance with dhamma and carries no *necessary* implication of, for example, permanence or self. Conventional speech is appropriate for referring to the world in conceptual terms. No-one here is saying that conventional speech is wrong, or is to be avoided (unless of course it's wrong speech) or is to be abandoned/overcome (enlightened beings still converse in conventional terms). However, the teachings are continually pointing us to the understanding that the world is other than the way we perceive it, that what we take for the world is in reality (a limited number of) dhammas none of which were apparent to us until pointed out through the teachings. These dhammas are the 'paramattha dhammas', and they are to be distinguished from the samutti dhammas (concepts) that otherwise occupy us. You say that paramattha dhammas involve a 'denial of conception'. I don' think this is so, at least to my understanding. The distinction between paramattha dhammas and samutti dhammas is made for the purpose of explaining that it is the understanding of the true nature of paramattha dhammas (not of samutti dhammas) that constitutes the insight that leads to enlightenment. But this in no way involves a denial of conception as such. <<>...whenever the suttas speak of man, woman, or person...this must not be taken as >being valid in the ultimate sense, but as a mere conventional mode of speech. [Nyanatiloka] This is wrong, as noted above, and contradicts MN sutta 58. "Not valid" can only mean incorrect, untrue. In the sutta the Buddha discusses un/true or in/correct (T of F), un/benefical (B or U), and un/welcome or dis/agreeable statements(A or D). This gives 8 permutations: 1. T B D 2. T B A 3. T U D 4. T U A 5. F B D 6. F B A 7. F U D 8. F U A He then sequentially eliminates 7, then 3, accepts 1 at it's proper time, eliminates 8, then 4, concluding 'yes' on 2. 5 and 6, statements false and beneficial, aren't even considered; I take this to mean that there are none such. Sammuti would fall into one of these types (in fact, a species of upaya, in the Mahayana sense of skillful use of falsehood). The Buddha rejected the entire notion.>> I think that what Ven. Nyanatiloka is talking about in the passage quoted above and the sutta at MN58 are about two different things. I believe it is quite correct to say that the Buddha in referring to man, person, etc was using conventional terms, not ultimate terms, i.e., that what he says is 'valid' even though in ultimate terms there is no man, person etc. This, however, does not imply any untruth or inaccuracy on his part. The truth or accuracy of a statement is independent of whether the speaker is talking in conventional or ultimate/absolute terms. So I would not equate the statement 'not ... valid in the ultimate sense' (in the quote from Nyanatiloka) with 'untrue'. MN58 on the other hand deals with the nature or a Buddha's speech. A Buddha will speak only that which is both true and beneficial (he will not speak anything that is true but not beneficial). The sutta further explains that a Buddha may at appropriate times speak what is true and beneficial even though the message is disagreeable to the listener, and gives a simile to explain this. A Buddha's speech could be given in terms of vohara sacca or paramattha sacca, depending on the occasion, but it will always be true and beneficial. <> I couldn't agree more with your last sentiment. Writing it down is a real learning process, I find (much of what I type never makes it to the list!). Looking forward to more discussion. Jon 15287 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 3:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi, Rob (and Nina, Robert, Sarah & Jon, and all others "in the know") - Of the citta types listed below, the last four are: Investigating - Prominent: Perception - Supporting: Initial Application ??? Determining - Prominent: Attention - Supporting: Decision ??? Javana - Prominent: Volition - Supporting: Zest ??? Registration - Prominent: Perception - Supporting: Sustained Application ??? In thinking about our experiencing, most particularly "my own" experiencing (which is all I directly know), it occurs to me that most of it is subliminal. It occurs to me that most of it is below a threshhold at which there is what we normally think of as conscious awareness. In looking at the types of citta you so kindly listed, Rob, the question now occurs to me of whether or to what extent these last four citta types play a role in experience rising to the "level of awareness", to the level of consciousness in the usual, informal sense. Am I onto something here, or way off base? With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/28/02 12:04:01 AM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi All, > > It looks as though this is a tough subject to research. I really > need your help on this one! > > This week, I will go over "Kamma in Dying and Rebirth". Next week, I > will do a review of the past few weeks (all the kusala cetasikas). > On September 15th, I want to review the functions of the universal > cetasikas and I would like to do this by doing a detailed analysis > of the thought process, showing when each of the universal cetasikas > become prominent, when they play a supporting role and when they are > present but dormant. When a universal cetasika is prominent or > supporting, I will use that as an opportunity to describe the nature > of the cetasika and, by extension, the functioning of the thought > process. > > My first pass guess is as follows (I know that there are many > mistakes and I am hoping that somebody can help me): > > Bhavanga > - Prominent: Life Faculty > - Supporting: Energy ??? > > Adverting > - Prominent: Attention > - Supporting: One-Pointedness ??? > > Eye Consciousness > - Prominent: Contact > - Supporting: Initial Application ??? > > Receiving > - Prominent: Feeling > - Supporting: Desire ??? > > Investigating > - Prominent: Perception > - Supporting: Initial Application ??? > > Determining > - Prominent: Attention > - Supporting: Decision ??? > > Javana > - Prominent: Volition > - Supporting: Zest ??? > > Registration > - Prominent: Perception > - Supporting: Sustained Application ??? > > > Larry, in response to your message below, I found the following site > which gives a biography and bibliography of Ledi Sayadaw. > > http://www.ubakhin.com/ledi/biograph.htm > > I downloaded the ten english language publications available from > this site but, after a very, very quick scan, did not find a > detailed analysis of the thought process as I had hoped. I will > review the materials more carefully. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > > Rob, here's a thought. You might poke around in Ledi Sayadaw's > writings. > > If you do, please pass along anything you find in the way of a > > bibliography for him. There are several brief comments by him in "A > > Comprehensive Manual..." which go into unusual depth of the citta > > process. > > > > Larry /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15288 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 7:26am Subject: Inside the Thought Process - Answers? Hi All, I sent the same message as was posted to the DSG to Bro. Teo to ask him which were the primary and secondary cetasiksas in each citta of the thought process. He just came back to me as follows: ========================================= Bhavanga Prominent: life faculty (Jivitindriya) Supporting: kammic energy (sankhara) Adverting Prominent: Attention (manasikara) Support: one pointedness (ekkaggata) Eye consciousness Prominent: contact (phassa) Supporting: attention (manasikara) Receiving Prominent: feeling (vedana) Supporting: Initial application (vitakka) Investigating Prominent: perception (sanna-recall) Supporting: sustained application (vicara) Determining Prominent: attention (yoniso/ayoniso manasikara) Supporting: decision (adhimokkha) Javana Prominent:volition (cetana) Supporting: desire (chanda) and zest (piti) if any Registration Prominent: perception (sanna-marking) Supporting: energy (viriya) This is only a possible answer. It changes according to the object and the actual situation. ========================================= Unless anybody has any major objections, I will work from this list. I gotta find out what book he dug this out of! Whichever one it is, it is not available to be downloaded. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15289 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 3:26am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A Question on Visual Image Processing Thanks, Herman. With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/28/02 12:16:22 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Gestalt psychology also maintains that perceptions are in chunks > (gestalts). I do not think gestalt theory goes down to an elemental > seeing that is somehow prior to perception. > > Kind Regards > > > Herman /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15290 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 3:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi, Ken - In a message dated 8/28/02 12:40:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@y... writes: > Hi Kom and Rob M > > After revisiting this topic, I would to say to Kom that this is a > wonderful piece of article. > > Rob M - I think we should stick to the ancient commentaries. If > everyone start their own opinions into the sutta, the meaning of it > will not be authentic and worse may affect the original meaning of > the sutta. And imagine what will happen in another ten generations. > Everyone could opinion on the Buddhist sutta but it is dangerous. I > feel unless one is an Arahat, we should refrain from opinioning on a > sutta less aside citing facts from ancient commentaries. > > I think Kom has put a very good point > > > "Metta is a "solvent" that "melts" not only one's own > > psychic pollutants of angers..., but also those of > > others...". I found this to be quite dangerous to simply > > believe in . We can see the effects of metta in one's own > > mind, but how do we see it in others except through > > bodily/verbal expressions and inferences? Making a jump to > > this conclusion, and to develop metta so that it "melts" > > other people's resentment is a dangerous belief. I am not > > saying that this isn't true, but one should take this > > carefully... > > > > The ultimate purpose of metta is to attain transcental > > insight. I again am not sure how he comes to this > > conclusion. Metta development and samatha bhavana's > > ultimate goal is to reside in the devine abode. Only the > > path and satipatthana can brings one to the "transcental > > insight". His conclusion that metta development brings > > about "holding no more to wrong beliefs" are simply not > > supported in the commentaries, where it appears that the > > Buddha explicitly added the last 4 stanzas to correct the > > normal mich-dithi that can come with samatha bhavana: the > > wrong view of permanence. > > > kind regards > Ken O > > ============================== I disagree. (Why should I break my stride? ;-)) While I think we would be foolish not to study, mull over, and learn from the commentaries, if we have access to them, I also think that we would be foolish to only consume predigested material. The Kalama Sutta - sorry, there is is again! - warns us not to accept on the basis of authority alone. The key word to me is 'alone'. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15291 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 7:37am Subject: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi Howard, Before attempting an answer, I want to be sure that I understand the question. Let me try to rephrase what you are asking: With millions of cittas arising and falling each microsecond, how can we be "consciously aware" of any of them? Surely, all that we could be "consciously aware" of is an aggregation or a memory of a concept formed by the millions of thought processes. So you are asking what role the investigating / determining / javana / registration cittas play in creating that aggregation or memory. Howard, is this the question that you are asking? Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob (and Nina, Robert, Sarah & Jon, and all others "in the know") - > > Of the citta types listed below, the last four are: > > Investigating > - Prominent: Perception > - Supporting: Initial Application ??? > > Determining > - Prominent: Attention > - Supporting: Decision ??? > > Javana > - Prominent: Volition > - Supporting: Zest ??? > > Registration > - Prominent: Perception > - Supporting: Sustained Application ??? > > In thinking about our experiencing, most particularly "my own" > experiencing (which is all I directly know), it occurs to me that most of it > is subliminal. It occurs to me that most of it is below a threshhold at which > there is what we normally think of as conscious awareness. In looking at the > types of citta you so kindly listed, Rob, the question now occurs to me of > whether or to what extent these last four citta types play a role in > experience rising to the "level of awareness", to the level of consciousness > in the usual, informal sense. Am I onto something here, or way off base? > > With metta, > Howard 15292 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 3:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A Question on Visual Image Processing Hi, Robert - In a message dated 8/28/02 2:11:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Dear Howard, > Perhaps you can think of it as a middle path between your original > statement in that many colours or shades of colours may comprise one > visible object (e.g. the diamond). Sometimes seeing may take a > complete face as visible object, at other moments a tiny feature of > the face- depending different conditions. > Robert > =========================== Okay, thanks. I understand. Actually, what I was thinking of was the following: When we open our eyes, the intitial image that appears, prior to any further processing, appears, in retrospect, to be a single, panoramic image (oval shaped, with indiscernable perimeter) within which no aspects have been identified or even separated out, and this is then quickly worked upon by further functions. Now, that may not, in fact, really be the way matters are at all. Perhaps this panorama is *already* constructed as the result of subliminal processing of thousands of visual scans. I have no clue as to the way the matter really is, and I was curious as to what Abhidhamma says is the reality. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15293 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 4:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Duration of Dhammas Hi, Rob - After years of practice with the consistent application of right effort, the goal has been reached! Done is what needed to be done: I have reached the stage at which I come to see such a post on DSG! ;-))) With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/28/02 3:37:41 AM Eastern Daylight Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > --- egberdina wrote: > > Hi Howard and everybody, > > > > My two pennies worth :-) > > > > There are no absolute measurements. Measures of size...require at least > one > other > > point of reference. So that would > > negate the possibility of any kind of measured state being a > > paramattha dhamma. > > Herman, > Are you talking about enlarging the penis again? You've got to let that ad > go! > > Robert Ep. > > P.S. It really does work! : ) /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15294 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 4:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi, Rob - In a message dated 8/28/02 10:15:30 AM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi Sarah, > > Please don't be so hard on "Free Will". It was "Free Will" that > brought us together !! :-) > > When we met in HK, you asked how I discovered the DSG. I told you > that it was as a result of a web search. > > I had typed > > Abhidhamma "Free Will" > > into Google search engine and the first entry was a DSG discussion > from early December 2001. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > ============================= And why did you type that, Rob? ;-)) For no reason at all? A truly random action? Naaah! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15295 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 4:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi, Rob - In a message dated 8/28/02 10:38:43 AM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > Before attempting an answer, I want to be sure that I understand the > question. Let me try to rephrase what you are asking: > > With millions of cittas arising and falling each microsecond, how > can we be "consciously aware" of any of them? Surely, all that we > could be "consciously aware" of is an aggregation or a memory of a > concept formed by the millions of thought processes. So you are > asking what role the investigating / determining / javana / > registration cittas play in creating that aggregation or memory. > > Howard, is this the question that you are asking? > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > ========================== No, not quite. I didn't make myself clear. It is not being *aware of* cittas that I'm asking about, but rather the matter of levels of "consciousness" (subliminal, fully conscious, and all degrees in between) of the cittas themselves. It seems to me that the great majority of cittas, of mind-moments, operate at subliminal levels, and that the level of conscious experience is maintained by a tiny fraction of our mind-moments - the "tip of the iceberg," if you will. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15296 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 8:58am Subject: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > No, not quite. I didn't make myself clear. It is not being *aware of* > cittas that I'm asking about, but rather the matter of levels of > "consciousness" (subliminal, fully conscious, and all degrees in between) of > the cittas themselves. It seems to me that the great majority of cittas, of > mind-moments, operate at subliminal levels, and that the level of conscious > experience is maintained by a tiny fraction of our mind-moments - the "tip of > the iceberg," if you will. I'm not comfortable with the term "levels of consciousness". There is citta, a paramattha, and everything else is papanca (conceptual proliferation). Do you see it differently? Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: Going to bed now. 15297 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 5:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi, Rob - In a message dated 8/28/02 11:59:18 AM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > Hi Howard, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > No, not quite. I didn't make myself clear. It is not being > *aware of* > > cittas that I'm asking about, but rather the matter of levels of > > "consciousness" (subliminal, fully conscious, and all degrees in > between) of > > the cittas themselves. It seems to me that the great majority of > cittas, of > > mind-moments, operate at subliminal levels, and that the level of > conscious > > experience is maintained by a tiny fraction of our mind-moments - > the "tip of > > the iceberg," if you will. > > I'm not comfortable with the term "levels of consciousness". There > is citta, a paramattha, and everything else is papanca (conceptual > proliferation). > > Do you see it differently? > ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I do. It seems to me that cetasikas occur with varying degrees of intensity or prominence, and that some of these cetasikas, viriya or maniskara for example, may influence what I am probably badly calling the "level of consciousness". ----------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > PS: Going to bed now. > ======================== Sleep well! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15298 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 10:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] A Question on Visual Image Processing op 26-08-2002 19:56 schreef upasaka@a... op upasaka@a...: Hi Howard, Ken H and all, See below: > Howard: I have a question with regard to visual rupas. As I understand the > Abhidhamma on this, what are actually and directly seen are colors and shades > of varying brightness. My question is the following: It seems that we see, at > one shot, a scene, an entire panorama which is composed of areas of varying > colors and brightness. Do we actually see an entire scene, an > undifferentiated color-image, which is then further processed, with sa~n~na > carving out the various "colored areas", or do we, in fact, directly see > individual colors, sequentially, which are subsequently combined into a > "scene". What are the paramattha dhammas here? What elements are primary? Nina:We see neither. I recognize myself in your question, it is what I used to ask A. Sujin: how far does visible object extend? Her only answer: visible object is just what appears through the eyes, that is all. At that time I was not satisfied, and I guess neither will you now. I had to consider more. What is the citta like, when we ask such questions? Thinking, and thinking and thinking. Since one citta only experiences one object, there cannot be seeing while there is thinking, and then we shall never, never know what visible object is. I saw that thinking in that way does not help and I stopped asking such questions. When we see individual colours, there is defining, not seeing. You wrote about impermanence, it seemed that you thought that the Buddha taught change, decay, but not momentary impermanence. However, you mentioned the three sub moments of citta. (Sorry if I misrepresent you, I cannot keep all mails, my computer does not like that.) Only when insight has been developed to higher stages, can we really prove that each dhamma, nama or rupa falls away immediately. And as you know, rupa lasts a little longer (seventeen times longer, but that is by comparison, it is still extremely fast), thus, we can say that rupa falls away immediately. As for now, we can understand intellectually that dhammas fall away extremely fast. It seems at this moment that you see and read at the same time, that you hear sound and know meanings at the same time, that you see and hear at the same time. In fact, they are all different moments. How could two cittas with different objects occur at the same time? But that it appears in that way shows us how fast cittas fall away. You notice decay of the body, but how could there be a change if there is not a change each split second? You had a discussion with Ken H about paramattha dhammas. You seemd to emphasize (sorry if I am mistaken) that the Buddha mostly spoke by way of conventional terms in the Suttas. Do you remember Suan's Post addressed to Joyce and Upasaka Howard? All the Buddha taught was Abhidhamma. I paste part of it: Recently Christine gave us an impressive list of links to many suttas dealing with paramattha dhammas. This confirms what Suan said. In your dialogue with Ken H also came up the question who experiences paramattha dhammas. We experience paramattha dhammas such as visible object or sound all the time, but we do not know them as paramattha dhammas, as realities that have no owner, that are devoid of self. This brings me to another point: you use the word empty, and Ken H had doubts about this. The word is the translation of su~n~natta, and this means empty or void of the self. It is a correct word. See also Middle Length Sayings, III, Division on emptiness, and the suttas of that vagga. Finally, you said that breath is a concept, but see my series on anapana sati, the Co explains that it is rupa. It is rupa conditioned by citta, and as you rightly say, it can be experienced as heat, cold, motion or pressure, hardness or softness. It is tangible object as the Co states. It is known by touch. It is a paramattha dhamma which can be realized as it is by insight: impermanent, dukkha and non-self. Best regards, Nina. 15299 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 10:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] Questioning Arahants and Abhidhamma Dear Christine, If someone has doubts about the truth of the Abhidhamma, this doubt will not be solved by historical arguments. See what is in it, verify what you can. See what the Buddha taught about kusala and akusala. Is this not relevant to your daily life? I do appreciate Herman's post to you: And then Herman's post to Howard: We cannot verify all details and if we try too hard it will be counter productive. Best regards Nina. op 26-08-2002 20:54 schreef christine_forsyth op cforsyth@v...: > >> From my limited understanding of studies on Abhidhamma, I believed > it to be an analysis of the realm of consciousness, a systematisation > of the whole of reality showing the way, from an ethical and > psychological viewpoint, to the liberation from suffering. > > Though I don't understand the Abhidhamma, I > had been taking it on Trust because it was mentioned in Suttas by > the Buddha and the expanded explanations were accepted by the Arahats > in the Councils. But then, another question that arises is 'Who > decides who is an arahat, and what is the extent of their knowledge > on *all* subjects? > Is the Abhidhamma truth, and is it the explanation of reality? If > not - what are all of us on dsg doing 15300 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 10:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Cow's urine Dear Herman, Just now I am reading the Co to the Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship, about the Bhikkhu's contentedness and I was so impressed: Cow's urine was a classic in India. Another passage about dwelling: Now I understand why the Buddha spoke so often about the roots of a tree. Laypeople can also consider fewness of wishes in their own situation. I never considered that a confortable place to live can give rise to heedlessness. It is good to know. Best wishes, Nina. op 27-08-2002 01:31 schreef egberdina op hhofman@t...: > > "A bhikkhu's life depends on fermented urine as medicine. So he > should take fermented urine as medicine and make an effort to > practise dhamma. But there are special allowances: they are ghee, > fresh butter, oil, honey and molasses. Having formally accepted them, > he is to take them as medicine within seven days at most. On the > seventh day he shall give them away. However, he may use them > externally after the seventh day." 15301 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 10:04am Subject: subtle point, to Kom Dear Kom, I have a question for A. Sujin, but only when there is time. The Foundation has made studies of subtle points, and these are in a report. One of these is bodily intimation, kaya vi~n~natti rupa, which is the rupa conditioning the conveying of a meaning through the bodysense, for example through gestures. It is also the body-door of kamma. I read in many passages about the monk who is walking, such as in the Fruits of Recluseship, He does not convey a meaning here, but can we say it is the bodydoor of his kusala kamma since he develops samatha and vipassana while walking? For a long time I have been wondering about this. Do you have the report? If not you could ask Kh Anop. It has many interesting items. Have a very good and fruitful trip with A. Sujin, take good care, Nina. 15302 From: robmoult Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 4:04pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Yes, I do. It seems to me that cetasikas occur with varying degrees of > intensity or prominence, and that some of these cetasikas, viriya or > maniskara for example, may influence what I am probably badly calling the > "level of consciousness". Let us assume that the list of prominent/supporting neutral cetasikas provided by Bro. Teo is correct: Bhavanga Prominent: life faculty (Jivitindriya) Supporting: kammic energy (sankhara) Adverting Prominent: Attention (manasikara) Support: one pointedness (ekkaggata) Eye consciousness Prominent: contact (phassa) Supporting: attention (manasikara) Receiving Prominent: feeling (vedana) Supporting: Initial application (vitakka) Investigating Prominent: perception (sanna-recall) Supporting: sustained application (vicara) Determining Prominent: attention (yoniso/ayoniso manasikara) Supporting: decision (adhimokkha) Javana Prominent:volition (cetana) Supporting: desire (chanda) and zest (piti) if any Registration Prominent: perception (sanna-marking) Supporting: energy (viriya) I think that you are commenting that the cetasikas associated with the last four types of cittas are more "active" than the cetasikas associated with the first four types of cittas. Let's list them out: First Four (Bhavanga / Adverting / Eye Consciousness / Receiving) ================================================================= - life faculty (Jivitindriya) - attention (manasikara) - one pointedness (ekkaggata) - contact (phassa) - feeling (vedana) - initial application (vitakka) Last Four (Investigating / Determining / Javana / Registration) =============================================================== - perception (sanna-recall and sanna-marking) - sustained application (vicara) - attention (yoniso/ayoniso manasikara) - decision (adhimokkha) - volition (cetana) - desire (chanda) - zest (piti) - energy (viriya) - Plus all of the kusala / akusala cetasiskas arising with javana Howard, I think that you are absolutely correct with your observation. If I were to dump all the cetasikas into one of two buckets (active / non-active), it would match the listing above. I intend to point this out during my class! Your intuitive grasp of this topic suggests to me that you were an Abhidhamma scholar in a previous life and therefore you were predestined (no free will) to become part of the DSG! :-) Thanks, Rob M :-) 15303 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 4:07pm Subject: ADL ch. 22 (3) http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 22 (3) Since there are four stages of arupa-jhana, there are four types of arupavacara kusala cittas. They produce vipaka in the form of rebirth in the happy planes of existence which are the arupa-brahma planes. The four types of arupavacara kusala cittas produce four types of arupavacara vipakacittas. Arupavacara vipakacitta can only perform the functions of patisandhi, bhavanga and cuti. There are four types of arupavacara kiriyacittas which are the cittas of the arahats who attain arupa-jhana. Thus, there are twelve arupavacara cittas in all. Summarizing them, they are: 4 arupavacara kusalacittas 4 arupavacara vipakacittas 4 arupavacara kiriyacittas Those who have cultivated jhana can develop the various types of 'direct knowledge' (abhinna; Also translated as 'supernormal powers' or 'higher intellectual powers'.). They should attain the highest stage of rupa-jhana (the fourth or the fifth, according as to whether they follow the fourfold system or the fivefold system) in the kasina meditations, and they should exercise 'complete mind-control in fourteen ways'; for example, the attainment of the jhana stages in the different kasina meditations in order and in reverse order. In developing the 'kinds of direct knowledge' or 'supernormal powers', one's concentration will become more advanced. The 'supernormal powers' (abhinna) are the following: 1. Magical powers such as passing through walls, walking on water, travelling through the air. 2. Divine Ear, by which one hears sounds both heavenly and human, far and near. 3. Knowledge of the minds of other people. 4. Divine Eye, by which one sees the deceasing and rebirth of beings. 5. Remembrance of one's former lives. These are the five 'mundane supernormal powers'. However, there is a sixth power, which is a Iokuttara citta, namely, the eradication of all defilements, when arahatship is attained. The sixth power is the greatest and in order to attain it insight has to be fully developed. Sometimes three kinds of knowledge are mentioned, namely: 1. Remembrance of former lives. 2. Heavenly Eye. 3. Destruction of the the Asavas. Those who have cultivated the right conditions, can achieve 'marvels'. In the 'Gradual Sayings' (Book of the Threes, Ch. VI, par. 60, III, Sangarava) we read about the greatest 'marvel'. The Budda asked the brahmin Sangarava about the topic of conversation of the royal party, when they were together in the palace. The brahmin Sangarava answered that they were talking about the fact that in former times the monks were fewer in number, but those possessed of supernormal powers were more numerous, and that now it was just the opposite. The Buddha said to him: 'Now as to that, brahmin, there are these three marvels. What three? The marvel of more-power, the marvel of thought- reading, the marvel of teaching. And what, brahmin, is the marvel of more-power? In this case a certain one enjoys sorts of more-power in divers ways. From being one he becomes many, from being many he becomes one; manifest or invisible he goes unhindered through a wall, through a rampart, through a mountain, as if through the air; he plunges into the earth and shoots up again as if in water; he walks upon the water without parting it as if on solid ground; he travels through the air sitting cross-legged, like a bird upon the wing; even this moon and sun, though of such mighty power and majesty,-- he handles them and strokes them with his hand; even as far as the Brahma world he has power with his body. This, brahmin, is called 'the marvel of more-power.' And what, brahmin, is the marvel of thought-reading? In this case a certain one can declare by means of a sign 'Thus is your mind. Such and such is your mind. Thus is your consciousness...' And what, brahmin, is the marvel of teaching? In this case a certain one teaches thus: 'Reason thus, not thus. Apply your mind thus, not thus. Abandon this state, acquire that state and abide therein.' This, brahmin, is called 'the marvel of teaching'. So these are the three marvels. Now of these three marvels, which appeals to you as the more wonderful and excellent?' 'Of these marvels, master Gotama, the marvel of more-power...seems to me to be of the nature of an illusion. Then again as to the marvel of thought- reading... this also, master Gotama, seems to me of the nature of an illusion. But as to the marvel of teaching... of these three marvels this one appeals to me as the more wonderful and excellent.' Sangarava then asked the Buddha whether he possessed all three marvels and the Buddha told him that he did. Sangarava also asked whether any other monk possessed them and the Buddha answered: 'Yes, indeed, brahmin. The monks possessed of these three marvellous powers are not just one or two or three, four, or five hundred, but much more than that in number.' Sangarava then expressed his confidence in taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, and he asked to be accepted as a lay-follower. In the Buddha's time many monks had cultivated conditions for 'marvellous powers'. The greatest 'marvel' of these, however, is the 'marvel of teaching' since it can lead to the eradication of all defilements, to the end of all sorrows. For those who have accumulations for jhana there are many benefits since jhana is kusala kamma of a high degree. One of the benefits is a happy rebirth, even for those who can attain only "access-concentration' or upacara samadhi. However, even rebirth in a happy plane of existence is dukkha, since life in a happy plane may be followed by rebirth in an unhappy plane. Therefore, no birth at all is to be preferred to any kind of rebirth. This can be realized only by developing the wisdom which eradicates defilements. 15304 From: Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 0:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi, Rob - Thanks for this reply of yours and the compliment included. I insert one brief comment near the end of your post. In a message dated 8/28/02 7:05:10 PM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Yes, I do. It seems to me that cetasikas occur with varying > degrees of > > intensity or prominence, and that some of these cetasikas, viriya > or > > maniskara for example, may influence what I am probably badly > calling the > > "level of consciousness". > > Let us assume that the list of prominent/supporting neutral > cetasikas provided by Bro. Teo is correct: > > Bhavanga > Prominent: life faculty (Jivitindriya) > Supporting: kammic energy (sankhara) > > Adverting > Prominent: Attention (manasikara) > Support: one pointedness (ekkaggata) > > Eye consciousness > Prominent: contact (phassa) > Supporting: attention (manasikara) > > Receiving > Prominent: feeling (vedana) > Supporting: Initial application (vitakka) > > Investigating > Prominent: perception (sanna-recall) > Supporting: sustained application (vicara) > > Determining > Prominent: attention (yoniso/ayoniso manasikara) > Supporting: decision (adhimokkha) > > Javana > Prominent:volition (cetana) > Supporting: desire (chanda) and zest (piti) if any > > Registration > Prominent: perception (sanna-marking) > Supporting: energy (viriya) > > > I think that you are commenting that the cetasikas associated with > the last four types of cittas are more "active" than the cetasikas > associated with the first four types of cittas. Let's list them out: > > First Four (Bhavanga / Adverting / Eye Consciousness / Receiving) > ================================================================= > - life faculty (Jivitindriya) > - attention (manasikara) > - one pointedness (ekkaggata) > - contact (phassa) > - feeling (vedana) > - initial application (vitakka) > > Last Four (Investigating / Determining / Javana / Registration) > =============================================================== > - perception (sanna-recall and sanna-marking) > - sustained application (vicara) > - attention (yoniso/ayoniso manasikara) > - decision (adhimokkha) > - volition (cetana) > - desire (chanda) > - zest (piti) > - energy (viriya) > - Plus all of the kusala / akusala cetasiskas arising with javana > > Howard, I think that you are absolutely correct with your > observation. If I were to dump all the cetasikas into one of two > buckets (active / non-active), it would match the listing above. I > intend to point this out during my class! > > Your intuitive grasp of this topic suggests to me that you were an > Abhidhamma scholar in a previous life and therefore you were > predestined (no free will) to become part of the DSG! :-) > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Mmm. But I must have had some *good* kamma back then as well! ;-))) --------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > =========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15305 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 7:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi Howard, k: Its nice to know that pple disagree :). You are right to warn us not to accept on the basis of authority alone. Definitely a lot of investigation and reflection are needed before we heed the words of the commentaries. Just like Abhidhamma, at times I also disagree :). But I like to point out the danger of putting our two cents of worth which is could be seen by millions of pple. Since the commentaries are already there, why reinvent the wheel. Isn't it better to use the commentaries to explain the metta sutta rather than on our own. kind regards kc (= Ken O) P.S. Use KC is better as it reduce confusion with Ken H :) 15306 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 10:57pm Subject: RE: [dsg] subtle point, to Kom Dear Nina, > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > > Dear Kom, I have a question for A. Sujin, but > only when there is time. The > Foundation has made studies of subtle points, and > these are in a report. One > of these is bodily intimation, kaya vi~n~natti > rupa, which is the rupa > conditioning the conveying of a meaning through > the bodysense, for example > through gestures. It is also the body-door of > kamma. I read in many passages > about the monk who is walking, such as in the > Fruits of Recluseship, the thought "Let me go forward" arises, the > mind-originated air element > arises together with that thought, producing > bodily intimation.> > He does not convey a meaning here, but can we say > it is the bodydoor of his > kusala kamma since he develops samatha and > vipassana while walking? > For a long time I have been wondering about this. > Do you have the report? If > not you could ask Kh Anop. It has many interesting items. > Have a very good and fruitful trip with A. Sujin, > take good care, I will print your questions and ask her. kom 15307 From: forsyth_1981 Date: Wed Aug 28, 2002 11:15pm Subject: Hello from a New Member Sarah A. asked me to write an intro as I have recently joined DSG. I am 21 years of age and I'm studying Information Technology at University. I share an apartment in Brisbane with a girlfriend. I work part-time for my Dad's Australian office as well. Some of you have already met me on the Noosa weekend. For those I haven't met yet, I am Christine's daughter. I am not a Buddhist; I was brought up as a Christian, went to Religious schools and through all the usual rituals. (Mum was shocked when I told her recently that by the time I was thirteen years of age, I had decided 'I can't believe most of this'.) Not sure what I do believe yet. At Noosa, I had the pleasure of meeting 'KenH', Azita, Andrew, Sundara and some others (from Maleny) plus the Dutch/Austrian backpackers Sundara found somewhere. I had already met Jon and Sarah A. in Hong Kong. Hello again everyone. Although I was a bit nervous meeting a bunch of buddhists :), there was nothing to worry about. Everyone was very friendly. I had fun and learned a little over breakfast each day and when walking through the national park - mainly about what Buddhism is not. I won't promise to contribute much, but I'll read the letters when I can. Bye for now, Sarah F. 15308 From: Sarah Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 0:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re:Re: Hi Hi Krishnan, --- dark knight wrote: > Hi Sarah, > Thanks for giving me a warm welcome to this group. > The topics discussed in this forum are very > interesting. I am sure to benefit from these > discussions. ..... It’s good to hear this. I don’t know if you are familiar with the Pali terms, but if not, you may find the simple Pali glossary in the Files section useful. Also, if you look under ‘Pali’ in Useful Posts there, there are one or two posts giving further assistance. Also, under ‘New to the List...’ (also in U.P.), there are more posts with advice to anyone just arriving: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ Sometimes the easiest way to start is to just start a new thread with your own questions or comments. ..... > Regarding myself, I hail from a state at the southern > most tip of India, called Kerala, famous for it's > landscapes and greenery. ..... Hmm, Kerala.....probably my favourite state in India....I think of Cochin and its spice trade history, the waterways trip from Quillon to Allepey, the beaches at Kovalam, trying not to get attacked by the crocodile at a yoga ashram whilst bathing, very intelligent and politically conscious people, stone-cutters by the side of the road breaking up boulders with chisels....... ..... >I am doing a PhD in Chemical > Engineering. > I was exposed to many spiritual/religious schools > early in my life. But only when I heard the Buddhas > words, I got a glimpse of what all others were trying > to say, and which Buddha clearly said. > It is sad that it is difficult to come across His > original words in India now.I was first introduced to > His words through the book "Old Paths White Clouds" by > Ven. Thich Nat Hanh. Luckily me and a friend of mine > found a Theravada monastry in my city (which is a > rarity in India now) , the Maha Bodhi Soceity founded > by Ven. Acharya Buddharakkhita. There I found many > books of many great seers of this path. .... Are you in Trivandrum or where? I was also very grateful for the Maha Bodhi Society in several places in India for books and basic accommodation too.. ..... > I can only claim that I have had just an introduction > to the great message of the Buddha. I intend to > practice sincerily and understand the Dhamma as much > as I can in this life. > Thanks once again for welcoming me into this group > were I can find like-minded people. .... Very glad to have you here, Krishnan....Rob M is also an engineer (but not chemical). As you say, your interest in dhamma is very unusual, especially in Kerala I’d think. Please shout if you’d like anything clarified. I’m also just thinking that you’re only a short hop from Colombo where we hope to visit with Khun Sujin* again for further discussions with our friends from DSG who live there. Sarah ===== * Ranil, Sumane, Gayan - K.Sujin was chatting to us about arranging a return visit just for dhamma discussions in Colombo sometime. Maybe we can coordinate off-list. 15309 From: egberdina Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 0:52am Subject: Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi Rob, Howard et al, > > I'm not comfortable with the term "levels of consciousness". There > is citta, a paramattha, and everything else is papanca (conceptual > proliferation). > > Do you see it differently? > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > PS: Going to bed now. Do you think that all phenomena (noumena) can be explained in terms of the concepts you mention? How would you describe in these terms a reflex action, say, the blinking of an eye as an insect flies into it? Do you allow for reactivity without any awareness whatsoever? All the best Herman 15310 From: Sarah Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 0:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello from a New Member Hi Sarah F, Thanks for the prompted intro...everyone will be glad to see more of the family joining in. One of our regular wits just wrote that families that study abhidhamma together don’t suffer from insomnia....you can tell us if this is correct. Anyway, we can see you share your mum’s good humour in your writing and look forward to more when you have time or inclination. Those breakfasts and walks with informal discussions were very special to me and I’m glad we have a little of your photographic work to remind us of them in the album. I think it was you that took the sunset one too?? No need to be an “anything-ist” or take anything on blind faith because anyone here or elsewhere says it....just check out, explore, enquire, consider for yourself as Howard often reminds us... As I just said to Krishnan, another new member, just start a new thread by making questions or comments anytime there’s something you’re considering. I’m also sorry to hear about your grandmother’s recent death. You’ve certainly had a lot of personal experience with “gain and loss” this year. Thanks again for being a good sport and I’m relieved to hear we didn’t completely put you off Buddhism in Noosa;-) Sarah A. ====== --- forsyth_1981 wrote: > Sarah A. asked me to write an intro as I have recently joined DSG. > I am 21 years of age and I'm studying Information Technology at > University. I share an apartment in Brisbane with a girlfriend. I > work part-time for my Dad's Australian office as well. Some of you > have already met me on the Noosa weekend. For those I haven't met > yet, I am Christine's daughter. > I am not a Buddhist;........ ................................. 15311 From: Sarah Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 1:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi Rob M, --- robmoult wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > Please don't be so hard on "Free Will". It was "Free Will" that > brought us together !! :-) > > When we met in HK, you asked how I discovered the DSG. I told you > that it was as a result of a web search. > > I had typed > > Abhidhamma "Free Will" > > into Google search engine and the first entry was a DSG discussion > from early December 2001. .... This is really funny;-)) I had meant to ask you what you were searching for. I should be thanking whoever it was in Dec 01 for introducing Abhidhamma ‘Free Will’. I had no idea that Google knew we existed, but it seems to know a lot from what Christine tells us. Wow, after the recent discussions, another newbie would have dozens of references for the same search;-) Free Will Reigns.... I won’t say another rude word about it. Sarah p.s. I find the list of Brother Teo’s quite unusual and I admit I have reservations as I indicated with just one citta. Perhaps you can show my posts to him on that for comments, though I understand he’s very busy. Best of all would be if he could join us here when he has time;-) ============================== 15312 From: egberdina Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 1:25am Subject: Re: Hello from a New Member Hi Sarah F, Welcome aboard, and thank you for your very informative introduction. You'll find a few I.T. bods here, many ex-denominational Christians of all varieties, and I am sure there's more than just one who doesn't call themself Buddhist. May your stay here be fruitful and wishing you well, Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "forsyth_1981" wrote: > Sarah A. asked me to write an intro as I have recently joined DSG. > I am 21 years of age and I'm studying Information Technology at > University. I share an apartment in Brisbane with a girlfriend. I > work part-time for my Dad's Australian office as well. Some of you > have already met me on the Noosa weekend. For those I haven't met > yet, I am Christine's daughter. > I am not a Buddhist; I was brought up as a Christian, went to > Religious schools and through all the usual rituals. (Mum was > shocked when I told her recently that by the time I was thirteen > years of age, I had decided 'I can't believe most of this'.) Not > sure what I do believe yet. > At Noosa, I had the pleasure of meeting 'KenH', Azita, Andrew, > Sundara and some others (from Maleny) plus the Dutch/Austrian > backpackers Sundara found somewhere. I had already met Jon and > Sarah A. in Hong Kong. Hello again everyone. > Although I was a bit nervous meeting a bunch of buddhists :), there > was nothing to worry about. Everyone was very friendly. I had fun and > learned a little over breakfast each day and when walking through the > national park - mainly about what Buddhism is not. > I won't promise to contribute much, but I'll read the letters when I > can. > Bye for now, > Sarah F. 15313 From: Sarah Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 2:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re : Was sariputta capable of lying? Hi Rob M, Here I am to be a spanner in the works again;-) --- robmoult wrote: > Hi All, > > I am preparing for this week's class, which will be a summary > of "Dying to Live - The Role of Kamma in Dying and Rebirth". Here is > the link: > > http://www.geocities.com/ekchew.geo/dying2live.htm > > The following story is told in this text which states that Sariputta > decided to decieve a person. I thought that as an Arahant, Sariputta > was incapable of lying. Please help me out. Does anybody know the > story? Any explanation on Sariputta's lying? ....... > He told him the reason. The Venerable Sariputta thought, "I shall > deceive him." Then he asked, "Did you do it out of your own choice > or did someone order you to do it?" ..... I agree with Bard’s helpful comments here (Btw, Bard: Are you KT who returns to the shadows and has the same signature lines? A consistent and preferably ‘real’ name would be helpful if so;-)): > “Well, truthfully Sariputta never decieved him since > each line was a question. He was wanting the man to > come to his own conclusions to allow him to hear the > teachings, because after hearing the teachings it > doesn't matter what had happened; he was on the steps > to enlightenment.” ..... As an arahant, there was no chance of Sariputta intending to deceive or in uttering any falsehood. I checked a couple of other translations of this Dhp story. Neither mentioned anything suggesting deception, but someone may help look at the Pali. This is one which says ‘decided to ask tactfully’ instead of ‘I shall deceive him’ (I think): http://www.vipassana.info/f.htm vipassana.info Khuddaka Nikaya The Dhammapada Stories Translated by Daw Mya Tin, M.A., Burma Pitaka Association (1986) Source: http://www.nibbana.com Chapter VIII: The Thousand (Sahassavagga) -ooOoo- Verse 100 VIII (1) The Story of Tambadathika While residing at the Jetavana monastery, the Buddha uttered Verse (100) of this book, with reference to Tambadathika, the executioner of thieves. Tambadathika served the king as an executioner of thieves for fifty-five years; he had just retired from that post. One day, after preparing rice gruel at his house, he went to the river for a bath; he had intended to take the speciallyprepared rice gruel on his return. As he was about to take the rice gruel, Thera Sariputta, who had just arisen from sustained absorption in Concentration (jhana samapatti), stood at his door for alms-food. Seeing the thera, Tambadathika thought to himself, "Throughout my life, I have been executing thieves; now I should offer this food to the thera." So, he invited Thera Sariputta to come in and respectfully offered the rice gruel. After the meal, the thera taught him the Dhamma, but Tambadathika could not pay attention, because he was so agitated as he recollected his past life as an executioner. When the thera knew this, he decided to ask Tambadathika tactfully whether he killed the thieves because he wished to kill them or because he was ordered to do so. Tambadathika answered that he was ordered to kill them by the king and that he had no wish to kill. Then the thera asked, "If that is so, would you be guilty or not ?" Tambadathika then concluded that, as he was not responsible for the evil deeds, he was not guilty. He, therefore, calmed down, and requested the thera to continue his exposition. As he listened to the Dhamma with proper attention, he came very close to attaining Sotapatti Magga, and reached as far as anuloma nana.[*] After the discourse, Tambadathika accompanied Thera Sariputta for some distance and then returned home. On his way home a cow (actually a demon in the guise of a cow) gored him to death. When the Buddha came to the congregation of the bhikkhus in the evening, they informed him about the death of Tambadathika. When asked where Tambadathika was reborn, the Buddha told them that although Tambadathika had committed evil deeds throughout his life, because he comprehended the Dhamma after hearing it from Thera Sariputta and had already attained anuloma nana before he died, he was reborn in the Tusita deva world. The bhikkhus wondered how such an evil-doer could have such great benefit after listening to the Dhamma just once. To them the Buddha said that the length of a discourse is of no consequence, for one single word of sense can produce much benefit. Then the Buddha spoke in verse as follows: Verse 100. Better than a thousand words that are senseless and unconnected with the realization of Nibbana, is a single word of sense, if on hearing it one is calmed. [*] anuloma nana: Vipassana Insight which causes the namarupa process of the yogi to become fully adapted for Magga Insight. ***** Sarah p.s Rob K.....I’ve just remembered, I meant to tell you that I still couldn’t get that other link for the breakdown of Pali for dhp to work, but really appreciated the Pali lines you found for the Kesamuttisutta (Kalama sutta) which I know will be useful again;-) ======================= 15314 From: dark knight Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 4:00am Subject: Re: About Kerala and MahaBodhiSoceity > Message: 3 > Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2002 15:35:24 +0800 (CST) > From: Sarah > Subject: Re: Re:Re: Hi Hi Sarah, It's a real surprise to hear that you are very familiar with Kerala ! Actually I am from Palakkad (don't tell me you know abt palakkad !!), a district in central kerala. But at present, I am doing my PhD in Bangalore. Kerala though blessed by nature,educational institutions are very few. So I was forced to leave first for Madras and then for Bangalore for my advanced studies. My contact with books on Buddhism was thus because of MahaBodhi Society(MBS) Bangalore. I will surely air my doubts as & when they arise. Thank you for the info regarding pali sites. Actually I had had an introduction to Pali through some classes which were conducted in MBS. Thanks and Best Regards, Krishnan. 15315 From: Sarah Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 5:51am Subject: Rob M in the album at last;-) Hi Chris & All, Rob M's pic had to wait patiently all this time in my camera, but has finally made it to the album. Along with him are Rob K w/two of his kids who really impress me with their patience in Bkk, while Dad has yet another long discussion. Also, Erik & Eath on the balcony of their house in Koh Samui on the mountain side, the mods at breakfast in Koh Samui to replace the one in 'rare party mood', now banished by Jon (he never liked it). Also, shot on return to finish the film and for temporary viewing - myself working on a DSG post in our wee dhamma room which was designed as a store room (about 3 foot by 3 foot) and now my favourite spot in the flat. Sarah A ======== 15316 From: abhidhammika Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 6:04am Subject: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Dear Dhamma friends The following conversation took place between Suan Lu Zaw and James Mitchell in the form of questions and answers. Suan Lu Zaw asked the following. "I would appreciate if you can find time (?) to elaborate on your expression "the greater mind". Do we need to resort to such expressions? I haven't come across such an expression in Pali texts yet. Is it the expresson you made up or a translation of a Pali term or a Sanskrit term? If the latter, I would like to see it." The answer given by James Mitchell contained the following as his main position. "Nibbana is not a place or a thing, it is a state-of-mind (while living) and it is pure mind (when dead). It is the greater mind of which our minds are only a shadow of." Therefore, Suan Lu Zaw responded to James Mitchell's position as follows where the pronoun "you" refers to James Mitchell. So you equated Nibbana with "the greater mind". I do not blame you as you are not alone in equating Nibbana with mind or consciousness. Nor do I intend to argue with you. I am a scientist who specializes in psychological aspects of Pali Tipitaka directly relevant to solutions to and cures for human miseries. So, if you feel good by equating nibbana with the greater mind, well, keep doing it by all means. The reason I asked you to elaborate on your use of the expression "the greater mind" is that I simply wanted to know just what it is. Now that you explained what you meant by "the greater mind", my suspicions have been confirmed. But, as you also insisted that you needed to use that expression "the greater mind" for Nibbana, you have spared me the chore of telling you what Nibbana is not, as far as Pali Tipitaka is concerned. Thank you for saving me time (?) in not having to tell you that Nibbana is one separate ultimate reality and that mind or consciousness is another separate ultimate reality. I do thank you for not having to tell you that there are exactly FOUR ULTIMATE REALITIES as far as Pali Tipitaka is concerned, and that the equating of Nibbana with mind or consciousness would leave us with only THREE ULTIMATE REALITIES. By the way, your statement "It is the greater mind of which our minds are only a shadow of" is reminiscent of the Veda or Brahminism which asserts that individual selves or small selves evolve from Absolute Consciousness or Great Self (Mahaatman). When you have time (?), why not check out the Veda or Brahminism. If you liked what they have to teach such as "our selves are only a shadow or a creation of the great self", then you could call yourself "Brahmintrue" instead of buddatrue. To learn more about "Mahaatman" for great mind or great self, please see page 796 (column 1, somewhere down the page) in Sir Monier Monier- Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary. By the way, the concept of "Mahaatman" or Great Mind is outside the teachings of the Buddha who did teach Nibbana. Therefore, Nibbana is not mind, let alone greater mnd. With kind regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org 15317 From: Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 2:48am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello from a New Member Hi, Sarah F - In a message dated 8/29/02 2:16:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sr_forsyth@h... writes: > > Sarah A. asked me to write an intro as I have recently joined DSG. > I am 21 years of age and I'm studying Information Technology at > University. I share an apartment in Brisbane with a girlfriend. I > work part-time for my Dad's Australian office as well. Some of you > have already met me on the Noosa weekend. For those I haven't met > yet, I am Christine's daughter. > I am not a Buddhist; I was brought up as a Christian, went to > Religious schools and through all the usual rituals. (Mum was > shocked when I told her recently that by the time I was thirteen > years of age, I had decided 'I can't believe most of this'.) Not > sure what I do believe yet. > At Noosa, I had the pleasure of meeting 'KenH', Azita, Andrew, > Sundara and some others (from Maleny) plus the Dutch/Austrian > backpackers Sundara found somewhere. I had already met Jon and > Sarah A. in Hong Kong. Hello again everyone. > Although I was a bit nervous meeting a bunch of buddhists :), there > was nothing to worry about. Everyone was very friendly. I had fun and > learned a little over breakfast each day and when walking through the > national park - mainly about what Buddhism is not. > I won't promise to contribute much, but I'll read the letters when I > can. > Bye for now, > Sarah F. > ================================ Welcome to the list from another member. It's a pleasure to have you here. Your mom is a delight to have around (she's really nice and really smart - of course, kids always have a slightly different perspective on their parents than the parents' friends do! ;-)). In any case, it will be a delight to have you here. Among other things it will be great to have a non-Buddhist here to keep the rest of us on our toes and avoiding in-bred dogmatism! ;-) [ Yep, there are dogmatic Buddhists too! ] I hope you enjoy being on the list. With metta (friendship), Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15318 From: Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 3:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Inside the Thought Process Hi, Herman (and Rob) - In a message dated 8/29/02 3:53:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > > > > > I'm not comfortable with the term "levels of consciousness". There > > is citta, a paramattha, and everything else is papanca (conceptual > > proliferation). > > > > Do you see it differently? > > > > Thanks, > > Rob M :-) > > > > PS: Going to bed now. > > Do you think that all phenomena (noumena) can be explained in terms > of the concepts you mention? > > How would you describe in these terms a reflex action, say, the > blinking of an eye as an insect flies into it? > > Do you allow for reactivity without any awareness whatsoever? > > > All the best > > > Herman > ============================== Actually, I would see a reflex action such as you suggest as being a pa~n~natti based on both nama and rupa. It is pa~n~natti in that it's experience as a separate thing involves the grasping of a complex of phenomena as a unity. The phenomena involved include many rupas, including motion, numerous occurrences of vi~n~nana at subliminal and surface levels, and sankhara (reactive elements). What is involved here seems to me to be *extraordinarily* complex, whether from the modern biochemistry-physiology-physics perspective or from the Abhidhammic perspective. BTW, when Rob mentions citta, I presume he is including cetasikas which include all of the elements of the khandhas other than tose of rupakhandha, and, in particular, include the reactive elements of sankhara. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15319 From: frank kuan Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 7:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello from a New Member --- Sarah wrote: > Hi Sarah F, > > Thanks for the prompted intro...everyone will be > glad to see more of the > family joining in. One of our regular wits just > wrote that families that > study abhidhamma together don’t suffer from > insomnia....you can tell us if > this is correct. Hello New Sarah. Welcome to the list. I always enjoy your mum's thought provoking questions and earnest attitude while investigating the dhamma. Um, I'm kind of curious about that insomnia question as well. I'm not exactly a Buddhist either (the way most people would understand the label), but after trying out alternative labels like "truth seeker", "spiritual", I discovered that every label has some serious baggage, and you can't win. Maybe I'll just get rid of my name altogether so people won't associate it with a label, and change it to an unpronouncable symbol like the artist currently known as the artist formerly known as Prince. M.C. Sarah, (aka moderator Sarah) I noticed you didn't qualify what type of "regular wit." Did you mean half wit, nit wit, or dim wit? -fk 15320 From: frank kuan Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 8:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Duration of Dhammas --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > After years of practice with the consistent > application of right > effort, the goal has been reached! Done is what > needed to be done: I have > reached the stage at which I come to see such a post > on DSG! ;-))) > [rest of post snipped to gain brownie points with Sarah and make my comment even more obscure] Given the nature of Rob's post, I think "arrived" would be a better choice of words Howard. -fk 15321 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 10:10am Subject: Anapanasati, Rob Ep, Rob Ep, Rob Ep. Anapana Sati. Part 3: We should go back to the second tetrad, group of four, of the sutta on Mindfulness of Breathing: V) He trains thus ; he trains thus . (VI) He trains thus ; he trains thus . (VII) He trains thus ; he trains thus . (VIII) He trains thus ; he trains thus , that is, making happiness (píti, also translated as rapture) known, making it plain. Herein, the happiness is experienced in two ways: (a) with the object, and (b) with non-confusion. As regards , the Visuddhimagga (VIII, 227) explains: How is happiness experienced with the object? He attains the two jhånas in which happiness (píti) is present. At the time when he has actually entered upon them the happiness is experienced with the object owing to the obtaining of the jhåna, because of the experiencing of the object. After the jhånacitta has fallen away paññå realizes the characteristic of píti as it is: only a kind of nåma, which is impermanent and not self. We read: ŠHow with non-confusion? When, after entering upon and emerging from one of the two jhånas accompanied by píti, he comprehends with insight that happiness associated with the jhåna as liable to destruction and fall, then at the actual time of insight the happiness is experienced with non-confusion owing to the penetration of its characteristics (of impermanence, and so on). The Vis. quotes from the Path of Discrimination with regard to the experience of happiness with non-confusion: In a similar way the words of the second tetrad are explained by the Visuddhimagga: (VI) I shall breathe inŠbreathe out experiencing bliss (sukha, pleasant feeling)Š Sukha occurs in three stages of jhåna (of the fourfold system); it does not arise in the highest stage of jhåna where there is equanimity instead of sukha. Sukha accompanies the jhånacitta of the three stages of jhåna and is, after the jhånacitta has fallen away, realized by paññå as impermanent. The realization of the characteristic of impermanence can only occur when the stages of insight knowledge have been developed, beginning with tender insight, as I said before. Thus both jhana and insight have been developed here. As to VI amd VII, experiencing mental formation, citta sankhara, and tranquillizing mental formation: the Vis. VIII, 229, explains that mental formation pertains here to feeling and perception, sanna. The feeling is associated with perception (Vis. VIII, 230). The Vis. quotes here from the Path of Discrimination: The Vis. adds that this tetrad deals with the contemplation of feeling. The Co, the Papa~casuudanii, speaks about a , vedanaa~n~nantara.m. As to the words of the sutta, ³The giving attention completely², the Co explains that although attention is not pleasant feeling it comes under the heading of feeling. The Co repeats what has been stated in the Vis. about experiencing rapture and pleasant feeling with the object and with non-delusion. The Co then states: The Commnetary explains that in the same way bliss and citta sankhara, the mental formation, are experienced and that it is thus rightly stated that the monk contemplates feelings in the feelings. The Commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta states that contemplating feelings in the feelings should be seen in the same way as contemplating the body in the body: thus, in order to limit the object and ³sifting it out². We read: ****** Nina. 15322 From: Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 6:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Duration of Dhammas Hi, Frank - In a message dated 8/29/02 11:53:55 AM Eastern Daylight Time, fcckuan@y... writes: > Given the nature of Rob's post, I think "arrived" > would be a better choice of words Howard. > ======================= Oh, oh! (Here's to being obscure! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15323 From: robmoult Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 4:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Inside the Thought Process Hi Sarah, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > I should be thanking whoever it was in Dec 01 for introducing > Abhidhamma `Free Will'. Perhaps you remember a long exchange titled "Beyond the Self Position" involving Amara, Victor, Kenneth Ong and Howard. The term "Free Will" was added to the title at one point. > Free Will Reigns.... I won't say another rude word about it. FYI - I have gone through my Class Notes and put quote marks around every instance of "Free Will". I also added a footnote explaining that "Free Will" is placed in quotation marks because the concept must be understood as not having an "I" making the decision (anatta). I'm hoping that nobody asks me how to understand "Free Will" without an "I" making the decision. If this happens, I will have to make some obscure remark about seeds and mango fruits; when the questioner looks confused, I will put on my "inscrutable expression", nod my head and say, "Ah, yes... the Dhamma is very deep." Thanks, Rob M :-) 15324 From: Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 5:00pm Subject: ADL ch. 22 (4) http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 22 Jhana is called in the teachings an 'abiding in ease, here, now' (for example, 'Discourse on Expunging', Middle Length Sayings I, No. 8). Those who are advanced in the development of calm can have many jhanacittas in succession, since they have cultivated conditions for this. They truly are 'abiding in ease, here, now'. However, the Buddha would point out that 'abiding in ease' is not the same as 'expunging' (eradication). We read in the 'Discourse on Expunging' that the Buddha said to Cunda in regard to the monk who could attain rupa-jhana: ...It may occur to him: 'I fare along by expunging'. But these, Cunda, are not called expungings in the discipline for an ariyan. These are called 'abidings in ease, here, now' in the discipline for an ariyan. With regard to the monk who could attain arupa-jhuna, the Buddha said: ...It may occur to him: 'I fare along by expunging'. But these, Cunda, are not called 'expungings' in the discipline for an ariyan; these are called 'abidings that are peaceful' in the discipline for an ariyan... Those who have accumulated skill for jhana and have developed vipassana can attain enlightenment with absorption. Instead of a meditation subject of samatha, nibbana is the object which is experienced with absorption. Lokuttara cittas can be accompanied by jhana-factors of different stages of jhana according to one's accumulations. In the process during which enlightenment is attained the magga-citta is immediately followed by the phala-citta (result of magga-citta). When the phalacittas have fallen away the process of cittas is over. The magga-citta of that stage of enlightenment cannot arise again, but the phala-citta can arise again, even many times in life, and it experiences nibbana with absorption. Those who have attained the fourth stage of arupa-jhana, the 'Sphere of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception' and have also realized the stage of enlightenment of the anagami or of the arahat, can attain 'cessation' (nirodha-samapatti) which is the temporary ceasing of bodily and mental activities. The person who has attained 'cessation' ('the stopping of perception and feeling') is different from a corpse. We read in the 'Greater Discourse of the Miscellany' (Middle Length Sayings I, No. 43) that Maha-kotthita asked Sariputta a number of questions. He also asked questions about the difference between the dead body and the monk who has attained cessation. We read that Maha-kotthita asked: 'In regard to this body, Your reverence, when how many things are got rid of, does this body lie cast away, flung aside like unto a senseless log of wood?' 'In regard to this body, Your reverence, when three things are got rid of: vitality, heat and consciousness, then does this body lie cast away, flung aside like unto a senseless log of wood.' 'What is the difference, your reverence, between that dead thing, passed away, and that monk who has attained to the stopping of perception and feeling?' 'Your reverence, the bodily activities of that dead thing, passed away, have been stopped, have subsided, the mental activities have been stopped, have subsided, the vitality is entirely destroyed, the heat allayed, the sense-organs are entirely broken asunder. But that monk who has attained to the stopping of perception and feeling, although his bodily activities have been stopped, have subsided, although his vocal activities have been stopped, have subsided, although his mental activities have been stopped, have subsided, his vitality is not entirely destroyed, his heat is not allayed, his sense- organs are purified. This, your reverence, is the difference between a dead thing, passed away, and that monk who has attained to the stopping of perception and feeling.' For those who emerge from cessation, the first citta which arises is a phala-citta (lokuttara vipakacitta), having nibbana as its object. In the case of the anagami it is the phala-citta of the anagami and in the case of the arahat it is the phala-citta of the arahat. The 'Visuddhimagga' (XXIII, 50) states that their minds tend towards nibbana. We read: Towards what does the mind of one who has emerged tend? It tends towards nibbana. For this is said: 'When a bhikkhu has emerged from the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling, friend Visakha, his consciousness inclines to seclusion, leans to seclusion, tends to seclusion.' (Middle Length Sayings 1,302). In the 'Lesser Discourse in Gosiriga' (Middle Length Sayings I, No. 31) we read that the Buddha came to see Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila when they were staying in the Gosinga sal-wood. The Buddha asked them about their life in the forest. They could attain all stages of rupa-jhana and arupa-jhana and they could 'abide' in them for as long as they liked. The Buddha said: 'It is good, Anuruddha , it is good. But did you, Anuruddha , by passing quite beyond this abiding, by allaying this abiding, reach another state of further-men, an excellent knowledge and vision befitting the ariyans, an abiding in comfort?' 'How could this not be, Lord? Here we, Lord, for as long as we like, by passing quite beyond the plane of neither perception-nor-non-perception, entering on the stopping of perception and feeling, abide in it, and having seen through intuitive wisdom, our cankers come to be utterly destroyed. By passing quite beyond that abiding, Lord, by allaying that abiding, another state of further-men, an excellent knowledge and vision befitting the ariyans, an abiding in comfort is reached. But we, Lord, do not behold another abiding in comfort that is higher or more excellent than this abiding in comfort,' 'It is good, Anuruddha, it is good. There is no other abiding in comfort that is higher or more excellent than this abiding in comfort.' Questions 1. What is the advantage of arupa-jhana, compared to rupa-jhana? 2. What is the difference between the fourth stage of arupa-ihana, the 'Sphere of neither perception-nor-non perception', and cessation'? 3. Can anybody who has developed the fourth stage of arupa-jhana attain cessation? 4. What is the purpose of the 'supernormal powers (abhinnas)? 5. When six abhinnas are mentioned, which of those is the greatest? Why? 6. What benefit is there for those who develop both jhana and vipassana and attain enlightenment? 7. What is the object of citta at the moment of jhana? 8. Through which door can the jhanacitta experience an object? 9. What is the object of the lokuttara citta? 10. What is the object of the lokuttara citta which is accompanied by jhana-factors? 15325 From: forsyth_1981 Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 7:30pm Subject: Thankyou for the Welcome Hello Sarah A, Herman, Howard, and Frank, I hope it is list etiquette to reply all in the one post. Sarah, I'm really glad Luke and I met you and Jon in Hong Kong, and because of that I came to Noosa. And far from putting me off Buddhism, it has helped me understand a little more. I'm also encouraging Mum to bring me to Thailand one day. :) Herman, thank you for your welcome and good wishes - IT bods and ex-christians must equal logical, rational thinkers. (By the way, I have these assignments that need to be done while I'm away in London and New York, any chance - - ??) (only joking :) Frank, thank you for your welcome. Your comments are a little like what I learned at Noosa - that labels and ideas describing people, things or -isms, are only 'part' of what they are, and are usually incomplete or inaccurate. Thanks Howard for welcoming me and for saying nice things about Mum. She and I have a different relationship to most mothers/daughters. All through my high school years, she had to invest a lot of time taking me to basketball training, clinics, matches, and interstate to play games. As the training was often six times a week, and the stadium was 45 minutes drive away, we spent up to two hours a day in the car. We shared the wins, losses, bruises, sprained ankles and twisted knees. A lot of talking, learning, laughter and tears took place in that car. :) Mainly about courage, about playing by the rules or suffering the consequences, that how well I played depended on how well I practiced, that pain and disappointment doesn't last - but neither does elation, that today is all I can work with - yesterdays' match is gone, and next weeks hasn't come yet, and I learned about always doing my best, never giving up and always trying again. I learned that winning and losing mattered, but not too much, as nothing lasts. And it is only how you 'think' about things that turns a lost tournament from being a temporary setback into a major disaster. I try to play life the same way I used to play basketball, although in life sometimes its seems a little harder to do. Mum has two personas - The Friend (99% of the time) and THE MOTHER. How I tell which is which is usually if I get an email or telephone call that begins with 'Sarah, this is Your Mother speaking.....' and I know ... uh-oh,here comes trouble ... :) Though I haven't lived at home for a few years now, I think you will understand why I gave Mum a plaque that reads 'My Mum is My Best Friend' .... Bye for now, Sarah F 15326 From: sukinderpal Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 7:36pm Subject: New members, welcome! Hi, Sarah F. and Krishnan, Welcome from an unusual member of the list. Being Christian is not unusual, being Indian is not unexpected, but being a Sikh?! It's almost like seeing a fundamental Moslem taking an interest in another religion. Just kiddding. Actually *nothing* is unusual, and being Christian or Indian has very little to do with one's accumulations and the fact that one is lead to the study of the Buddha's teachings. It is more a matter of wisdom being attracted to 'WISDOM'.;-) However, there is still the problem of being 'conditioned' as Christian, Indian, Scientific, Rational etc. etc. and there is also the habitual tendency to judge things according to our present level of understanding. Here I would like to give you a bit of advice (don't like this word but can't think of any other!). What you read here may at some instance go against your normal way of looking at things, even to the way most other buddhists do. Patience and some degree of trust is required here. The end result is *very* rewarding, as, Sarah F., your GREAT mom can give evidence to. Here on this list you will both find what we call *Good friends*, and will understand what this phrase really mean. 'Dear' friends often turn out to be worse than one's enemies, because they tend to indulge us. But friends here on DSG, will give you what is 'really' good. And they are very nice when doing it too!!;-). I take this opportunity to express my appreciation for every input on this list and particularly to Sarah A. and Jon A. for setting this list up in the first place. Lastly, I hope you both gain much from here, which should be both, 'understanding', and a more easy, happy, and comfortable life. Best wishes, Sukin 15327 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Aug 29, 2002 11:48pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Dear Ken O, Howard, and all, > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > I disagree. (Why should I break my stride? ;-)) > While I think we would be foolish not to > study, mull over, and learn > from the commentaries, if we have access to them, > I also think that we would > be foolish to only consume predigested material. > The Kalama Sutta - sorry, > there is is again! - warns us not to accept on > the basis of authority alone. > The key word to me is 'alone'. > I think we generally agree that we should take the teachings (from anybody) carefully indeed. Ultimately, the teachings must be in accordance with the truths, and must be useful toward accumulating knowledge and detachment, and contributes toward reaching nibbana. Here's a passage I wrote to a friend recently, when we were discussing an (obvious) wrong view: ... Yes, these are evidently gross misinterpretations of the Buddha's teachings, but it is a good reminder why we need to be careful when we hear "dhamma" from other people, to beware of gross and subtle wrong views. In the maha-paranibbana sutta, the Buddha mentioned about the 4 references: 1) A bhikkhu who said to learn a teaching from the Buddha himself 2) A bhikkhu who said to learn a teaching from the sangha and theras 3) A bhikkhu who said to learn a teaching from multiple theras 4) A bhikkhu who said to learn a teaching from a single thera The Buddha said not to agree or disagree, but to learn the teachings from the Bikhhu well, and then to compare the teaching to the sutta, to the vinaya. If the teaching doesn't match, then one should conclude that the Bikkhu remembered the teaching incorrectly, and then discard the teaching. If it does match, then one should conclude that the Bikkhu remembered it correctly. kom 15328 From: bodhi2500 Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 0:51am Subject: Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abhidhammika" wrote: >Therefore, Nibbana is not mind. > Hi Could someone please explain why Nibbana is called a Nama. Seems confusing to say Nibbana is not mind ,but it is a Nama. Thank-you Steve 15329 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 3:10am Subject: Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "bodhi2500" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abhidhammika" wrote: > >Therefore, Nibbana is not mind. > > > > Hi > Could someone please explain why Nibbana is called a Nama. > Seems confusing to say Nibbana is not mind ,but it is a Nama. > > Thank-you > Steve ___________________ Dear Steve, Suan gave this translation a while >>>>Section 499, Kevatta Suttam, Silakkhandhavagga, Dighanikayo Kevatta Sutta tika "Ettha nama?a rupa?a, asesam uparujjhati Viññanassa nirodhena, etthetam uparujjhati'ti". "Here (in nibbana), nama as well as rupa ceases without remainder. By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here.">>>> But it is experienced by nama (not rupa). Robert 15330 From: Seylan Bank - DBD (Sumane Rathnasuriya) Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 4:43am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re:Re: Hi Dear Sarah & Jon, What pleasant reminiscence I experience when you mention your next visit to Colombo! My heartiest appreciation of you all and of course for Khun Sujin for deciding to return to my blessed country. Why I am so emotional is that at least a few like Ranil, Gayan, self etc. who are in the list & the ones who join for discussions as Nihal, Suren & his wife will benefit once more with clarifications they have been piling up for the discussion. As for me it was a “Course Correction”! You all know that. Further, any land will be blessed with so much reality seekers stepping in there. MY LAND needs it most! Thanks again Sumane PS: Dear Jon, Nihal’s sister in law’s son (s-i-l works with you, we learnt) is keen on Dhamma study. Though a Buddhist, he has had little exposure in HK, Nihal says. Just some info to extend the light of Dhamma to someone who could benefit therefrom. Sumane Rathnasuriya 15331 From: Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 5:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi, Kom - In a message dated 8/30/02 2:51:22 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kom@a... writes: > > Dear Ken O, Howard, and all, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > > I disagree. (Why should I break my stride? ;-)) > > While I think we would be foolish not to > > study, mull over, and learn > > from the commentaries, if we have access to them, > > I also think that we would > > be foolish to only consume predigested material. > > The Kalama Sutta - sorry, > > there is is again! - warns us not to accept on > > the basis of authority alone. > > The key word to me is 'alone'. > > > > I think we generally agree that we should take the teachings > (from anybody) carefully indeed. Ultimately, the teachings > must be in accordance with the truths, and must be useful > toward accumulating knowledge and detachment, and > contributes toward reaching nibbana. > > Here's a passage I wrote to a friend recently, when we were > discussing an (obvious) wrong view: > > ... > > Yes, these are evidently gross misinterpretations of the > Buddha's teachings, but it is a good reminder why we need to > be careful when we hear "dhamma" from other people, to > beware of gross and subtle wrong views. In the > maha-paranibbana sutta, the Buddha mentioned about the 4 > references: > 1) A bhikkhu who said to learn a teaching from the Buddha > himself > 2) A bhikkhu who said to learn a teaching from the sangha > and theras > 3) A bhikkhu who said to learn a teaching from multiple > theras > 4) A bhikkhu who said to learn a teaching from a single > thera > > The Buddha said not to agree or disagree, but to learn the > teachings from the Bikhhu well, and then to compare the > teaching to the sutta, to the vinaya. If the teaching > doesn't match, then one should conclude that the Bikkhu > remembered the teaching incorrectly, and then discard the > teaching. If it does match, then one should conclude that > the Bikkhu remembered it correctly. > > kom > ========================== This, of course, makes great sense. However, we should also realize that comparing the teaching to the directly taught Dhamma is still subjective. How one understands/interprets the original teachings is not entirely objective, but is a function of one's background knowledge, one's meditative experience, one's thinking, and, most perilously, one's predispositions. So, all that one can do is "take your best shot". As far as the correctness of one's views, one's interpretations, and even one's practice are concerned, the old pragmatic adage, "The proof of the pudding is in the eating", probably applies. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15332 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 10:07am Subject: Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no. 2 Perfections, ch 5, Wisdom, no 2: The Commentary to the ³Conduct of Yudañjaya² explains about the beginning of paññå in that life of the Bodhisatta. We read: By offering mahå-dåna before he retired from the world and by his giving up of the kingdom he fulfilled the perfection of giving. By his restraint in action and speech he fulfilled the perfection of síla. By his going forth from worldly life and by his attainment of jhåna he fulfilled the perfection of renunciation. In that life paññå began to develop by wise consideration of impermanence and in that way he finally attained the higher powers (abhiññås), and the paññå which could distinguish the dhammas that were beneficial from those that were not beneficial for the development of generosity and other ways of kusala, and this was the perfection of paññå. By energy for the accomplishment of what was beneficial in all his undertakings he fulfilled the perfection of energy. By patience with regard to paññå (ñåùa khanti) and by endurance (adhivasana khanti) he fulfilled the perfection of patience. By not speaking wrongly, deviating from what he had promised, he fulfilled the perfection of truthfulness. By his unshakable determination in all that he undertook and observed, he fulfilled the perfection of determination. By the power of the divine abiding of loving kindness, thinking only of the benefit of all beings, he fulfilled the perfection of loving kindness. By his evenmindedness towards beings¹ contrary behaviour, and by the divine abiding of equanimity, he fulfilled the perfection of equanimity. These are the ways by which he fulfilled the ten perfections. The perfection of paññå is essential for the development of the other perfections in the right way. We should remember that the goal of the development of the perfections is paññå which penetrates the four noble Truths. Since its development to that degree takes an endlessly long time, paññå, in its turn, is also dependent on the other perfections. We can notice in this life that someone who has developed the perfections will be inclined to listen to the Dhamma, whereas someone who has not developed the perfections does not see the benefit of the development of paññå and does not want to listen to the Dhamma. Even though there is still opportunity to listen to the true Dhamma he is not interested in listening. A person who has already developed the perfection of paññå to a certain extent, wishes to understand and to know the true nature of realities, no matter where he is born, or even if he is born into a family where there is wrong view. We read in the ³The Questions of Pingiya² (Cúlaniddesa of the ³Khuddhaka Nikåya²) that the Brahmin Pingiya who was hundred and twenty years old asked the Buddha: I am old and weak, I have lost my beauty, and moreover, my eyesight and my hearing are not clear. Meanwhile, Lord Buddha, may I not go astray, may the Lord explain the Dhamma that he penetrated, the Dhamma that makes an end to birth and old age. A person with paññå would not ask for anything else but hearing the true Dhamma which makes an end to birth and old age. Although Pingiya was hundred and twenty years old, he wanted to listen to the true Dhamma. He had accumulated paññå to such degree that he saw the benefit of listening to the Dhamma. We read further on: The Buddha said to the Brahmin Pingiya: ²People are intoxicated, they are oppressed by physical phenomena, rúpas. It can be seen that people are disturbed because of rúpas. Therefore, Pingiya, you should not be neglectful, you should give up clinging to rúpas so that you will not be reborn.² 15333 From: Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 6:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi, Robert (and Steve) - In a message dated 8/30/02 6:38:23 AM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "bodhi2500" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abhidhammika" wrote: > > >Therefore, Nibbana is not mind. > > > > > > > Hi > > Could someone please explain why Nibbana is called a Nama. > > Seems confusing to say Nibbana is not mind ,but it is a Nama. > > > > Thank-you > > Steve > ___________________ > Dear Steve, > Suan gave this translation a while > >>>>Section 499, Kevatta Suttam, > Silakkhandhavagga, Dighanikayo > Kevatta Sutta tika > > "Ettha nama?a rupa?a, asesam uparujjhati > Viññanassa nirodhena, etthetam uparujjhati'ti". > > "Here (in nibbana), nama as well as rupa ceases without remainder. > By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here.">>>> > > But it is experienced by nama (not rupa). > Robert > ============================= Well, there is also the following by Nina van Gorkom, in her Abhidhamma in Daily Life: ************************ The fourth paramattha dhamma is nibbana. Nibbana is the end of defilements. Nibbana can be experienced through the mind-door if one follows the right Path leading towards it: the development of the wisdom which sees things as they are. Nibbana is nama. However, it is not citta or cetasika. Nibbana is the nama which does not arise and fall away; it is the nama which is an unconditioned reality (in Pali:visankhara dhamma). It does not arise, because it is unconditioned and therefore it does not fall away. Citta and cetasika are namas which experience an object; nibbana is the nama which does not experience an object, but nibbana itself can be the object of citta and cetasika which experience it, Nibbana is not a person, it is not-self; it is anatta. ************************ The foregoing includes describing nibbana as "the nama which does not experience an object". So, it is called a nama. Moreover, this reminds me of the "unmanifestive consciousness" referred to in certain suttas. It would seem *possible* that the nibbana paramattha dhamma is the discernment of absolute absence, the complete absence of all conditions. (And I would think that the total cessation of all conditions would be a perfection beyond imagination - something aptly describable as a refuge, a cool cave, and the ultimate emptiness.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a pha ntom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15334 From: robmoult Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 8:06pm Subject: Updated Class Notes Now On-Line Hi All, I have uploaded the September 2002 updated version of Class Notes in the files section. Changes to existing material: - Cleaned up and corrected "Abhidhamma Papers" - Put quote marks around "free will" (for Sarah :-) ) - Added caution footnote to "Philosophy and Practice of Metta" - Miscellaneous minor corrections New material: - Three Abstinences - Role of Kamma in Dying and Rebirth (10 pages) - Noble Eightfold Path (19 pages) - Four Sublime States (8 pages) - Mudita - Near and Far Enemies of Sublime States I welcome any feedback and suggestions for improvement. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15335 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 8:17pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: The foregoing includes describing nibbana as "the nama which does > not experience an object". So, it is called a nama. Moreover, this reminds > me of the "unmanifestive consciousness" referred to in certain suttas. It > would seem *possible* that the nibbana paramattha dhamma is the discernment > of absolute absence, the complete absence of all conditions. (And I would > think that the total cessation of all conditions would be a perfection beyond > imagination - something aptly describable as a refuge, a cool cave, and the > ultimate emptiness.) > ++++++++++++++++++++++===== Dear Howard, I think this has been discussed before. If you could supply a reference for nibbana as unmanisfestive consciousness we can look at again. It might be a misunderstanding of this phrase:"Vinnanam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabbam" (D.i. 223)." Suan looked at this in detail: Kevatta Sutta Atthakatha defines "Viññanam" as follows. "Tattha viññatabbanti "Viññanam" nibbanassetam namam,.." "There, to be known specially, so (it is) "Viññanam". This is the name of nibbana." And Kevatta Sutta Tika further explains the phrase "viññatabbanti" as follows. "Viññatabbanti visitthena ñatabbam, ñanuttamena ariyamaggañanena paccakkhato janitabbanti attho, tenaha "nibbanassetam namam"ti." "(To be known specially) means to be extraordinarily known. The meaning is 'to be known in the sense of realization by ultimate wisdom, by noble path wisdom'". Therefore, (the commentator) stated that 'This is the name of nibbana'" Therefore, the term 'Viññanam' in the line of the original Pali verse "Viññanam anidassanam, anantam sabbatopabham .." does not refer to consciousness, the usual meaning of viññanam. In fact, the same verse includes the following two lines "Ettha namañca rupañca, asesam uparujjhati Viññanassa nirodhena, etthetam uparujjhati'ti". "Here (in nibbana), nama as well as rupa ceases without remainder. By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here." Nibbana does not become a sort of consciousness just because one of its Pali names happens to be Viññanam. In English language, the term 'object' can have different meanings. For example, the term 'object' in visual object has no relation to the term 'object' in my object of studting Pali. Hope this message helps clarification.>>End of Suan's message. Nibbana does not arise, it cannot cease, there are no conditions for it. But it can be experienced by magga citta and phala citta (so the texts say). Robert Ps. Nina may have something to add about it. 15336 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Aug 30, 2002 11:02pm Subject: Speech and Intentions was (Re: Updated Class Notes Now On-Line) Hi Rob M and All, I've started reading the additions to the class notes, so far mainly The Noble Eightfold Path. Interesting to note in the ten courses of unwholesome kamma that Speech is given such a predominant role. Four out of the ten points relate to speech. Only one to killing another being. I think speech is a much underrated cause of misery and harm to others - particularly in its written form, whether performed in concert with others, or alone. Most people would easily see the harm in false speech and there seems to be a tendency to see Slander also as false speech - but Bhikkhu Bodhi says Slanderous Speech can be factually true. One form of Slanderous Speech is 'speech intended ...... to alienate one person or group from another'. Whereas those abstaining from Slanderous Speech "unite those that are divided; .... and it is concord that he spreads by his words." Slanderous speech creates weighty kamma because it is rooted in hate and usually occurs after deliberation. Many people do not realise that in producing Slanderous speech (or writing) - which may or may not be 'true' - the ramifications and hurt to others is serious. One can often hear people say in justification of the pain they have caused "Well, it's the truth and it needed to be said/done for the good of everyone" .... Does the Law that all will receive their vipaka according to their cetana cetasika, mean that those with little insight or compassion can go through life causing pain by their speech and writing, yet claim truthfully that it was not their intention and so receive no vipaka? Or does the magnitude of the consequences to others of someone's actions affect the magnitude of their vipaka? Say signing a letter (true or not) that has the consequence of excluding someone from many of the meaningful activities, which gave them fulfullment and happiness in life? A little further along in the class notes, it says 'When the intentions are right, the action will be right' - not sure I agree with this. Apart from the example above to do with speech, most intentions can be carried out in multiple ways, don't you think? Take my Occasional Kitchen Rat (Rachel) [please do!] My intention is to have a rat-free kitchen - there are a number of actions that could spring from this intention - most not acceptable to Rachel the Rat Being.... either depriving her (and her dependants) of food, accommodation or life. (Sadly, she hasn't fallen for the non-harming rat trap and 'a nice drive in the country' gambit) Are one class of beings more valuable, of higher status, than another - in the sense that if any of the ten courses of unwholesome kamma are performed regarding one "continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena" (say a human) - is the vipaka different than if they are performed for any other (say Rachel the Rat) process? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi All, > > I have uploaded the September 2002 updated version of Class Notes in > the files section. > > Changes to existing material: > - Cleaned up and corrected "Abhidhamma Papers" > - Put quote marks around "free will" (for Sarah :-) ) > - Added caution footnote to "Philosophy and Practice of Metta" > - Miscellaneous minor corrections > > New material: > - Three Abstinences > - Role of Kamma in Dying and Rebirth (10 pages) > - Noble Eightfold Path (19 pages) > - Four Sublime States (8 pages) > - Mudita > - Near and Far Enemies of Sublime States > > I welcome any feedback and suggestions for improvement. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) 15337 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 1:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] “People....People who need People.......” Dear Sarah, This is extremely valuable! This Sutta and commentary have a lot to offer in specifying anatta in a comprehensible way, and is a good basis for further discussion about what constitutes a 'self', and other related points. I have a few questions about some points, such as the occurrence of jhana-factors in the examples given here, and if I am able, I will come back to them in a day or two. Best, Robert Ep. ====================== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear All, > > In the Brahmajaala Sutta (and commentaries) we read in detail about all > the possible wrong views. We read that the idea of an ‘existent being’ is > the real crux of the various views. For example, this is the first of the > annihilationist views (which I quoted in an earlier post): > ..... > (p.79 B.Bodhi trans.) > “ ‘Herein, bhikkhus, some recluse or brahmin asserts the following > doctrine and view: ‘The self, good sir, has material form; it is composed > of the four primary elements and originates from father and mother. Since > this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the > body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely > annihilated.’ In this way some proclaim the annihilation, destruction, > and extermination of an existent being.’” > ..... > The other 6 kinds of annihilation view all end with the same last sentence > about the belief in the ‘extermination of an existent being’. > ..... > In the sub-commentary notes (p.182), we read: > “Since the destruction of the non-existent (asato) is impossible, the > words ‘(annihilation) of an existent being’ are given signifying > annihilation based on existence (atthibhaavanibandhano upacchedo). The > word ‘being’ (sattassa) is used in order to show the following. > > The specific-natured dhammas occurring as causes and effects included in a > single (multi-life) continuum exhibit a certain distinction as they may > belong to different (individual life) continuities (within that single > multi-life continuum). Misapplying the method of diversity > (naanattanaya), these theorists misapprehend the real differentiatiation > between the causes and the effects, and arrive at the conclusion that the > differentiation is absolute, as though (the causal and resultant > continuities) belonged to completely different continua > (bhinnasantaana)...........” > ..... > A little later (p.183): > > “..For the assumption of a being arises when the compact of aggregates > occurring in the form of a coninuum is not dissected (into its > components). And since it is held that ‘the self exists so long as it is > not annihilated,’ the assumption of annihilationism is based on the > asumption of a being.’ “ > > (“Santaanavasena hi vattamaanesu khandhesu ghanavinibbhogaabhaavena > sattagaaho, sattassa ca atthibhaavagaahanibandhano ucchedagaaho yaavaaya”m > attaa na ucchijjati, taavaaya”m vijjati yevaa ti gaha.nto.”) > > ***** > Victor quoted from the excellent Satta Sutta, SN,Khandhavagga, p985 (Bodhi > transl) > > “One is stuck, Radha, tightly stuck, in desire, list, delight, and craving > for form; therefore one is called a being.” > > In a footnote here, B,Bodhi explains this is a pun between satta, meaning > ‘being’ and also ‘attached’ from ‘sajati’. . > > “One is stuck, tightly stuck, in desire, lust, delight, and craving for > feeling...for perception...for volitional formations...for consciousness; > therefore one is called a being....” > ***** > Back to the Brahmajala Sutta and the question of killing which has been > discussed recently on DSG. We read in the sutta: > > “ “Having abandoned the destruction of life, the recluse gotama abstains > from the destruction of life....” > Commentary. The word ‘life’ (paa.na) signifies, in conventional > discourse, a living being (satta); in the ultimate sense, it is the > faculty of life (jivitindriya). the ‘destruction of life” > (paa.naatipaata) is the volition of killing in one who perceives a living > being as such, when this volition issues forth through the door of either > body or speech and occasions an act cutting off the life-faculty of that > living being...... > > “Sub.Cy. query: when formations are subject by nature to constant > cessation from moment to moment, who kills and who is killed?..... > > ‘Reply: the ‘killer’ is the assemblage of formations (sankhaaraana”m > pu~nja) conventionally called a ‘being’, containing the aforementioned > volition of killing. That which ‘is killed’ by him is the aggregation of > material and immaterial dhammas that would have been capable of arising > (in continued succession) if the aforementioned means of killing had not > been applied, but which now continues as a bare procession (of material > dhammas) conventionally termed ‘dead’, deprived of vital warmth, > consciousness, and the life-faculty due to the application of the means of > killing by the killer...........................Though formations lack > personal initiative, nevertheless the conventional designation of agency > is applicable to causes which are effective through their contiguity, and > are fixed in their capacity to give results adequate to themselves, just > as in the statements ‘the lamp illuminates’ and ‘the moon brings in the > night’ (agency is ascribed to the lamp and to the moon). > > “The act of destroying life must be recognized to pertain not only to the > aggregation of consciousness and mental concomitants existing > simultaneously with the intention of killing, but must also be admitted to > apply to the (entire sequence of states) which endures by way of (the > unity and the indiviuality of) the continuum. Just as the accomplishment > of activity is senen in the case of lamps, etc, which likewise exist by > way of continuity, so too there certainly does exist one who is bound by > the kamma of destroying life.” > ***** > In the commentary and sub commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta, we read > in detail about what is meant by conventional terms when it is said “in > looking straight on” or “in wearing the shoulder-cloak” and so on. We can > see from the following detail, how useful some understanding of abhidhamma > is when we read the suttas and these conventional terms. Clear > comprehension (sati and panna) should be developed at any time. The > following is from Soma Thera’s translation: > > “Within, it is said, there certainly is no self or soul which looks > straight on or looks away from the front. Still, at the arising of the > thought "I shall look straight on," and with that thought the process of > oscillation (vayo dhatu) originating from mind, [citta samutthana] > bringing into being bodily expression [viññatti] arises. Thus owing to the > diffusion of the process of oscillation born of mental activity > [cittakiriyavayodhatu vipphara], the lower eyelid goes down and the upper > eyelid goes up. Surely there is no one who opens with a contrivance. > > "Thereupon, eye-consciousness arises fulfilling the function of sight > [tato cakkhu viññanam dassana kiccam sadhentam uppajjati], it is said. > Clear comprehension of this kind here is indeed called the clear > comprehension of non-delusion [evam sampajananam panettha asammoha > sampajaññam nama]. Further, clear comprehension of non-delusion should be > also understood, here, through accurate knowledge of the root (mula > pariñña), through the casual state (agantuka bhava) and through the > temporary state [tavakalika bhava]. First (is the consideration) by way of > the accurate knowledge of the root: -- > > "There is (first) the mental state of the life-continum, > And (then) there are adverting, seeing, receiving, > Considering, determining, and impulsion > Which is seventh (in cognition's course). > > [bhavangavajjanañceva dassanam sampaticchanam > santiranam votthapanam javanam bhavati sattamam]. " > ***** > During our stay in Koh Samui, I was reading Nina’s “Conditions”, an > introduction to the Patthana (the last book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka) more > carefully and considering further the interplay of the various paccaya and > paccayupana (conditioning and conditioned dhammas). Understanding more > about conditions helps us to understand that what we take for people are a > variety of conditioned namas and rupas. “Each reality which arises does so > because of a concurrence of different conditions which operate in a very > intricate way” > > For example, under jhana paccaya, we learn that the jhana factors may be > wholesome or unwholesome: > > “When someone commits an unwholesome deed, such as killing, nåma and rúpa > which arise because of conditions perform their functions. The > dosa-múla-citta is accompanied by vitakka which is in this case thought of > violence, by vicåra which is occupied with the object, by unpleasant > feeling and by concentration which causes the citta to be firmly fixed on > the object. The akusala citta and the accompanying cetasikas and also the > mind-produced rúpa are conditioned by akusala > jhåna-factors,“strength-givers” or intensifying factors, by way of > jhåna-condition. When we perform a generous deed, the kusala citta and > accompanying cetasikas and also the mind produced rúpa are conditioned by > sobhana jhåna-factors by way of jhåna-condition. These dhammas are also > conditioned by root-condition, by faculty-condition and by several other > conditions. Thus, as we have seen, jhåna-factors are not only operating > while one cultivates jhåna, they are conditions which function time and > again in daily life, no matter whether we perform wholesome or unwholesome > deeds.” > > We also learn how rupa -jivitindriya (physical life faculty) maintains > rupas produced by kamma “as a wet-nure does a prince” (Vism X1V,59). > > As Nina writes: > “Life faculty is a condition for distinguishing kamma-produced rupa from > other kinds of rupa. We cling to the body which is alive, we cling to > eyesense and earsense and take them for self. they are only elements > maintained by life faculty, a kind of rupa which is not self.” > > Nama-jivitindriya is also life faculty, but in this case a cetasika > (mental factor) arising with every citta, controlling and maintaining the > life of the other namas and rupas. While there is life faculty, there will > be feelings. > > In other words, by understanding more about the various dhammas we learn > more about what ‘people’ really are. I find the following comments in the > last chapter of Nina’s book very helpful and I apologise for making a long > post longer (though I've just reduced it by half;-)): > ..... > “We are so used to the idea of seeing living beings, people and animals, > and we do not realize that we are deluded about reality because of our > accumulated ignorance and wrong view. When we watch T.V. and we see people > moving, we know that there are no people there. There are rapidly changing > projected images on a screen and this gives us the illusion that there are > people who are acting. These images are merely different colours which > appear through the eyesense and then we know the meaning of what we see, > we think of concepts on account of what we see. The same happens in real > life. There is seeing of visible object and then we take what we see for > people or things which last. Persons are not real in the ultimate sense, > no matter whether we see them on a screen or in the world around > us............ > > “The Buddha and the arahats also thought of concepts but they were not > deluded about them, they had no defilements on account of them. If we > cling to concepts and take them for things which really exist, which are > permanent or self, we are deluding ourselves. Clinging to concepts of > person or self leads to many other kinds of defilements, it leads to a > great deal of sorrow. > > When someone has lost a person who was dear to him he seems to live with > his memories of the person he loved, he lives with his dreams, with an > illusion. However, also when a beloved person is still alive we live with > our dreams; we take the person we believe we see, hear or touch for > reality. Someone who is in love with another person is actually in love > with his own concept of that person, with an idealized image he has of > that person. He does not have understanding of realities, of the different > cittas which arise because of their approriate conditions. When he finds > out that the image he has of another person is completely different from > reality he may experience disillusion. We may have idealized images of > other people and have expectations about them which cannot be realised. We > have learnt about nåma and rúpa and about the conditions for their > arising, but theoretical understanding is not enough. We should consider > ultimate realities in daily life. We tend to forget that seeing is only a > conditioned reality and that visible object is only a conditioned reality, > and therefore we are easily carried away by sense impressions..... > > “ If there can be mindfulness of one reality as it appears through one of > the six doors, we will know the difference between the moments of > mindfulness of a reality and the moments there is thinking of an image of > a “whole”, a person or a thing. By being mindful of just visible object or > sound we learn to distinguish between the objects appearing through the > five sense-doors and the mind-door. > When there is right understanding of a reality as it appears one at a > time, we do not expect other people to behave according to an idealized > image. Someone may insult us, but if we can see that there is nobody who > can hurt us we will be less inclined to take unjust treatment personally. > When words of praise and blame are spoken to us, the hearing is result > produced by kusala kamma or akusala kamma. When we think about the meaning > of the words which were spoken to us defilements tend to arise. We take > what we hear very seriously and we forget that what is experienced by > hearing is only sound. Depending on our accumulations we may be afflicted > on account of what is heard, we think about it for a long time. We are so > affected by what others say or do to us because of clinging to ourselves. > Life is short, a moment of experiencing an object is very short. If there > were no citta which experiences an object the world and everything in it > would not appear. The sotåpanna who has no more wrong view about person or > self understands that there are only conditioned nåma and rúpa, no > people.” > ***** > > The song (from memory) says that “People who need people are the luckiest > people alive”.....We can see that the study of paramatha dhammas goes > against the conventional flow of ideas and this is why the Buddha reminded > us that the truth is so very ‘hard to see’. > > Sarah > ==== 15338 From: bodhi2500 Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 5:29am Subject: Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi I understand that Nibbana is not mind, but the mind can take Nibbana (the absence of conditions)as a object, and that Khandhaparinibbana is the cessation of nama/rupa. But why is Nibbana sometimes refered to as a Nama,ie in Nina's ADL as Howard pointed out, and I think I remember a com. stating that Nibbana is called Nama because it bends the mind towards it(something like that). In this case in Nama being used in a namati sense of "bending towards" rather than anything to do with mind? This question has come up after going through Nina's Abhidhamma in daily life with someone, who sees "Nibbana is nama. However it is not citta or cetasika. Nibbana is the Nama that does not arise or fall away" ,then the convo goes> but I thought you said Nibbana was not mind, but it says here Nibbana is Nama, etc.. Thank-you Steve --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "bodhi2500" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abhidhammika" wrote: > > >Therefore, Nibbana is not mind. > > > > > > > Hi > > Could someone please explain why Nibbana is called a Nama. > > Seems confusing to say Nibbana is not mind ,but it is a Nama. > > > > Thank-you > > Steve > ___________________ > Dear Steve, > Suan gave this translation a while > >>>>Section 499, Kevatta Suttam, > Silakkhandhavagga, Dighanikayo > Kevatta Sutta tika > > "Ettha nama?a rupa?a, asesam uparujjhati > Viññanassa nirodhena, etthetam uparujjhati'ti". > > "Here (in nibbana), nama as well as rupa ceases without remainder. > By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here.">>>> > > But it is experienced by nama (not rupa). > Robert 15339 From: Sarah Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 5:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi Steve, (Rob K and all), Good to see you around;-) --- bodhi2500 wrote: > Hi > I understand that Nibbana is not mind, but the mind can take Nibbana > (the absence of conditions)as a object, and that Khandhaparinibbana > is the cessation of nama/rupa. But why is Nibbana sometimes refered > to as a Nama,ie in Nina's ADL as Howard pointed out, and I think I > remember a com. stating that Nibbana is called Nama because it bends > the mind towards it(something like that). > In this case in Nama being used in a namati sense of "bending > towards" rather than anything to do with mind? > ...... I've just fished out the following post of Nina's in full. I'm not sure how far it goes in answering the question, but it gives more info to work on. Sarah ================================== http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/6342 Subject: Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: . Nibbbana op 13-07-2001 15:12 schreef Derek Cameron op derekacameron@y...: I don't think anyone has yet mentioned the lines: "There > is, bhikkhus, a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not- > conditioned. If, bhikkhus, there were no not-born, not-brought-to- > being, not-made, not-conditioned, no escape would be discerned from > what is born, brought-to-being, made, conditioned. But since there is > a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not-conditioned, > therefore an escape is discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, > made, conditioned" (Udaana VIII.3, repeated at Itivuttaka 43). Dear Derek and all, I am glad you brought up this important text. I have noticed that people might think that nibbana is citta, or even right view which is panna cetasika. In that case nibbana would be conditioned, and there would not be the third noble Truth, no cessation of dukkha. Dukkha is the arising and falling away of conditioned dhammas. Citta experiences an object, it is conditioned by object-condition and several other conditions. Cetasika is conditioned by citta and several other conditions. When the Buddha was the Bodhisatta Sumedha he made the quest for the unconditioned, that which is not dukkha. See the Chronicle of the Buddhas (Buddhava'msa), Sumedha: < Sitting in seclusion I thought thus then:" Again-becoming is dukkha, also the breaking up of the physical frame. Liable to birth, liable to ageing, liable to disease am I then; I will seek the peace that is unageing, undying, secure." In the first book of the Abhidhamma, the Dhammasangani (Buddhist Psychological Ethics) Nibbana is referred to as the unconditioned element, asankhata dhatu (See Appendix II) and it is nama or arupa( non rupa), but it is different from conditioned nama, it does not experience an object. Realities are either nama or rupa, and since nibbana is not rupa it is classified as nama. Kom has explained very clearly about the classification of the four paramattha dhammas. We read in the Atthasalini, Expositor (II, Book II, Part II, Suttanta Couplets, 392) an explanation of nama. Nama is derived from namati, bending towards an object, and it can also be a name. Citta and cetasika bend towards an object, experience an object. And also: they cause one another to bend on to the object: "The four khandhas are name (nama) in the sense of bending, for they bend towards the object. In the sense of causing to bend all (of the foregoing, namely nibbana and the four nama khandhas) are "name" (nama). For the four khandhas cause one another to bend on to the object; and nibbana bends faultless dhammas on to itself by means of the causal relation of the dominant influence of the object." Thus, nibbana does not bend towards an object, it does not experience an object, but, it is predominant object condition for the lokuttara cittas that experience it, it bends them towards itself in that way. Buddhists take their refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the ariyan Sangha. At this moment we do not know what nibbana is like, and it makes no sense to speculate about it. We have confidence that there is a Path leading to the end of dukkha, and that there are people who have realised the third noble Truth by following this Path. We have to learn what dukkha is, the impermanence of nama and rupa. This can only be realized if we study now what nama is and what rupa is, so that their characteristics can be clearly distinguished, there is no other way. I liked what Robert said about awareness, even of attachment to right view, being aware again and again and again of the object at the very moment it appears, so that we come to know its true nature. Nina. 15340 From: Sarah Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 6:14am Subject: Buddhaghosa (was: Four Sublime States (long message)) Hi Rob M, --- robmoult wrote: > I agree that we should, as much as possible, limit ourselves to the > Suttas and ancient commentaries. On the other hand, I am sure that > five years after the Vissudhimagga was written, some contemporaries > dismissed it as "revolutionary, not fully supported by the Suttas". > It is amazing how much authority a few centuries can give :-) ..... I’m sure this is probably true. However, for your interest let me quote the following from “The Pali Literature of Ceylon” by G.P. Malalasekera: “Buddhaghosa’s fame spread far and wide, quite soon after the compilation of his monumental visuddhimagga; in his own lifetime his works were being assiduously studied in more than one country - in mid-India, in Ceylon, in unlettered Thaton, and lastly in Burma, where, as some believe, he spent the latter part of his life. He established the preeminence of Ceylon over all other countries in the genuineness of its traditional heritage of the Buddha’s religion, and justified her claim to be the home of the orthodox Thera-vaada of his days. Scholars were thus attracted to the island for purposes of study in even larger numbers than heretofore, and their visits, as we shall see later, resulted in the production of works of much value.” In an earlier quote, it says: “Perhaps Buddhaghosa’s greatest value to the modern historian lies in the very limitations of his mental powers*, such as originality and independence of thought, which were imposed upon him by his extreme reverence for all that was traditional. For him there was no development in the doctrine and all the texts were the words of the Master himself. for the correct understanding of that doctrine, however, Buddhaghosa’s work is indispensable.”** ..... * This may be misleading. I believe references suggest he was an arahat. ** Of course many debate this. Sarah ===== 15341 From: Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 2:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi, Sarah (and Steve, Rob, and, especially, Nina) - In a message dated 8/31/02 8:52:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Hi Steve, (Rob K and all), > > Good to see you around;-) > > --- bodhi2500 wrote: > Hi > > I understand that Nibbana is not mind, but the mind can take Nibbana > > (the absence of conditions)as a object, and that Khandhaparinibbana > > is the cessation of nama/rupa. But why is Nibbana sometimes refered > > to as a Nama,ie in Nina's ADL as Howard pointed out, and I think I > > remember a com. stating that Nibbana is called Nama because it bends > > the mind towards it(something like that). > > In this case in Nama being used in a namati sense of "bending > > towards" rather than anything to do with mind? > > > ...... > I've just fished out the following post of Nina's in full. I'm not sure > how far it goes in answering the question, but it gives more info to work > on. > Sarah > ================================== > > ttp://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/6342 > > Subject: Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: . Nibbbana > > op 13-07-2001 15:12 schreef Derek Cameron op derekacameron@y...: > I don't think anyone has yet mentioned the lines: "There > > is, bhikkhus, a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not- > > conditioned. If, bhikkhus, there were no not-born, not-brought-to- > > being, not-made, not-conditioned, no escape would be discerned from > > what is born, brought-to-being, made, conditioned. But since there is > > a not-born, a not-brought-to-being, a not-made, a not-conditioned, > > therefore an escape is discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, > > made, conditioned" (Udaana VIII.3, repeated at Itivuttaka 43). > > Dear Derek and all, I am glad you brought up this important text. I have > noticed that people might think that nibbana is citta, or even right view > which is panna cetasika. In that case nibbana would be conditioned, and > there would not be the third noble Truth, no cessation of dukkha. Dukkha > is > the arising and falling away of conditioned dhammas. Citta experiences an > object, it is conditioned by object-condition and several other > conditions. > Cetasika is conditioned by citta and several other conditions. > When the Buddha was the Bodhisatta Sumedha he made the quest for the > unconditioned, that which is not dukkha. See the Chronicle of the Buddhas > (Buddhava'msa), Sumedha: < Sitting in seclusion I thought thus then:" > Again-becoming is dukkha, also the breaking up of the physical frame. > Liable to birth, liable to ageing, liable to disease am I then; I will > seek > the peace that is unageing, undying, secure." > In the first book of the Abhidhamma, the Dhammasangani (Buddhist > Psychological Ethics) Nibbana is referred to as the unconditioned element, > asankhata dhatu (See Appendix II) and it is nama or arupa( non rupa), but > it > is different from conditioned nama, it does not experience an object. > Realities are either nama or rupa, and since nibbana is not rupa it is > classified as nama. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: So, by fiat, all dhammas are namas or rupas. But if nibbana is not cognitive in any sense whatsoever, why is it not, then, a rupa? ----------------------------------------------------------- Kom has explained very clearly about the> > classification > of the four paramattha dhammas. > We read in the Atthasalini, Expositor (II, Book II, Part II, Suttanta > Couplets, 392) an explanation of nama. Nama is derived from namati, > bending > towards an object, and it can also be a name. Citta and cetasika bend > towards an object, experience an object. And also: they cause one another > to > bend on to the object: "The four khandhas are name (nama) in the sense of > bending, for they bend towards the object. In the sense of causing to bend > all (of the foregoing, namely nibbana and the four nama khandhas) are > "name" > (nama). > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: But nama pertains to bending *towards*, not *causing* something else to bend towards it. -------------------------------------------------- For the four khandhas cause one another to bend on to the object;> > and nibbana bends faultless dhammas on to itself by means of the causal > relation of the dominant influence of the object." -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Talking about "bending", I find this not just a stretch, but a *contortion*! ------------------------------------------------ > Thus, nibbana does not bend towards an object, it does not experience an > object, but, it is predominant object condition for the lokuttara cittas > that experience it, it bends them towards itself in that way. > -------------------------------------------------- Howard: That makes it closer to being a rupa (towards which the mind bends) than a nama (which does the bending). ------------------------------------------------ > Buddhists take their refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the ariyan > Sangha. > At this moment we do not know what nibbana is like, and it makes no sense > to > speculate about it. We have confidence that there is a Path leading to the > end of dukkha, and that there are people who have realised the third noble > Truth by following this Path. We have to learn what dukkha is, the > impermanence of nama and rupa. This can only be realized if we study now > what nama is and what rupa is, so that their characteristics can be > clearly > distinguished, there is no other way. I liked what Robert said about > awareness, even of attachment to right view, being aware again and again > and again of the object at the very moment it appears, so that we come to > know its true nature. > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: If one were to take the position that nibbana, being the absence of all conditions, is sui generis, neither nama nor rupa, but, like all the conditioned dhammas, takable as an object, I would find that a bit more reasonable. But even that would be troublesome to me. The notion of the unconditioned dhamma serving as object for a conditioned dhamma, namely citta, is at best odd. It seems to me plausible that there could be the awareness of the *imminence* of cessation (or even of the cessation, itself, i.e., the *entry* to nibbana), a kind of an experiencing of nibbana at a distance like the feeling when one is *about* to pass out (or is passing out), or *about* to drop off to sleep (or is dropping off to sleep). If that is what it means for lokutara cittas to experience nibbana, that would make sense to me. It would amount to the awareness by conditioned dhammas of their imminent demise, which might correspond to what the Zen Buddhists sometimes describe as water breaking through the bottom of the bucket. But nibbana, itself, the utter absence of all conditions, does not strike me as something which is cognizable by conditioned cittas, nor could it be something which could serve as object, in the usual sense of 'object', even for itself. If nibbana is nama, that nama would have to be a nondual awareness radically different from all conditioned nama, close, perhaps, to what the Zen people mean by 'no-mind'. It would have to be an awareness without an object, and, in that case, even using the word 'awareness' is misleading, because nibbana is totally "other" from anything we have known. That, and only that, would satisfactorily account for nibbana being nama, from my perspective. It seems to me that nibbana, the summum bonum, is not a darkness, but a light, not dead, but alive, not avijja, but vijja. That would make sense to me. --------------------------------------------- > Nina. > ====================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15342 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 11:27am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Robert > > k: It always nice to see u here :) Same here, Kenneth. I was happy to see you posting too! > > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. > > Not = no. No self. Atta is > > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You > > can argue that anatta is > > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's > > personal self, but if that is > > the case there is really no difference between > > Hinduism and Buddhism. > > k: If you argue in this way, there will be no end. > Just like impermenance is the opposite of permanent. > Anatta is applied to everything not just objects. Oh I agree. The question is, can you perceive the anatta-nature of oneself? I think some on dsg have argued that you can't see the anatta-ness of oneself, because one cannot look at something that doesn't exist [oneself] as an object and perceive its nature; at least that's the way I understand it. They would therefore say, again as I understand it [and ready to be corrected] that one can only gain panna towards the anatta of a dhamma - an object - and by doing so, one gets rid of attachement to the things of this world and this life as 'oneself'. I think that one would see the 'anatta' or 'non-self' of oneself as being a concept, perhaps a wise concept, but a concept none-the-less. Now I have had the experience which for me at least seemed like a strong insight experience, of looking back at my own thoughts, feelings, etc. and realizing that there was no 'self' to be found in any of that, that the awareness by which I was 'looking within' was impersonal and there was no 'Robert' present in any of that. To me that experience was one of seeing that the presumption of self was a concept; and to me, that seems like a realization of 'anatta' on the personal level. In other words, by directly seeing that there is not 'self' within, one realizes the anatta-nature of the presumed self. But what does one actually perceive in such a moment? Is it a direct perception of something, or is it a concept? I am not sure how to evaluate that, but in the moment that it happened it was a very liberating shock to the system. Then one can witness the arising of various things in the moment without overlaying it all the time with a sense of 'someone perceiving it'. But I am not sure how to define that experience in terms of namas and rupas, in terms of which we could discuss it here on dsg, because it is the perception of something that one thought was there NOT being there; it is the removal of a concept; but how is that perceived without another concept that notices and compares the absence? Or are there mental factors that can account for this kind of change within a particular citta? > By the way when you mention about Hinduism, are these > Hinduism concepts exist before when Buddha is around > or evolve after Buddha enters Nibbana. I don't think > earlier Hindusim (Vedaism - hope I get the spelling > right) talks abt non-clinging. It is more likely, > these concepts abt non clinging are borrowed from > Buddhism (no offense please). I think the Vedas are pretty good in most departments and I don't think they borrowed from Buddhism. I'm pretty sure they pre-date the teachings of the Buddha. The point is that they do deal with non-clinging to objects and self; and they do deal with the impermanence of the body and self-concept. The primary difference between most Hindu teachings and Buddhism is that Hinduism still postulates a soul or Atman which is an inner self or higher self; a spiritual self that replaces the lower psychophysical self; while Buddhism says that the structures of the psychophysical self do not constitute a true self or entity; but there is no 'higher' or 'inner' self to replace it; instead there is just the arising of consciousness within the structures of living and the relinquishment of that in the realization of Nibbana. Then within Buddhism you have the arguments about what the Enlightened experience is like WITHOUT a higher or inner self, and what the implications are of dis-identifying with the khandas and storehouse consciousness when there is no self left over of any kind. Some schools of Buddhism will argue that there is a primal nature that takes the place of the self-concept and is discovered; or which can be called Buddha-nature as one's true self. Or that there is a primal awareness which is shown to be impersonal and not contained by the khandas, which tends to be my point of view. But in Theravada most schools I think tend towards the self being a false construct and there really being nothing to take its place except the experience of living itself which arises impersonally without a self and is fully realized as such in Enlightenment. > Hinduism > > also teaches total non-clinging and > > non-identification with external objects of > > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of > > the mind leads to cessation of > > the continued round of birth and death. The > > non-existence of Atta or Atman [the > > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] > > is the radical difference > > between most schools of Hinduism and all of > > Buddhism. > > > k: Why "non-clinging and non-identification with > external objects of desire", since everything is > inside. Inside what? : ) You are still affirming an inside. If you affirm an inside you affirm an outside. Are you saying 'inside the body'? Inside the mind? What is there to be inside or outside of? When I say external objects of desire, I should say 'seeming external objects of desire, and mean that they are outside the body. One grasps at food, sex, people and relationships, precious things, memories, a favorite song, whatever one treasures. These objects of clinging are temporary and dissatisfying in the long run and have no real nature to hold onto, so they cause suffering. If one clings to self-concept or clings to the young body and doesn't want it to grow old or die, these are then seemingly external objects of desire as well, since they become the separate objects that the self tries to hold onto. When clinging is let go of because we see the nature of these objects and realize they are causes of suffering rather than satisfaction, then we get rid of the suffering that is consequent on our dependence on these things. That's my understanding of that aspect of the relationship of the Buddhist to the world, simplistic though it may be. If Hinduism taught that by non clinging to > external objects is the way then they have a big > problem bc I dont believe in blaming external things > for my weaknesses. It is all inside :). It's not a matter of blaming external things, but seeing that one is attached to them. One has to, as you say, acknowledge that the attachment is one's own, not the objects, but what is it that we attach this clinging to? Whatever it is, we have to let go of it, don't we? When we let go, it is 'our' clinging that we let go of, but it is always attached to an object of some kind, whether a 'big important' object like our own body, or the presence of a loved one, or just to food and sex, or a favorite habit. Can you think of a clinging that doesn't have an object? We can even be attached to enlightenment, and I bet everyone here has that problem! : 0 But I dont > think I know Hinduisim concepts very well, even if it > is similar, we should not be worry :). But there is > one thing Hinduisim dont talk as much as Buddha, the > consistent method in the eradication of moha. Well, Hinduism is quite concerned with elminating ignorance through systematic means, such as meditation, karma yoga, which is going through life not seeing oneself as the 'doer', but merely as the witness that experiences, and a lot of othe sophisticated methods. It is not really necessary to compare them against each other, because Buddhism is chosen for its very specific path and teachings. My point was just that if one does not include anatta in their understanding, that the unique essence of Buddhism is lost. Anatta is a very tough thing to swallow, it is much colder than the Hindu Atman or Brahman. To me, Buddhism in that sense is only for those who can handle anatta. It is really not pleasant to the 'ego' to contemplate no-self and the emptiness of all things. Hinduism gives one a slightly more pleasant carpet to sit on while eradicating self-concept. Buddhism is much more direct in that sense. And not for the weak of heart or stomach. But that is not to say that Hinduism is more primitive than Buddhism. It is extremely sophisticated in its analysis of life, and has a lot of comparable features to Buddhism. I have always had an interest in both, so I naturally include them in my understanding, but I understand perfectly that a lot of Buddhists aren't interested in the Hindu teachings at all, and that is just fine. I just think at times we can learn something from a specific comparision, since they are two of the main religions of the East. Taoism also has some interesting things in it which have Buddhist parallels, but I won't go into that since it's not really appropriate for people's interests here. > > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a > > different moment right now? Or do > > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? > > Answer according to your > > actual experience, and you will have a hard time > > finding where you can choose. In > > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? > > When you make the final > > decision, is there some way in which you finally > > decide, or does it just happen > > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is > > actually an illogical conceptual > > construct. > > > > k: Good questions and difficult to answer :). As I > said before, if there is no choice why are you reading > DSG mails :). Because I am? Why have a choice? I AM reading the dsg mails when I read them, and at that time, I can't really choose not to. It seems that I read when I read and I stop when I stop. Sometimes I want to stop and can't!!! : / If you said you are conditioned by your > lobha or panna (to learn more), your actions are > conditined by other cetasikas - you are not wrong. > But if there is no power to choice then we might as > well dont learn Buddhism at all since there is nothing > we could choose to change our present and future state No, I think that's a point of confusion. Of course it makes a difference to learn Buddhism. I'm just arguing that you did not necessarily choose to do so. The fact that you are doing it makes the same enormous difference whether you chose it or not. But I think there is some value to seeing that you are just drawn into what you wind up doing by circumstances and the responses of your consciousness, and that it just happens the way it does. You don't stop and go: wait a minute, do I want to do this? Life happens instantaneously, and you find yourself doing it, 'choosing' it if you like, but without a choice. : - / I think if you look at it this way it is good, because it just cuts out the self concept very neatly. If you are not making choices isn't that disappointing in a way? Like there's no one there? Well, that's the point. The conciousness which is disappointed by that is that consciousness that clings to the concept of self. When you let it go, there's nothing there but what's there at the moment. This is what there is to deal with. > R: Do we choose to choose > > K: Definitely we choose to choose :) Really? Or is that just another thought that arises? Is that a self > that choose, if we are conditioned by moha yes there > is a self, Really? What does it look like? We use self as if we know what it is, but it is hard to describe it, because it really is a concept, or a conglomeration of impressions in the mind. if we are conditoined by pana, there is no > self involved (just like Arahats) :) > > R: Who chooses freely? > > k: We cannot choose freely bc we are conditioned, > but remembers that does not imply we cannot choose to > choose :) Why would that be unconditioned? Dont take cetana as a self, bc it takes > many more cetasikas before cetana could decide. Well, it sounds like it's all process to me. I still don't see where the choice comes in. Maybe > I should said there is no such thing as free will but > there is such a thing as the power of choice/volition. I like volition better than choice, because volition has the sense of being something that arises in conciousness and has energy. I can imagine volition just coming up out of causal factors, whereas choice to me definitely implies that there is a self, a someone, making that choice. And that is the opposite of anatta, as far as I can tell. > As I said b4, it is a wonderful paradox :). Well, the paradox to me is that we can *think* there is a self and be so convinced of it, while there really isn't a being or entity. There is a living physical organism, there is a brain which generates thoughts. There are desires and perceptions which go back to the body and are processed by the brain. But there really isn't a 'self' in the middle of all that taking it all in. There is only consciousness taking it all in, and that consciousness is just a function, it isn't a 'you' or an 'I'. 'Self' seems to be a concept, a myth, an imposition of the mind on reality. It really is like a unicorn, it's attractive but isn't really there. Best, Robert 15343 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 1:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Formal meditation practice (was, Anapanasati and Mindfulness Practice) Dear Jon, Thank you for jumping in to clarify your view, and please consider it a standing invitation. : ) I take it, based on what you say here, that you would consider it more efficacious to discern naturally arising dhammas than to engage in formal mediatation practice? This has been my impression, but I just want to make sure I'm hearing you correctly. I have interspersed a few more comments below towards this subject. And thank you for engaging with me in this area. --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > ...Just a slight clarification here, Rob. I think what I probably said was > that the teachings do not talk about formal meditation practice, in the > sense of making a distinction between that and daily life/daily life > practice, nor in my view do they prescribe sitting, slow walking/moving, > or selecting a particular object or range of objects as being practices > conducive to the development of insight. > > I would not ascribe this view to the Abhidhamma in particular, but rather > to an understanding of the suttas read together with the commentaries and > the Abhidhamma (it is after all a subject spoken of at length in the sutta > texts). When you say this subject is spoken of at length in the sutta texts, as well as the Abhidhamma commentaries, are there places in the suttas where it is actually said that one would progress more naturally in the development of panna and sati by discerning naturally arising objects, and that one should not engage in formal meditation practice? Or do you think it's a case of both being described and it being left up to the individual to exercise his own discrimination? Do you think it is implied that the purposeful taking of an object of meditation creates an obstacle to the development of sati and panna? If so, are there suttas that describe this, or would it be in the commentaries? I am not quite sure what you are saying is discussed at length in the suttas. If there is any caution expressed towards formal meditation, I would be very interested to see that. > The comment about formal practice taking one away form the present moment > is not something I have seen stated as such in the texts, but is an > attempt at an explanation of the difference between awareness naturally > arising on the one hand and directed attention on the other. I just wonder if that difference is actually described in the suttas or the commentaries. Or on what basis this explanation is based. I keep contending that it seems to be more like a feeling amongst abhidhammists that formal meditation is not the way to go, but I am still not sure what teachings this is really based on, or whether it is a kind of traditional understanding that has grown up over the centuries because of abhidhamma's emphasis on seeing rupas and namas as they occur in life. Best, Robert Ep. 15344 From: robmoult Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 1:40pm Subject: Re: Buddhaghosa (was: Four Sublime States (long message)) Hi Sarah, The Visuddhimagga is an amazing piece of literature and I have incredible respect for Buddhaghosa. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Rob M, > > --- robmoult wrote: > > > I agree that we should, as much as possible, limit ourselves to the > > Suttas and ancient commentaries. On the other hand, I am sure that > > five years after the Vissudhimagga was written, some contemporaries > > dismissed it as "revolutionary, not fully supported by the Suttas". > > It is amazing how much authority a few centuries can give :-) > ..... > I'm sure this is probably true. However, for your interest let me quote > the following from "The Pali Literature of Ceylon" by G.P. Malalasekera: > > "Buddhaghosa's fame spread far and wide, quite soon after the compilation > of his monumental visuddhimagga; in his own lifetime his works were being > assiduously studied in more than one country - in mid-India, in Ceylon, in > unlettered Thaton, and lastly in Burma, where, as some believe, he spent > the latter part of his life. He established the preeminence of Ceylon > over all other countries in the genuineness of its traditional heritage of > the Buddha's religion, and justified her claim to be the home of the > orthodox Thera-vaada of his days. Scholars were thus attracted to the > island for purposes of study in even larger numbers than heretofore, and > their visits, as we shall see later, resulted in the production of works > of much value." > > In an earlier quote, it says: > > "Perhaps Buddhaghosa's greatest value to the modern historian lies in the > very limitations of his mental powers*, such as originality and > independence of thought, which were imposed upon him by his extreme > reverence for all that was traditional. For him there was no development > in the doctrine and all the texts were the words of the Master himself. > for the correct understanding of that doctrine, however, Buddhaghosa's > work is indispensable."** > ..... > > * This may be misleading. I believe references suggest he was an arahat. > ** Of course many debate this. > > Sarah > ===== 15345 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 1:50pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > < must be sitting to attain enlightenment, or that enlightenment only comes > through meditation. I am looking to have meditation included as an > expedient means in your purview, not to exclude other practices.>> > > [Jon:] > The purpose of meditation, generally speaking, is to focus on particular > (chosen) things by excluding others. This is done, as I understand it, so > as to perceive the chosen things more clearly, or perhaps to perceive the > qualities of impermanence or not-self. > > Satipatthana is the direct experience at some level of a > presently-appearing dhamma, as it truly is. > > The difference between the two may not be readily apparent, but it has to > do with perceiving whatever is as it actually is rather than perceiving > what is really our preconceived idea of how things are. This as I see it > is the danger in focussing on what we believe to be dhammas, or in trying > to see by directed attention what we believe to be the characteristics of > anicca, dukkha and anatta as we understand them to be. Thanks, Jon, for your comments. I understand what you are saying better than I sometimes have in the past. As usual, the post I wrote just before this crosses partially with this one, so please forgive any redudancy. It seems to me that the problem of looking for what one thinks are 'the real dhamma's through formal focus on an object is a real one, and I think this is at least taken into account, if not totally resolved, in meditation instruction. There is no doubt that many meditators will focus on what they think is the correct object of discernment, and that many of these practices may be misdirected. There are forms of meditation that do not have this trap, I think, but many forms do. It is easy to conceptualize the practice as it is easy to conceptualize the goals of Buddhism in general. One of the ways in which I think serious meditators work with this problem is to gradually notice when concepts are occurring, and place attention on the real object. If breath is the object, the goal is to follow the breath closely enough that one begins to discern the actual sensations, feelings, perceptions, thoughts, etc., that arise with the breath. The breath is a focal point for focussing on the experience of dhammas as they arise. So to some extent the intention is to let go of concepts and go to the experiences themselves. There is also a form of zen meditation that seems to have a kinship with adhidhamma in this way. It is called shikantaza, and it is an attempt to practice complete awareness of whatever arises in the moment. It does entail the formal act of sitting, but then one focusses upon whatever arises and attempts to discern it just as it is, without concept. The practice of 'choiceless awareness', taking in exactly what is as it arises, seems similar to what you talk about in discerning everyday objects as they arise. The only difference is there is a formal sitting practice in which this is done. I just mention this to point out that not all forms of meditation take a formal object. Some are devoted, as is abhidhamma, to taking in realities just as they are, just as they arise, just as adhidhamma does. I will also mention in passing, that some of the criticisms or warnings that you have regarding formal meditation that insists on its specific object of discernment, is shared by some of the meditation teachers who are also interested in the 'highest' practice, which is understanding reality as it truly is. One Mahayana teacher that I have exchanged correspondence with says that the ultimate meditation practice is to practice free and open awareness towards whatever arises in life, having mindfulness towards whatever arises, without particularly clinging to either the awareness or the discernment of the object. In this practice of 'meditation', there is really no formal meditation left. So there are practitioners in various fields of Buddhist practice that share some of your concerns and interests. I still feel, however, that to get to this point, it may not be enough to start and end with naturally occurring dhammas in the midst of the distractions of life. It seems to me that some development of concentration and awareness is necessary to focus consciousness on its own object with mindfulness. After all, everyone is practicing the discernment of everyday objects. They just discern them through ignorance and habit instead of discernment. So there is still a question as to what prepares or focusses the attention on the correct discernment of realities. To me, practicing this focus and experiencing discernment of a 'special object' such as the breath, has limitations, but also has great benefits. Then it is a question of going beyond one's concept of practice and ultimately applying it to all of living experience. But there is an equal danger of thinking one is progressing by having the 'concept' of discerning everyday objects arising when one may just be going the normal course conceptualizing objects as they arise, and thinking that the concept of discernment is actually the discernment. With or without mediation, I don't think anyone functioning through consciousness can avoid the challenge of recognizing concepts and preconceptions and going beyond them. I truly wonder whether the decision to discern everyday objects rather than engage in formal practice causes one to progress past concepts more or less effectively, and I wonder whether there's any way to say that one is a more certain path than the other. I do think that the admonitions of some on this list should be taken: Before we criticize the practice of everyday discernment we should try it ourselves; and before we decide that meditation is either harmful or superfluous we should attempt to practice it and see what the actual experience yields. Since Buddha mentioned both of these practices prominently in his descriptions, it would be a mistake in my view to dismiss either one of them without engaging with them, perhaps a really dangerous mistake, since the Buddha clearly had a lot to say, and therefore may well have supported the practice, of both. For all we know, both formal and everyday practice may be necessary in order to reach enlightenment. Best, Robert Ep. 15346 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 2:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Anapanasati and Mindfulness Practice Hi Jon. Interesting points. You point out that Buddha does not ever refer to 'mindfulness of breathing' practice as 'breathing meditation'. I assume that by this you mean that he has not referred to one sitting and engaging in mindfulness of breathing as a sitting meditation practice. Do you think that he was advocating following the specific breathings, long, short, etc., with mindfulness of the body and the four foundations, while going through the ordinary activities of daily living? I will admit that this possibility had never even occurred to me. I would personally think that to discern the specifics of the breathing while washing dishes, attending a meeting at the office, or driving one's car would be an exceedingly advanced practice, and that the sutta is directed towards the development of full awareness of the breathing while sitting in meditation in a quiet place by oneself or with other monks. If you are envisioning the discernment of the breath during everyday activities, please let me know. It is sitting and focussing on the breathing that I am considering to be 'meditation', nothing more complicated than that. And then, following the Buddha's instructions for discerning the various aspects of the breath and body and mind that he describes. I think I am correct in saying that this is the way that a vast majority of Buddhists interpret the Sutta and how it is to be practiced. How ever, you may be correct that sitting and focussing on the breathing in a formal session may not be explicitly mentioned in the sutta. So I will ask you, what is your impression of the conditions under which the sutta is meant to be practiced, and if you feel it is meant to be applied as the discernment of other everyday objects would be practiced? More comments below. I have snipped most or all of my own remarks, which you quoted and arranged very expeditiously. I thank you for taking my words seriously enough to do that work. I appreciate it quite a lot. --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > [Jon:] > You seem to be suggesting that unless it can be shown that 'meditation' > (whatever that may mean if this context) has been specifically excluded by > the Buddha *in a particular sutta* that it should be taken as an > acceptable means of practice for the purposes of that sutta. I was thinking more of the 'practice of mindfulness of the breathing' itself, which I was calling 'meditation'. Honestly, it never occurred to me that Buddha could be advocating the mindfulness of breathing practice outside of the setting of sitting meditation in this sutta. I do not deny the great efficacy of practicing mindfulness of the breathing in everyday life, something which I have tried to do as much as possible myself, not necessarily with great success. : ) But as I said above, I would consider that an extremely difficult exercise, especially with all the specifics of the Four Foundations that Buddha describes. It just sounds like a very concentrated formal practice to me. But with your comments on this I realize that there is at least a possibility that I am wrong about that. I am anxious to hear how you think the Buddha meant for this practice to be carried out. > That would mean ignoring other suttas (like the Satipatthana Sutta, which > has been the subject of this thread up to now -- not trying to change the > subject, I hope ;-) ) which might suggest that the Buddha's actual views > were to the contrary (particularly in the passage I quoted in my earlier > post). > > Would you agree that the Anapanasati Sutta is an elaboration of a > particular passage within the Satipatthana Sutta and, as such, should be > read in the overall context of the Satipatthana Sutta? I'm afraid that's a little beyond me to say. I certainly think they cross-reference each other, but I would have to look more closely to see one as the elaboration of the other. The anapanasati sutta is certainly aimed towards satipatthana, so in that way they are deeply related. But the way in which mindfulness of breathing is described in the anapanasati sutta also seems very complete and independent in the way it is composed. I think I would probably say, 'both are true'. [Jon:] > The sutta talks about *mindfulness of breathing* and its development, so I > wonder what specifically you mean by *breathing meditation* and why you > prefer this way of referring to the sutta. Just my own presumption that meditation would be the setting for this practice, and of course, I am used to Theravada traditions which have interpreted it that way for centuries. Where exactly is the reference > to 'meditation' in the sutta? Do the 2 terms mean the same to you or > something different? Well, they don't mean the exact same thing to me. Certainly, all Theravada traditions allow for the possibility and importance of practicing satipatthana in everyday life. This cannot be overly stressed. On the other hand, every single Theravada tradition I have run across -- and have not been a deep practitioner of most of them -- has also stressed the absolute necessity of meditation to achieve this potentiality, and have moreover stressed that meditation practicing mindfulness of the breathing is the core practice by which this capacity is developed. Honestly, Abhidhamma is the only tradition I have personally ever come across that casts any doubt on this. I think the long-standing tradition of almost all Theravadan practices are to stress Sutta reading, sitting and walking meditation, and application of mindfulness to the objects and situations of everyday life, probably in that order. > [Rob:] > < recently, but is worthy of repetition in this discussion: > > << = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = > > <<"Mindfulness of in-&-out breathing, when developed & pursued, is of > great fruit, of great benefit. Mindfulness of in-&-out breathing, when > developed & pursued, brings the four frames of reference to their > culmination. The four frames of reference, when developed & pursued, bring > the seven factors for Awakening to their culmination. The seven factors > for Awakening, when developed & pursued, bring clear knowing & release to > their culmination. > (Mindfulness of In-&-Out Breathing) > > <<"Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as > to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination? ... > > << = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = > > < meditation. ... > [Jon:] > I have no argument whatsoever about the significance or importance of > mindfulness of breathing (anapanasati), either as an aspect of samatha > (and in that regard as a means of attaining jhana), or as part of the > first of the 4 foundations of mindfulness. I believe however that each of > these 2 meanings of mindfulness of breathing/anapanasati needs to be > understood quite separately. (Neither, by the way, is referred to in the > texts as breathing meditation.) Either the meditative component is taken for granted as being so, or, as you say, it is omitted because it is not being promoted as the practice medium for mindfulness. I would look to the Theravadan commentaries and traditions as a whole to make a judgment on this. I don't personally know the answer. But there must be ancient commentaries apart from the Abhidhamma that scholars would know of -- perhaps some here?? That would either affirm or contradict the notion that meditation was or was not assumed by the ancients for the practice of mindfulness. I wonder if there are living traditions of Theravada that can still trace the verbal teachings of the early Arahants back to their roots? I have no idea if this is the case. > You ask why, out of all the 'practices', mindfulness of breathing has been > singled out for its own sutta. If we had access to the commentary we > would probably have an authoratitive anser to that question. My own > thoughts on this (for what they are worth) are that mindfulness of > breathing *as an aspect of samatha* was a fairly widespread practice > amongst ascetics at the time of the Buddha, with many attaining to the > level of jhana, and it was for the benefit of monks with this level of > attainment and others like them or potentially so, i.e., skilled in > samatha but not yet attained to enlightenment, that the Anapanasati Sutta > was taught. Well, I certainly think this is a possibility, but it neither affirms nor denies the possibility of the Buddha promoting mindfulness of the breathing as a most efficacious practice, worthy of his detailed commentary in any case. It is hard to know. What is without doubt then, is that either the Buddha granted special attention to this subject because of his knowledge that it was especially efficacious for the practice of mindfulness, and/or because the highly developed practitioners of his day had used discernment of the breathing as a vehicle to reach a very high state of readiness for his teaching on mindfulness. In either case, it seems apparent that the practice of discerning the breathing as an object of mindfulness was a most efficacious practice, and that the breathing must therefore be a most efficacious object for discernment. So the only question remaining is really whether the Buddha approved or promoted of sitting formally while doing this, or whether he was equally happy to have it practiced in everyday life without any formal meditation. We have covered a lot, but still cannot settle the main object of our discussion! Best, Robert Ep. 15347 From: robmoult Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 2:19pm Subject: Speech and Intentions was (Re: Updated Class Notes Now On-Line) Hi Christine, A couple of comments inserted below... --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote > Most people would easily see the harm in false speech and there > seems to be a tendency to see Slander also as false speech - but > Bhikkhu Bodhi says Slanderous Speech can be factually true. One > form of Slanderous Speech is 'speech intended ...... to alienate one > person or group from another'. > Whereas those abstaining from Slanderous Speech "unite those that are > divided; .... and it is concord that he spreads by his words." > Slanderous speech creates weighty kamma because it is rooted in hate > and usually occurs after deliberation. Many people do not realise > that in producing Slanderous speech (or writing) - which may or may > not be 'true' - the ramifications and hurt to others is serious. ========= In a recent talk, Bro. Teo commented that we have to be careful of the term slanderous speech. In Pali, I believe that the term is "pisunaya vacaya". Bro Teo mentioned that in Bhikkhu Bodhi's more recent writings, "pisunaya vacaya" has been translated as "divisive speech" - speech intended to divide. Certainly "divisive speech" has slightly different baggage associated with it when compared to "slanderous speech". In the next edition of Class Notes, I will add a (divisive) after every instance of "slanderous". There is always a problem trying to capture the complete meaning when translating (even for modern languages). This is why I typically put multiple English words for each Cetasiaka in the Class Notes; one should understand the Pali term as a combination of all of the English words. ========= One > can often hear people say in justification of the pain they have > caused "Well, it's the truth and it needed to be said/done for the > good of everyone" .... Does the Law that all will receive their > vipaka according to their cetana cetasika, mean that those with > little insight or compassion can go through life causing pain by > their speech and writing, yet claim truthfully that it was not their > intention and so receive no vipaka? Or does the magnitude of the > consequences to others of someone's actions affect the magnitude of > their vipaka? Say signing a letter (true or not) that has the > consequence of excluding someone from many of the meaningful > activities, which gave them fulfullment and happiness in life? ========= The ethical quality of an action depends largely on the volition. When it comes to harsh speech, divisive speech or idle chatter, the "truthfulness" of the subject matter is not relevant. Take a look at the table on P. 13 of Class Notes; it is the damage caused or the virtue of the other party or the frequency that impact the kammic weight of the action. ========= > > A little further along in the class notes, it says 'When the > intentions are right, the action will be right' - not sure I agree > with this. Apart from the example above to do with speech, most > intentions can be carried out in multiple ways, don't you think? > Take my Occasional Kitchen Rat (Rachel) [please do!] My intention > is to have a rat-free kitchen - there are a number of actions that ===== And what is the motivation behind this intention? Is it kusala or aksuala? (Rachel paid me to ask this question :-) ) ===== > could spring from this intention - most not acceptable to Rachel the > Rat Being.... either depriving her (and her dependants) of food, > accommodation or life. (Sadly, she hasn't fallen for the non- harming > rat trap and 'a nice drive in the country' gambit) Are one class of > beings more valuable, of higher status, than another - in the sense > that if any of the ten courses of unwholesome kamma are performed > regarding one "continually self-consuming process of arising and > passing bodily and mental phenomena" (say a human) - is the vipaka > different than if they are performed for any other (say Rachel the > Rat) process? ========= Again, P.13 of Class Notes indicates the "class" of beings (see remarks under "killing"). "Large animals more serious than small animals, humans more serious than animals. Virtuous being more serious than non-virtuous being." Christine, I am glad that you find the Class Notes useful. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15348 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 2:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Walking meditation (was, A Minor Point ...etc) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Anyway, what do you mean by 'walking meditation'? Is it something that > complements 'sitting meditation', or is it a different practice in itself? Dear Jon, In my limited experience with formal Theravadan meditation practice, sitting and walking meditation were interspersed as two ways of practicing mindfulness. In sitting meditation with breathing as the object [there were sometimes other objects, such as sound, and there is also a meditation on eating in which one eats slowly and silently and pays close attention to each of the individual experiences of the eating process, usually glossed over by inattention and concept] one would practice mindfulness of the breathing, and in the Theravadan tradition I happened to be involved with at the time, would use the device of 'noting' the breath to involve the mind in the attention to breathing. One would 'note' gently with the mind 'rising' and 'falling' with the in and out breath, if the place of following the breath were the 'belly'. It was also possible to note breathing out and breathing in at the nostrils or with other locations of the breath. One would follow the attention and see where it went, if it departed from the breath and note what it did, such as 'thinking', 'imagining', 'feeling discomfort'; whatever the object of attention was. The noting was a gross method for sort of marking one's place and one would hopefully go beyond this to discern the exact sensation or thought or movement of the breath to the extent possible. To break up the sitting sessions, one would have a silent meal at one point, walking meditations at certain points, and in one retreat I attended, some time just walking around silently being aware of whatever was around one in the area and how it was experienced. In the walking meditations, the mindfulness was turned towards the walking itself. One would either just walk, noticing the sensation of the feet moving into the ground, down and up, etc., or one could silently note the walking. I don't remember the actual word used, whether it was something like 'stepping', 'stepping', or something to that effect, but in any case it was again just a reminder towards the act of stepping down and the associated sensations, to practice mindfulness of the action as it took place. The accumulation of these different meditations did lead to a sense of mindfulness being more available and the specific noticing of whatever was arising at other times was intensified. Best, Robert Ep. 15349 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 2:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Supportive spiritual practices --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > Among other psychophysical disciplines that come out of spiritual > tradition, there are some things in common with yoga and some that > diverge. For instance, t'ai chi and yoga both have techniques that > increase circulation of prana/ch'i; but they do it in different ways. > They both have the overall goal to spiritualize both the body and mind; > they both have a set of postures through which the spiritual energy and > awareness is brought into the body. Yoga has stretch which not only makes > the body more flexible and open, but opens up of the nadis [psychic nerve > passageways] as well; T'ai Chi opens the psychic nerve passageways without > a lot of stretching. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > [Jon:] > But pointing out aspects in common doesn't really prove anything, in fact > only confuses the issue. There can be any number of similarities between > 2 teachings, but it is the differences that one needs to appreciate. > Trying to be ecumenical about it is to miss the point entirely, in my view > ;-)) why? I would think one would need evidence for the similarities being totally arbitrary, just as one might ask proof that they are associated. One point, from my perspective, is that there are certain structures in spiritual practice that are 'natural' to be included in one way or another, and different traditions tackle them in different ways. I do tend to be ecumenical, because I believe that all human beings, for the most part, have two arms, two legs, and a similar mind, likewise a similar spiritual component that we are born with, and it only remains as to how one is going to deal with it. But all beings learn to walk without consulting with each other, and likewise, every single human culture has a spiritual tradition because of our spiritual nature. No, it's not a coincidence. The Buddha may be spot-on where others are vague, but everyone is up to the same endeavor at root. Samsara is not a construction of Buddhism, it is the condition we are all in, and we all have to struggle with it with our minds. When spiritual interest dawns in a being, he or she begins to search for a means of getting out of the present mess, and out of this we seek a spiritual tradition. I think that they all try to deal with this same condition, only in different ways. > <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< > [Rob:] > Buddha may well have taken the benefits of seclusion and simple living > from the ascetics; sitting posture and perhaps breathing meditation from > the yogis; he may have mirrored the eightfold ashtanga yoga path in his > eightfold path, while covering a much different series of elements. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > [Jon:] > Interesting, Rob, but purely speculative, I think :-)) In any event, I am > not sure how useful such a line of inquiry would be. To regard the Buddha > and his teachings as an outgrowth of the time and place in which the > Buddha was born is of course the conventional (non-dhamma) perspective. But there is also no doubt that in terms of the Buddha's skillful means, that he made use of the time and place in which he was born, didn't ignore it, didn't tell people they were silly for having their customs, or reference some other different time and place, but explained to them in every possible way how they could take their present understanding and go beyond it through skillful means that they, as cultural beings, could try to understand. If the Buddha made use of the technology that surrounded him at that time, and then stretched it way beyond its original capacity, he was only showing his mastery of both the time and place and that which was beyond that time and place. His making use of the materials at hand should not somehow be seen as an aspersion upon him. On the other hand, Buddha was also a human being, with a mind and body. He transcended these in his enlightenment, but still had a cultural knowledge and personal history to make use of and fall back upon. It's not as though we have to presume that every vestige of personality was stricken from him upon his enlightenment. We certainly don't know that this was so. When you see a spiritual teacher today whom you respect and who may be quite advanced, perhaps to you as Buddha would be to them, you do not see someone who has less cultural resonance than you do, only somehow who is perhaps clearer and wiser in their understanding and response to life. I am sure that as a human being with superhuman understanding, the Buddha made full use of all the materials around him. Every artist does. > According to the Dhamma, however, we are a product of our own kamma and > accumulated knowledge and tendencies, rather than of our forebears and the > society into which we are born, so to view the teachings in the light you > suggest would run counter to the teachings themselves. Well, there is no doubt that our tendencies and accumulated knowledge find their form of expression in any given lifetime amidst the cultural terms of the mileau into which we were born, and that where and when we are born is also partially an expression, a result of our kamma and tendencies. So I think they do have a relationship to each other. I also don't think this principle at all contradicts the common-sense understanding that a master born in brooklyn will have a brooklyn accent, and a master born in ancient India will speak Pali. Just to be facetious for a moment, if the Buddha's tendencies and kamma were totally independent of the time and place in which he was born, why didn't he speak French? : ) > > <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< > [Rob:] > I think that like the genius he was, Buddha both took and transcended > elements of the spiritual culture of his time, and in an evolved form > brought them to the level of supreme wisdom and supreme vehicle. To see > the evolutionary connections between systems is not to undermine Buddha's > teaching; it is to see the way in which world, spiritual culture, and > Buddha may interact, and perhaps give a context for understanding, which, > living at a much later time, we may not easily have. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > [Jon:] > This reminds me of a previous comment of yours to the effect that the > teachings are not complete in themselves (in doctrinal terms) and need to > be supplemented, and perhaps this view goes hand in hand with what you are > saying here. Further discussion along these lines would indeed require > investigation outside the teachings themselves. Would this be an approach > you see as having value? I think that every historical teaching has two components: there are the teachings in their own right, which are complete in themselves, as they are a 'closed book'; and there is the historical context and content of which it is composed within human history. There are many reasons why we can suppose that the teachings as we have them do not represent the total sum of everything the Buddha had to teach us. To believe that is to believe that the supernatural necessity of the Buddha's teaching was so complete that there was no historical influence of any kind on the form in which it was written or the form in which it was handed down to us. I believe in a 'middle view' of this. I think there were supernatural forces and necessities that caused the Buddha to come when he did and created the fortuituous circumstances in which he delivered his teachings to different groups. I also believe that circumstances arose in 'life' which led the Buddha to give a particular teaching to a particular group, and for them to then be lost, found, remembered, disremembered, handed down, edited, translated, the way they were. There are versions of the suttas in Chinese that are not in Pali. There may be times when the Chinese version survived more accurately than the Pali. I do not make absolutel presumptions that everything handed down in the Pali canon is complete or is handed down as Buddha intended. There are historical circumstances as well as the original teachings, and the historical circumstances are part of OUR kamma and conditions, not just the Buddha's own in his own time. So I don't have an absolute view of the perfection of the written teachings as they are, although i think they are probably very complete in their own right. Where there are gaps in subject matter or gaps in our understanding, it may be that there are pieces missing that can be filled in by understanding the conditions and terms under which the Buddha spoke and his teachings were written down. It also can't hurt to understand historical traditions that might shape the way in which he would choose to communicate to a particular audience. If the Buddha refers to samadhi, a term which his Indian audience would understand from Yoga, then looking to the use of the term in yoga is of course elucidating. Buddha presumed a certain understanding on the part of his audience which we don't have. If we do the research to understand what 'Yogic' audience might understanding by his terminology, then we are putting ourselves in the place his audience was in, and through which they understood his teachings. Best, Robert Ep. 15350 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 2:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Samatha, samadhi & jhanas --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > I have heard samatha and samadhi used somewhat interchangeably. I think > that you would obviously disagree, and say that samadhi can be abused, but > not samatha. There are others of course who use samadhi in the same > positive sense; they would not define it as samadhi if it is an unskillful > form of concentration, since samadhi is the height of skillful > concentration. It is possible they can be used interchangeably in the > kusala sense, and that some other terms should be used for > concentration-lobotomy and bliss addiction. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > [Jon:] > No doubt samadhi can be found used in any number of ways, but I think we > are concerned here with its meaning in the texts. As I said in an earlier > post to Howard, samadhi is sometimes used as a synonym for samatha, but at > other times it has its own meaning (concentration) and in that context can > be either kusala or akusala. > > In my view, the commentaries are the only reliable guide to the correct > interpretation of the individual suttas. > > <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< > [Rob:] > So you feel that Buddha was not prescribing the jhanas, but simply > acknowledging them as one possible positive support for development of the > path? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > [Jon:] > Yes, that's more or less it. I do not read the Buddha as prescribing the > jhanas for everyone as a necessary precondition for the development of > satipatthana and the insight that leads to enlightenment. But samatha is > indeed a high level of (non-path) kusala and as such is to be developed at > every opportunity. And for the benefit of those who had already developed > samatha to the level of jhana, or who had the potential to do so, the > Buddha gave a number of instructions on the development of insight based > on the jhana experience (including, for example, the Anapanasati Sutta and > the 'mindfulness of breathing' section in the Satipatthana Sutta). > > Jon Dear Jon, Thanks for this clarification. Best, Robert Ep. 15351 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 2:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Vism study (rumoured) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > Hi Jon. Ramble alert. > > Noted ;-) > > <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< > [Rob:] > ha ha. well I finally got this post, just in time for a good chuckle. > yup, what's fun is to know you're on one extreme or the other and to just > see it as 'conditions'. It's like the 'path' itself. I stopped being so > impatient when I suddenly got a view of how gigantic it was, way beyond > what I could even imagine seeing, like the universe itself. Or when I saw > the Himalayas for the first time [1 out of 2]. You think: 'Well that's > impossible; they're not there.' Then you have to give up, and realize > there are some things so much bigger than you, that it's ridiculous. How > small we are. One's own nature is like that too. The years that I spent > trying to change myself by main force. At some point you give up and > contribute 'what you are' to the situation. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > [Jon:] > This is very true, Rob, and well put (I had a similar awesome first view > of the Himalayas). In my own case however, I have found that such > reluctant submission to the reality of the situation is more likely to be > just another ploy by wrong view and other kilesas, than a clear > appreciation of the true nature of the situation. But thanks for the > reminder about acceptance of the 'what is' rather than trying to see the > 'what I think should be'. > > <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< > [Rob:] > So here we are, covering both ends of intention without having the > capacity to intend anything in the first place. None of this has anything > to do with the jhanas, but that's okay. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > [Jon:] > And if it's nothing more than the blind leading the blind, well, at least > we are accepting the 'what we are' :-)) When we get around to it, that > is ... > > Jon > > PS There are quite a number of posts from you in my 'reply to' folder > that I have been working on this weekend. I was tempted to try and > consolidate some of them, to save others being swamped by our multiple > (and marathon) exchanges, but will probably take the easy way out and send > them out one-by-one (in order received, as usual). Dear Jon, I am somewhat chagrined that I have responded to these posts two weeks late, and also in reverse order. Hope that's not too confusing. I was happy to find and finally get to these very considered responses on your part, and thank you much for taking the time to take up these matters. Answering these posts has been very pleasureable, as the subjects are close to my heart and mind. I hope that's not an expression of moha on my part, I mean, enjoying the dialogue 'too much'. : ) Best, Robert Ep. 15352 From: frank kuan Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 3:30pm Subject: ack! It's the attack of the Robs! 10 posts in a row from Robs. I mercifully interrupt the streak before it gets any longer. -fk 15353 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 4:59pm Subject: Re: ack! Hey Frank! I love RobEp 'n Ms posts. The quantity and quality is like baby bears' porridge - not too much, not too little, just right. Mind you, I'm only up to the 'What is Anatta?' one from RobEp to KenO. I enjoy your posts too Frank, but as I see it, the problem really is *you* don't post enough. :)) How about telling us your thoughts on Practice, Progress and Theravada Buddhism in Hawaii. Is it so wonderful living there that you forget what suffering is all about, and don't feel the urgency to escape samsara? Isn't that said to be one of the drawbacks of rebirth as a god or deva? ... Frank - a thought has just struck me - Could it be? ... Dare I ask? ... (oh, no just forget it - Impossible! as Hawaii isn't one of 'The Six Heavenly Realms') :-)) metta, Chris A bit of Trivia: If RobEp or Rob M (or anyone) had been inspired to write yesterday and had a few replies, dsg would have broken an eight month record on the number of posts. We must have all had more energy in March. And what were you lot all doing in February and June, might I ask - I see a need to lift your game? :)) 2002 Jan 601 Feb 471 Mar 752 Apr 716 May 574 Jun 478 Jul 543 Aug 723 ----------------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > It's the attack of the Robs! 10 posts in a row from > Robs. I mercifully interrupt the streak before it gets > any longer. > > -fk 15354 From: Antony Woods Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 6:38pm Subject: Re: Speech and Intentions Dear Christine, Rob M and All, Here are some relevant extracts from "Right Speech" by Ven U Dhamminda (Greg Kleiman): "The second one I translate as tale-bearing and in this translation it's translated as slander. The reason I don't translate it as slander is that slander is usually a lie about somebody that isn't true but in the definition here the person he doesn't slander somebody - he hears something that is true about somebody else or said about somebody else and then he goes and tells somebody else to go and create division amongst them. So it says here "having abandoned slander, he abstains from slander; he does not repeat elsewhere what he has heard here in order to divide others from the people here; nor does he repeat here what he has heard elsewhere in order to divide these from the people there; thus he is a reconciler of those who are divided and a promoter of friendships, rejoicing, delighting and exalting in concord. He speaks only words that are conducive to concord. This too pertains to his moral discipline." So this practice the Buddha is referring to is not telling lies about somebody and constructing lies and fabrications and taking them to other people but you actually hear somebody say bad things about one person and then you go to that person and say "this person said this about you" in order to make them dislike one person and also make them like yourself more - they think you're their friend then. So if it was an outright lie as in slander then that would also come under false speech in the first place - so usually I translate the second one as tale-bearing - taking a story from one person to another, carrying it from one place to another in order to create dissension. So that's the second type of speech that we should abstain from." ........... ........... "For tale-bearing, the commentary says "the act is less blameworthy when the persons one divides are of inferior moral qualities; more blameworthy when they are of superior moral qualities." So this means that when you do an action, the person that you harm, depending upon their virtue, their standing in virtue, the harm that you do to a virtuous person actually gives a worse kammic consequence in the future. If the people are immoral and you engage in tale-bearing and split them up then that one is less reprehensible, it brings less result than if you divide people of virtuous conduct." ........... ........... "It's always best to be honest but sometimes people are honest but it's abusive speech. Sometimes you call someone an idiot when they are, but really you've done it with anger, so not all honest things are actually kusala (wholesome), not all honest speech. Sometimes it's also idle chatter even though it's true. So a lot of people when they say things and you get into a fight with them they tell you that they're just telling you the truth to justify themselves but it doesn't necessarily work that way that that's also wholesome action. The truth can also be unwholesome - even though it's truthful it could be abusive towards somebody and done out of anger." http://groups.yahoo.com/group/eightfold-l/message/2203 or for Microsoft Word format: ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/genbud/rspeech.zip with metta / Antony. 15355 From: frank kuan Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 6:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ack! Hi Chris, --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Hey Frank! I love RobEp 'n Ms posts. The quantity > and quality is > like baby bears' porridge - not too much, not too > little, just > right. :-) > Mind you, I'm only up to the 'What is Anatta?' one > from RobEp to KenO. > I enjoy your posts too Frank, but as I see it, the > problem really is > *you* don't post enough. :)) The world can't handle too many of my posts. Put it this way. I'm in the camp of telling the truth even if it hurts and begins to resemble wrong speech type of person you were talking about :) > How about telling us your thoughts on Practice, > Progress and > Theravada Buddhism in Hawaii. Is it so wonderful > living there that > you forget what suffering is all about, and don't > feel the urgency to > escape samsara? yes. > Isn't that said to be one of the drawbacks of > rebirth as a god or > deva? ... Frank - a thought has just struck me - > Could it be? ... > Dare I ask? ... (oh, no just forget it - Impossible! > as Hawaii isn't > one of 'The Six Heavenly Realms') :-)) > Kauai is pretty close. All I need is a retinue of celestial maidens and a longer life span. Who knows, maybe the tai qi, qi gong, and astanga yoga I'm practicing will take care of the latter. I really haven't checked out the dhamma scene in Kauai. There's a tibetan group that has weekly gatherings, practicing visualization and mantras which I'm totally not interested in doing. A few pure land buddhist groups which I might drop in once just to check it out because Hisayo recommended it. There was a zen sitting group for a few weeks that I was somewhat interested in, but they're not there anymore. Fare lonely as the rhinoceros. Living in a paradise presents challenges in more subtle forms of suffering. For example, I know I don't have enough cash reserves to do this TOO long, so there is an ever present awareness of how transient these pleasures are. Sooner or later, I would either have to leave paradise or trade the subtle dukkha of enjoying bliss for the grosser dukkha of part time employment to pay the bills. Well, back to paradise. :) -fk 15356 From: epsteinrob Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 9:55pm Subject: [dsg] Re: ack! --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > Living in a paradise presents challenges in more > subtle forms of suffering. For example, I know I don't > have enough cash reserves to do this TOO long, so > there is an ever present awareness of how transient > these pleasures are. Sooner or later, I would either > have to leave paradise or trade the subtle dukkha of > enjoying bliss for the grosser dukkha of part time > employment to pay the bills. > > Well, back to paradise. :) Hi Frank! Always enjoy your posts. Feel free to post more, we can take it! : ) Um...Frank, on a more important subject.....uh, how do you feel about having guests? : ) Best, Robert Ep. 15357 From: epsteinrob Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 9:59pm Subject: Re: ack! Don't worry. We Robs are hard at work, producing more posts. And hopefully in the near future....more Robs to come? Rob.....Ep. ================= --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hey Frank! I love RobEp 'n Ms posts. The quantity and quality is > like baby bears' porridge - not too much, not too little, just > right. ... > metta, > Chris > > A bit of Trivia: If RobEp or Rob M (or anyone) had been inspired to > write > yesterday and had a few replies, dsg would have broken an eight month > record on the number of posts. ... > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > > It's the attack of the Robs! 10 posts in a row from > > Robs. I mercifully interrupt the streak before it gets > > any longer. > > > > -fk 15358 From: epsteinrob Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 10:03pm Subject: Re: ack! --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > It's the attack of the Robs! 10 posts in a row from > Robs. I mercifully interrupt the streak before it gets > any longer. > > -fk Thank you Frank! Stop us before we post again!!! Rob, Rob and Rob. 15359 From: epsteinrob Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 10:17pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > ------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > If one were to take the position that nibbana, being the absence of > all conditions, is sui generis, neither nama nor rupa, but, like all the > conditioned dhammas, takable as an object, I would find that a bit more > reasonable. But even that would be troublesome to me. The notion of the > unconditioned dhamma serving as object for a conditioned dhamma, namely > citta, is at best odd. It seems to me plausible that there could be the > awareness of the *imminence* of cessation (or even of the cessation, itself, > i.e., the *entry* to nibbana), a kind of an experiencing of nibbana at a > distance like the feeling when one is *about* to pass out (or is passing > out), or *about* to drop off to sleep (or is dropping off to sleep). If that > is what it means for lokutara cittas to experience nibbana, that would make > sense to me. It would amount to the awareness by conditioned dhammas of their > imminent demise, which might correspond to what the Zen Buddhists sometimes > describe as water breaking through the bottom of the bucket. But nibbana, > itself, the utter absence of all conditions, does not strike me as something > which is cognizable by conditioned cittas, nor could it be something which > could serve as object, in the usual sense of 'object', even for itself. If > nibbana is nama, that nama would have to be a nondual awareness radically > different from all conditioned nama, close, perhaps, to what the Zen people > mean by 'no-mind'. It would have to be an awareness without an object, and, > in that case, even using the word 'awareness' is misleading, because nibbana > is totally "other" from anything we have known. That, and only that, would > satisfactorily account for nibbana being nama, from my perspective. It seems > to me that nibbana, the summum bonum, is not a darkness, but a light, not > dead, but alive, not avijja, but vijja. That would make sense to me. Dear Howard, Glad to see you getting back to one of my favorite topics, and asking such interesting questions regarding nibbana. Thanks, Robert Ep. 15360 From: epsteinrob Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 10:31pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" < > "Here (in nibbana), nama as well as rupa ceases without remainder. > By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here." Dear Robert, If there is no nama, no rupa, no consciousness in nibbana, why is nibbana known as a nama? > Nibbana does not become a sort of consciousness just because one of > its Pali names happens to be Viññanam. What does Vinnanam mean in this case, if not consciousness? > In English language, the term 'object' can have different meanings. > For example, the term 'object' in visual object has no relation to > the term 'object' in my object of studying Pali. In what sense is the word 'object' used in relation to Nibbana? What sort of object is it? In what sense is it an object? As Howard has pointed out, an object should rather be a rupa than a nama. if Nibbana is an 'object' that is at the same time a 'nama', can this not be explained more specifically so that these terms can be understood in this case? Thanks, Robert Ep. 15361 From: epsteinrob Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 10:34pm Subject: Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "bodhi2500" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abhidhammika" wrote: > >Therefore, Nibbana is not mind. > > > > Hi > Could someone please explain why Nibbana is called a Nama. > Seems confusing to say Nibbana is not mind ,but it is a Nama. > > Thank-you > Steve Yes, it is also confusing that it is said of Nibbana that 'all namas and rupas cease here' and yet Nibbana itself is a nama. How can the 'object' that is the cesssation of both nama and rupa itself be a nama at the same time that all namas have ceased? Robert Ep. 15362 From: epsteinrob Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 10:46pm Subject: Re: ADL ch. 22 (4) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Those who have attained the fourth stage of arupa-jhana, the 'Sphere of > Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception' and have also realized the stage > of enlightenment of the anagami or of the arahat, can attain 'cessation' > (nirodha-samapatti) which is the temporary ceasing of bodily and mental > activities. The person who has attained 'cessation' ('the stopping of > perception and feeling') is different from a corpse. ... But that monk who > has attained to the stopping of perception and feeling, although his > bodily activities have been stopped, have subsided, although his vocal > activities have been stopped, have subsided, although his mental > activities have been stopped, have subsided, his vitality is not > entirely destroyed, his heat is not allayed, his sense- organs are > purified. This, your reverence, is the difference between a dead thing, > passed away, and that monk who has attained to the stopping of > perception and feeling.' ... The Buddha said: > > 'It is good, Anuruddha , it is good. But did you, Anuruddha , by passing > quite beyond this abiding, by allaying this abiding, reach another state > of further-men, an excellent knowledge and vision befitting the ariyans, > an abiding in comfort?' > > 'How could this not be, Lord? Here we, Lord, for as long as we like, by > passing quite beyond the plane of neither perception-nor-non-perception, > entering on the stopping of perception and feeling, abide in it, and > having seen through intuitive wisdom, our cankers come to be utterly > destroyed. By passing quite beyond that abiding, Lord, by allaying that > abiding, another state of further-men, an excellent knowledge and vision > befitting the ariyans, an abiding in comfort is reached. But we, Lord, > do not behold another abiding in comfort that is higher or more > excellent than this abiding in comfort,' > > 'It is good, Anuruddha, it is good. There is no other abiding in comfort > that is higher or more excellent than this abiding in comfort.' This material is quite wonderful, a good view of the properties of the enlightened and the near enlightened. It provides strong suggestions as to the ultimate difference between enlightenment and complete cessation. Best, Robert Ep. 15363 From: epsteinrob Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 10:49pm Subject: Re: Anapanasati, Rob Ep, Rob Ep, Rob Ep. ha ha, thanks for the nice header!!! I am really looking forward to reading this, probably tomorrow, since I seem to be falling asleep...... : ) Best, Robert Ep. ========== --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Anapana Sati. Part 3: > We should go back to the second tetrad, group of four, of the sutta on > Mindfulness of Breathing: > V) He trains thus ; he trains > thus . (VI) He trains thus shall breathe in experiencing bliss>; he trains thus experiencing bliss>. (VII) He trains thus the mental formation>; he trains thus mental formation>. (VIII) He trains thus the mental formation>; he trains thus the mental formation. > On that occasion, monks, a monk abides contemplating the feelings in the > feelings, ardent, clearly comprehending, mindful, having put away > covetousness and grief regarding the world. > I say that this, monks, is a certain feeling among the feelings, namely, = the > giving attention completely to in-breathing and out-breathing. That is wh= y > on that occasion, monks, a monk abides contemplating the feelings in the > feelings, ardent, clearly comprehending, mindful, having put away > covetousness and grief regarding the world. > > As regards the second tetrad (marked V-VIII), the Visuddhimagga (VIII, 22= 6) > comments: > > (V) He trains thus happiness>, that is, making happiness (píti, also translated as rapture) > known, making it plain. Herein, the happiness is experienced in two ways:= > (a) with the object, and (b) with non-confusion. > > As regards , the Visuddhimagga (VI= II, > 227) explains: > > How is happiness experienced with the object? He attains the two jhånas i= n > which happiness (píti) is present. At the time when he has actually ente= red > upon them the happiness is experienced with the object owing to the > obtaining of the jhåna, because of the experiencing of the object. > > After the jhånacitta has fallen away paññå realizes the characteristic of= > píti as it is: only a kind of nåma, which is impermanent and not self. We= > read: > > SHow with non-confusion? When, after entering upon and emerging from one = of > the two jhånas accompanied by píti, he comprehends with insight that > happiness associated with the jhåna as liable to destruction and fall, th= en > at the actual time of insight the happiness is experienced with > non-confusion owing to the penetration of its characteristics (of > impermanence, and so on). > The Vis. quotes from the Path of Discrimination with regard to the > experience of happiness with non-confusion: > steadies his mind, resolves with faith, exerts energy, establishes > mindfulness, concentrates his mind, understands with understanding, direc= tly > knows what is to be directly-known, fully understands what is to be fully= > understood, abandons what is to be abandoned, realizes what is to be > realized. it is in this way that that happiness is experienced (Ps. I, 18= 7)> > In a similar way the words of the second tetrad are explained by the > Visuddhimagga: (VI) I shall breathe inSbreathe out experiencing bliss > (sukha, pleasant feeling)S > Sukha occurs in three stages of jhåna (of the fourfold system); it does n= ot > arise in the highest stage of jhåna where there is equanimity instead of > sukha. Sukha accompanies the jhånacitta of the three stages of jhåna and = is, > after the jhånacitta has fallen away, realized by paññå as impermanent. > > The realization of the characteristic of impermanence can only occur when= > the stages of insight knowledge have been developed, beginning with tende= r > insight, as I said before. Thus both jhana and insight have been develope= d > here. As to VI amd VII, experiencing mental formation, citta sankhara, an= d > tranquillizing mental formation: the Vis. VIII, 229, explains that mental= > formation pertains here to feeling and perception, sanna. The feeling is > associated with perception (Vis. VIII, 230). The Vis. quotes here from th= e > Path of Discrimination: things are bound up with citta and are mind functions.> > > The Vis. adds that this tetrad deals with the contemplation of feeling. > > The Co, the Papa~casuudanii, speaks about a , > vedanaa~n~nantara.m. certain one among the three feelings.> > As to the words of the sutta, 3The giving attention completely2, the Co > explains that although attention is not pleasant feeling it comes under t= he > heading of feeling. The Co repeats what has been stated in the Vis. about= > experiencing rapture and pleasant feeling with the object and with > non-delusion. The Co then states: > is present, and emerged therefrom, he masters rapture associated with jha= na > (by contemplating it) as destructable and perishable. By his penetration = of > its characteristics at the moment of insight, rapture is experienced by h= im > with non-delusion. For this is said in the Path of Discrimination:2 For o= ne > who knows one-pointedness and non-distraction of mind through breathing i= n > long, mindfulness is established. By means of that mindfulness and that > insight that rapture is experienced with non-delusion, because the three > characteristics are realized.> > The Commnetary explains that in the same way bliss and citta sankhara, th= e > mental formation, are experienced and that it is thus rightly stated that= > the monk contemplates feelings in the feelings. > The Commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta states that contemplating feelin= gs > in the feelings should be seen in the same way as contemplating the body = in > the body: thus, in order to limit the object and 3sifting it out2. We rea= d: > feeling because it is the stuff of suffering, as suffering. Painful feeli= ng > because it is the condition of bringing out trouble, etc. , as a thorn. A= nd > the neither pleasurable nor painful feeling, because of non-mastery or > dependence and so forth, as transiency.> > ****** > Nina. 15364 From: Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 10:50pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Rob Ep (&Jon), I very much appreciate your comments but I think I want to take exception to characterizing satipatthana as a discrimination between concept and paramattha dhammas. In doing a quick review of Ven Nyanaponika's "The Heart of Buddhist Meditation" it occurs to me that the practice as it is outlined in the sutta makes extensive use of concepts. The contemplation of mind objects seems to be overtly contemplative and therefore necessarily conceptual. The other categories of mindfulness seem to have a mix of contemplation and identifying present experience. This identification is tantamount to naming and is therefore pannatti. Admittedly concept is not recognized as an object. It seems that there is some variation among the various meditation traditions as to what to emphasize. Apparently nothing is set in stone. Many traditions focus on the breath in a one pointed manner but I think this may be an attempt to mix satipatthana and jhana. There is no mention of 'one pointed focus' in the satipatthana. (Don't know about Anapanasati Sutta) What I see in the Satipatthana Sutta is an emphasis on identifying experience in a simple straight forward objective way and understanding certain processes. Not an attempt to get to a really real experience. Contemplation definitely stands out. So, I may have erred in scolding Nina for not meditating. The study and contemplation of abhidhamma could encompass samma sati. Although it is extremely unconventional for a Buddhist to have never meditated. I think this is unique to Acharn Sujin and her school. Many, if not most, meditation traditions are wary of jhana. This makes me a little uneasy. Not sure what to make of it. There *are* dangers. The Tibetans are very heavy duty meditators but there is lots of supervision and many levels of training. Sorry for the ramble. I expect Kom would object to what I said about concept and paramattha dhammas, but he is probably too busy to respond. Larry 15365 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Aug 31, 2002 11:14pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Jon and RobEp, Larry, Howard, and All, First of all, Happy Fathers Day to all Aussie and Kiwi Dads - plus 'Honorary Aussie Dad for the Day' Howard, who didn't have such a happy time on the US Fathers Day.(though I know your family will have made it up to you in the meantime.:) I was reading RobEp's reply to Jon, and, to refresh my memory (as you two take so long to reply to each other :)) I went to the archive at escribe to use the excellent 'view all messages in this thread' facility. http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/ This subject obviously is part of a longer thread, but only shows on escribe as having two messages in the thread. This happens with other threads on occasion also. As some of us don't read all messages or all threads until a later date, changing the subject title will be detrimental to us unless the 'reply' is attached to the original thread somehow. Does anyone know what interferes with compiling threads at escribe and what a solution could be? I am intensely interested in your discussions about practice. What is bhavana and does it mean meditation in the formal sense? If not, why does Thanissaro Bhikkhu always translate it that way? I am sincerely grateful to Thanissaro Bhikkhu, and have no criticism about his intentions or scholarship. It is just that I recall the frustration I felt when looking on Access to Insight for Suttas regarding Abhidhamma, only to find those suttas mentioned in articles, books or journals were ones he had not translated into English. So, English speakers seem only to have been offered a rather 'selective' view of the suttas. His translations of suttas have been the main nourishment of a whole generation of computer literate Western Buddhists who don't question the absolute accuracy of the translations and thus the meanings that he determines. Could there be an unrecognised bias? A conductor, following his own interests and thereby unconsciously orchestrating the practices of a whole Tradition? What do you reckon? I never seem to settle on a conclusion about whether formal sitting meditation is essential, or just a nice way to fill in a bit of time and feel good. Is it the product of lobha, the craving for calm, peace and the feeling of a 'self' doing' something, having control? and, hence, not likely to lead to insight? I waver back and forth. I know this has been discussed before, but (IMHO) the discussion has never been as thorough, engaged in with such goodwill and as constructive as I see this one progressing between the two of you, spread over a number of threads.. I was very interested to read a remark you made Jon (not sure where) that your understanding was that formal meditation was a fairly modern phenomena .... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Rob Ep (&Jon), > > I very much appreciate your comments but I think I want to take > exception to characterizing satipatthana as a discrimination between > concept and paramattha dhammas. In doing a quick review of Ven > Nyanaponika's "The Heart of Buddhist Meditation" it occurs to me that > the practice as it is outlined in the sutta makes extensive use of > concepts. The contemplation of mind objects seems to be overtly > contemplative and therefore necessarily conceptual. The other categories > of mindfulness seem to have a mix of contemplation and identifying > present experience. This identification is tantamount to naming and is > therefore pannatti. Admittedly concept is not recognized as an object. > > It seems that there is some variation among the various meditation > traditions as to what to emphasize. Apparently nothing is set in stone. > Many traditions focus on the breath in a one pointed manner but I think > this may be an attempt to mix satipatthana and jhana. There is no > mention of 'one pointed focus' in the satipatthana. (Don't know about > Anapanasati Sutta) > > What I see in the Satipatthana Sutta is an emphasis on identifying > experience in a simple straight forward objective way and understanding > certain processes. Not an attempt to get to a really real experience. > Contemplation definitely stands out. So, I may have erred in scolding > Nina for not meditating. The study and contemplation of abhidhamma could > encompass samma sati. Although it is extremely unconventional for a > Buddhist to have never meditated. I think this is unique to Acharn Sujin > and her school. > > Many, if not most, meditation traditions are wary of jhana. This makes > me a little uneasy. Not sure what to make of it. There *are* dangers. > The Tibetans are very heavy duty meditators but there is lots of > supervision and many levels of training. > > Sorry for the ramble. I expect Kom would object to what I said about > concept and paramattha dhammas, but he is probably too busy to respond. > > Larry 15366 From: Sarah Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 3:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ack! Hi Chris & Frank, --- christine_forsyth wrote: > A bit of Trivia: If RobEp or Rob M (or anyone) had been inspired to > write > yesterday and had a few replies, dsg would have broken an eight month > record on the number of posts. We must have all had more energy in > March. And what were you lot all doing in February and June, might I > ask - I see a need to lift your game? :)) .... This is great, Chris... I see you’ve taken on the List Cheer Leadership without any prompting. We’ll add it to your accumulating titles. If you wish to give a monthly report (with right speech and no slander of course), no need to fear the ‘telling the truth even if it hurts and begins to resemble wrong speech’ when it comes to Frank;-) Frank, you suggest ‘the world can’t handle too many of my posts’ and I’m inclined to agree....rumours tell me we should be grateful for receiving the self-moderated ones here;-) I think a ‘whacky wit’ was about what I had in mind. You are getting plenty of brownie points and thankfully your earlier comment to Howard and Rob Ep on Herman’s homepage viewing was too obscure for me to follow. Luckily we are still blessed by Jesus on the homepage in Hong Kong (Asian censors know we have delicate atta-less souls here;-)) Two suggestions for cash reserves in Paradise: 1. Move to Koh Samui for half the year: - Great surf in winter months (forget June-August), a debating neighbour to challenge any idea you’ve ever had about Buddhism (read: Erik), occasional visits from us to join you in the surf, yoga and tai-chi on the beach and assistance with the debates with Erik, super cheap accomo and living (read: Erik can arrange it all), celestial maidens? (read: no comment). 2. Maybe we could turn the ‘Abhidhamma for Family Insomnia’ into a best-seller between us. I have quite a few favourites already. While others count sheep, I count cetasikas in order (phassa, vedana, sanna.....) or paccaya (hetu, arammana, adhipati...). Usually I get lost and have to return to the start and that’s the point that sleep always kicks in. Just like one might introduce variations into an astanga series, one can start introducing the sub-categories if it gets easy. Of course there are many simpler ones like khandhas of Noble 8fold Path and then there are the hard ones like the 89 or 121 cittas (I’m falling asleep at the thought) and so on. We could add a few monopoly-type rules....you can’t pass a list until it’s without mistake or something like that, but that might only be acceptable to the ‘tell the truth even if it hurts’ members;-) ***** Just to show we’re not merely following trivial pursuits and Heavenly Realms, let me quote from ‘Good Sleep’ (AN,3s,p.50 B.Bodhi trans) for those with greater confidence in the Suttas and for those who are beyond need of any cures for insomnia: “ “Now, prince, the lust, hatred and delusion by which that householder is tormented, and which cause him to sleep bacly, have been abandoned by the Tathagata, cut off at the root, made barren like palm-tree stumps, obliterated so that they are no more subject to arise in the future. Therefore, prince, I have slept well.” The brahmin who is quenched within Always sleeps happily; he does not cling to sensual desires, Free from props, one cool in mind. Having cut all straps of attachment, Removed care deep within the heart, the peaceful One sleeps happily, Attained to perfect peace of mind.” ***** Sarah p.s. One last silly thought - Perhaps Christian sites have a Buddha blessing the homepage?? ==================================================== 15367 From: rikpa21 Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 7:27am Subject: Re: Anapanasati and Mindfulness Practice --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: Hi Rob & Jon, Rob: > How ever, [Jon] may be > correct that sitting and focussing on the breathing in a formal session may not be > explicitly mentioned in the sutta. To get a bit Clintonian, this seems a case of it depending on what the definition of 'is' is. The hermeneutical hair-splitting on this point of formal practice vs. no formal practice seems little more than eel-wriggling (amaravikkhepa). Unless of course we're talking about meditation with or without a black tie, in which case, I'd say that the best meditation is informal, since a black tie tends to hinder breathing, constrict the flow of blood to the brain, and thus serves as a support condition for the meditative hindrances of sloth & torpor (thinha and middha). Besides, the Dhamma taught by the Buddha is aimed at helping us get rid of ties of all kinds, so I think we can set this aside and get down to what matters: all proper meditation is informal, yet within a very clear set of guidelines that instruct us on seeking out the very best possible conditions for replicating the Buddha's understanding ourselves. If one reads carefully, without extreme bias, I do not think there's much room for eel-wriggling wrt. to regular practice performed in the ways outlined by the Buddha, since these comprise the essential aspects of the path, and are thus prerequisites. On this point, the [Anapanasati] Sutta seems pretty clear to me: "Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination? "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out." Recently, thanks to Howard's fine inspiration, I have begun again to follow my respiration (after pretending to be practicing "daily life" mediattion), so that before my expiration, there is only the remainderless cessation and fading away of that ignorance that conceives of an "I, me, mine". I can only attest to the efficacy of following these instructions in my own practice--to the point that the difference between following them vs. not following them is as stark as night and day. Others may have different experiences; so be it. Jon: > > Would you agree that the Anapanasati Sutta is an elaboration of a > > particular passage within the Satipatthana Sutta and, as such, should be > > read in the overall context of the Satipatthana Sutta? The Buddha suggests that anapanasati is sufficient to bring all four foundations to their culmination: "[4] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself to breathe in... &... out focusing on inconstancy; trains himself to breathe in... &... out focusing on dispassion; trains himself to breathe in... &... out focusing on cessation; trains himself to breathe in... &... out focusing on relinquishment: On that occasion the monk remains focused on mental qualities in & of themselves -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- subduing greed & distress with reference to the world. He who sees clearly with discernment the abandoning of greed & distress is one who oversees with equanimity, which is why the monk on that occasion remains focused on mental qualities in & of themselves -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. "This is how mindfulness of in-&-out breathing is developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination." It is left as an exercise to the lightly-biased reader how to interpret the last sentence. If the Sutta merely ended here, it would still be "good enough" to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination. But it doesn't. It goes much further than that. "And how are the four frames of reference developed & pursued so as to bring the seven factors for Awakening to their culmination?" [...] Here the Buddha hasn't just detailed how anapanasati brings the Four Foundations of Mindfulness to their culmination, but goes on to describe how these act as the foundation for the seven factors of awakening as well: "This is how the seven factors for Awakening, when developed & pursued, bring clear knowing & release to their culmination." [...] In other words, according to what the Buddha taught, following the in-breath & out-breath with right mindfulness is "good enough" (and that's all it need be--perfectionism and the fear of doing something even a little wrong is a nasty enemy of development of all kinds), and leads all the way to the end of the path. > Just my own presumption that meditation would be the setting for this practice, > and of course, I am used to Theravada traditions which have interpreted it that > way for centuries. And thank the Buddhas for that interpretation, otherwise the Buddha- sasana would be a mouldering corpse by now. Rob: > Honestly, Abhidhamma is the only tradition I have personally ever come > across that casts any doubt on [formal practice]. Hmmm... If any interpretation of the Dhamma serves as a condition for skeptical doubt (vicikicca) about the efficacy of the practices outlined by the Buddha in great detail, especially ones (like anapanasati) praised so highly by the Tathagata, then I strongly question that interpretation, and would encourage others to do the same. The Abhidhamma "school" (Vaibhasika), for example, is rejected in the Tibetan Geluk school's analysis of Right View. It is rejected on the basis that it asserts ultimately, or truly, self-existing realities--paramattha dhammas. This was a view held by enough Abhidhammikas to warrant special attention and refutation. Such is the danger of the Abhidhamma as a "school", that it is the first one dispensed with by Je Tsongkhapa in the analysis of what is definitive (nitattha), and what requires further interpretation (neyyattha). Je Tsongkhapa moves on to subtler and subtler schools' views, such as "Mind Only" (Cittamatra/Yogacara)--that there is only Mind as an absolute reality, for example. I mention this only to point out the pitfalls of Abhidhamma, grasped at the wrong way. It can and does bite, sometimes fatally. In other words, if the study of Abhidhamma isn't informed by direct knowledge of the Path and is taken for a system in itself, divorced from direct meditative experience, or, for that matter, the Suttas, that it is at best useless puff, and a potentially dangerous trap. It is very easy to misuse the Abhidhamma's classifications to create extremely subtle and pernicious views that /sound/ right, but are really the near enemy of authentic understanding. In terms of true understanding--the understanding the Buddha was trying to point us at with every word--all views are direct hindrances to that understanding. In other words, interpretations of the Abhidhamma uninformed by direct meditative experience of the path are potentially fatal traps--especially for those with overweening intellectual pride, the perfectionists who obsess over minutiae and miss the bigger picture, or those who believe that study (pariyatti) alone, without the concomitant discipline and development (patipatti), leads to direct knowledge (pativedha). When the study of Abhidhamma /is/ informed by direct meditative experience, I see the Abhidhamma as a very useful pedagogical tool, both in terms of helping experienced meditators put a label on those experiences, and as an aid to communicating that experience within a common framework. I see it as especially useful for those tasked with instructing others on points of Dhamma, since its theoretical (with the emphasis on theoretical) breakdowns can be very helpful for teachers who need to give a student further explanation on certain points. Rob: > I wonder if > there are living traditions of Theravada that can still trace the verbal teachings > of the early Arahants back to their roots? I have no idea if this is the case. Does it really matter if a teaching can be traced back to the arahants of old, or even the Buddha? The only thing that matters, in the final analysis, is the direct knowledge of the Dhamma. The Buddha observed that the Dhamma is ehipassiko (to be investigated directly), sanditthiko (bearing visible results here & now), and akaliko (timeless). Unless the Dhamma is realized directly, all there is is the /belief/ that the Buddha pointed out the correct path. And until it is verified directly, one's understanding remains consigned to the realm of speculation, conjecture, belief, and views. Jon: > > You ask why, out of all the 'practices', mindfulness of breathing has been > > singled out for its own sutta. If we had access to the commentary we > > would probably have an authoratitive anser to that question. The only authoritative answer is found in the direct knowledge and vision of the way. One could spend lifetimes without end learning every category of the Abhidhamma, memorizing the Suttas, and still never know the cool peace of Nibbana. > We have covered a lot, but still cannot settle the main object of our discussion! The only thing that needs settling is the untamed mind! :) May all beings have happiness and cause of happiness! Cheers, Erik 15368 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 7:29am Subject: Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no. 3 Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no. 3. People who have developed paññå know that dukkha, suffering, arises because of clinging to rúpa. In order to abandon dukkha, we should eliminate clinging to rúpas. The dukkha in our life is caused by rúpas, because we cling and take delight in the sense objects of colour, sound, odour, flavour and tangible object. All these objects are the cause of diverse kinds of dukkha. Further on we read: The term ³by rúpas² (rúpesu) means: by the four great Elements and the derived rúpas that are dependent on these 3). Beings are disturbed and troubled, they are hurt and killed because of rúpa; rúpa is the condition and the cause of this. Because of rúpa, Kings commit many kinds of deeds, they inflict many kinds of punishment. They have someone beaten by whips.... They have people¹s hands, feet, earlobs, and nose cut off. They have a pot of boiling rice placed on someone¹s head.... Since there are rúpas one will experience the effect of being punished, one will be beaten by whips etc. We read further on: The skin of the head is stripped off so that its colour is white as a conchshell...their body is cut up and smeared with a biting liquid...They have their skin stripped off, their bones smashed; they have the body sprinkled with hot oil; they let the dogs eat the flesh of their body, they let their body be pierced by spears, or they have it cut up with a knife.... All beings are bound to be troubled, harmed and killed, because of rúpa. One can see, investigate and consider this so that paññå develops and one sees clearly that all beings are troubled and harmed in those ways. Therefore the Buddha said, that he saw all beings being troubled because of rúpa. When we part from this world, we do not know where we will go. It may happen that we shall receive punishment in the aforesaid ways. So long as we have a body we do not know what will happen to it, but when there is a cause for receiving tortures, which is the result of akusala kamma, rúpa is the cause, the reason for experiencing painful feeling. We read further on: When the eyesight declines, or even disappears altogether, people are troubled. Apart from trouble caused by the ear, the nose, the tongue, visible object, sound, odour, flavour and tangible object, it is caused by the family (which supports the monk), by the fellow monks of the monastery, gain, honour, praise, wellbeing, robes, almsfood, dwelling, medicines; when these things decline or disappear altogether so that one is without them, people are troubled. Because of these reasons it is said that everybody is disturbed because of rúpa. One should eliminate attachment to rúpa so that one can give it up in this life. With regard to Pingiya, he attained enlightenment when the Buddha had finished this Dhamma discourse. We see from this example that although Pingiya had accumulated perfections through listening to the Dhamma, he also needed the perfection of energy and of patience because paññå develops only very gradually, it is a long and difficult process. The perfection of truthfulness and the perfection of determination are a nessary foundation for being able to listen to the Dhamma. One should be unshakable in one¹s determination to listen, no matter in what circumstances one may be. Footnote: 3. The four Great Elements are: Earth or solidity, Water or cohesion, Fire or temperature and Wind, motion or pressure. The derived rúpas are twenty four rúpas. Rúpas arise and fall away in groups, consisting of at least eight rúpas: the four Great Elements and four derived rúpas. 15369 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 7:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi Howard, see below, I do not have much to add, since the subject is so difficult and not much is explained in the texts. The Vis. has Recollection of Peace, and there you will see the description of nibbana as a refuge, which you rightly mentioned. It is also in the Suttas described as the cool. op 31-08-2002 15:51 schreef upasaka@a... op upasaka@a...: Old post: In the first book of the Abhidhamma, the Dhammasangani (Buddhist >> Psychological Ethics) Nibbana is referred to as the unconditioned element, >> asankhata dhatu (See Appendix II) and it is nama or arupa( non rupa), but >> it >> is different from conditioned nama, it does not experience an object. >> Realities are either nama or rupa, and since nibbana is not rupa it is >> classified as nama. >> > ---------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > So, by fiat, all dhammas are namas or rupas. But if nibbana is not > cognitive in any sense whatsoever, why is it not, then, a rupa? Nina: nibbana is not a place where one would go to, it could not be physical. But if we take it that all phenomena are either nama or rupa, nibbana must be nama. I understand if that does not appeal so much to you. ----------------------------------------------------------- old post: Kom has explained very clearly about the> >> classification >> of the four paramattha dhammas. >> We read in the Atthasalini, Expositor (II, Book II, Part II, Suttanta >> Couplets, 392) an explanation of nama. Nama is derived from namati, >> bending >> towards an object, and it can also be a name. Citta and cetasika bend >> towards an object, experience an object. And also: they cause one another >> to >> bend on to the object: "The four khandhas are name (nama) in the sense of >> bending, for they bend towards the object. In the sense of causing to bend >> all (of the foregoing, namely nibbana and the four nama khandhas) are >> "name" >> (nama). >> > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > But nama pertains to bending *towards*, not *causing* something else > to bend towards it. > -------------------------------------------------- N: For the four khandhas cause one another to bend on to the object;> >> and nibbana bends faultless dhammas on to itself by means of the causal >> relation of the dominant influence of the object." > -------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Talking about "bending", I find this not just a stretch, but a > *contortion*! N: Yes, it is difficult to understand, I could not blame you. The commentator uses often word associations: nama and namati, to bend. We should try to get to the meaning. I could use another word: the object draws the citta to itself, the citta is drawn towards it, citta inclines towards the object, bends towards the object. Is that more acceptable? The lokuttara citta is drawn towards nibbana, inclines towards nibbana. The conditions are right for its arising, nobody can prevent it from experiencing nibbana. Example of citta drawn towards, bending towards an object: I try to read my Email with concentration, but alas, the unmusical neighbour up blows her recorder so loudly that I must hear it. I am just drawn towards that sound, even though I like to concentrate, not to speak of the aversion. The object is is intruding, it bends, causes citta to incline towards it. Here I am not speaking of object predominance (this unpleasant sound is not highly valued, not object predominance-condiiton) and not of nibbana. The old post: Thus, nibbana does not bend towards an object, it does not experience an >> object, but, it is predominant object condition for the lokuttara cittas >> that experience it, it bends them towards itself in that way. > N: the object is highly estimable, highly valued. ----------------------------------------------- > Howard: > That makes it closer to being a rupa (towards which the mind bends) > than a nama (which does the bending). N: If nibbana were experiencing an object, it would be conditioned by that object. Since nama is unconditioned, as you agree, it could not experience any object. You may remember Suan's post to Rob Ep about the luminous mind, and also what Jim wrote. These were long discussions. I understand that you find my arguments not satisfactory. So long as we have not developed precise understanding of citta, cetasika and rupa, and the way they are conditioned, how could we understand the unconditioned dhamma? I better understand sound now, pleasant or unpleasant, hearing, aversion on account of it. > ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ > Howard: (snip) The notion of the > unconditioned dhamma serving as object for a conditioned dhamma, namely > citta, is at best odd. It seems to me plausible that there could be the > awareness of the *imminence* of cessation (or even of the cessation, itself, > i.e., the *entry* to nibbana), a kind of an experiencing of nibbana at a > distance like the feeling when one is *about* to pass out (or is passing > out), or *about* to drop off to sleep (or is dropping off to sleep). If that > is what it means for lokutara cittas to experience nibbana, that would make > sense to me. It would amount to the awareness by conditioned dhammas of their > imminent demise, which might correspond to what the Zen Buddhists sometimes > describe as water breaking through the bottom of the bucket. But nibbana, > itself, the utter absence of all conditions, does not strike me as something > which is cognizable by conditioned cittas, nor could it be something which > could serve as object, in the usual sense of 'object', even for itself. N: Of course we cannot understand this yet. One of those things we just read about. H: If nibbana is nama, that nama would have to be a nondual awareness radically > different from all conditioned nama, close, perhaps, to what the Zen people > mean by 'no-mind'. It would have to be an awareness without an object, and, > in that case, even using the word 'awareness' is misleading, because nibbana > is totally "other" from anything we have known. That, and only that, would > satisfactorily account for nibbana being nama, from my perspective. N: Right, it is totally unknown from anything we have known. H:It seems > to me that nibbana, the summum bonum, is not a darkness, but a light, not > dead, but alive, not avijja, but vijja. That would make sense to me. N: I am afraid to say much, because whatever we say, it may be wrong. Vis. VII, 248: nibbana is: the auspicious, the safe, the marvellous, the intact, the unafflicted, the purity, the island, the shelter. But not vijja, because that is a property of citta, panna cetasika which knows nibbana. Panna is called illumination. Best wishes from Nina. 15370 From: Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 3:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/1/02 1:35:38 AM Eastern Daylight Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Yes, it is also confusing that it is said of Nibbana that 'all namas > and rupas cease here' and yet Nibbana itself is a nama. How can the > 'object' that is the cesssation of both nama and rupa itself be a nama > at the same time that all namas have ceased? > > ============================ Well, I would think that the word 'nama' is serving double duty here. In << Here (in nibbana), nama as well as rupa ceases without remainder. By ceasing of consciousness, nama as well as rupa ceases here. >> I think that 'nama' simply means 'conditioned nama' - that is, it refers to citta and cetasika. Most often, 'nama' means 'conditioned nama'. I think the apparent contradiction here is not substantive, but is just due to the language being a bit underspecific. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15371 From: Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 4:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/1/02 1:51:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Rob Ep (&Jon), > > I very much appreciate your comments but I think I want to take > exception to characterizing satipatthana as a discrimination between > concept and paramattha dhammas. In doing a quick review of Ven > Nyanaponika's "The Heart of Buddhist Meditation" it occurs to me that > the practice as it is outlined in the sutta makes extensive use of > concepts. The contemplation of mind objects seems to be overtly > contemplative and therefore necessarily conceptual. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: In fact, I've seen expositors who describe dhammanupassana (sp?) as contemplation of ideas! (Such as the 4 noble truths) --------------------------------------------------- The other categories> > of mindfulness seem to have a mix of contemplation and identifying > present experience. This identification is tantamount to naming and is > therefore pannatti. Admittedly concept is not recognized as an object. > > It seems that there is some variation among the various meditation > traditions as to what to emphasize. Apparently nothing is set in stone. > Many traditions focus on the breath in a one pointed manner but I think > this may be an attempt to mix satipatthana and jhana. There is no > mention of 'one pointed focus' in the satipatthana. (Don't know about > Anapanasati Sutta) > > What I see in the Satipatthana Sutta is an emphasis on identifying > experience in a simple straight forward objective way and understanding > certain processes. Not an attempt to get to a really real experience. > Contemplation definitely stands out. So, I may have erred in scolding > Nina for not meditating. The study and contemplation of abhidhamma could > encompass samma sati. Although it is extremely unconventional for a > Buddhist to have never meditated. I think this is unique to Acharn Sujin > and her school. > > Many, if not most, meditation traditions are wary of jhana. This makes > me a little uneasy. Not sure what to make of it. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: In most cases, the wariness does *not* bring with it the suggestion of avoidance. It is generally considered a very useful preparation of the mind for investigation of dhammas, holding hindrances at bay, suppressing defilements, and making the mind flexible and fit for further work. The wariness, as I see it, is twofold: 1) jhana alone will not result in liberation, and 2) the delight of the jhanas is a danger - the ecstacy engendered can be addictive. ------------------------------------------------------- > > The Tibetans are very heavy duty meditators but there is lots of > supervision and many levels of training. > > Sorry for the ramble. I expect Kom would object to what I said about > concept and paramattha dhammas, but he is probably too busy to respond. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, hey, your timing was superb, then! ;-)) ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Larry > > =========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15372 From: Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 5:30am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi, Nina - In a message dated 9/1/02 10:31:07 AM Eastern Daylight Time, nilo@e... writes: > > Hi Howard, > see below, I do not have much to add, since the subject is so difficult and > not much is explained in the texts. The Vis. has Recollection of Peace, and > there you will see the description of nibbana as a refuge, which you > rightly > mentioned. It is also in the Suttas described as the cool. > op 31-08-2002 15:51 schreef upasaka@a... op upasaka@a...: > > Old post: In the first book of the Abhidhamma, the Dhammasangani (Buddhist > >> Psychological Ethics) Nibbana is referred to as the unconditioned > element, > >> asankhata dhatu (See Appendix II) and it is nama or arupa( non rupa), > but > >> it > >> is different from conditioned nama, it does not experience an object. > >> Realities are either nama or rupa, and since nibbana is not rupa it is > >> classified as nama. > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > So, by fiat, all dhammas are namas or rupas. But if nibbana is not > > cognitive in any sense whatsoever, why is it not, then, a rupa? > Nina: nibbana is not a place where one would go to, it could not be > physical. But if we take it that all phenomena are either nama or rupa, > nibbana must be nama. I understand if that does not appeal so much to you. ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: No, actually it very much appeals to me. My intention was to zero in on exactly *why* it is a nama. I wanted to carry out a bit of an analysis, looking at various sides of the issue. My main point is that nibbana, inexpressible as it is, should nevertheless not be thought of as some dead and isolated dhamma without cognitive aspect. ----------------------------------------------------------- > ----------------------------------------------------------- > old post: Kom has explained very clearly about the> > >> classification > >> of the four paramattha dhammas. > >> We read in the Atthasalini, Expositor (II, Book II, Part II, Suttanta > >> Couplets, 392) an explanation of nama. Nama is derived from namati, > >> bending > >> towards an object, and it can also be a name. Citta and cetasika bend > >> towards an object, experience an object. And also: they cause one > another > >> to > >> bend on to the object: "The four khandhas are name (nama) in the sense > of > >> bending, for they bend towards the object. In the sense of causing to > bend > >> all (of the foregoing, namely nibbana and the four nama khandhas) are > >> "name" > >> (nama). > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > But nama pertains to bending *towards*, not *causing* something else > > to bend towards it. > > -------------------------------------------------- > N: For the four khandhas cause one another to bend on to the object;> > >> and nibbana bends faultless dhammas on to itself by means of the causal > >> relation of the dominant influence of the object." > > -------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Talking about "bending", I find this not just a stretch, but a > > *contortion*! > N: Yes, it is difficult to understand, I could not blame you. The > commentator uses often word associations: nama and namati, to bend. We > should try to get to the meaning. > I could use another word: the object draws the citta to itself, the citta > is > drawn towards it, citta inclines towards the object, bends towards the > object. Is that more acceptable? > The lokuttara citta is drawn towards nibbana, inclines towards nibbana. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: As I see it, that makes the lokuttara citta nama, but does not make nibbana nama. For nibbana to be nama, there must be some cognitive aspect to it, albeit radically different from what we are used to. ---------------------------------------------------------- The> > conditions are right for its arising, nobody can prevent it from > experiencing nibbana. > Example of citta drawn towards, bending towards an object: > I try to read my Email with concentration, but alas, the unmusical > neighbour > up blows her recorder so loudly that I must hear it. I am just drawn > towards > that sound, even though I like to concentrate, not to speak of the > aversion. > The object is is intruding, it bends, causes citta to incline towards it. > Here I am not speaking of object predominance (this unpleasant sound is not > highly valued, not object predominance-condiiton) and not of nibbana. > The old post: Thus, nibbana does not bend towards an object, it does not > experience an > >> object, but, it is predominant object condition for the lokuttara cittas > >> that experience it, it bends them towards itself in that way. > > N: the object is highly estimable, highly valued. > ----------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > That makes it closer to being a rupa (towards which the mind bends) > > than a nama (which does the bending). > N: If nibbana were experiencing an object, it would be conditioned by that > object. Since nama is unconditioned, as you agree, it could not experience > any object. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: I agree that nibbana would not experience an object. And yet it is nama. This says to me that it is an objectless awareness, a nondual awareness of absence of conditions, and, simultaneously, that very absence. For nibbana, the light is on, but it encounters no objects to reflect off of. ----------------------------------------------------- > You may remember Suan's post to Rob Ep about the luminous mind, and also > what Jim wrote. These were long discussions. I understand that you find my > arguments not satisfactory. So long as we have not developed precise > understanding of citta, cetasika and rupa, and the way they are > conditioned, > how could we understand the unconditioned dhamma? > ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: As I see it, only the direct seeing of conditioned dhammas and their emptiness enables the seeing of the unconditioned (at a distance) and the eventual "entry" to it. And we cannot understand the unconditioned dhamma at all until actual contact with it or entry to it is made. ----------------------------------------------------- I better understand sound> > now, pleasant or unpleasant, hearing, aversion on account of it. ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: But that is theoretical understanding, understanding via the intellect. It is not the understanding that is freeing (though it *is* supportive of that understanding). ------------------------------------------------------ > > ------------------------------------------------ > ------------------------------------------------------ > > Howard: > (snip) The notion of the > > unconditioned dhamma serving as object for a conditioned dhamma, namely > > citta, is at best odd. It seems to me plausible that there could be the > > awareness of the *imminence* of cessation (or even of the cessation, > itself, > > i.e., the *entry* to nibbana), a kind of an experiencing of nibbana at a > > distance like the feeling when one is *about* to pass out (or is passing > > out), or *about* to drop off to sleep (or is dropping off to sleep). If > that > > is what it means for lokutara cittas to experience nibbana, that would > make > > sense to me. It would amount to the awareness by conditioned dhammas of > their > > imminent demise, which might correspond to what the Zen Buddhists > sometimes > > describe as water breaking through the bottom of the bucket. But nibbana, > > itself, the utter absence of all conditions, does not strike me as > something > > which is cognizable by conditioned cittas, nor could it be something > which > > could serve as object, in the usual sense of 'object', even for itself. > N: Of course we cannot understand this yet. One of those things we just > read > about. > > H: If nibbana is nama, that nama would have to be a nondual awareness > radically > > different from all conditioned nama, close, perhaps, to what the Zen > people > > mean by 'no-mind'. It would have to be an awareness without an object, > and, > > in that case, even using the word 'awareness' is misleading, because > nibbana > > is totally "other" from anything we have known. That, and only that, > would > > satisfactorily account for nibbana being nama, from my perspective. > N: Right, it is totally unknown from anything we have known. ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: A clear point of agreement! :-) ------------------------------------------------------- > > H:It seems > > to me that nibbana, the summum bonum, is not a darkness, but a light, not > > dead, but alive, not avijja, but vijja. That would make sense to me. > N: I am afraid to say much, because whatever we say, it may be wrong. Vis. > VII, 248: nibbana is: the auspicious, the safe, the marvellous, the intact, > the unafflicted, the purity, the island, the shelter. > But not vijja, because that is a property of citta, panna cetasika which > knows nibbana. Panna is called illumination. ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Okay. Then "vijja beyond vijja". ;-)) [But, I agree with you in a sense - to say *anything* with regard to nibbana is fundamentally to err.] ---------------------------------------------------------- > Best wishes > from Nina. > > ========================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15373 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 1:34pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Larry, I will be too busy to respond in a few days, but for now... > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > > I very much appreciate your comments but I think > I want to take > exception to characterizing satipatthana as a > discrimination between > concept and paramattha dhammas. In doing a quick > review of Ven > Nyanaponika's "The Heart of Buddhist Meditation" > it occurs to me that > the practice as it is outlined in the sutta makes > extensive use of > concepts. The contemplation of mind objects seems > to be overtly > contemplative and therefore necessarily > conceptual. My personal favorite interpretation is that satipatthana is knowing the dhammas as they truly are. What are the objects of satipatthana? The 5 kandhas, the 12 ayatanas, and the 18 dhatus. And how are these related to the categoizations of paramatha dhammas that we are studying? They are all paramatha dhammas. It's interesting that you think what is describe in the "dhamma" section in the maha-satipatthana sutta is conceptual. Personally, the section that is most difficult to map with paramatha theory is the rupa section because many objects discussed in that section are concepts, and the commentaries also discuss those conceptual objects in further details. Would you mention specifically which objects in the dhamma section that you found to be "overtly contemplative and therefore necessarily conceptual"? > The other categories > of mindfulness seem to have a mix of > contemplation and identifying > present experience. How do you define "contemplation?" >This identification is > tantamount to naming and is > therefore pannatti. Admittedly concept is not > recognized as an object. As far as I know, when the Buddha says something like: "When feeling a painful feeling of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a painful feeling of the flesh", this is not the same as identification by naming. It is merely discernment of the painful feeling (of the flesh) as painful feeling, different from the painful mental feeling, different from other mental feeling, and different from other objects. When one becomes more familiar with such objects, it begins to be clearer at the experiential level why there is no self anywhere in these dhammas, and there are only these dhammas. > > It seems that there is some variation among the > various meditation > traditions as to what to emphasize. Apparently > nothing is set in stone. > Many traditions focus on the breath in a one > pointed manner but I think > this may be an attempt to mix satipatthana and > jhana. There is no > mention of 'one pointed focus' in the > satipatthana. (Don't know about > Anapanasati Sutta) > > What I see in the Satipatthana Sutta is an > emphasis on identifying > experience in a simple straight forward objective > way and understanding > certain processes. Not an attempt to get to a > really real experience. > Contemplation definitely stands out. If you says contemplation, i.e., thinking about the stories about the dhammas even when it is true, is satipatthana. I would disagree with you. Although thinking and contemplation is good and necessary to learn about the teachings of the Buddha, the wisdom at that level is not very firm. We may think that impermanence is suffering, but we cannot truly understand (and be firm about) that until we truly see how objects are rising and falling away rapidly at each every moment of our life. When we experience this, the theory of impermanence is backed up by the truth (what wisdom experiences) and is not merely theory anymore. It is firm because it is backed up by what can be verified. When we have objects that are conceptual, these objects don't have any characteristics, including the characteristics of falling away. When I think of Larry (conceptual object), it is regardless of whether or not Larry is dead or alive, or if there is really a Larry there or not (maybe Larry is some other guy under the alias of Larry), but it is as if Larry is there. Larry doesn't arise and doesn't fall away, only thinking about Larry does. Paramatha objects aren't like Larry: when it appears, its characteristics are there, and its 3 common characteristics are also there (anicca, dukkha, anatta). > So, I may > have erred in scolding > Nina for not meditating. The study and > contemplation of abhidhamma could > encompass samma sati. Although it is extremely > unconventional for a > Buddhist to have never meditated. I think this is > unique to Acharn Sujin > and her school. There are some categorizations of teachings (I think, according to the commentaries) that are "rooted" in the buddha teachings: 1) The buddha's sayings (the textual scriptures, including the Vinaya, the Suttanta, and the Abhidhamma) [buddha-vacana] 2) The explanation of the Buddhas saying, specifically meaning the atthagatha [sutta-nulome] 3) Our teacher's teaching, including tika and anu-tika [Acariya-vata] 4) Our own thinking [attanomatti] There are obvious levels of confidence that we can place in these sources of teachings. As I mention in a previous post, we should compare what we hear to the scriptures and to the commentaries (and to your teacher's and your own thinking), at the very least to be able to say who says what. If you decide to hold something as the current "working theory", then you can say (largely) from which sources this theory comes from. Are there a lot of "Buddhist" schools (my teacher's teaching?) nowadays? Yes. Do they all teachings only what comes from the tipitakas. Mostly no. Do they teach what is deviant from the tipitakas? Some do. Is is hard to tell what is the buddha teachings and what is not? Depending on accumulations! The deviation goes from very gross to very subtle. When it begins to be subtle enough that we cannot tell right-off, then additional studies are required. However, as all things go, eventually things become so subtle even the texts cannot help you. My advise to you (and myself) is this: learn what you can (in details) from the people that you have the confidence in, and study for yourself (from the scriptures) how what they teach compares with the texts. When there appear to be conflicts, ask questions. Even hearing the right dhammas depend on conditions: good kamma conditions you to hear the right dhamma, and bad kamma conditions you to hear the wrong dhamma. More anatta! > Many, if not most, meditation traditions are wary > of jhana. This makes > me a little uneasy. Not sure what to make of it. > There *are* dangers. > The Tibetans are very heavy duty meditators but > there is lots of > supervision and many levels of training. > I think as long as one: 1) understands what the path is, and what isn't the path 2) works wisely and dilligently toward the true liberation from defilements, and not just suppression 3) knows the conditions that allow samatha to progress (perhaps to the point of Jhana), knows the differences between kusala and akusala. Then, there is no danger in developing Jhana. Jhana is said to be difficult to attain, so one shouldn't understimate the task and overestimate oneself. kom 15374 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 2:53pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Dear Rob M, I have looked through the notes in The Four Sublime States section which you took from Nyanoponika Thera, and found them to raise fewer questions than the notes from B. Buddharakkhita's, probably because they don't have specific references, and therefore, there are fewer things to compare to. I do have a few ramblings, though. The bikkhu seems to imply that that are relationships between the objects of concentration/samatha and the level of samatha. For example, as one goes from having agreeable people, to both agreeable and disagreeble people as the object of the meditation, "At that point of the practice one will have come to the higher stages of concentration: with the appearance of the metnal reflex-image, 'access contcentration' will have been reached and further progress will lead to the full concentration for the first jhana, then the higher jhana.". What do you think about this? The paragraph "Embracing all beings...", the low-minded and evil-minded are included because they are those are most in need of love. Many of them the seed of goodness may have died meerly because... It almosts sound like by embracing these low-mided and evil-mided beings as the object of concentrations, they are now "reseeded" with goodness. This sounds completely way out to me... We can increase kusala in others by saying useful things, or by showing by examples, or by not increasing akusala by not saying anything at all, but increasing other people's goodness by meditation and by thinking of them is not practical or helpful (I think.) The paragraph "Lying like a soft...", same thing as above. Like this sentence: "This insight into the general law of suffering is the real foundation fo our compassion". His thougths, words, and deeds are full of pity. I personally don't think pity (as I understand it) goes well with compassion, so I would be careful with explaining what this means. That it doesn't mean we pity others for their sufferings, but that we offer to help when we see others' sufferings... Also like these: "A stil nobler cause for our joy with others is their faith in the Dhamma, their understanding of the Dhamma, and their following of the Dhamma." "Equanimity is a perfect, unshakable balance of mind, rooted in insight." (really like this simile) "These waves of emotion carry us up and fling us down; and no sonner do we find rest, than we are in the power of a new wave again. How can we expect to get a footing on the crest of the waves? How can we erect the building of our lives in the midst of this ever restless ocean of existence, if no on the island of Equanimity." "By looking at suffering as our teacher and friend, we shall better succeed in enduring it with equanimity." "It is the delusion of a self that creates suffering and hinders or disturbs equanimity" I have a question for you. When he say this "To establish equanimity as an unshakable state of mind, one has to give up all possesive thoughts of "mine". How do you think he propose that we do "give up" the possessive thoughts of mine? kom 15375 From: Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 7:35pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Kom, glad to see you are still around. So here are my answers to your questions and a question for you. K: Would you mention specifically which objects in the dhamma section that you found to be "overtly contemplative and therefore necessarily conceptual"? L:"He knows how the arising of the non-arisen sense-desire comes to be; he knows how the abandoning of the arisen sense-desire comes to be; and he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned sense-desire comes to be." "Herein, monks, a monk thinks, "Thus is material form;..." "Herein, monks, a monk knows the eye and visual forms and the fetter that arises dependent on both..." "Herein, monks, when the enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is present, the monk knows, "The enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is in me,"" "Herein, monks, a monk knows, "This is suffering," according to reality..." K: How do you define "contemplation?" L: Conceptual cognition; not necessarily papanca but definitely vitakka and vicara. All the examples above are more than naming, but not a lot more. It isn't encyclopedic. "Naming" is how I interpret something like this: "Herein, monks, a monk knows the consciousness with lust, as with lust...". I think several meditation masters teach that the proper way to deal with this is to "note". I'm calling it naming. It is more than simply paying attention to what is happening or witnessing. It is a little nugget of cognition; although it is often mechanical and not so cognitive. I think panna is conceptual but I guess you don't. Could you explain? Also, I think the function of satipatthana is to cultivate detachment; detachment leads to tranquility; tranquility leads to definitive detachment ( a magga citta) if there is a foundation of right view. So I guess I'm saying working on right view (panna) is a different track than practicing satipatthana; although there is an element of panna in satipatthana and an element of satipatthana in the cultivation of panna. That's why I think the study of abidhamma without any meditation discipline _could_ accomplish samma sati. In spite of all this babble about meditation, I am definitely not an eager meditator. Meditation seems to be something many of us have to force ourselves to practice. There are many other more pleasurable activities. That obviously says something about attacment. What is A. Sujin's view on satipatthana meditation? Why doesn't she teach it? Does she teach a similar discipline for developing detachment? Larry 15376 From: Antony Woods Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 7:49pm Subject: Bhavana Dear Christine, Nyanatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary says: "BHAVANA: 'Mental Development' (lit. 'calling into existence, producing') is what in English generally but rather vaguely, is called 'meditation'. One has to distinguish 2 kinds: Development of Tranquillity (samatha-bhavana), i.e. concentration (samadhi), and Development of Insight (vipassana-bhavana), i.e. wisdom (panna)." with metta / Antony. 15377 From: Antony Woods Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 7:50pm Subject: Concepts and Satipatthana Dear Larry, Rob Ep, Howard and all, The late Ven Mahasi Sayadaw said: "The Buddha himself used the language of concepts and told us to be aware 'I am walking' etc. when we walk, bend or stretch. He did not use the language of realities and tell us to be aware 'It is supporting, moving' etc. Although you meditate using the language of concepts like 'walking, bending, stretching', as your mindfulness and concentration grow stronger, all the concepts disappear and only the realities like support and moving appear to you." ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/medbud/mahasifv.zip with metta / Antony. 15378 From: jinavamsa Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 9:05pm Subject: Re: Concepts and Satipatthana hello Antony, thank you so much for this link to such a gem. I have a few things here from Mahasi, but not this one! in appreciation for your offering, Jinavamsa --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Antony Woods" wrote: > Dear Larry, Rob Ep, Howard and all, > > The late Ven Mahasi Sayadaw said: > > "The Buddha himself used the language of concepts and told us to be > aware 'I am walking' etc. when we walk, bend or stretch. He did > not use the language of realities and tell us to be aware 'It is > supporting, moving' etc. Although you meditate using the language > of concepts like 'walking, bending, stretching', as your > mindfulness and concentration grow stronger, all the concepts > disappear and only the realities like support and moving appear to > you." > ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/medbud/mahasifv.zip > > with metta / Antony. 15379 From: frank kuan Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 9:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ack! (sarah) --- Sarah wrote: > > Two suggestions for cash reserves in Paradise: > > 1. Move to Koh Samui for half the year: - Great surf > in winter months > (forget June-August), a debating neighbour to > challenge any idea you’ve > ever had about Buddhism (read: Erik), occasional > visits from us to join > you in the surf, yoga and tai-chi on the beach and > assistance with the > debates with Erik, super cheap accomo and living > (read: Erik can arrange > it all), celestial maidens? (read: no comment). > Is Koh Samui on the big island of hawaii? Don't know about debating with Erik. His posts seem pretty sensible, even the Mahayana influenced ones. Group sitting would be nice though. Haven't had that in a long time. > 2. Maybe we could turn the ‘Abhidhamma for Family > Insomnia’ into a > best-seller between us. I don't know if I could stay awake to help write it. Whenever my eyes get to the third syllable of the word "abhidhamma", I'm already half asleep. Speaking of dreams, I had a nightmare a few nights ago where I was getting murdered, but I was calm throughout the murder, and woke up calmly afterwards. My attitude throughout the dream was to not become to wrapped up in the drama of identifying with self and situations, and as a result I didn't really go through any kind of anxiety or pain. -fk 15380 From: frank kuan Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 9:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ack! (rob e) --- epsteinrob wrote: > > Hi Frank! > Always enjoy your posts. Feel free to post more, we > can take it! : ) Glad you enjoy my posts. But trust me, the world can not handle the truth, or at least my interpretation of truth - not even most of the fine people on this list. > Um...Frank, on a more important subject.....uh, how > do you feel about > having guests? : ) > I have a studio here in Kauai, could probably have 3 or 4 adults crash on the floor. Unbeatable location. 5 minute walk to beach, 2 minute walk to middle of town. If any DSG'ers are serious about visiting, you can write me off line. Depending on timing, number of guests, I'd be happy to let you crash in my studio. -fk 15381 From: Sarah Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 10:08pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ack! (sarah) Hi Frank, --- frank kuan wrote: > > Is Koh Samui on the big island of hawaii? Don't know > about debating with Erik. His posts seem pretty > sensible, even the Mahayana influenced ones. Group > sitting would be nice though. Haven't had that in a > long time. ..... Perhaps if there is a library with an atlas in Kaui you could take a look. Hint: forget Hawaii. Re debates with Erik; New Plan - enjoy the group sittings with him and then assist him in the debates when we visit;-) ..... > I don't know if I could stay awake to help write it. > Whenever my eyes get to the third syllable of the > word "abhidhamma", I'm already half asleep. > > Speaking of dreams, I had a nightmare a few nights ago > where I was getting murdered, but I was calm > throughout the murder, and woke up calmly afterwards. > My attitude throughout the dream was to not become to > wrapped up in the drama of identifying with self and > situations, and as a result I didn't really go through > any kind of anxiety or pain. ..... A chapter on Painless Nightmares with Abhidhamma would definitely help the sales;-) I’m not at all sure there can be awareness (of any kind) whilst dreaming but maybe threre were moments of wakefulness in betwen the dreaming. I have an idea we’ve discussed sleep and dreams before. No dreams for those that have eradicated defilements as discussed in the sutta. Btw, I meant to comment yesterday on your post to New Sarah about considering changing your name to an ‘unpronouncable symbol’.....I think we need to hear pretty good reasons here for any name changes (we get confused enough as it is). We know you don’t like accumulating ‘baggage’ but a label does (like other concepts) offer much assistance and the ‘real’ concept label is best of all;-). Sarah ===== p.s. Ken O, I think we will be a lot less confused by sticking to this and we don’t confuse you with Ken H. (also I’m pretty attached to the ‘O’ now ;-)) ===== 15382 From: Sarah Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 11:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi Howard & All, ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: So, by fiat, all dhammas are namas or rupas. But if nibbana is not cognitive in any sense whatsoever, why is it not, then, a rupa? ----------------------------------------------------------- In a couple of places it seems that you have the idea that nama cannot be object of citta and cetasikas (i.e of other namas). Of course, any nama or rupa or even concepts can be objects and therefore condition cittas by way of object condition. Aything can be an object of experience. ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: But nama pertains to bending *towards*, not *causing* something else to bend towards it. -------------------------------------------------- It can do either. As arammana paccaya (object condition), it is the conditioning factor, the paccaya, for the other namas, ie the cittas and cetasikas to be the conditioned realities (paccayupanna). -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Talking about "bending", I find this not just a stretch, but a *contortion*! ------------------------------------------------ This whole post is being written because I read your line here about bending just after we came out of the really funny film ‘Bend it Like Beckham’. (Num - you’d love it and so would Chris and Sarah F- more questions about courage for the Sikh teenage girl who just wants to play football like the star). -------------------------------------------------- Nina:> Thus, nibbana does not bend towards an object, it does not experience an > object, but, it is predominant object condition for the lokuttara cittas > that experience it, it bends them towards itself in that way. > -------------------------------------------------- Further to Nina’s later comments, I’d like to quote a little more from her ‘Conditions’ which touches on this area. If you remember from my post to Frank, when we count paccaya (conditions) instead of sheep, the third one is adhipati paccaya (predominance condition). Under this paccaya, there are two kinds;- conascent predominance and object predominance. As Nina indicated in her recent post, object predominance condition only relates to ‘desirable’ or ‘esteemed’ objects: ***** QUOTE We read in the “Paììhåna” (Faultless Triplet, VII, Investigation Chapter, Conditions: Positive, 1, Classification Chapter, Predominance, 10, § 413): ... After having offered the offering, having undertaken the precept, having fulfilled the duty of observance, (one) esteems and reviews it. (One) esteems and reviews (such acts) formerly well done... Wholesomeness can be object-predominance-condition for kusala citta which esteems and considers the wholesome deed which was done. In this case one gives preponderance to that object. When we have been generous we can recollect our generosity and then there can be the arising again of kusala cittas...... We read in the same section of the “Paììhåna” (§ 416): Learners esteem and review (lower) Fruition. (They) esteem and review Nibbåna. Nibbåna is related to change-of-lineage, purification 1, Path by predominance-condition. Nibbåna is object-predominance-condition for the eight lokuttara cittas which experience it, and it can also be object-predominance-condition for mahå-kusala citta accompanied by paññå and mahå-kiriyacitta (of the arahat) accompanied by paññå. Lokuttara cittas can be object-predominance-condition for the cittas which arise after the attainment of enlightenment and which review, consider with paññå, the lokuttara cittas which arose. ***** To relate this topic a little to our present study and consideration, often people comment they are too busy to read or consider dhamma. Another argument goes that if there is no self to direct or choose, i.e. no “free-will”, then what is the point or purpose or intention to read and consider. At the end of the above chapter in ‘Conditions’ we read about (MN1,37) how Sakka, lord of the devas ‘had inclination to mental development, but when there were conditions to enjoy sense-pleasures, he was absorbed in these’: ***** QUOTE Moggallåna wanted to find out whether Sakka had grasped the meaning of the Buddha’s words and to this end he appeared among the “devas of the Thirtythree”. Sakka, who was equipped and provided with five hundred deva-like musical instruments, was amusing himself. When he saw Moggallåna coming he stopped those instruments and welcomed Moggallåna. Moggallåna then asked Sakka to repeat the Buddha’s words about freedom by the destruction of craving. Sakka answered: I, my good Moggallåna, am very busy, there is much to be done by me; both on my own account there are things to be done, and there are also (still more) things to be done for the devas of the Thirtythree. Further, my good Moggallåna, it was properly heard, properly learnt, properly attended to, properly reflected upon, so that it cannot vanish quickly.... Sakka invited Moggallåna to come and see the delights of his splendid palace. Moggallåna thought that Sakka lived much too indolently and wanted to agitate him. By his supernatural power he made the palace tremble, shake and quake. Moggallåna asked Sakka again to repeat the Buddha’s words and then Sakka did repeat them. We may recognize ourselves in Sakka when he tries to find excuses not to consider the Dhamma. We also are inclined to think at times that we are too busy to develop right understanding of realities, to be aware of nåma and rúpa over and over again, until they are thoroughly understood. When Moggallåna agitated Sakka there were conditions for him to give preponderance to the development of right understanding. Our life is likewise. When we listen to the Dhamma or read the scriptures there can be conditions to give preponderance to the consideration of the Dhamma and the development of right understanding. When there is mindfulness of nåma and rúpa as they appear one at a time, they can eventually be known as they are: elements which are non-self. ***** I can relate to this story very easily. So, by conditions, we are reading and considering dhamma now. What is seen, heard and considered can be object predominance condition for the namas to bend towards these objects which may condition wise reflection, sati and panna at this moment. Gradually by understanding a little more about conditions and all the other details which Kom mentioned such as the dhatus and ayatanas and so on, the Abhidhamma seems less of a ‘contortion’ and more a practical description of realities being experienced now, whether or not there is any awareness. Howard, I think in another post you suggested you thought there were levels of consciousness. I’d suggest the cittas (consciousness) and the other realities are just as they are regardless of whether there is any awareness of them or not. In other words, it is the understanding and awareness which develop and change, rather than the ordinary realities of daily life. On this note, for anyone (not Howard, I know) who considers there is a self until one is enlightened, let me quote from AN, 3s, The Three Characteristics of Existence, B.Bodhi transl): Whether Thathagatas arise in the world or not, it still remains a fact, a firm and necessary condition of existence, that all formations are impermanent...that all formations are subject to suffering...that all things are non-self”. ***** In the same way, whether or not it is taught by a Buddha, whether or not any understanding is ever developed, paccaya (conditions) and all the other details about paramattha dhammas that we read about in the Tipitaka are true as some of us have confidence. Sarah ............ p.s Nina, when Howard mentioned details about Lance Cousins and the Samatha Trust before, did it remind you of our trip to Manchester sometime in the 70s when you were invited to discuss abhidhamma questions with the group there? I had completely forgotten all about it until Howard mentioned these details;-) ================================ 15383 From: Sarah Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 11:18pm Subject: Welcome Dear Anthony, I'm very glad to see you've 'broken the ice' and with such helpful quotes and support. We all look forward to your contributions and hope you find it useful here. There was another Anthony B here (who may still be lurking), but we haven't heard from him in a long while. He was the first member to meet us without any pic or special tips. He told everyone that it was Ok because we were 'ordinary' or 'normal'...forget now which. Anyway, as you'll have seen, there are many discussions about very ordinary experiences and actualities and all the ups and downs, joys and reactions in our studies and practices. If you'd care to add any details about where you live or your interest in the Teachings, we'd be glad to hear. Best wishes, Sarah ===== 15384 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Sun Sep 1, 2002 11:51pm Subject: Re: Welcome --- Dear Sarah, Antony, like the other Antony is from down under, and is well known to any of us who have posted on d-l in the past. A helpful and insightful writer, I'm very pleased to see him here. Robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Anthony, > > I'm very glad to see you've 'broken the ice' and with such helpful quotes > and support. > > We all look forward to your contributions and hope you find it useful > here. > > > If you'd care to add any details about where you live or your interest in > the Teachings, we'd be glad to hear. > > Best wishes, > > Sarah > ===== 15385 From: ranil gunawardena Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 0:41am Subject: Re: Hi attn: Sarah, Jon & Sumane, Dear Sarah, Jon & Sumane, Missed the original letter but got hold of this letter form Mr. Rathnasuriya. What a good news. So when is going to be the date? And Sarah, this time I will try not to work half-day...on the discussion day (by the way how long you are going to stay and I hope there will be a chance for a discussion). Awaithing to see you all and Kun Sujin, metta ranil >Dear Sarah & Jon, >What pleasant reminiscence I experience when you mention your next visit >to Colombo! My heartiest appreciation of you all and of course for Khun >Sujin for deciding to return to my blessed country. Why I am so >emotional is that at least a few like Ranil, Gayan, self etc. who are in >the list & the ones who join for discussions as Nihal, Suren & his wife >will benefit once more with clarifications they have been piling up for >the discussion. As for me it was a “Course Correction”! You all know >that. > >Further, any land will be blessed with so much reality seekers stepping >in there. MY LAND needs it most! > >Thanks again >Sumane > >PS: Dear Jon, >Nihal’s sister in law’s son (s-i-l works with you, we learnt) is keen on >Dhamma study. Though a Buddhist, he has had little exposure in HK, Nihal >says. Just some info to extend the light of Dhamma to someone who could >benefit therefrom. > >Sumane Rathnasuriya 15386 From: Sarah Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 0:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dilemma Nr 183 & 184 Hi Herman (& Erik), We haven’t chatted in a while and I hope I don’t end up having to poke out my eyes again;-( I read these dilemmas with interest while we were away and was surprised not to see any response. Actually, Erik assured me he was set to respond to them which is why his name gets a mention. I’ll just repeat your message in full as it was some time ago now: ***** --- egberdina wrote: > Hi all, > > Following on from the discussion re the debt we owe our parents, > regardless of the quality of the parenting, I have the following > questions and would appreciate your consideration. > > Is it wisdom to not have children, because: > > 1 ]that way one can devote much more effort to the realisation of the > path, and > 2 ]there is no control over the being one brings into the world. One > may well be consigning a being to aeons of hell by virtue of having > brought this being into this world. Whatever way one looks at it, > samsara goes yet another revolution. > > or is it selfish and unwise to not have children, because: > > 1 ]children are very adept at exposing all the preconceptions one > clings to, thus opening the way for the possibility of the shedding > of some views, and > 2 ]by not having children, one is preventing a being from > experiencing birth in this realm, with all it's concomitant benefits. ***** In brief, I don’t think we can set any rules about what is best. Conditions are so very complex that we don’t know how our life will work out at all. Realisation of the path depends on understanding and not on lifetstyle. Selfishness and lobha depend on accumulations and will always find an object regardless. Life never works out as we intend in any case. When we were in Noosa meeting several friends from long back, it turned out that those who had really wanted to have children were childless and one who never intended to have children now has two grown kids. I think that when we see life’s dilemmas in terms of ‘situations’ we forget about conditioned realities changing from moment to moment. You commented in ‘the Snow’ post about the ‘sublte movements of the mind’ and how ‘realisation that neither the avoidance of the unpleasant or the clinging to the pleasant is of any intrinsic value.’ As we know, so many factors affect rebirth and in that lifetime the different experiences. No one can control them. from a section of ADL (20-1) we read: >Birth as a human being is a happy rebirth. In the human plane there is opportunity for the cultivation of kusala. One can study Dhamma and learn to develop the way leading to the end of defilements and the end of birth and death. Birth in the human plane is kusala vipaka, but during one's lifespan in this plane there are both kusala vipaka and akusala vipaka. Each person experiences different results in life: there is gain and loss, honour and dishonour, praise and blame, happiness and misery. Each person is born into the family which is the right condition for him to experience the results of his deeds. It is due to one's kamma that one experiences pleasant and unpleasant things through eyes, ears, nose, tongue and body-sense.< Earlier it also said: “However, we should realize that happiness and unhappiness are only mental phenomena which arise because of conditions and fall away again. Our whole life is a sequence of phenomena which arise and fall away again.” ***** What is good, what is bad, what is the solution to the dilemma? There are no rules. We will live whatever lifestyle we do, by conditions. The development of the Path does not depend on whether we have or don’t have children, on our job or how many of few possessions we have. As Kom wrote to Rob M “One lives a simple life because one knows that attachments toward complicated living only brings more troubles.” When the Buddha talks about living alone, it refers to seeing the danger of attachments whether one is in the city or the forest.,learning to live alone with seeing, hearing and so on. So, Herman, whether you add to your gang or not, there are realities to be known, living alone to be experienced. ***** As we read in the Migajala Sutta; ‘There are, Migajala, sounds cognizable by the ear..odours cognizable by the nose..tastes cognizable by the tongue..tactile objects cognizable by the body..mental phenomena cognizable by the mind that are desirable, lovely, agreeable, pleasing, sensually enticing, tantalizing. If a bhikkhu does not seek delight in them..he is called alone dweller. ‘Migajala, even though a bhikkhu who dwells thus lives in the vicinity of a village, associating with bhikkhus and bhikkhunis, with male and felmale lay follower, with kings and royal ministers, with sectarian teachers and their disciples, he is still called a lone dweller. For what reason? Because craving is his partner and he has abandoned it; therefore his is called a lone dweller.” (SN, Bk of 6 Sense Bases.63, B.Bodhi trans) .......... Best wishes, Sarah ====== 15387 From: Sarah Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 2:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata Dear Nina & Rob M, Thanks for the discussion on this subject which can be quite confusing I find also. ..... --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Rob M, > I shall paste from A. Sujin's Dhamma in Cambodia: > > The term upekkhå, equanimity, has several meanings . Upekkhå can refer > to > the feeling that is neither happy nor unhappy, to indifferent feeling; > thus, > it can be the cetasika that is feeling, vedanå. It can also refer to > paññå > cetasika in the development of vipassanå, paññå that is neutral towards > the > realities arising because of conditions. Therefore, when we have > equanimity, > this can be indifferent feeling or it can be tatramajjhattatå cetasika, > or > it can be paññå in the development of vipassanå. ..... This reminds me of the comments Jaran gave from talks by K.Sujin on TMT (as he called it). I had hoped he was going to add more. I really find comments about tatramajjhattata cetasika very useful indeed - so little impartiality in a day. Panna has to be impartial to its object. I found Larry’s quote from Vism very helpful indeed as a reminder of the impartiality of panna or TMT: "Hi all, in case you are curious, here is the definition of tatramajjhattata from Vism. XIV 153: Specific neutrality (tatra-majjhattata--lit. 'neutrality in regard thereto') is neutrality (majjhattata) in regard to those states [of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants arisen in association with it]. It has the characteristic of conveying consciousness and consciousness-concomitants evenly. Its function is to prevent deficiency and excess, or its function is to inhibit partiality. It is manifested as neutrality. It should be regarded as like a conductor (driver) who looks with equanimity on thoroughbreds progressing evenly.” ***** In U.P. under ‘equanimity’ and under ‘upekkha’ there are more details and helpful comments: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts Rob, I also appreciated your correspondence with Kom on metta.and I’m glad you see the harm in any misleading. I really liked this quote of Kom’s: “When one is kind towards another person, one has the person as the object. When we are kind to this person, we are not thinking about sending out kindness to that person: one is simply kind (thinnking kindly, saying kind things, doing kind things) to the person.” I remember he gave some good examples before but they’re not in front of me. I think examples of misleading info or leading to wrong views would be: If there is an idea of a special time, place, radiating, universal from the start, partiality or a particular person, confusion with insight, suggestion it can lead to all jhanas, or can be applied and should be applied to oneelf or has one’s own interest at heart. You had some discussions on karuna, compassion. There is also more in U.P. Again if there is an idea of a story or situation or an occasion for compassion, I think it’s a conventional idea and not the specific cetasika that arises briefly and without any unhappiness, just wishing the one suffering to be well. These cittas are ‘light’ and without any unpleasant feeling. Mudita - sympathetic joy when one’s just glad for the other’s good fortune at any time. Is one glad when one’s colleague gets the promotion, when one’s friends are enjoying life in Hawaii, when someone else has the chance for dana or other kusala, when a friend in class gets a good score....appreciating the kusala vipaka without any trace of envy or thought of oneself? Sarah ===== > See Acharn Sujin1s 3Survey of Paramattha Dhammas, Appendix to Cetasika, > where it has been explained that there are ten kinds of equanimity, > upekkhå > (Visuddhimagga IV, 156-1660). It can refer, for example, to > tatramajjhattatå, to indifferent feeling, to equanimity of effort, > viriya, > that is neither overstrenuous nor lax in mental development. It can > refer to > paññå that is equanimity in vipassanå. Paññå is neutral as it > investigates > the object that arises because of the appropriate conditions. > > As to the Brahma Vihara of upekkha, this has, just as in the case of the > other Brahma Viharas, living beings as object. It is Tatram, but it is > called upekkha. Is this slow motion enough ? :-) 15388 From: robmoult Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 3:24am Subject: Re: Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata Hi Sarah, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Rob, I also appreciated your correspondence with Kom on metta.and I 'm glad > you see the harm in any misleading. I encourage all DSGrs to help me root any out anything that could lead to wrong view from my Class Notes. I am now deep inside the thought process and learning a lot. My thought process lecture is on Sept. 15. (I am goin to buy some time next week by doing a review). I would appreciate any links to detailed analysis of the thought process. I find the Abhidhammathasangha to be quite light in this area. Which of the original seven volumes did the thought process appear in? I know it wasn't the first as I have a copy. Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: Sorry if there are weird characters in my posting, I am using an airport terminal in Seoul and sometimes Korean characters appear in my message. 15389 From: egberdina Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 3:32am Subject: The Phone Hi all, Just letting you know that since a thunderstorm last Thursday night we have been phoneless until just a while ago. So lots of business, personal and dhamma matters to catch up with. I did miss the interchange, but I think the garden did quite well out of it :-) All the best Herman 15390 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 7:47am Subject: RE: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Larry, > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > > L:"He knows how the arising of the non-arisen > sense-desire comes to be; > he knows how the abandoning of the arisen > sense-desire comes to be; and > he knows how the non-arising in the future of the > abandoned sense-desire > comes to be." I am going to read some more in this area in response to comments in this area (from multiple people to me.), so I will get back to you. Meanwhile, maybe other people will say something about what they think on this being contemplative/conceptual. > I think panna is conceptual but I guess you > don't. Could you explain? Just like lobha is not conceptual, panna is not conceptual. It co-arises with the citta and cetasikas that know the dhamma as they are (which is a function of panna). An example may be knowing the difference between kusala and akusala (especially kusala and lobha, as it seems to be extra-ordinarily difficult for me). When there is a correct realization, panna arises with that citta. > Also, I think the function of satipatthana is to > cultivate detachment; > detachment leads to tranquility; tranquility > leads to definitive > detachment ( a magga citta) if there is a > foundation of right view. Yes, I think this is a function of satipatthana and panna. But why do you think Satipatthana leads to detachment? Some people think that when they realize that they have lobha/dosa, they should "let go" of that lobha/dosa. Is that "letting go" satipatthana? > So I > guess I'm saying working on right view (panna) is > a different track than > practicing satipatthana; although there is an > element of panna in > satipatthana and an element of satipatthana in > the cultivation of panna. When there is wisdom, right attention, right efforts, right mindfulness, and right concentration come with the wisdom automatically (in the mundane path, also with right conduct, right speech, and right livelihood in the supramundane path). Wisdom leads to detachment [if you know for a fact that attachment leads to suffering, wouldn't you be less attached?]. What else do you think satipathana leads to that panna doesn't? > That's why I think the study of abidhamma without > any meditation > discipline _could_ accomplish samma sati. I am not sure if you know this, but A. Sujin and her associates (including Nina, Sarah, etc.) have never said that conceptual studying alone is enough to grow wisdom towards the path. As long as one doesn't directly realize dhamma for themselves, then it is impossible to reach the supramundane path. Realizing the dhamma directly as dhamma is the mundane path which eventually conditions the supramundane path. The controversies/disagreements regarding the meditations (I think) are two-folds: 1) The distinctions between jhana development and vipassana development. Some don't appear to make distinctions and some do. Some think vipassana development is not possible / is too hard to do with out jhana development, and some don't. What's your take on this? 2) What exactly is vipassana development? Is it following the steps that are popularly taught by people like V. Mahasi or Goenka? How about steps as taught by V. Buddhadhasa or V. Chah? Does one have to be formal (i.e., has to be in specific place, doing specific things; otherwise, one is not fast enough to "catch" the dhamma)? Does one have to sit to develop vipassana, or is sitting a requirement for the panna to be developed? > In spite of all this babble about meditation, I > am definitely not an > eager meditator. Meditation seems to be something > many of us have to > force ourselves to practice. There are many other > more pleasurable > activities. That obviously says something about > attacment. What is A. > Sujin's view on satipatthana meditation? Why > doesn't she teach it? Does > she teach a similar discipline for developing detachment? > Whenever I see her (which is not often), satipatthana development and development of panna are the only topics she talks about, sometimes almost seemingly in exclusion of all other kusala development. I don't think she views (as evident by what all her students say!) Satipatthana the same way as popularly viewed by others. The more important question (I think) is whether or not what she (or anybody else) teaches matches what the Buddha has taught. kom 15391 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 5:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 9/2/02 2:09:47 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Hi Howard & All, > ---------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > So, by fiat, all dhammas are namas or rupas. But if nibbana is not > cognitive in any sense whatsoever, why is it not, then, a rupa? > ----------------------------------------------------------- > In a couple of places it seems that you have the idea that nama cannot be > object of citta and cetasikas (i.e of other namas). Of course, any nama or > rupa or even concepts can be objects and therefore condition cittas by way > of object condition. Aything can be an object of experience. > ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I am aware of that. I know that vi~n~nana takes emotions, feelings, thoughts etc as objects. My point is that rupa can be taken as object, but has no cognitive function. What makes nama "nama" except for its having a cognitive aspect? How is nama defined? Nyanatiloka writes "náma: (lit. 'name'): 'mind', mentality." If there is no cognitive aspect to nibbana, if it is not the nondual awareness of absence of objects and conditions, if it can be taken as object but is, itself, unknowing in addition to being unconditioned, then it sounds more like an "unconditioned rupa" than a nama. Moreover, in this case, *entry* to final nibbana sounds more like annihilation to me than liberation - it sounds like a final turning off of the light. Instead of being the freeing of consciousness, the dropping off of all conditions, entry to nibbana inaugurates the ultimate avijja (non-seeing). Let me ask you - what is it you would find lovely in that? ------------------------------------------------------ > ----------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > But nama pertains to bending *towards*, not *causing* something > else > to bend towards it. > -------------------------------------------------- > It can do either. As arammana paccaya (object condition), it is the > conditioning factor, the paccaya, for the other namas, ie the cittas and > cetasikas to be the conditioned realities (paccayupanna). > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: But what is distinctive about namas? ------------------------------------------------------- > -------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Talking about "bending", I find this not just a stretch, but a > *contortion*! > ------------------------------------------------ > This whole post is being written because I read your line here about > bending just after we came out of the really funny film ‘Bend it Like > Beckham’. (Num - you’d love it and so would Chris and Sarah F- more > questions about courage for the Sikh teenage girl who just wants to play > football like the star). > -------------------------------------------------- > Nina:> Thus, nibbana does not bend towards an object, it does not > experience an > > object, but, it is predominant object condition for the lokuttara cittas > > that experience it, it bends them towards itself in that way. > > > -------------------------------------------------- > Further to Nina’s later comments, I’d like to quote a little more from her > ‘Conditions’ which touches on this area. If you remember from my post to > Frank, when we count paccaya (conditions) instead of sheep, the third one > is adhipati paccaya (predominance condition). Under this paccaya, there > are two kinds;- conascent predominance and object predominance. As Nina > indicated in her recent post, object predominance condition only relates > to ‘desirable’ or ‘esteemed’ objects: > ***** > QUOTE > We read in the “PaììhÃ¥naâ€? (Faultless Triplet, VII, Investigation Chapter, > Conditions: Positive, 1, Classification Chapter, Predominance, 10, § 413): > > ... After having offered the offering, having undertaken the precept, > having fulfilled the duty of observance, (one) esteems and reviews it. > (One) esteems and reviews (such acts) formerly well done... > > Wholesomeness can be object-predominance-condition for kusala citta which > esteems and considers the wholesome deed which was done. In this case one > gives preponderance to that object. When we have been generous we can > recollect our generosity and then there can be the arising again of kusala > cittas...... > > We read in the same section of the “PaììhÃ¥naâ€? (§ 416): > > Learners esteem and review (lower) Fruition. (They) esteem and review > NibbÃ¥na. NibbÃ¥na is related to change-of-lineage, purification 1, > Path by predominance-condition. > > NibbÃ¥na is object-predominance-condition for the eight lokuttara cittas > which experience it, and it can also be object-predominance-condition for > mahÃ¥-kusala citta accompanied by paññå and mahÃ¥-kiriyacitta (of the > arahat) accompanied by paññå. Lokuttara cittas can be > object-predominance-condition for the cittas which arise after the > attainment of enlightenment and which review, consider with paññå, the > lokuttara cittas which arose. > ***** > To relate this topic a little to our present study and consideration, > often people comment they are too busy to read or consider dhamma. Another > argument goes that if there is no self to direct or choose, i.e. no > “free-willâ€?, then what is the point or purpose or intention to read and > consider. > > At the end of the above chapter in ‘Conditions’ we read about (MN1,37) how > Sakka, lord of the devas ‘had inclination to mental development, but when > there were conditions to enjoy sense-pleasures, he was absorbed in these’: > ***** > QUOTE > MoggallÃ¥na wanted to find out whether Sakka had grasped the meaning of the > Buddha’s words and to this end he appeared among the “devas of the > Thirtythreeâ€?. Sakka, who was equipped and provided with five hundred > deva-like musical instruments, was amusing himself. When he saw MoggallÃ¥na > coming he stopped those instruments and welcomed MoggallÃ¥na. MoggallÃ¥na > then asked Sakka to repeat the Buddha’s words about freedom by the > destruction of craving. Sakka answered: > > I, my good MoggallÃ¥na, am very busy, there is much to be done by me; both > on my own account there are things to be done, and there are also (still > more) things to be done for the devas of the Thirtythree. Further, my good > MoggallÃ¥na, it was properly heard, properly learnt, properly attended to, > properly reflected upon, so that it cannot vanish quickly.... > > Sakka invited MoggallÃ¥na to come and see the delights of his splendid > palace. MoggallÃ¥na thought that Sakka lived much too indolently and wanted > to agitate him. By his supernatural power he made the palace tremble, > shake and quake. MoggallÃ¥na asked Sakka again to repeat the Buddha’s words > and then Sakka did repeat them. > We may recognize ourselves in Sakka when he tries to find excuses not to > consider the Dhamma. We also are inclined to think at times that we are > too busy to develop right understanding of realities, to be aware of nÃ¥ma > and rúpa over and over again, until they are thoroughly understood. When > MoggallÃ¥na agitated Sakka there were conditions for him to give > preponderance to the development of right understanding. Our life is > likewise. When we listen to the Dhamma or read the scriptures there can be > conditions to give preponderance to the consideration of the Dhamma and > the development of right understanding. When there is mindfulness of nÃ¥ma > and rúpa as they appear one at a time, they can eventually be known as > they are: elements which are non-self. > ***** > I can relate to this story very easily. > > So, by conditions, we are reading and considering dhamma now. What is > seen, heard and considered can be object predominance condition for the > namas to bend towards these objects which may condition wise reflection, > sati and panna at this moment. Gradually by understanding a little more > about conditions and all the other details which Kom mentioned such as the > dhatus and ayatanas and so on, the Abhidhamma seems less of a ‘contortion’ > and more a practical description of realities being experienced now, > whether or not there is any awareness. > > Howard, I think in another post you suggested you thought there were > levels of consciousness. I’d suggest the cittas (consciousness) and the > other realities are just as they are regardless of whether there is any > awareness of them or not. In other words, it is the understanding and > awareness which develop and change, rather than the ordinary realities of > daily life. --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: The "levels of consiousness" are variations among the cittas, particularly as regards their intensity and the kinds of cetasikas associated, nothing more mysterious. Bhavanga cittas, for example, have low intensity, and are subliminal. ---------------------------------------------------------- > > On this note, for anyone (not Howard, I know) who considers there is a > self until one is enlightened, let me quote from AN, 3s, The Three > Characteristics of Existence, B.Bodhi transl): > > Whether Thathagatas arise in the world or not, it still remains a fact, a > firm and necessary condition of existence, that all formations are > impermanent...that all formations are subject to suffering...that all > things are non-selfâ€?. > ***** > In the same way, whether or not it is taught by a Buddha, whether or not > any understanding is ever developed, paccaya (conditions) and all the > other details about paramattha dhammas that we read about in the Tipitaka > are true as some of us have confidence. > > Sarah > ............ > > p.s Nina, when Howard mentioned details about Lance Cousins and the > Samatha Trust before, did it remind you of our trip to Manchester sometime > in the 70s when you were invited to discuss abhidhamma questions with the > group there? I had completely forgotten all about it until Howard > mentioned these details;-) > ================================= This last doesn't ring a bell with me. I think it must have been someone else who talked about this. (I did have some e-mail correspondence once with Lance Cousins - but that's it.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15392 From: frank kuan Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 9:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dilemma Nr 183 & 184 sarah: > I read these dilemmas [whether to have children] with interest while we were > away and was surprised > not to see any response. Actually, Erik assured me > he was set to respond > to them which is why his name gets a mention. Sarah sure knows how to get people to respond to a question. Mention specific individuals by name, and throw down an implicit challenge to the rest of the list for being silent :) Herman's question on children dilemma: > > Is it wisdom to not have children, because: > > > > 1 ]that way one can devote much more effort to the > realisation of the > > path, and > > 2 ]there is no control over the being one brings > into the world. One > > may well be consigning a being to aeons of hell by > virtue of having > > brought this being into this world. Whatever way > one looks at it, > > samsara goes yet another revolution. > > > > or is it selfish and unwise to not have children, > because: > > > > 1 ]children are very adept at exposing all the > preconceptions one > > clings to, thus opening the way for the > possibility of the shedding > > of some views, and > > 2 ]by not having children, one is preventing a > being from > > experiencing birth in this realm, with all it's > concomitant benefits. Any combination of all 4 motivations you mention can be active simultaneously. Maybe it wasn't your intention, but it seems like you were asking for a thumbs up or thumbs down response on having children. No universal answer to that one. I agree with Sarah, it depends on the person and their situation. A catholic priest should not be having children for example. Lay people having children can be a wonderful thing. But if one wants to have children, they should be careful not to use this as a justification: > > 1 ]children are very adept at exposing all the > preconceptions one > > clings to, thus opening the way for the > possibility of the shedding > > of some views, and This sounds suspiciously like an anonymous friend of mine who chooses to hang out with drug dealers, partiers, with the so called motivation that it presents many opportunities to develop wisdom and also gives the evil friends an opportunity to hear the dhamma. Right. This is a deluded intention, and a horrible investment of precious limited resources, with little to no chance on the return of investment. Not to mention our "good intentioned" friend is more likely to get sucked down into that vortex of evil rather than save their friends. Our life is short, best to use it on wise investments with favorable chance of return. I'm not saying that kids don't provide opportunites for developing wholesome qualities and wisdom, I'm just saying it's deluded and misguided to use that as a justification to HAVE kids. Good kamma does not stack the odds in your favor for having a good kid. For example, my parents are people of excellent virtue, yet they ended up with me. Bet they got a good lesson they'll never forget in how good kamma doesn't always ripen in the form of well behaved children. :) I just hung out with a couple of friends and their 6 month old for a few hours. What a monumental effort maintaining baby! Really makes me appreciate what my parents had to go through, and what I don't want to go through. Better to be born into one of those deva realms where fully grown children spring forth on their birthday and (hopefully) potty trained, quiet and can feed themselves to a certain extent. :) -fk 15393 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 10:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Larry, see below: op 01-09-2002 07:50 schreef LBIDD@w... op LBIDD@w...: > Contemplation definitely stands out. So, I may have erred in scolding > Nina for not meditating. N: Larry, I had a good laugh, you did not scold me, you merely suggested something :-) L: Although it is extremely unconventional for a > Buddhist to have never meditated. I think this is unique to Acharn Sujin > and her school. N: How do you know this :-) :-) Although you have seen this before, I paste again from Perfections, about the story of the Bodhisatta who saw the evanescent dewdrops: You see, apart from mindfulness of breath, there are other subjects very apt to contemplate in daily life. I have several occasions now for mindfulness of death, and in this way I can be reminded of momentary death: nama and rupa which last only for a moment. And there are opportunities to develop metta and karuna, especially when there are troubles around us with regard to relationships. As I wrote to someone: when there are problems with persons, it is good to remember that one may see that person for the last time, because who knows when death occurs? This really helps me. As we read above in the quote about the dewdrops: we should not let such opportunities pass by, but we can be reminded to develop understanding of nama and rupa now, so that one day (we do not know when) their impermanence can be realized. Insight and samatha can be combined in this way. If we do not see the value of understanding this moment the Buddha has taught us in vain, we let the opportunity to develop understanding slip. Understanding is essential, also for samatha, because we can delude ourselves. A moment of metta feels so good, we are delighted, but immediately we are attached to this pleasant feeling. Should this not be known? I have an insignificant example, but just an illustration. Yesterday we visited my father who is sick and gave him soup. We also had soup, and I was hungry. But since my father wanted more soup, we gave away ours and I said that I wanted to give it with love, but then I was attached to the pleasant feeling coming in. How tricky. You may wonder whether the satipatthana sutta teaches about concepts, but then, it is good to note that after each section it is said that arising and ceasing should be realized. This pertains to nama and rupa. Only a Buddha can teach this, and let it not be in vain for us. Another meditation subject: we can pay respect to the Triple Gem, together with the development of understanding. Even when we understand a little more, it is thanks to whom? Best wishes from Nina. 15394 From: robmoult Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 10:58am Subject: Time for a change (a long post) Hi All, I am reading a book, "Buddhist Psychology of Perception" by E. Sarachchandra, M.A., Ph.D., D. Litt., Chancellor, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. Actually, the book was his thesis submitted to the University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. A little light reading :-) The book has three sections: "Theories of Perception in the Nikayas", "Perception in the Abhidhamma" and "Theory of Bhavanga". Here is a quote from the book, "The results of the investigations embodied in the Nikayas were made use of by the schoolmen of the fifth century for the formulation of a theory of perception which, while being faithful as far as possible to the views of early Buddhism, attempted also to fill in the gaps that were left by it. The theory is quite unique in the history of Indian thought, and it was probably the work of Buddhaghosa after having immersed himself in Sanskrit philosophy. There are in it unmistakeable signs of the influence of the theories of perception that were current in the schools of Indian philosophy and the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. Whenever borrowings were made, however, they were modified and adapted so as to be in keeping with the ideology of Theravada Buddhism." There is a chapter of the book titled, "Developments in the Twelfth Century", where the theory of moments was introduced into the Abhidhamma, to merge/adapt/refute positions of the Yogacara and Sautrantika schools which also had developed similar theories at that time. Later, the book spent some time explaining the parallels and differences between bhavanga and the Alaya Vijnana of the Yogacara school. As I delve into the details of the thought process in preparation for my class, I come to the conclusion that if I want anything more than a very simple overview, I am wandering into the realm of "speculative theories" put forth by philosophers. The philosophers can't agree; there is a different view of the importance of the registration citta as explained in the Visuddhi Magga (early concept; registration is an exceptional case, rarely occurring), the Abhidhammatthasangaha (late concept; registration occurs in most thoughts) and the Atthasalini (wavers between early and late concepts). I even find that some of the "simple overview" was added later into the Abhidhamma and is not clearly supported in the Suttas. For example, it appears as though the registration citta was introduced by Buddhaghosa. In brief, I am starting to lose faith in the accuracy and authenticity of the Abhidhamma. Here is another quote from the book, "... the Abhidhamma does not make any attempt to explain the phenomenon of memory, for, having postulated process without substance, they were without any known equipment for explaining it, and were obliged to merely recognize it as a fact." Why is it that the Abhidhamma does not give a clear description on the function of memory? I think that memory is a very important topic that deserves a detailed explanation. The beginning few paragraphs of the final chapter, "Philosophical Basis of the Buddhist Theory of Perception", gives some comfort (to me, at least): ===== As far as the early texts reveal, the Buddha's examination of mental phenomena was undertaken with a purely practical end in view. His immediate environment suggested to him the expediency of arriving at a practical solution to the problem of pain. There was theorizing and speculation around him ad nauseam. The very failure of these theoretical methods to arrive at and advocate a satisfactory solution to the problem would have emphasized the immediate need for a method that would, at least as far as the individual was concerned, same him from the inner unrest that was tormenting him. No sensitive soul could remain untouched by the pervading chaos and disintegration of values. What the Buddha advocated was that each individual should retreat from the battleground and seek to gain his own inward happiness. Let the wranglers go on abusing one another and demonstrating their several theories with the help of logic. What finality was there in this method of logical demonstration? The theory that one of them held to be true and irrefutable, the other proved to be false by equally convincing arguments (Yam ahu saccam tathiyam ti eke, Tam ahu anne tuccham musa ti - Sutta Nipata 883). The alternatives, surely were either that all of these contradictory views were correct or that they were all false. It is impossible to accept the first alternative, for there cannot be several truths in the world (Ekam hi saccam na dutiyam atthi - Ibid 884). We are driven to the conclusion, therefore, that they are all false, and that some method other than logical demonstration must be found to help us in the search for truth. ===== As a young teenager, I started reading Descartes, Kant and a number of other Western Philosophers. At first, I was impressed by the skill of their arguments, but then I became disillusioned. These were the greatest minds produced by the Western World and they could not agree! I postulated that either there was no solution (I did not want to accept this) or that they had all taken a wrong turn out of the starting gate. My conclusion was that the use of logical arguments was somehow the wrong tool for philosophers. For example "X" = "cup is on the table" "NOT X" = "the cup is not on the table". The intersection of "X" and "NOT X" is the null set. In other words, "the cup cannot be both on the table and not on the table". The fallacy is that this statement, developed through symbolic logic, is only true at one instant in time. The questions being asked by philosophers are outside the domain of time and therefore logic (at least symbolic logic) is not an appropriate tool to deal with philosophical questions. I gave up reading philosophy (Wittgenstein did me in) and spent a few years developing "my own" philosophy. I thought long and hard about this. Later, when I was 19 and had a girlfriend whose father was a Christian minister. We were sitting around the campfire at their cottage one night and her father (the father) asked me about my views on religion. I explained that I had been brought up Christian but had developed my "own philosophy" over the past few years. He was open-minded and asked me to explain my "own philosophy". I had never verbalized it before and I talked solidly for two hours. The father listened respectfully, asking questions and clarifications where appropriate. When it was over, he said to me, "To become a minister, you have to take a course on comparative religions. What you have described over the past two hours is Buddhism." I was shocked! I had never read anything about Buddhism and I found it difficult to believe that "on my own" I had come up with one of the world's major religions! Later I realized that I had been a Buddhist in a previous life and it started to make sense. So here I am, twenty-five years later facing similar challenges with the Abhidhamma as I faced with the western philosophers as a teenager. Fortunately, the next few paragraphs in the last section of the book I am reading give some guidance: ===== One thing noticeable about the argumentations of these clever philosophers is that they are by no means salutary to the attainment of happiness which, in the last resort, should constitute their ultimate aim. One philosopher calls the other a fool, and the other retorts with the same term of abuse. If they were both correct, either they should both be fools or they should both be wise men and there should be no fools at all among the religieux (Parassa ce hi vacasa nihino, Tumo saha hoti nihinapanno, atha ce sayam vedagu hoti dhiro, na koci balo samanesu atthi - Sutta Nipata 890). Besides, these arguments engender passion and lead to a considerable amount of heart-breaking. The sad fact about them is, therefore, that they defeat their own purpose. Consequently we might suspect that there is something inherently wrong in the very premises from which these arguments start. On examination, they are all seen to rest on three things, dittha, suta and muta, that is, things seen, heard and cogitated. These three things belong to the sphere of sense perception, the sphere of discursive reasoning (sanna). Multiplicity of views is the natural result of dependence on sense knowledge (Na h'eva saccani bahuni nana, annatra sannaya niccani loke - Ibid 886) Logical reasoning leads to an inevitable dualism of thought. One is driven to the correlatives of truth and falsehood. Only these two alternatives are open to the way of logic (Takkan ca ditthisu pakappayitva, saccam musa ti dvayadhammam ahu - Ibid 886). How is one to escape from this vicious circle? It is here that introspective analysis helps us. Every form of mental activity is seen to lead to our attainment of a kind of knowledge which does not satisfy in the last resort. The polarities (dvandva) of happiness and sorrow (sukha, dukkha), pleasure and unpleasure (piya, appiya), attraction and repulsion (raga, dosa) agreeability and disagreeability (satam, asatam) are ultimately seen to rest on sense impression (Phassanidanam satam asatam - Ibid 870). Our notion of the diversity of external nature is derived from the sphere of the senses. All these polarities of thought and feeling lead to conflict and strife (kalahavivada), to rancour and pride (manamacchariya). ===== I have come to the conclusion that if I were to have the opportunity to meet the Buddha and ask about the detailed functions of the thoughts in the thought process, the Buddha would answer me as he answered Malunkyupatta, "If a man who is pierced by a poison arrow, refuses to allow the surgeon to remove the arrow until he is told the name, height, etc. of the archer, he would die before learning the answers to all of his questions." My view on the Abhidhamma has changed. No longer is it a subject worthy of study for its own sake, nor is it accurate in all respects. The Abhidhamma is, however, an excellent structure to help study and understand the Dhamma as laid out the Suttas. I will continue to teach Abhidhamma each Sunday morning. I will focus even more on the practical aspects of the teaching rather than the theoretical side (focusing on the practical has been my habit and style, anyway). I will put more focus on the Suttas. I will deliver my lecture on "Inside the Thought Process" on September 15, but my focus will using the structure of the thought process to be able to cover all seven neutral universal cetasikas and all six neutral occasional cetasikas in one class. Yes, the lecture will be almost purely theory (how to make a neutral cetasika "practical"?), but covering thirteen cetasikas in one class is not bad. This has been an extremely long post. I feel that my direction is shifted a little bit away from the Abhidhamma as a subject of study and more to the Suttas as a subject of study (using the Abhidhamma as a structure and to provide some background details). This is new territory for me and I'm not sure where it will lead. I would be interested in feedback from others either supporting or not supporting this shift in focus (with your reasons, of course). Thanks, Rob M :-) 15395 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 7:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi, Sarah (and all) - A bit more about nibbana. I found a (possibly) interesting item at the web site http://web.ukonline.co.uk/buddhism/panadi10.htm, where nibbana is described as an unmanifestive consciousness: ************************************************** In the Theravada Canon there are references to assert that Nibbana is the consciousness liberated from all worldly objects and thoughts, as is stated in the Dighanikaya. "Nibbanam-Vinnanam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabbam" - Nibbana is the consciousness that has no sign perceptible to the senses and it is immeasurable, purest and a state wherein all the connection with elements cease, leaving no trace (assesam uparujjhati). (D.i. 223). *************************************************** Now, I have discovered that this is actually a (probably unfaithful) translation of what appears near the very end of the Kevatta Sutta of the D. Nikaya. The formulation given on ATI as well as in the Maurice Walshe "The Long Discourses of the Buddha" is the following: **************************************************** "'Your question should not be phrased in this way: Where do these four great elements -- the earth property, the liquid property, the fire property, and the wind property -- cease without remainder? Instead, it should be phrased like this: > Where do water, earth, fire, & wind > have no footing? > Where are long & short, > coarse & fine, > fair & foul, > name & form > brought to an end? "'And the answer to that is: > Consciousness without feature, > without end, > luminous all around: > Here water, earth, fire, & wind > have no footing. > Here long & short > coarse & fine > fair & foul > name & form > are all brought to an end. > With the cessation of [the activity of] consciousness > each is here brought to an end.'" *************************************************** Note that, contrary to what the monk wrote (in my first reference), there is no mention here of nibbana. I *do* believe that it pertains to nibbana, as does, for example, Peter Harvey, who also does not indicate the word 'nibbana' as actually occurring. If the word 'nibbana' doesn't actually occur - and it seems that it does not - the monk could have asserted that he *understands* this to refer to nibbana, but he should *not* have just inserted the word. To just insert it is, well - you know! ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15396 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 11:55am Subject: Re: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Dear Howard (and Larry), Thanks for the detailed posts. -----Original Message----- From: upasaka@a... Note that, contrary to what the monk wrote (in my first reference), there is no mention here of nibbana. I *do* believe that it pertains to nibbana, as does, for example, Peter Harvey, who also does not indicate the word 'nibbana' as actually occurring. If the word 'nibbana' doesn't actually occur - and it seems that it does not - the monk could have asserted that he *understands* this to refer to nibbana, but he should *not* have just inserted the word. To just insert it is, well - you know! ;-) I think this is a good reason to check references and commentaries. The commentaries sometimes have discussions of words in the sutta, often shedding light (or obfuscating, depending on how it is translated). I am not suggesting you believe everything the commentaries say, of course. But again, who does? kom 15397 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 8:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Time for a change (a long post) Hi, Rob - I consider this post of yours to be important enough for me to save. Thank you. I would very much appreciate a fuller reference for the book "Buddhist Psychology of Perception" by E. Sarachchandra, M.A., Ph.D., D. Litt., Chancellor, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. In particular, I would like the date, publisher, and the ISBN, and I would also like to know the price of the book. Is there a pbk edition, or only hardcover? With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/2/02 2:02:32 PM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > Hi All, > > I am reading a book, "Buddhist Psychology of Perception" by E. > Sarachchandra, M.A., Ph.D., D. Litt., Chancellor, University of > Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. Actually, the book was his thesis submitted > to the University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. > A little light reading :-) The book has three sections: "Theories of > Perception in the Nikayas", "Perception in the Abhidhamma" > and "Theory of Bhavanga". > > Here is a quote from the book, "The results of the investigations > embodied in the Nikayas were made use of by the schoolmen of the > fifth century for the formulation of a theory of perception which, > while being faithful as far as possible to the views of early > Buddhism, attempted also to fill in the gaps that were left by it. > The theory is quite unique in the history of Indian thought, and it > was probably the work of Buddhaghosa after having immersed himself > in Sanskrit philosophy. There are in it unmistakeable signs of the > influence of the theories of perception that were current in the > schools of Indian philosophy and the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. > Whenever borrowings were made, however, they were modified and > adapted so as to be in keeping with the ideology of Theravada > Buddhism." > > There is a chapter of the book titled, "Developments in the Twelfth > Century", where the theory of moments was introduced into the > Abhidhamma, to merge/adapt/refute positions of the Yogacara and > Sautrantika schools which also had developed similar theories at > that time. Later, the book spent some time explaining the parallels > and differences between bhavanga and the Alaya Vijnana of the > Yogacara school. > > As I delve into the details of the thought process in preparation > for my class, I come to the conclusion that if I want anything more > than a very simple overview, I am wandering into the realm > of "speculative theories" put forth by philosophers. The > philosophers can't agree; there is a different view of the > importance of the registration citta as explained in the Visuddhi > Magga (early concept; registration is an exceptional case, rarely > occurring), the Abhidhammatthasangaha (late concept; registration > occurs in most thoughts) and the Atthasalini (wavers between early > and late concepts). I even find that some of the "simple overview" > was added later into the Abhidhamma and is not clearly supported in > the Suttas. For example, it appears as though the registration citta > was introduced by Buddhaghosa. In brief, I am starting to lose faith > in the accuracy and authenticity of the Abhidhamma. > > Here is another quote from the book, "... the Abhidhamma does not > make any attempt to explain the phenomenon of memory, for, having > postulated process without substance, they were without any known > equipment for explaining it, and were obliged to merely recognize it > as a fact." Why is it that the Abhidhamma does not give a clear > description on the function of memory? I think that memory is a very > important topic that deserves a detailed explanation. > > The beginning few paragraphs of the final chapter, "Philosophical > Basis of the Buddhist Theory of Perception", gives some comfort (to > me, at least): > > ===== > > As far as the early texts reveal, the Buddha's examination of mental > phenomena was undertaken with a purely practical end in view. His > immediate environment suggested to him the expediency of arriving at > a practical solution to the problem of pain. There was theorizing > and speculation around him ad nauseam. The very failure of these > theoretical methods to arrive at and advocate a satisfactory > solution to the problem would have emphasized the immediate need for > a method that would, at least as far as the individual was > concerned, same him from the inner unrest that was tormenting him. > No sensitive soul could remain untouched by the pervading chaos and > disintegration of values. > > What the Buddha advocated was that each individual should retreat > from the battleground and seek to gain his own inward happiness. Let > the wranglers go on abusing one another and demonstrating their > several theories with the help of logic. What finality was there in > this method of logical demonstration? The theory that one of them > held to be true and irrefutable, the other proved to be false by > equally convincing arguments (Yam ahu saccam tathiyam ti eke, Tam > ahu anne tuccham musa ti - Sutta Nipata 883). The alternatives, > surely were either that all of these contradictory views were > correct or that they were all false. It is impossible to accept the > first alternative, for there cannot be several truths in the world > (Ekam hi saccam na dutiyam atthi - Ibid 884). We are driven to the > conclusion, therefore, that they are all false, and that some method > other than logical demonstration must be found to help us in the > search for truth. > > ===== > > As a young teenager, I started reading Descartes, Kant and a number > of other Western Philosophers. At first, I was impressed by the > skill of their arguments, but then I became disillusioned. These > were the greatest minds produced by the Western World and they could > not agree! I postulated that either there was no solution (I did not > want to accept this) or that they had all taken a wrong turn out of > the starting gate. My conclusion was that the use of logical > arguments was somehow the wrong tool for philosophers. For > example "X" = "cup is on the table" "NOT X" = "the cup is not on the > table". The intersection of "X" and "NOT X" is the null set. In > other words, "the cup cannot be both on the table and not on the > table". The fallacy is that this statement, developed through > symbolic logic, is only true at one instant in time. The questions > being asked by philosophers are outside the domain of time and > therefore logic (at least symbolic logic) is not an appropriate tool > to deal with philosophical questions. I gave up reading philosophy > (Wittgenstein did me in) and spent a few years developing "my own" > philosophy. I thought long and hard about this. > > Later, when I was 19 and had a girlfriend whose father was a > Christian minister. We were sitting around the campfire at their > cottage one night and her father (the father) asked me about my > views on religion. I explained that I had been brought up Christian > but had developed my "own philosophy" over the past few years. He > was open-minded and asked me to explain my "own philosophy". I had > never verbalized it before and I talked solidly for two hours. The > father listened respectfully, asking questions and clarifications > where appropriate. When it was over, he said to me, "To become a > minister, you have to take a course on comparative religions. What > you have described over the past two hours is Buddhism." I was > shocked! I had never read anything about Buddhism and I found it > difficult to believe that "on my own" I had come up with one of the > world's major religions! Later I realized that I had been a Buddhist > in a previous life and it started to make sense. > > So here I am, twenty-five years later facing similar challenges with > the Abhidhamma as I faced with the western philosophers as a > teenager. Fortunately, the next few paragraphs in the last section > of the book I am reading give some guidance: > > ===== > > One thing noticeable about the argumentations of these clever > philosophers is that they are by no means salutary to the attainment > of happiness which, in the last resort, should constitute their > ultimate aim. One philosopher calls the other a fool, and the other > retorts with the same term of abuse. If they were both correct, > either they should both be fools or they should both be wise men and > there should be no fools at all among the religieux (Parassa ce hi > vacasa nihino, Tumo saha hoti nihinapanno, atha ce sayam vedagu hoti > dhiro, na koci balo samanesu atthi - Sutta Nipata 890). Besides, > these arguments engender passion and lead to a considerable amount > of heart-breaking. The sad fact about them is, therefore, that they > defeat their own purpose. > > Consequently we might suspect that there is something inherently > wrong in the very premises from which these arguments start. On > examination, they are all seen to rest on three things, dittha, suta > and muta, that is, things seen, heard and cogitated. These three > things belong to the sphere of sense perception, the sphere of > discursive reasoning (sanna). Multiplicity of views is the natural > result of dependence on sense knowledge (Na h'eva saccani bahuni > nana, annatra sannaya niccani loke - Ibid 886) Logical reasoning > leads to an inevitable dualism of thought. One is driven to the > correlatives of truth and falsehood. Only these two alternatives are > open to the way of logic (Takkan ca ditthisu pakappayitva, saccam > musa ti dvayadhammam ahu - Ibid 886). > > How is one to escape from this vicious circle? It is here that > introspective analysis helps us. Every form of mental activity is > seen to lead to our attainment of a kind of knowledge which does not > satisfy in the last resort. The polarities (dvandva) of happiness > and sorrow (sukha, dukkha), pleasure and unpleasure (piya, appiya), > attraction and repulsion (raga, dosa) agreeability and > disagreeability (satam, asatam) are ultimately seen to rest on sense > impression (Phassanidanam satam asatam - Ibid 870). Our notion of > the diversity of external nature is derived from the sphere of the > senses. All these polarities of thought and feeling lead to conflict > and strife (kalahavivada), to rancour and pride (manamacchariya). > > ===== > > I have come to the conclusion that if I were to have the opportunity > to meet the Buddha and ask about the detailed functions of the > thoughts in the thought process, the Buddha would answer me as he > answered Malunkyupatta, "If a man who is pierced by a poison arrow, > refuses to allow the surgeon to remove the arrow until he is told > the name, height, etc. of the archer, he would die before learning > the answers to all of his questions." > > My view on the Abhidhamma has changed. No longer is it a subject > worthy of study for its own sake, nor is it accurate in all > respects. The Abhidhamma is, however, an excellent structure to help > study and understand the Dhamma as laid out the Suttas. > > I will continue to teach Abhidhamma each Sunday morning. I will > focus even more on the practical aspects of the teaching rather than > the theoretical side (focusing on the practical has been my habit > and style, anyway). I will put more focus on the Suttas. I will > deliver my lecture on "Inside the Thought Process" on September 15, > but my focus will using the structure of the thought process to be > able to cover all seven neutral universal cetasikas and all six > neutral occasional cetasikas in one class. Yes, the lecture will be > almost purely theory (how to make a neutral cetasika "practical"?), > but covering thirteen cetasikas in one class is not bad. > > This has been an extremely long post. I feel that my direction is > shifted a little bit away from the Abhidhamma as a subject of study > and more to the Suttas as a subject of study (using the Abhidhamma > as a structure and to provide some background details). This is new > territory for me and I'm not sure where it will lead. > > I would be interested in feedback from others either supporting or > not supporting this shift in focus (with your reasons, of course). > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15398 From: Jim Anderson Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 2:32pm Subject: the noumenal world Dear members, I'm not really all that familiar with many of the philosophical terms used by Western philosophers. I know that 'noumenon' is one of them and when Howard was asking those tough questions about naama and nibbaana, I wondered if there was a connection between 'naama' and 'noumenon'. Not knowing what 'noumenon' meant I had to look it up in a couple of dictionaries but as it turns out it doesn't have the meaning I was banking on. At one point I was even thinking of a similar parallel between ruupa and phenomenon but I have now dropped those ideas. What I found most interesting, however, was Kant's definition of the phenomenonal world vs the noumenal world which seem in my mind to relate quite well to the conventional and the real world of the Buddhist teachings. Here are the definitions given in D.D. Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy: Phenomenal World: The world of appearance as opposed to the world as-it-is-in-itself. The only world we know, said Kant, is the world-we-know, (appearance). The real world is beyond our knowledge. -- p. 231 Noumenal World: The real world as opposed to the appearance world. Kant said of the noumenal realm that it cannot be known. -- p. 215 The main difference being that the Buddhist would argue that the noumenal world can, in fact, be known through the higher understanding. I think what the Abhidhamma may be doing is describing this noumenal or real world. There is also this interesting comment in the article on Noumenon: In his [Kant's] practical philosophy, however, the postulation of a noumenal realm is necessary in order to explain the possibility of freedom. -- p. 215 Best wishes, Jim 15399 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 3:30pm Subject: ADL ch. 23 (1) [Note: The final two chapters of ADL have been revised and are viewable on the web only at the Zolag site. So with Christine's help I will post these last two chapters from the final version. Due to peculiarities of the transmission I have had to guess where to end paragraphs. Also, diacritical marks were transmitted which I haven't eased. These may misprint in your system. Many, many thanks to Binh Anson and Robert Kirkpatrick for making this invaluable work available on their web sites.] http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 23 (1) Lokuttara Cittas The Abhidhamma teaches us about different kinds of wholesome cittas. There are kåmåvacara kusala cittas (kusala cittas of the sensuous plane of consciousness, mahå-kusala cittas), rúpåvacara kusala cittas (rúpa-jhånacittas) and arúpåvacara kusala cittas (arúpa-jhånacittas). All these types of citta are kusala, but they do not eradicate the latent tendencies of defilements. Only lokuttara kusala cittas, magga-cittas, eradicate the latent tendencies of defilements. When all defilements are eradicated completely there will be an end to the cycle of birth and death. We may wonder whether lokuttara kusala cittas really eradicate defilements so that they never arise again. There are many defilements. We are full of lobha, dosa and moha. We have avarice, jealousy, worry, doubt, conceit and many other defilements. The clinging to the self is deeply rooted: we take our mind and our body for self. It is hard to understand how all these defilements can be eradicated. Defilements can be eradicated and there is a Path leading to it, but we have accumulated defilements to such an extent that they cannot be eradicated all at once. Ditthi, wrong view, has to be eradicated first; so long as we take realities for self there cannot be eradication of any defilement. There are four stages of enlightenment: the stages of the sotåpanna (streamwinner), the sakadågåmí (once-returner), the anågåmí (no-returner) and the arahat. At each of these stages the lokuttara kusala citta, the magga-citta, arises which experiences nibbåna and eradicates defilements. The sotåpanna, the ariyan who has attained the first stage of enlightenment, has eradicated ditthi completely, so that it can never arise again, but he has not eradicated all defilements. Defilements are eradicated stage by stage and only when arahatship has been attained all defilements have been eradicated. People may wonder how one can know that one has attained enlightenment. The lokuttara citta is accompanied by paññå (wisdom) which has been developed in vipassanå. One does not attain enlightenment without having developed insight-wisdom, vipassanå. There are several stages of insight-wisdom. First, doubt about the difference between nåma and rúpa is eliminated. It may be understood in theory that nåma is the reality which experiences an object and rúpa is the reality which does not know anything. However, theoretical understanding, understanding of the level of thinking, is not the same as direct understanding which realizes nåma as nåma and rúpa as rúpa. When there is, for example, sound, which is rúpa, there is also hearing, which is nåma, and these realities have different characteristics. There can be mindfulness of only one characteristic at a time and at such a moment right understanding of the reality which presents itself can develop. So long as there is not right mindfulness of one reality at a time there will be doubt as to the difference between nåma and rúpa. There has to be mindfulness of the different kinds of nåma and rúpa which appear in daily life in order to eliminate doubt. When the first stage of insight, which is only a beginning stage, is attained, there is no doubt as to the difference between the characteristics of nåma and rúpa. The characteristics of nåma and rúpa have to be investigated over and over again until they are clearly understood as they are and there is no more wrong view about them. The realization of the arising and falling away of nåma and rúpa is a higher stage of insight which cannot be attained so long as the characteristic of nåma cannot be distinguished from the characteristic of rúpa. All the different stages of insight have to be attained in the right order. Paññå should continue to investigate the characteristics of realities as they appear through the six doors so that the three characteristics of conditioned realities, namely: impermanence (anicca), dukkha and non-self (anattå), can be penetrated more and more. When paññå has clearly understood these three characteristics enlightenment can be attained; paññå can then experience nibbåna, the unconditioned reality. When paññå has been developed to that degree there cannot be any doubt as to whether one has attained enlightenment or not. The English word enlightenment can have different meanings and therefore it may create confusion. The Påli term for enlightenment is ``bodhi´´. Bodhi literally means knowledge or understanding. The attainment of enlightenment in the context of the Buddhist teachings refers to paññå which has been developed to the degree that it has become lokuttara paññå, ``supramundane paññå´´, which accompanies lokuttara cittas experiencing nibbåna. Enlightenment is actually a few moments of lokuttara cittas which do not last. Nibbåna does not arise and fall away, but the lokuttara cittas which experience nibbåna fall away and are followed by cittas of the sense-sphere; in the case of the ariyans who have not yet attained the fourth stage of enlightenment, also akusala cittas are bound to arise again. However, the defilements which have been eradicated at the attainment of enlightenment do not arise anymore. Only the right Path, the eightfold Path, can lead to enlightenment. If one develops the wrong path the goal cannot be attained. When one develops the wrong path one has ditthi, wrong view. In the Abhidhamma defilements are classified in different ways and also different kinds of wrong view are classified in various ways. For example, different kinds of wrong view are classified under the group of defilements which is clinging (upådåna). Three of the four kinds of clinging mentioned in this group are clinging to various forms of ditthi; these three kinds of clinging have been completely eradicated by the sotåpanna. One of them is: ``clinging to rules and ritual´´ (sílabbatupådåna), which includes the wrong practice of vipassanå. Some people think that they can attain enlightenment by following some path other than the eightfold Path but this is an illusion. There are no other ways leading to enlightenment. The eightfold Path is developed by being mindful of the nåma and rúpa which appear in daily life, such as seeing, visible object, hearing, sound, thinking, feeling, attachment, anger or the other defilements which arise. If the eightfold Path is not developed by being mindful of all realities which appear in one's daily life, wrong view cannot be eradicated and thus not even the first stage of enlightenment, the stage of the sotåpanna, can be attained. Therefore, there is no way leading to enlightenment other than the development of right understanding of realities, which is the wisdom (paññå) of the eightfold Path. 15400 From: robmoult Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 4:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Time for a change (a long post) Hi Howard, Publisher is Buddhist Cultural Centre, 125 Anderson Road, Nedimala, Dehiwala, Sri Lanka. Tel 71-4256 Fax 72-6737. I paid Rs160 (US$1.67) for the book. It is soft cover, 110 pages (including index). ISBN 955-9219-06-5. Originally written in 1958, the second edition was printed in 1994. Howard, I would be pleased to photocopy the book and send it to you. Please send your snail mail address to me at rob.moult@j... So Howard, do you support this change or not? Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: If others would like a photocopy of this book, please advise so I can get the copying done at one time. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > I consider this post of yours to be important enough for me to save. > Thank you. I would very much appreciate a fuller reference for the book > "Buddhist Psychology of Perception" by E. Sarachchandra, M.A., Ph.D., D. > Litt., Chancellor, University of > Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. In particular, I would like the date, publisher, and > the ISBN, and I would also like to know the price of the book. Is there a pbk > edition, or only hardcover? > > With metta, > Howard > > In a message dated 9/2/02 2:02:32 PM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... > writes: > > > > Hi All, > > > > I am reading a book, "Buddhist Psychology of Perception" by E. > > Sarachchandra, M.A., Ph.D., D. Litt., Chancellor, University of > > Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. Actually, the book was his thesis submitted > > to the University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. > > A little light reading :-) The book has three sections: "Theories of > > Perception in the Nikayas", "Perception in the Abhidhamma" > > and "Theory of Bhavanga". > > > > Here is a quote from the book, "The results of the investigations > > embodied in the Nikayas were made use of by the schoolmen of the > > fifth century for the formulation of a theory of perception which, > > while being faithful as far as possible to the views of early > > Buddhism, attempted also to fill in the gaps that were left by it. > > The theory is quite unique in the history of Indian thought, and it > > was probably the work of Buddhaghosa after having immersed himself > > in Sanskrit philosophy. There are in it unmistakeable signs of the > > influence of the theories of perception that were current in the > > schools of Indian philosophy and the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. > > Whenever borrowings were made, however, they were modified and > > adapted so as to be in keeping with the ideology of Theravada > > Buddhism." > > > > There is a chapter of the book titled, "Developments in the Twelfth > > Century", where the theory of moments was introduced into the > > Abhidhamma, to merge/adapt/refute positions of the Yogacara and > > Sautrantika schools which also had developed similar theories at > > that time. Later, the book spent some time explaining the parallels > > and differences between bhavanga and the Alaya Vijnana of the > > Yogacara school. > > > > As I delve into the details of the thought process in preparation > > for my class, I come to the conclusion that if I want anything more > > than a very simple overview, I am wandering into the realm > > of "speculative theories" put forth by philosophers. The > > philosophers can't agree; there is a different view of the > > importance of the registration citta as explained in the Visuddhi > > Magga (early concept; registration is an exceptional case, rarely > > occurring), the Abhidhammatthasangaha (late concept; registration > > occurs in most thoughts) and the Atthasalini (wavers between early > > and late concepts). I even find that some of the "simple overview" > > was added later into the Abhidhamma and is not clearly supported in > > the Suttas. For example, it appears as though the registration citta > > was introduced by Buddhaghosa. In brief, I am starting to lose faith > > in the accuracy and authenticity of the Abhidhamma. > > > > Here is another quote from the book, "... the Abhidhamma does not > > make any attempt to explain the phenomenon of memory, for, having > > postulated process without substance, they were without any known > > equipment for explaining it, and were obliged to merely recognize it > > as a fact." Why is it that the Abhidhamma does not give a clear > > description on the function of memory? I think that memory is a very > > important topic that deserves a detailed explanation. > > > > The beginning few paragraphs of the final chapter, "Philosophical > > Basis of the Buddhist Theory of Perception", gives some comfort (to > > me, at least): > > > > ===== > > > > As far as the early texts reveal, the Buddha's examination of mental > > phenomena was undertaken with a purely practical end in view. His > > immediate environment suggested to him the expediency of arriving at > > a practical solution to the problem of pain. There was theorizing > > and speculation around him ad nauseam. The very failure of these > > theoretical methods to arrive at and advocate a satisfactory > > solution to the problem would have emphasized the immediate need for > > a method that would, at least as far as the individual was > > concerned, same him from the inner unrest that was tormenting him. > > No sensitive soul could remain untouched by the pervading chaos and > > disintegration of values. > > > > What the Buddha advocated was that each individual should retreat > > from the battleground and seek to gain his own inward happiness. Let > > the wranglers go on abusing one another and demonstrating their > > several theories with the help of logic. What finality was there in > > this method of logical demonstration? The theory that one of them > > held to be true and irrefutable, the other proved to be false by > > equally convincing arguments (Yam ahu saccam tathiyam ti eke, Tam > > ahu anne tuccham musa ti - Sutta Nipata 883). The alternatives, > > surely were either that all of these contradictory views were > > correct or that they were all false. It is impossible to accept the > > first alternative, for there cannot be several truths in the world > > (Ekam hi saccam na dutiyam atthi - Ibid 884). We are driven to the > > conclusion, therefore, that they are all false, and that some method > > other than logical demonstration must be found to help us in the > > search for truth. > > > > ===== > > > > As a young teenager, I started reading Descartes, Kant and a number > > of other Western Philosophers. At first, I was impressed by the > > skill of their arguments, but then I became disillusioned. These > > were the greatest minds produced by the Western World and they could > > not agree! I postulated that either there was no solution (I did not > > want to accept this) or that they had all taken a wrong turn out of > > the starting gate. My conclusion was that the use of logical > > arguments was somehow the wrong tool for philosophers. For > > example "X" = "cup is on the table" "NOT X" = "the cup is not on the > > table". The intersection of "X" and "NOT X" is the null set. In > > other words, "the cup cannot be both on the table and not on the > > table". The fallacy is that this statement, developed through > > symbolic logic, is only true at one instant in time. The questions > > being asked by philosophers are outside the domain of time and > > therefore logic (at least symbolic logic) is not an appropriate tool > > to deal with philosophical questions. I gave up reading philosophy > > (Wittgenstein did me in) and spent a few years developing "my own" > > philosophy. I thought long and hard about this. > > > > Later, when I was 19 and had a girlfriend whose father was a > > Christian minister. We were sitting around the campfire at their > > cottage one night and her father (the father) asked me about my > > views on religion. I explained that I had been brought up Christian > > but had developed my "own philosophy" over the past few years. He > > was open-minded and asked me to explain my "own philosophy". I had > > never verbalized it before and I talked solidly for two hours. The > > father listened respectfully, asking questions and clarifications > > where appropriate. When it was over, he said to me, "To become a > > minister, you have to take a course on comparative religions. What > > you have described over the past two hours is Buddhism." I was > > shocked! I had never read anything about Buddhism and I found it > > difficult to believe that "on my own" I had come up with one of the > > world's major religions! Later I realized that I had been a Buddhist > > in a previous life and it started to make sense. > > > > So here I am, twenty-five years later facing similar challenges with > > the Abhidhamma as I faced with the western philosophers as a > > teenager. Fortunately, the next few paragraphs in the last section > > of the book I am reading give some guidance: > > > > ===== > > > > One thing noticeable about the argumentations of these clever > > philosophers is that they are by no means salutary to the attainment > > of happiness which, in the last resort, should constitute their > > ultimate aim. One philosopher calls the other a fool, and the other > > retorts with the same term of abuse. If they were both correct, > > either they should both be fools or they should both be wise men and > > there should be no fools at all among the religieux (Parassa ce hi > > vacasa nihino, Tumo saha hoti nihinapanno, atha ce sayam vedagu hoti > > dhiro, na koci balo samanesu atthi - Sutta Nipata 890). Besides, > > these arguments engender passion and lead to a considerable amount > > of heart-breaking. The sad fact about them is, therefore, that they > > defeat their own purpose. > > > > Consequently we might suspect that there is something inherently > > wrong in the very premises from which these arguments start. On > > examination, they are all seen to rest on three things, dittha, suta > > and muta, that is, things seen, heard and cogitated. These three > > things belong to the sphere of sense perception, the sphere of > > discursive reasoning (sanna). Multiplicity of views is the natural > > result of dependence on sense knowledge (Na h'eva saccani bahuni > > nana, annatra sannaya niccani loke - Ibid 886) Logical reasoning > > leads to an inevitable dualism of thought. One is driven to the > > correlatives of truth and falsehood. Only these two alternatives are > > open to the way of logic (Takkan ca ditthisu pakappayitva, saccam > > musa ti dvayadhammam ahu - Ibid 886). > > > > How is one to escape from this vicious circle? It is here that > > introspective analysis helps us. Every form of mental activity is > > seen to lead to our attainment of a kind of knowledge which does not > > satisfy in the last resort. The polarities (dvandva) of happiness > > and sorrow (sukha, dukkha), pleasure and unpleasure (piya, appiya), > > attraction and repulsion (raga, dosa) agreeability and > > disagreeability (satam, asatam) are ultimately seen to rest on sense > > impression (Phassanidanam satam asatam - Ibid 870). Our notion of > > the diversity of external nature is derived from the sphere of the > > senses. All these polarities of thought and feeling lead to conflict > > and strife (kalahavivada), to rancour and pride (manamacchariya). > > > > ===== > > > > I have come to the conclusion that if I were to have the opportunity > > to meet the Buddha and ask about the detailed functions of the > > thoughts in the thought process, the Buddha would answer me as he > > answered Malunkyupatta, "If a man who is pierced by a poison arrow, > > refuses to allow the surgeon to remove the arrow until he is told > > the name, height, etc. of the archer, he would die before learning > > the answers to all of his questions." > > > > My view on the Abhidhamma has changed. No longer is it a subject > > worthy of study for its own sake, nor is it accurate in all > > respects. The Abhidhamma is, however, an excellent structure to help > > study and understand the Dhamma as laid out the Suttas. > > > > I will continue to teach Abhidhamma each Sunday morning. I will > > focus even more on the practical aspects of the teaching rather than > > the theoretical side (focusing on the practical has been my habit > > and style, anyway). I will put more focus on the Suttas. I will > > deliver my lecture on "Inside the Thought Process" on September 15, > > but my focus will using the structure of the thought process to be > > able to cover all seven neutral universal cetasikas and all six > > neutral occasional cetasikas in one class. Yes, the lecture will be > > almost purely theory (how to make a neutral cetasika "practical"?), > > but covering thirteen cetasikas in one class is not bad. > > > > This has been an extremely long post. I feel that my direction is > > shifted a little bit away from the Abhidhamma as a subject of study > > and more to the Suttas as a subject of study (using the Abhidhamma > > as a structure and to provide some background details). This is new > > territory for me and I'm not sure where it will lead. > > > > I would be interested in feedback from others either supporting or > > not supporting this shift in focus (with your reasons, of course). > > > > Thanks, > > Rob M :-) 15401 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 0:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the noumenal world Hi, Jim - In a message dated 9/2/02 6:08:39 PM Eastern Daylight Time, jimanderson_on@y... writes: > > Dear members, > > I'm not really all that familiar with many of the philosophical terms > used by Western philosophers. I know that 'noumenon' is one of them > and when Howard was asking those tough questions about naama and > nibbaana, I wondered if there was a connection between 'naama' and > 'noumenon'. Not knowing what 'noumenon' meant I had to look it up in a > couple of dictionaries but as it turns out it doesn't have the meaning > I was banking on. At one point I was even thinking of a similar > parallel between ruupa and phenomenon but I have now dropped those > ideas. > > What I found most interesting, however, was Kant's definition of the > phenomenonal world vs the noumenal world which seem in my mind to > relate quite well to the conventional and the real world of the > Buddhist teachings. Here are the definitions given in D.D. Runes' > Dictionary of Philosophy: > > Phenomenal World: The world of appearance as opposed to the world > as-it-is-in-itself. The only world we know, said Kant, is the > world-we-know, (appearance). The real world is beyond our > knowledge. -- p. 231 > > Noumenal World: The real world as opposed to the appearance world. > Kant said of the noumenal realm that it cannot be known. -- p. 215 > > The main difference being that the Buddhist would argue that the > noumenal world can, in fact, be known through the higher > understanding. I think what the Abhidhamma may be doing is describing > this noumenal or real world. > > There is also this interesting comment in the article on Noumenon: > > In his [Kant's] practical philosophy, however, the postulation of a > noumenal realm is necessary in order to explain the possibility of > freedom. -- p. 215 > > Best wishes, > > Jim > ============================ Thanks for this interesting post. Theravada doesn't seem to allow much thought in this direction. Mahayana is more "willing". The perspective there, at least in the Madhyamika school of Nagarjuna, tends to identify noumenon with phenomenon, seeing the noumenal realm as not intrinsically different from the world of phenomena, but rather as identical with the phenomenal realm "rightly seen", which amounts to a nondual seeing of interdependent conditions which are not self-existing, but are merely aspects of an interconnected whole. I just wrote a post to Dhamma List along these lines, a part of which, slightly modified, is the following: *************************** Some people take the position that nibbana is the absence of all conditions as separate things. This position is that seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, and cognizing, and the seen, heard, touched, and cognized are not *absolutely* gone in nibbana, but are gone as separate entities - that what remains is what the defiled mind currently misperceives as separate conditions - what remains is what there is when avijja is removed, and, therefore what there always really was. In a sense, this nibbana is always present, but, in the worldling, and to some extent in the lesser ariyans, is obscured by defilements, hidden by avijja. This perspective is, perhaps, another way of pointing towards the far shore. *************************** Vi~n~nana, as I understand it, is a separative knowing, a separating out of an object from a vast, interconnected field of possibilities. This is a kind of special knowing - one which arises in dependence on kamma (and avijja). With the cessation of ignorance, and the consequent cessation of kamma, there is the cessation of vi~n~nana, leaving that "noumenon" which was actually there to begin with, but misperceived. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15402 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 0:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Time for a change (a long post) Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/2/02 7:15:46 PM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Publisher is Buddhist Cultural Centre, 125 Anderson Road, Nedimala, > Dehiwala, Sri Lanka. Tel 71-4256 Fax 72-6737. I paid Rs160 (US$1.67) > for the book. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Wow, that is inexpensive! ----------------------------------------------------- It is soft cover, 110 pages (including index). ISBN > > 955-9219-06-5. Originally written in 1958, the second edition was > printed in 1994. > > Howard, I would be pleased to photocopy the book and send it to you. > Please send your snail mail address to me at rob.moult@j... > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: That would be wonderful, except I wonder if that would not be a copyright violation. If the Buddhist Cultural Centre has no objection, I would love to have a photocopy mailed to me. Would there be a way for you to easily check on that? If yes, and there is no problem, I will gratefully (and speedily) send you my address. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > So Howard, do you support this change or not? > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, I am reluctant to comment definitively on that, Rob. As you and others may have realized, I have serious reservations about parts of Abhidhamma and also about its origins. However, I also see enormous value in it. I don't think that my take on this is of any particular importance. This decision is a personal one for you to make. All I will commit myself to is that it always makes sense to analyze and evaluate as best as one can, and also to avoid extremes when possible. --------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > PS: If others would like a photocopy of this book, please advise so > I can get the copying done at one time. > > > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15403 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 5:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi Howard, k: As what you said that one's predispositions depend on ones factor, that is why I am incline to discourage pple to write their own opinion even if one best shot rather than facts from the sutta and commentaries in well read or any publication. It could lead to distortion of the truth. Opinion should be confined to our own consumption or healthy discussion confining to ones circle of friends and let it be known that is our own opinion esp during this age of the dhamma. kind rgds Ong KC > This, of course, makes great sense. However, > we should also realize > that comparing the teaching to the directly taught > Dhamma is still > subjective. How one understands/interprets the > original teachings is not > entirely objective, but is a function of one's > background knowledge, one's > meditative experience, one's thinking, and, most > perilously, one's > predispositions. > So, all that one can do is "take your best > shot". As far as the > correctness of one's views, one's interpretations, > and even one's practice > are concerned, the old pragmatic adage, "The proof > of the pudding is in the > eating", probably applies. > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A > star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, > a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond > Sutra) > > > > 15404 From: robmoult Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 5:25pm Subject: Re: Time for a change (a long post) Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > -------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > That would be wonderful, except I wonder if that would not be a > copyright violation. If the Buddhist Cultural Centre has no objection, I > would love to have a photocopy mailed to me. Would there be a way for you to > easily check on that? If yes, and there is no problem, I will gratefully (and > speedily) send you my address. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Oops, you are correct about the copyright laws, though I'm not sure how much money they make on $1.67 :-). Here is their web-site where you can contact them and order books: http://www.buddhistcc.com/bookshop/index.html Thanks, Rob M :-) 15405 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 5:00pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Kom, here's a few comments: K: "Just like lobha is not conceptual, panna is not conceptual." L: Sorry, I think lobha is also conceptual, actually mis-conceptual, pervaded by miccha ditthi conceiving a self and other. I don't think we can separate concept and reality in ordinary experience. K: "But why do you think Satipatthana leads to detachment?" L: I tried to answer this with my own experience and got in a lot of trouble. Do you not think satipatthana leads to detachment? If not, what is it for? K: "What else do you think satipathana leads to that panna doesn't?" L: Satipatthana leads to present experience but panna doesn't necessarily. The upatthana of satipatthana is present moment; so satipatthana's object is necessarily present experience. Because of that satipatthana's panna is short and succinct. Whereas right view panna could be a whole book, like the Visuddhimagga. K: "Some think vipassana development is not possible / is too hard to do with out jhana development, and some don't. What's your take on this?" L: I think insight happens because of accumulations. Meditation practice seems to be a good thing to accumulate. K: "What exactly is vipassana development?" L: Satipatthana, many ideas on the best way to teach this. Almost all involve some sort of discipline as opposed to a casual approach. K: "I don't think she views (as evident by what all her students say!) Satipatthana the same way as popularly viewed by others. The more important question (I think) is whether or not what she (or anybody else) teaches matches what the Buddha has taught." L: I would be interested in reading what you and Sarah and Jon and Nina and Robert K (or any other of A. Sujin's students) think is the best way to practice satipatthana. Larry 15406 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 6:37pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Anatta? Hi Rob Ep > > Oh I agree. The question is, can you perceive the > anatta-nature of oneself? k: Rob, this is an extremely difficult question and is a novel one too. Honestly speaking I don't know but I speculate that one should reach at least the level of stream entrant before we could see a glimspe of it. Assuming if we could see it, I don't think we could describe it either to the human level of understanding, just like we try to explain the taste of sweet to a computer with current technology. > I think some on dsg have argued that you can't see the anatta-ness of oneself, because one cannot look at something that doesn't exist [oneself] as an object and > perceive its nature; at least that's the way I > understand it. They would > therefore say, again as I understand it [and ready > to be corrected] that one can > only gain panna towards the anatta of a dhamma - an > object - and by doing so, one > gets rid of attachement to the things of this world > and this life as 'oneself'. I > think that one would see the 'anatta' or 'non-self' > of oneself as being a concept, > perhaps a wise concept, but a concept none-the-less. > > Now I have had the experience which for me at least > seemed like a strong insight > experience, of looking back at my own thoughts, > feelings, etc. and realizing that > there was no 'self' to be found in any of that, that > the awareness by which I was > 'looking within' was impersonal and there was no > 'Robert' present in any of that. > To me that experience was one of seeing that the > presumption of self was a > concept; and to me, that seems like a realization of > 'anatta' on the personal > level. In other words, by directly seeing that > there is not 'self' within, one > realizes the anatta-nature of the presumed self. > But what does one actually > perceive in such a moment? Is it a direct > perception of something, or is it a > concept? I am not sure how to evaluate that, but in > the moment that it happened > it was a very liberating shock to the system. k: To me the experience of Not being there is a very exhilarating experience and hard to describe, it also feel like we are boundless, a sense of total freedom. But is it the real perception of anatta, that is something I do not know. >Then one can witness the arising of various things in the moment without overlaying it all the time with a sense of 'someone perceiving it'. But I am not sure how to > define that experience in terms > of namas and rupas, in terms of which we could > discuss it here on dsg, because it > is the perception of something that one thought was > there NOT being there; it is > the removal of a concept; but how is that perceived > without another concept that > notices and compares the absence? Or are there > mental factors that can account > for this kind of change within a particular citta? k: As one goes deeper into mindfulness and developing more right understanding of impermanence, this witnessing will arise. This is what I called "living in the moment", a moment without any form of prejudice or self or views attched, Some pple called it seeing things as it is. What are the technicality on what citta process involved, that I really do not know. > I think the Vedas are pretty good in most > departments and I don't think they > borrowed from Buddhism. I'm pretty sure they > pre-date the teachings of the > Buddha. The point is that they do deal with > non-clinging to objects and self; and > they do deal with the impermanence of the body and > self-concept. The primary > difference between most Hindu teachings and Buddhism > is that Hinduism still > postulates a soul or Atman which is an inner self or > higher self; a spiritual self > that replaces the lower psychophysical self; while > Buddhism says that the > structures of the psychophysical self do not > constitute a true self or entity; but > there is no 'higher' or 'inner' self to replace it; > instead there is just the > arising of consciousness within the structures of > living and the relinquishment of > that in the realization of Nibbana. > > Then within Buddhism you have the arguments about > what the Enlightened experience > is like WITHOUT a higher or inner self, and what the > implications are of > dis-identifying with the khandas and storehouse > consciousness when there is no > self left over of any kind. Some schools of > Buddhism will argue that there is a > primal nature that takes the place of the > self-concept and is discovered; or which > can be called Buddha-nature as one's true self. Or > that there is a primal > awareness which is shown to be impersonal and not > contained by the khandas, which > tends to be my point of view. But in Theravada most > schools I think tend towards > the self being a false construct and there really > being nothing to take its place > except the experience of living itself which arises > impersonally without a self > and is fully realized as such in Enlightenment. k: Some school of thought equate Nibbana as the true nature of one self, or Greater Mind. But at that time such thoughts have already manifest in various teachings in India. As we know that Buddha rejects the idea of atman, then how could we equate Nibbana as the Greater Mind or true nature. To me there is a danger to equate or describe Nibbana as the Greater Mind or true nature of one self because it generates another "self" to be obtained. Then what is Nibbana, dont asked me. It can't be describe or equate as even Buddha has diffcuitly describing Nibbana to us. > It's not a matter of blaming external things, but seeing that one > is attached to > them. One has to, as you say, acknowledge that the attachment is > one's own, not > the objects, but what is it that we attach this clinging to? > Whatever it is, we > have to let go of it, don't we? When we let go, it is 'our' > clinging that we let > go of, but it is always attached to an object of some kind, whether > a 'big > important' object like our own body, or the presence of a loved > one, or just to > food and sex, or a favorite habit. Can you think of a clinging > that doesn't have > an object? We can even be attached to enlightenment, and I bet > everyone here has > that problem! :0 > k: that is a real problem, we could even attached to enlightment. Can I think of a clinging that doesn't have an object? No. If I remember correctly, one clings till the third stage of Arahat, only the last stage of Arahat then the clinging problem will be solved. > > Because I am? Why have a choice? I AM reading the dsg mails when > I read them, > and at that time, I can't really choose not to. It seems that I > read when I read > and I stop when I stop. Sometimes I want to stop and can't!!! : / k: hmm lobha is a very strong paccaya for cetana:). > Maybe > > I should said there is no such thing as free will but > > there is such a thing as the power of choice/volition. > > I like volition better than choice, because volition has the sense > of being something that arises in conciousness and has energy. I can imagine volition just coming up out of causal factors, whereas choice to me definitely implies that there is a self, a someone, making that choice. And that is the opposite of anatta, as far as I can tell. k: I should have used volition in the first instance rather than choice :). kind regards KC (= Ken O) 15407 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 6:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Speech and Intentions was (Re: Updated Class Notes Now On-Line) Hi Rob M > > Again, P.13 of Class Notes indicates the "class" of beings (see > remarks under "killing"). "Large animals more serious than small > animals, humans more serious than animals. Virtuous being more > serious than non-virtuous being." > k: Where do you get these references? kind regards kc 15408 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 7:14pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Time for a change (a long post) Dear Rob, All I can say is "been there, done that". My conclusion is I don't know enough to quit, so I'm staying the course. I've learned more about the dhamma through abhidhamma study than any other way. If you are like me, what you have right now is an attitude problem. Attitude changes from moment to moment, day to day. You could look at this attitude as it arises and recognize it as an impermanent phenomenon, "not me". Everyone changes all the time, but I hope you will stay with abhidhamma. You have made an excellent contribution to this group and I bet you would be surprised at the difference you have made to your students. People can get sutta study anywhere, but abhidhamma study is rare. If it doesn't provide you with an answer to every question that pops into your head, maybe you need to rest the head. This stuff is deeper than deep. Let it work on you. best wishes, Larry 15409 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 3:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi, Ken - In a message dated 9/2/02 8:12:09 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@y... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > k: As what you said that one's predispositions depend > on ones factor, that is why I am incline to discourage > pple to write their own opinion even if one best shot > rather than facts from the sutta and commentaries in > well read or any publication. It could lead to > distortion of the truth. Opinion should be confined > to our own consumption or healthy discussion confining > to ones circle of friends and let it be known that is > our own opinion esp during this age of the dhamma. > > > kind rgds > Ong KC > ========================== I understand your point. I generally make it a point to indicate that what is only my opinion is, indeed, just that. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15410 From: robmoult Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 9:05pm Subject: [dsg] Speech and Intentions was (Re: Updated Class Notes Now On-Line) Hi Kenneth, Am on the road now; I will check which commentary they came from when I return home on the weekend. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Rob M > > > > > Again, P.13 of Class Notes indicates the "class" of beings (see > > remarks under "killing"). "Large animals more serious than small > > animals, humans more serious than animals. Virtuous being more > > serious than non-virtuous being." > > > > k: Where do you get these references? > > > kind regards > kc > 15411 From: Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 5:46pm Subject: Re: Time for a change (a long post) Hello Howard, I have this book and will be glad to loan it to you if the copyright thing is seen as a problem. I had great difficulty reading it, never getting beyond the first 15 pages or so, do to the large number of untranslated Pali footnotes (and one passage in the text, as I recall). Perhaps I can do a bit better now than a few years ago. I'd be way glad to loan it if it came back with translations! metta, stephen 15412 From: robmoult Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 9:49pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Time for a change (a long post) Hi Larry, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Everyone changes all the time, but I hope you will stay with abhidhamma. I will definitely stay with the Abhidhamma, because, like you, I find it an excellent way to learn the Dhamma. What will change is my focus; less on the technical aspects of Abhidhamma and more on the practial aspects of the Abhidhamma (and the Dhamma). No disillusionment, just a shift in approach. Thanks for your kind words and encouragement. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15413 From: Sarah Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 1:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1) Hi Larry & All, --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > [Note: The final two chapters of ADL have been revised and are viewable > on the web only at the Zolag site. So with Christine's help I will post > these last two chapters from the final version. Due to peculiarities of > the transmission I have had to guess where to end paragraphs. Also, > diacritical marks were transmitted which I haven't eased. These may > misprint in your system. ..... It came out fine in my system ..... Many, many thanks to Binh Anson and Robert > Kirkpatrick for making this invaluable work available on their web > sites.] > http://www.zolag.co.uk/ ..... Likewise. Many thanks to you too, Larry for your hard anc consistent work for the ADL corner. I've benefitted a lot by considering more carefully. Maybe we need to start at the beginning again;-) Just kidding. Do you have any plans or suggestions for the next study corner? Perhaps we'll need a break to finish digesting ADL first. How about B.Bodhi's Abhidhamattha Sangaha? Rob M could then introduce any disparities he finds with other Tipitaka texts or commentaries and notes from other translations can be considered too. (Not sure we'd ever finish mind you - guess it would depend on Num's scheduling). If it's considered too long, we could use another one of Nina's books on line, eg Cetasikas or Nyantiloka's Buddhist Dictionary or any other text we mostly like. Sarah ===== 15414 From: Antony Woods Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 10:43pm Subject: Re: Four Sublime States Dear Kom, Rob M and all, My favorite quote is: "Noble and sublime joy is not foreign to the Teaching of the Enlightened One. Wrongly the Buddha's Teaching is sometimes considered to be a doctrine diffusing melancholy. Far from it: the Dhamma leads step by step to an ever purer and loftier happiness." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel006.html with metta / Antony. 15415 From: Antony Woods Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 10:13pm Subject: Re: Welcome Dear Sarah, Rob K and all, Thanks for the warm welcome. I have been monitoring the dsg archives for a while and have found some topics interesting in the last week or so. I live in Sydney, Australia. I am 32 years old and have been studying Theravada since I was 23. The main point I learnt about introductory Abhidhamma from a Burmese monk Ven U Dipaloka was that anxiety, worry, fear, sadness, anger are all //dosa//. I've heard that the Patthana is profound but difficult. My interests in the Dhamma include Buddhist Economics, Right Speech and The Four Sublime States (and other works by Nyanaponika). I accepted Kamma and Rebirth only after reading the comprehensive "Paticcasamuppada" by Mahasi Sayadaw which I recommend: ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/therabud/mahasipt.zip I look forward to participating in dsg further. Best wishes / Antony. 15416 From: Sarah Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 2:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > Howard: >...... Nyanatiloka writes "náma: (lit. > 'name'): 'mind', mentality." > If there is no cognitive aspect to nibbana, if it is not the > nondual > awareness of absence of objects and conditions, if it can be taken as > object > but is, itself, unknowing in addition to being unconditioned, then it > sounds > more like an "unconditioned rupa" than a nama. .... Just reading from the latest extract from Perfections: “The term by rúpas (rúpesu) means: by the four great Elements and the derived rúpas that are dependent on these”. Or from Atthasalini, “one having material qualities (ruupii) refers to the possession of material quality (ruupa.m)”. Maybe it’s easiest to just consider nibbana as nama by default or to say realities consist of cittas, cetasikas, rupas and nibbana if that helps. ..... >Moreover, in this case, > *entry* to final nibbana sounds more like annihilation to me than > liberation > - it sounds like a final turning off of the light. Instead of being the > freeing of consciousness, the dropping off of all conditions, entry to > nibbana inaugurates the ultimate avijja (non-seeing). Let me ask you - > what > is it you would find lovely in that? > ------------------------------------------------------ I don’t find this phrase very lovely and somewhat confusing. Anpupadi-sesa nibbana or parinibbana is nibbana with the cessation of the khandhas. “They who, by knowing this state uncompounded have heart’s release, by cutting off the stream, they who have reached the core of dhamma, glad To end, such have abandoned all becomings.” (Itivuttaka, ch 11). Of course it is not appealing to those of us with so much lobha accumulated. Only the arahats have eradicated all lobha for all becoming (bhava). > > ------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > But what is distinctive about namas? > ------------------------------------------------------- I don’t think I can add much more to the quote from Atthasalini (discussed in more detail, PTS trans p500) without more research. There is also this one other short quote if it helps: “In the mind and matter group, the term ‘mind’ (naama) is applied to mental properties because ‘names’ once given to them are fixed, or because they bend (namanti) objects, or because as objects they bend the mind unto themselves. ‘Matter’ is that which changes its state or condition (according to heat or cold, etc).” (p.69) >> --------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > The "levels of consiousness" are variations among the cittas, > particularly as regards their intensity and the kinds of cetasikas > associated, nothing more mysterious. Bhavanga cittas, for example, have > low > intensity, and are subliminal. > ---------------------------------------------------------- I think ‘subliminal’ ‘subconscious’ are confusing terms to refer to bhavanga cittas as discussed before. I agree we could talk about the intensity of cetasikas - degrees of dosa, for example. I don’t think we could talk about seeing or bhavanga citta as being less intense because they are not accompanied by lobha or dosa though. One other point I’d like to pick up (read: butt in) from your post to Nina. She said “I better understand sound now, pleasant or unpleasant, hearing, aversion on account of it.” You replied that “this is theoretical understanding, understanding via the intellect. It is not the understanding that is freeing (though it *is* supportive of that understanding).” ..... Of course, if we talk about these realities now, it is most probably just theoretical understanding. However, at the moments hearing or aversion or sound arise, there can be direct understanding of their characteristics without any thinking or theorizing. Panna that directly knows realities can arise anytime if there is clear comprehension. This understanding is ‘freeing’ for just that moment, but of course no kilesa (defilements) will be eradicated or 'freed' until panna is of the degree to realize nibbana with the sotapatti magga (at stage of sotapanna). It just depends on conditions at this moment what kind of understanding may arise. Hope I haven’t confused further;-) Sarah =====. 15417 From: dark knight Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 3:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] Digest Number 1046 Hello Sir, I have a small doubt reg. "noting" mentioned in your mail attached below. Message: 11 Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2002 14:26:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Robert Epstein Subject: Re: Re: Walking meditation (was, A Minor Point ...etc) "...and in the Theravadan tradition I happened to be involved with at the time, would use the device of 'noting' the breath to involve the mind in the attention to breathing. One would 'note' gently with the mind 'rising' and 'falling' with the in and out breath, if the place of following the breath were the 'belly'. It was also possible to note breathing out and breathing in at the nostrils or with other locations of the breath. One would follow the attention and see where it went, if it departed from the breath and note what it did, such as 'thinking', 'imagining', 'feeling discomfort'; whatever the object of attention was. The noting was a gross method for sort of marking one's place and one would hopefully go beyond this to discern the exact sensation or thought or movement of the breath to the extent possible." Even though it's told that noting is a wonderfull tool, but while noting, aren't we involving our mental faculties ?ie, labelling as "thinking", or "imagining", etc. ? this process thus involves recollection. In that view, how is it different from thinking ? only that one knows that one is thinking. Doesn't this also increase one's feeling of doership or ego sense ? With Metta, Krishnan. PS : As I understand very little of Abhidhamma, I request all who are kind enough to clarify this doubt using minimum of Abhidhamma. 15418 From: Sarah Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 3:26am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah (and all) - > > A bit more about nibbana. I found a (possibly) interesting item > at the > web site http://web.ukonline.co.uk/buddhism/panadi10.htm, where nibbana > is > described as an unmanifestive consciousness: > > ************************************************** > In the Theravada Canon there are references to assert that Nibbana is > the > consciousness liberated from all worldly objects and thoughts, as is > stated > in the Dighanikaya. "Nibbanam-Vinnanam anidassanam anantam sabbato > pabbam" - > Nibbana is the consciousness that has no sign perceptible to the senses > and > it is immeasurable, purest and a state wherein all the connection with > elements cease, leaving no trace (assesam uparujjhati). (D.i. 223). > *************************************************** "There is that dimension where there is neither earth, nor water, nor > fire, nor wind; neither dimension of the infinitude of space, nor > dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, nor dimension of > nothingness, .................... S: I may not have made it clear, that in the Masefield translation and Com notes which I’m using, base is used instead of dimension (as here) in ‘There is, monks,that base’ (tadayatanam) ******************** (p.1012 Udana com): “...The Lord, having thus indicated, face to face, the existence, in its highest sense, of the unconditioned element, next says ‘Wherein there is neither earth, nor water’ and so on so as to indicate its own nature via an elimination of things that are the antithesis thereof. Just as nibbana is nowhere (to be found) amidst conditioned (sankhata) things, since it has as its own nature that which is antithetical to all formations (sankhara), so are all cvonditioned things (not to be found) therein either, for the collection of things conditioned and unconditioned is (a thing) not witnessed......there is neither the earth element whose characteristic is that of hardness, nor the water element whose characteristic is that of oozing, nor the fire element whose characteristic is that of heat, nor the wind element whose characteristic is that of distending......absence therein of the four great elements, the absence of all derived materiality....absence..of any becoming associated with (the world of) sense desires and (the world of) form.....Even though its own nature is one in which there is an absence of forms, there is next said, so as to indicate the absence within nibbana of any of the states belonging to becoming in the formless (sphere), ‘Nor that base consisting of endless space......nor that base consisting of neither perception nor non-perception’.” ******************** In other words, as I understand ‘endless space.....non-perception’, these lines are referring to the arupa planes where there are already an absence of the elements and all rupas. They are referred to here to indicate that even so, all ‘states belonging’ to these planes (i.e. all conditioned realities) are also absent. END EARLIER POST (1) ***** Howard, I also had some discussion with Anders this time last year on the use of vi~n~naana.m and thanks to Escribe’s search function, I just found this very easily: ***** QUOTE earlier post (Both S and Sarah are me I think;-)) > 'The intellect of Arahatship, the invisible, the endless, > accessible from every side[23] > 'Where is it that earth, water, fire, and wind,...’ > > ************************************************ S: With regard to the MN 49 (24-26) passage you quoted: Sarah: >> B.Bodhi translates the passage as: > > 'the consciousness that makes no showing, > > And in becoming about to disbecome, > > Not claiming being with respect to all: > > that is not partaken of by the earthness of earth etc Maj NIk, 49, The Invitation of a Brahma,24-26 -------------------------------- S: The word 'consciousness' is translated from 'vi~n~naa.na.m' to be understood as 'cognizable' (vijaanitabba.m) and not consciousness according to the Pali com. as explained to me. As I mentioned, BB also added in his notes (513). , Sarah: >>"MA takes > >the subject of the sentence to be Nibbana, called 'consciousness' in the > >sense that "it can be cognized" '. ----------------------------------- S: Perhaps another translation of the first line could be: 'Cognizable (vi~n~naa.na.m), invisible (anidassana.m), shinining in all directions (ananta.m sabbatopabha)' END EARLIER POST (2) ***** The translation work here was Jim’s. Suan also wrote a useful post and translation along these lines but with far more detail (Suan, perhaps you can repost it or a link if you can find it easily....it didn’t show up on my search just now). Sarah ====== 15419 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 3:50am Subject: Re: Meditation and Satipatthana --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: >L: I would be interested in reading what you and Sarah and Jon and Nina and Robert K (or any other of A. Sujin's students) think is the best way to practice satipatthana. _________________ Dear Larry, Perhaps when we think about practice of satipatthana we are already in the realm of looking for methods and techniques that we think enhance or lead to satipatthana. There may be already the idea of me doing something to get somewhere; the same motivating factors that have been with us throughout samsara that have got us good things and bad; but that won't, I suspect, lead out of samsara because they are tainted with self view. If one has enough patience and dedication one can learn to concentrate; to become conscious of subtle sensations, of thoughts, of movements, of tastes, feelings. This may be useful but it depends on the type of citta that experiences these dhammas as to whether it is really satipatthana - the test, I believe, is whether the moment is clung to, such as a subtle wanting to understand or experience; or whether the moment is known, perhaps wordlessly, as just an insignificant dhamma - not me or mine. With effort and the right practice, we can become the 'Meditator" or the "Abhidhamma expert" or the "Calm person" because these seem desirable and have the look of progress - but they too may be varied shapes of the Paticcasamuppada(dependent origination). Think of seeing. It occurs almost an infinite number of times just in one day. Yet every moment of seeing arises because of very complex conditions - no one can make it arise, but if the conditions are there it must arise. We take it for granted but it is at least as amazing that seeing should arise as that satipatthana should arise. From this perspective, then, can you really tell someone how to have satipatthana; it is like trying to explain to someone how to see. If they good eyes (conditioned by kamma and other conditions) then they must see; but if they are without eyes.... If you have time you might like to read over these edited letters I wrote to an American writer a few years ago. http://www.dhammastudy.com/corr.html Robert 15420 From: Ven. Dr. Bhikkhu Dhammapiyo Date: Mon Sep 2, 2002 9:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Never mind the opinion(s). What is the Dhamma knowledge and experience you have to share. I am always awed by your profound sharing. I do not ascribe to, not do I subscribe to the Dhamma ever being opinion or opinionated. Do you think this is Right View/Understanding? Metta, VBD ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 10:56 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) > Hi, Ken - > > In a message dated 9/2/02 8:12:09 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > ashkenn2k@y... writes: > > > > > > Hi Howard, > > > > k: As what you said that one's predispositions depend > > on ones factor, that is why I am incline to discourage > > pple to write their own opinion even if one best shot > > rather than facts from the sutta and commentaries in > > well read or any publication. It could lead to > > distortion of the truth. Opinion should be confined > > to our own consumption or healthy discussion confining > > to ones circle of friends and let it be known that is > > our own opinion esp during this age of the dhamma. > > > > > > kind rgds > > Ong KC > > > ========================== > I understand your point. I generally make it a point to indicate that > what is only my opinion is, indeed, just that. > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) > > > 15421 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 5:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Time for a change (a long post) Hi, Stephen - In a message dated 9/3/02 4:46:57 AM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > Hello Howard, > I have this book and will be glad to loan it to you if the copyright thing > is > seen as a problem. I had great difficulty reading it, never getting beyond > the first 15 pages or so, do to the large number of untranslated Pali > footnotes (and one passage in the text, as I recall). Perhaps I can do a > bit > better now than a few years ago. > I'd be way glad to loan it if it came back with translations! > metta, stephen > > ============================== Thank you! That is very kind of you. I guess I'll wait to see what, if anything, Rob is able to find out. If there is an objection to making and distributing copies, then I will sure take you up on your kind offer! (But you can bet that it will *not* come back with translations of the Pali! ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15422 From: frank kuan Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 9:24am Subject: McYoga from http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/0,1640,42783,00.html Yogis Behaving Badly For millennia, the intricate techniques of yoga were passed down from teacher to student in a sacred exchange. But today, in the booming yoga industry, it's (downward-facing) dog-eat-dog. By Paul Keegan, September 2002 Issue You can't take it anymore. The greed, corruption, and selfishness of the business world have broken your spirit. You need inner peace. Everyone's walking around with a yoga mat these days, so you fly to Los Angeles, yoga capital of America, hoping for a little enlightenment: a quiet candlelit room, some gentle stretching, the chanting of mantras, a sage Indian guru dispensing ancient truths. But when you arrive at one of the most popular yoga centers in the country -- the Bikram Yoga College of India in Beverly Hills -- it's a giant mirrored studio crammed with more than 100 buff and sweaty devotees of the resident guru, Bikram Choudhury, a short Indian fellow sitting on a raised-platform throne wearing nothing but a black Speedo swimsuit and a diamond-studded wristwatch. Power trips, cutthroat competition, and sex scandals? Tell us about your yoga controversy. "Inhale!" cries your new master. Soon you're lying on your stomach, grasping your ankles behind you, and swaying like a rocking horse, trying to hold the Bow Pose. "Exhale!" The heat is cranked up to 105 degrees -- designed to turn your muscles into Silly Putty -- and the sweat's flying. For the next 90 minutes, the closest you get to God is praying for this torture to stop. Then, lying in the Corpse Pose when it's all over, you begin meditating: 100 people times $20 apiece = $2,000 for one class; 2,000 students a week = $2 million per year. Given that Bikram has franchised his "hot yoga" method in 600 studios nationwide, and that 600 Bikram teachers will pay $5,000 each for his 60-day crash course this year, that's another $3 million annually. Throw in lecture fees, yoga seminars, books, videos, and a line of clothing and accessories, and Bikram's empire adds up to at least $7 million, making him one of the biggest players in the burgeoning industry of Yoga Inc. After class you follow Bikram as he pads back to his office. A recognized yoga master at age 56 -- he won the National India Yoga Competition at age 11, the youngest ever -- he sits behind his big desk and begins lecturing about the sacred eight-limbed path to enlightenment outlined in the ancient Yoga Sutra. The first limb is called "yama" and consists of five Sanskrit words that mean don't harm others, lie, steal, lust, or be greedy. You nod enthusiastically. This is exactly what America needs: a thriving new industry built not on unethical behavior and ruthless opportunism but rather on timeless humanitarian ideals. Nobody knows how big the yoga market is, but with an estimated 18 million practitioners in the United States today -- mostly affluent baby boomers who drive the wider $230 billion market in healthy, environmentally friendly products -- it surely ranks in the hundreds of millions. But the business model that supports it must, by definition, defy the rapacious ethos of our era, based as it is on a 5,000-year-old philosophy of selfless devotion to helping others achieve inner peace. Excited by this prospect, you ask Bikram about some other forms of hatha yoga you might want to try -- ashtanga, iyengar, jivamukti -- but he scowls at your temerity. "Nobody does hatha yoga in America except me!" he bellows, offering as proof his celebrity students, ranging from George Harrison in 1969 to Madonna and Michael Jackson. "All of them are my students! All of them! ALL OF THEM! My name is Guru of the Stars." Later on, Bikram brags about his mansion with servants in Beverly Hills and his 30 classic cars, from Rolls-Royces to Bentleys. He also claims to have cured every disease known to humankind and compares himself to Jesus Christ and Buddha. Requiring neither food nor sleep, he says, "I'm beyond Superman." When you ask how he can make such wild statements, he answers, "Because I have balls like atom bombs, two of them, 100 megatons each. Nobody fucks with me." Perhaps. But it sounds more like Bikram has let this guru stuff go to his head. Still, one megalomaniacal yogi, you solemnly vow, will not derail your search for the pious new business model of Yoga Inc., surely in abundant evidence everywhere else. Power trips, cutthroat competition, and sex scandals? Tell us about your yoga controversy. Yoga Yama 1: Ahimsa Don't Harm Others Yoga literally means "union with God" and encourages a divine harmony with all things. Which raises an intriguing question: How do the biggest players in the yoga business reconcile ahimsa -- that one's actions should never harm others -- with the capitalist principle that one should always try to squash the competition like a bug? In short, not very well. Resentment has been brewing in recent years over what some yogis consider thuggish behavior by Yoga Journal magazine, the powerful nexus for the industry. Much of the bad karma flows toward Yoga Journal's conference business. The Berkeley-based magazine pioneered the concept of a yoga conference back in 1995, ostensibly to bring thousands together to teach, practice, and meditate. Today, these one- to seven-day conferences draw more than 1,000 neophytes and longtime practitioners alike, who cough up as much as $850 apiece to bask in the saintly glow of star yogis like Rodney Yee. At five conferences a year, this adds up to some serious money, fully 30 percent of Yoga Journal's estimated $11 million in annual revenue. Growth like that is what has inspired the magazine to launch bold new marketing gambits like the "Yoga Cruise." In February, for the first time, a luxury liner full of people doing the sun salutation will sail to the Caribbean -- for as much as $2,600 per head. As the conference business has grown, so has the number of yoga entrepreneurs seeking opportunity in various regions of our stiff-necked nation. Three years ago yoga teacher Jonny Kest started the Midwest Yoga and Wellness Conference in Ann Arbor, Mich. -- only to discover how little ahimsa was being practiced back at Yoga Journal. First, Kest says, the magazine refused to run his ads. (It took an outcry from the yoga community, he says, to make it reverse its policy a few months later.) Now, he claims, Yoga Journal is trying to run him out of business entirely by holding a conference next spring within weeks of his annual event and within 50 miles of his planned venue near Chicago. "Yoga's not so big that you can have two major conferences in one area," Kest says glumly, noting that the magazine's marketing power and ability to attract celebrity yoga teachers could wipe him out. Why doesn't the magazine go into the vast areas that still don't have big conferences, he wonders, like the Northwest, the Northeast, or Toronto? "Yoga Journal is a monopoly," he sighs. "It's trying to do the Microsoft thing." Yoga Yama 2: Satya Don't Lie Yoga Journal behaving like Microsoft? The same magazine that publishes earnest articles like "Love Thine Enemy"? Impossible. But then again, Yoga Journal is no longer the sleepy little nonprofit it was in back in 1975 when it was launched by the California Yoga Teachers Association. In 1998 a former Citicorp investment banker named John Abbott bought the magazine and began transforming it into a slick glossy. In place of New Agey pieces about crystals and how to conquer fear with trapeze flying, Abbott began publishing articles about exotic yoga travel destinations and celebrity yogis like Madonna and Sting. He even signed up supermodel Christy Turlington as the magazine's editor at large. Power trips, cutthroat competition, and sex scandals? Tell us about your yoga controversy. Purists grumbled, but many in the yoga community give Yoga Journal credit -- not only for raising yoga's overall profile but for raising serious issues, like coping with injuries and the health benefits of yoga. The results have been impressive. Since Abbott took over, paid circulation has tripled from 90,000 to 275,000, ad revenue has skyrocketed while the rest of the magazine industry slumps, and Abbott says his publication will turn a profit this year for the first time in 27 years. Abbott, who has the bespectacled, balding look of a yoga-fit middle-age businessman, rebuts charges that his publication refused to run ads for competing conferences as "absolutely false." But Anne O'Brien, the director of the magazine's conference business before leaving a year ago, says Kest is right: Yoga Journal did, in fact, have a clear policy of not accepting ads from competing conferences, until complaints came pouring in. (She applauds the magazine, however, for reversing the policy, calling it "the right decision in the best interests of yoga.") As for why Yoga Journal decided to hold its conference so close to Kest's event, Abbott chalks it up to pure coincidence. Plans for a Chicago-area conference began two years ago, he says -- though O'Brien says Yoga Journal had never discussed it as of last August, when she left -- so he didn't know about the Midwest Yoga and Wellness Conference, which drew 850 attendees last spring. Abbott denies he's trying to wipe out his competitors, but sources say that two years ago the magazine hired a consultant who advised him to do exactly that by targeting markets all over North America that already host yoga conferences. "I don't believe so," Abbott says when asked if that's true. "Maybe things are said over a beer ..." There's another reason, actually, for Abbott's reticence. While most executives love to jaw about going mano a mano with their competitors, such talk is verboten within the yoga industry because it violates ahimsa -- even for Abbott, who confesses that he got into yoga not for its spiritual dimensions but to rehab a pulled hamstring. "It would bode poorly for any person trying to grind others under to adopt business practices that are harming," he says. "In this space, if you're viewed as doing that, a lot of adherents will run away. If you practice in a crass way, a predatory way, you won't be successful." Yoga Yama 3: Asteya Don't Steal "Be successful" is the new mantra of the yoga universe, which has become so competitive that trying to crack the big leagues is far more difficult than it was even a few years ago. But how do yogis in our covetous culture separate themselves from the pack without violating asteya, the yama that strictly forbids stealing? For millennia, the intricate techniques of yoga were passed down freely from teacher to student. Today they form a collection of highly marketable intellectual properties -- a phenomenon that has only encouraged some rather unenlightened behavior. Power trips, cutthroat competition, and sex scandals? Tell us about your yoga controversy. Bikram says there has been so much stealing of his "hot yoga" techniques during the last few years that he had to spend $500,000 in January for a lawyer to trademark his sequence of 26 asanas, or yoga poses, as well as his word-for-word monologues describing how to do them. Thus yoga, the franchise, was born. "People were doing illegal things," Bikram growls. "I had to stop them." At Jivamukti in New York City -- the downtown studio with 2,000 students per week and a website that lists 51 celebrity clients, from Steve Martin to Monica Lewinsky -- owner David Life complains that several former teachers have set up shop nearby, offering the same method he painstakingly developed with co-owner Sharon Gannon during the last 17 years. "They're not calling themselves Jivamukti, but the staff is almost 100 percent certified through our training program," Life says, adding that he might consider taking action if they start using the word Jivamukti -- which, naturally, the couple has trademarked. Yoga teachers respond that big schools like Jivamukti and Yoga Works in Los Angeles don't pay them nearly enough -- $25 per class with 10 students, plus $2.50 for each additional student the teacher attracts, is not unusual -- despite having revenue of well over $1 million per year. Such schools make the situation worse, they say, by requiring teachers to sign contracts that prohibit them from teaching at other schools within a wide geographical radius. "Most teachers simply want to share it, to give the gift of yoga," says Mark Stephens, who recently opened the L.A. Yoga Center in Westwood. "Schools shouldn't have contracts preventing them from doing that." Yoga scholars say these clashes are the inevitable result of trying to sell a spiritual experience that shouldn't be marketed in the first place. But that hasn't slowed the mad dash to own a slice of divinity: When Stephens started his business, he was amazed to find that nearly every sacred yoga word or phrase had been trademarked. The latest: A New York company selling "perfumes and colognes and essential oils for personal use" has applied for a trademark for "shanti," the ancient Sanskrit word for peace. Yoga Yama 4: Brahmacharya Don't Lust As word has spread in recent years about the wonders yoga can do for your sex life -- Sting has waxed eloquent on the subject in interviews -- the reaction is predictable: People start showing up for classes looking for some action, especially from the exquisitely toned teachers. This has become enough of an issue that the California Yoga Teachers Association has established a code of ethics that flatly states, "All forms of sexual behavior or harassment with students are unethical, even when a student invites or consents to such behavior [or] involvement." But, of course, it still happens. And now Rodney Yee, the man Time magazine called the "stud muffin" of yoga, is being sued by a former teacher at Yee's studio in Oakland, Calif. The teacher claims that Yee refused to let her teach there after she confronted him about his alleged sexual affairs with students. In May, after the lawsuit was filed, one of Yee's former students, Athena Pappas, released a statement saying that when her affair with him began, she was "vulnerable and sought his help as my teacher." Another former student has also said publicly that she felt manipulated in her sexual relationship with Yee. The fact that Yee has appeared everywhere from People to Yoga Journal, preaching about how yoga has helped his marriage and family life with three children, hasn't done much for his credibility while the saga drags on. Yee was on a teaching tour of Indonesia and couldn't be reached for comment, but his lawyer, Sanford Margolin, calls the lawsuit "much ado about nothing." Power trips, cutthroat competition, and sex scandals? Tell us about your yoga controversy. Yee's sex scandal is hardly the first to hit the yoga elite. In 1994, Amrit Desai of the Kripalu Center for Yoga and Health in Lennox, Mass., resigned after admitting that he'd had affairs with three female followers -- an ironic development, given that he'd made celibacy a cornerstone of his teaching. And in 1997, the Himalayan Institute of Honesdale, Pa., lost a $1.9 million judgment after a woman charged that its spiritual leader, Swami Rama, sexually assaulted her while she was a student there. But are the gurus, in fact, the ones being victimized? The Speedo-clad Bikram certainly thinks so. Defending the behavior of Yee and Desai, Bikram says he himself was actually blackmailed several times into having sex with students. "What happens when they say they will commit suicide unless you sleep with them?" he says. "What am I supposed to do? Sometimes having an affair is the only way to save someone's life." Yoga Yama 5: Aparigraha Don't Be Greedy The final yama, aparigraha, has been trampled so many times it's impossible to keep count. Clearly, the world of big-time yoga in America is undergoing a profound crisis but won't admit it. The most influential players, like Yoga Journal -- well positioned to monitor ethical lapses -- are also the worst offenders. The small operators are terrified of the powerful -- and are trying to let go of their anger, as the practice suggests -- so nobody challenges the unscrupulous behavior that everyone knows takes place. "Yoga has become cutthroat, Mafia-like," says Thom Birch, a prominent teacher on the yoga conference circuit before he recently quit in disgust. "Many of these people are the biggest thieves, bullies, and sex addicts -- all of it under this veil of spirituality." Needing inner peace more than ever, you take off your shoes and enter a little studio on Manhattan's East Side. The Dharma Yoga Center, quietly run since the 1960s by a respected yogi named Sri Dharma Mittra, is just what you've been looking for all along: a small room with carpet and dim lighting, chants of Om-m-m-m, and a few people in baggy sweatsuits moving through their poses. Later, lying again in the Corpse Pose, enlightenment dawns: There are thousands of devoted teachers like Dharma Mittra out there. You just don't hear about them because they're not driven by riches or fame. To them yoga is not a business at all, but a service through which they simply provide themselves with life's necessities -- the very definition of aparigraha.This was the idea behind Swami Vivekananda's historic visit to Chicago in 1893, when yoga first arrived in the United States. Rather than yoga changing America, however, the reverse is happening. Bikram recalls that when he started teaching in Los Angeles in the 1960s, he didn't charge for his classes. After all, that's how it was done in Calcutta, where he grew up. "In India, rich people built yoga schools," he says. "Here, nobody builds anything. So how long can I teach yoga for free?" So Bikram built an empire, not caring a whit that his flamboyant display of wealth and aggressive business tactics made him an embarrassment to the greater yoga community. Because he knows that Yoga Inc. has nothing to do with yamas. "I learned that when you are in Rome, you must do as the Romans do," he says, his diamond-studded wristwatch flashing in the brilliant L.A. sunshine streaming through his window. "Hey, America is a beautiful country." 15423 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 5:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi, Sarah - Thanks for your kind reply. Most of it calls for no further comment from me. I'll just make a couple points. One of these is that I certainly do not claim that nibbana is a kind of rupa, but only that should it have no cognitive aspect whatsoever, then it would seem to have more in common with rupas than with cittas and cetasikas. Another comment is with respect to your statement "Maybe it’s easiest to just consider nibbana as nama by default or to say realities consist of cittas, cetasikas, rupas and nibbana if that helps." Making nibbana a category unto itself, with only cittas and cetasikas being nama has some virtue, but that's not the standard. The standard, evidentally, is to include nibbana in the category of nama. Now, given the detailed precision of Abhidhamma, talking nibbana as nama by *default* seems quite anomalous. All the other namas have cognitive aspect, and that cognitive aspect is what distinguishes them from rupa. It seems straightforward to me that it is for the same reason that nibbana is nama. With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/3/02 5:08:58 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Howard: > >...... Nyanatiloka writes "náma: (lit. > > 'name'): 'mind', mentality." > > If there is no cognitive aspect to nibbana, if it is not the > > nondual > > awareness of absence of objects and conditions, if it can be taken as > > object > > but is, itself, unknowing in addition to being unconditioned, then it > > sounds > > more like an "unconditioned rupa" than a nama. > .... > > Just reading from the latest extract from Perfections: > “The term by rúpas (rúpesu) means: by the four great Elements and the > derived rúpas that are dependent on theseâ€?. > > Or from Atthasalini, “one having material qualities (ruupii) refers to the > possession of material quality (ruupa.m)â€?. > > Maybe it’s easiest to just consider nibbana as nama by default or to say > realities consist of cittas, cetasikas, rupas and nibbana if that helps. > ..... > > >Moreover, in this case, > > *entry* to final nibbana sounds more like annihilation to me than > > liberation > > - it sounds like a final turning off of the light. Instead of being the > > freeing of consciousness, the dropping off of all conditions, entry to > > nibbana inaugurates the ultimate avijja (non-seeing). Let me ask you - > > what > > is it you would find lovely in that? > > ------------------------------------------------------ > > I don’t find this phrase very lovely and somewhat confusing. Anpupadi-sesa > nibbana or parinibbana is nibbana with the cessation of the khandhas. > > “They who, by knowing this state uncompounded > have heart’s release, by cutting off the stream, > they who have reached the core of dhamma, glad > To end, such have abandoned all becomings.â€? (Itivuttaka, ch 11). > > Of course it is not appealing to those of us with so much lobha > accumulated. Only the arahats have eradicated all lobha for all becoming > (bhava). > > > > ------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > But what is distinctive about namas? > > ------------------------------------------------------- > I don’t think I can add much more to the quote from Atthasalini (discussed > in more detail, PTS trans p500) without more research. There is also this > one other short quote if it helps: > > “In the mind and matter group, the term ‘mind’ (naama) is applied to > mental properties because ‘names’ once given to them are fixed, or because > they bend (namanti) objects, or because as objects they bend the mind unto > themselves. ‘Matter’ is that which changes its state or condition > (according to heat or cold, etc).â€? (p.69) > > >> --------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > The "levels of consiousness" are variations among the cittas, > > particularly as regards their intensity and the kinds of cetasikas > > associated, nothing more mysterious. Bhavanga cittas, for example, have > > low > > intensity, and are subliminal. > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > I think ‘subliminal’ ‘subconscious’ are confusing terms to refer to > bhavanga cittas as discussed before. I agree we could talk about the > intensity of cetasikas - degrees of dosa, for example. I don’t think we > could talk about seeing or bhavanga citta as being less intense because > they are not accompanied by lobha or dosa though. > > > One other point I’d like to pick up (read: butt in) from your post to > Nina. She said “I better understand sound now, pleasant or unpleasant, > hearing, aversion on account of it.â€? You replied that “this is theoretical > understanding, understanding via the intellect. It is not the > understanding that is freeing (though it *is* supportive of that > understanding).â€? > ..... > Of course, if we talk about these realities now, it is most probably just > theoretical understanding. However, at the moments hearing or aversion or > sound arise, there can be direct understanding of their characteristics > without any thinking or theorizing. Panna that directly knows realities > can arise anytime if there is clear comprehension. This understanding is > ‘freeing’ for just that moment, but of course no kilesa (defilements) will > be eradicated or 'freed' until panna is of the degree to realize nibbana > with the sotapatti magga (at stage of sotapanna). It just depends on > conditions at this moment what kind of understanding may arise. > > Hope I haven’t confused further;-) > > Sarah > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15424 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 5:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Digest Number 1046 Hi, Krishnan (and Rob) - In a message dated 9/3/02 6:23:32 AM Eastern Daylight Time, thedarc_knight@y... writes: > > Even though it's told that noting is a wonderfull > tool, > but while noting, aren't we involving our mental > faculties ?ie, labelling as "thinking", or > "imagining", etc. ? this process thus involves > recollection. In that view, how is it different from > thinking ? > ------------------------------------------------- Howard: You are not alone in thinking this. Bhante Gunaratana also recommends against the labelling practice. I think, however, that at least at an early stage of practice the labelling can be useful, because it moves one's thoughts in an impersonal direction: One gets used to thinking "seeing" instead of "I am seeing", "odor" instead of "I smell something", or "plannng" instead of "I am planning". This serves to establish a habit of thinking impersonally instead of personally. But, I agree that, ultimately, labelling needs to be dropped in order for vipassana to be operative. ---------------------------------------------------- only that one knows that one is thinking.> > Doesn't this also increase one's feeling of doership > or ego sense ? > > With Metta, > Krishnan. > > PS : As I understand very little of Abhidhamma, I > request all who are kind enough to clarify this doubt > using minimum of Abhidhamma. > > ========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15425 From: frank kuan Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 9:44am Subject: dukkha of craving, conceit, I and mine The three stages of computer ownership: "The computer has 256MB of RAM." "My computer has 256MB of RAM." "I have 256MB of RAM." (from netfunny.com) 15426 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 5:46am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi, Sarah - Thanks! With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/3/02 6:28:15 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah (and all) - > > > > A bit more about nibbana. I found a (possibly) interesting item > > at the > > web site http://web.ukonline.co.uk/buddhism/panadi10.htm, where nibbana > > is > > described as an unmanifestive consciousness: > > > > ************************************************** > > In the Theravada Canon there are references to assert that Nibbana is > > the > > consciousness liberated from all worldly objects and thoughts, as is > > stated > > in the Dighanikaya. "Nibbanam-Vinnanam anidassanam anantam sabbato > > pabbam" - > > Nibbana is the consciousness that has no sign perceptible to the senses > > and > > it is immeasurable, purest and a state wherein all the connection with > > elements cease, leaving no trace (assesam uparujjhati). (D.i. 223). > > > *************************************************** > > You may also find it useful to revisit the detailed discussions I had > quite a long time back with Ken O and Rob Ep on the Udana passages and > commentary passages - some saved under “Udanaâ€? in U.P. > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts > > I’ll quote from one here, where although nibbana is not mentioned > specifically in the text, it is in the commentary notes and title: > > QUOTE from my earlier post > ======================= > Udana VIII.1 > > "There is that dimension where there is neither earth, nor water, nor > > fire, nor wind; neither dimension of the infinitude of space, nor > > dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, nor dimension of > > nothingness, > .................... > > S: I may not have made it clear, that in the Masefield translation and Com > notes which I’m using, base is used instead of dimension (as here) in > > ‘There is, monks,that base’ (tadayatanam) > > ******************** > > (p.1012 Udana com): > > “...The Lord, having thus indicated, face to face, the existence, in its > highest sense, of the unconditioned element, next says ‘Wherein there is > neither earth, nor water’ and so on so as to indicate its own nature via > an > elimination of things that are the antithesis thereof. > > Just as nibbana is nowhere (to be found) amidst conditioned (sankhata) > things, > since it has as its own nature that which is antithetical to all > formations > (sankhara), so are all cvonditioned things (not to be found) therein > either, > for the collection of things conditioned and unconditioned is (a thing) > not > witnessed......there is neither the earth element whose characteristic is > that > of hardness, nor the water element whose characteristic is that of oozing, > nor > the fire element whose characteristic is that of heat, nor the wind > element > whose characteristic is that of distending......absence therein of the > four > great elements, the absence of all derived materiality....absence..of any > becoming associated with (the world of) sense desires and (the world of) > form.....Even though its own nature is one in which there is an absence of > forms, there is next said, so as to indicate the absence within nibbana of > any > of the states belonging to becoming in the formless (sphere), ‘Nor that > base > consisting of endless space......nor that base consisting of neither > perception > nor non-perception’.â€? > > ******************** > > In other words, as I understand ‘endless space.....non-perception’, these > lines > are referring to the arupa planes where there are already an absence of > the > elements and all rupas. They are referred to here to indicate that even > so, all > ‘states belonging’ to these planes (i.e. all conditioned realities) are > also > absent. > END EARLIER POST (1) > ***** > > Howard, I also had some discussion with Anders this time last year on the > use of vi~n~naana.m and thanks to Escribe’s search function, I just found > this very easily: > ***** > QUOTE earlier post (Both S and Sarah are me I think;-)) > > > 'The intellect of Arahatship, the invisible, the endless, > > accessible from every side[23] > > 'Where is it that earth, water, fire, and wind,...’ > > > > > > ************************************************ > S: With regard to the MN 49 (24-26) passage you quoted: > > Sarah: >> B.Bodhi translates the passage as: > > > 'the consciousness that makes no showing, > > > And in becoming about to disbecome, > > > Not claiming being with respect to all: > > > that is not partaken of by the earthness of earth etc > Maj NIk, 49, The Invitation of a Brahma,24-26 > -------------------------------- > S: The word 'consciousness' is translated from 'vi~n~naa.na.m' to be > understood > as > 'cognizable' (vijaanitabba.m) and not consciousness according to the Pali > com. > as explained to me. As I mentioned, BB also added in his notes (513). , > > Sarah: >>"MA takes > > >the subject of the sentence to be Nibbana, called 'consciousness' in > the > > >sense that "it can be cognized" '. > ----------------------------------- > S: Perhaps another translation of the first line could be: > 'Cognizable (vi~n~naa.na.m), invisible (anidassana.m), shinining in all > directions (ananta.m sabbatopabha)' > END EARLIER POST (2) > ***** > > The translation work here was Jim’s. Suan also wrote a useful post and > translation along these lines but with far more detail (Suan, perhaps you > can repost it or a link if you can find it easily....it didn’t show up on > my search just now). > > Sarah > ====== > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15427 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: dreams Dear Frank, thank you, I printed this out for Lodewijk (my husband), he wakes up overtired because of nightmares, every day. It is beyond control. The Dhamma is not a medicine for everything, but I handed him your post. You do have a sense of humor, I had to laugh so much: Well Frank, I appreciate your presence, I am glad your parents put you on this world, but they are not the real cause as you know. My nephew came with a little one and after an hour I almost started yelling, I lacked patience. op 02-09-2002 06:32 schreef frank kuan op fcckuan@y...: >> > Speaking of dreams, I had a nightmare a few nights ago > where I was getting murdered, but I was calm > throughout the murder, and woke up calmly afterwards. > My attitude throughout the dream was to not become to > wrapped up in the drama of identifying with self and > situations, and as a result I didn't really go through > any kind of anxiety or pain. > N: This also goes for real life. Are we not wrapped up in dramas? Identifying with self and situations? With appreciation, Nina. > > > > 15428 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Larry and Kom, May I butt in? I find your dialogue most interestiung and very important, I appreciate it very much. There are so many points here, I shall touch on only a few. op 02-09-2002 04:35 schreef LBIDD@w... op LBIDD@w...: > > L:"He knows how the arising of the non-arisen sense-desire comes to be; > he knows how the abandoning of the arisen sense-desire comes to be; and > he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned sense-desire > comes to be." N: this is about the four right efforts, very actual for daily life. When there is awareness and understanding of nama and rupa, they will reach accomplishment. L: "Herein, monks, a monk thinks, "Thus is material form;..." > > "Herein, monks, a monk knows the eye and visual forms and the fetter > that arises dependent on both..." N: this is all about satipatthana now. L: "Herein, monks, when the enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is present, > the monk knows, "The enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is in me,"" N: Satipatthana. In my series on anapanasati I shall deal more with the enlightenment factors. > "Herein, monks, a monk knows, "This is suffering," according to > reality..." > > K: How do you define "contemplation?" > > L: Conceptual cognition; not necessarily papanca but definitely vitakka > and vicara. All the examples above are more than naming, but not a lot > more. It isn't encyclopedic. > > "Naming" is how I interpret something like this: "Herein, monks, a monk > knows the consciousness with lust, as with lust...". I think several > meditation masters teach that the proper way to deal with this is to > "note". I'm calling it naming. It is more than simply paying attention > to what is happening or witnessing. It is a little nugget of cognition; > although it is often mechanical and not so cognitive. N: I personally believe that it is highly cognitive, it is panna. This is dukkha...etc., well, that is the realization of the four noble Truths. We often read this phrase in the suttas. L (snip) That's why I think the study of abidhamma without any meditation > discipline _could_ accomplish samma sati. N: Study of Abhidhamma without any meditation: again, what do people mean by meditation. I would say, just as Kom, study without mindfulness of nama and rupa is not enough. L: What is A. > Sujin's view on satipatthana meditation? Why doesn't she teach it? Does > she teach a similar discipline for developing detachment? N: There should be development of satipatthana, that is, sati and panna, development of direct awareness and understanding of the characteristics of nama and rupa, very, very gradually. There may be a lot of thinking involved, but there can also be a moment of noting a characteristic without thinking. This may be seldom, but in this way the difference between thinking and sati can be known. The development of satipatthana will lead first to detachment from self, and later on from all namas and rupas. But together with satipatthana all perfections should be developed. They support panna. When the perfections are being developed there is a degree of giving up of clinging: dana, sila, renunciation, patience, metta, and the other perfections. Best wishes from Nina. 15429 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 10:00am Subject: Perfections, Ch 5,Understanding, no 4 Perfections, Ch 5, Understanding, no 4; The perfection of paññå can be developed when we perform deeds of generosity, when we know to what purpose we give things away: to eliminate defilements. Someone who does not know that paññå is to be developed in order to realize the four noble Truths, gives without paññå, and he may expect a reward for his good deed. However, when someone gives things away with understanding of realities he knows that there are no beings, people or self; he knows that because of birth there will be suffering and trouble, life after life. If he has truly understood this, he knows that when there is an end to rebirth, there will an end to suffering. This means that there will not be any more seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or the experience of tangible object and all the sufferings caused by them. All kinds of kusala have to be developed to the degree of a perfection, so that the four noble Truths can be realized and defilements be eradicated. When someone has become a streamwinner, sotåpanna, he will not more than seven times be reborn and then attain arahatship. When sati and paññå have become keener and more refined, we shall see that we have many different kinds of defilements through the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the body and the mind, the whole day. It is extremely difficult to eradicate them completely. This can only be achieved by developing every kind of kusala to the degree of a perfection. If someone has right understanding of the significance of the perfections, he will, when he performs generous deeds, not aim for anything else but the realization of the noble Truths so that defilements can be completely eradicated. We can only know ourselves whether our kusala is a perfection or not. If someone has no understanding of the way to eradicate defilements, his generosity is not a perfection. Someone who has listened to the Dhamma and notices his defilements, may perform kusala of the degree of a perfection, but it all depends on the strenghth of his paññå. Some people who have just begun to listen to the Dhamma say that they do not need to attain nibbåna, and that they do not need to be a ³streamwinner², sotåpanna, who will not be reborn more than seven times. They want to be reborn more than seven times. Thus, it is evident that in their case paññå of the level of listening is still weak. For the development of the perfections it is necessary that paññå clearly sees the benefit of developing them, be it the perfection of generosity, of síla, of renunciation or any of the other perfections. Thus, it all depends on the degree of paññå to what extent the perfections can be developed. We may not have understood that the defilements and all dukkha, suffering, which arise in this life are in ourselves, that is, the nåma dhammas and rúpa dhammas we take for me, for self. The true cessation of dukkha is that nåma dhamma and rúpa dhamma do not have to be reborn. 15430 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 6:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi, Bhante - In a message dated 9/3/02 7:46:52 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vinmardeb@e... writes: > > Never mind the opinion(s). What is the Dhamma knowledge and experience you > have to share. I am always awed by your profound sharing. > > I do not ascribe to, not do I subscribe to the Dhamma ever being opinion or > opinionated. > > Do you think this is Right View/Understanding? > > Metta, > > VBD > =============================== It's good to hear from you, Bhante. I'm not completely clear on what you are asking. Do I think *what* is Right View/Understanding? Ken's statement? Well, as far as that is concerned, I think I used the term 'opinion' where, perhaps, I would better have used the word 'understanding' or 'interpretation'. When a position is mere opinion, I do think it would be best either not communicated or, at least, clearly labelled as "opinion". However, there is nothing wrong, as I see it, to try to communicate ones *understanding* of the Dhamma, especially as one has come to see it through following the practice laid out by the Buddha. Now everything we worldlings think and do is influenced by predisposition, by craving, and by aversion, and this includes our understanding of the Dhamma. But if we restrict ourselves on that account to only quoting chapter and verse without benefit of our own understanding it would not be adequate as I see it. We are all trying to grasp the Buddha's Dhamma and make it the core of our life, and sharing our understanding of it, both theory and practice, is beneficial so long as we apply mindfulness and clear comprehension in the process. With metta, Howard > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: > To: > Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 10:56 PM > Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) > > > > Hi, Ken - > > > > In a message dated 9/2/02 8:12:09 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > > ashkenn2k@y... writes: > > > > > > > > > > Hi Howard, > > > > > > k: As what you said that one's predispositions depend > > > on ones factor, that is why I am incline to discourage > > > pple to write their own opinion even if one best shot > > > rather than facts from the sutta and commentaries in > > > well read or any publication. It could lead to > > > distortion of the truth. Opinion should be confined > > > to our own consumption or healthy discussion confining > > > to ones circle of friends and let it be known that is > > > our own opinion esp during this age of the dhamma. > > > > > > > > > kind rgds > > > Ong KC > > > > > ========================== > > I understand your point. I generally make it a point to indicate > that > > what is only my opinion is, indeed, just that. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15431 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 7:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: dreams Hi, Nina - In a message dated 9/3/02 1:00:46 PM Eastern Daylight Time, nilo@e... writes: > Dear Frank, > thank you, I printed this out for Lodewijk (my husband), he wakes up > overtired because of nightmares, every day. It is beyond control. The > Dhamma > is not a medicine for everything, but I handed him your post. > ============================== I hope your husband manages to find a "quick fix". If not, there is a longer term procedure that might help, the cultivation of lucid dreaming, where one is aware during a dream that it *is* a dream. (It is a bringing of mindfulness into the dream state.) What is useful in this is, among other things, the ability to take some control over what occurs in the dream, to change things, to greet "monsters" with lovingkindness. It really can work, but it requires regular practice. I used to engage in it a bit, and it is quite amazing. (But I'm no expert at all.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15432 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 2:39pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Time for a change (a long post) Hi Howard, The link sent previously was to the publisher's on-line book store. If you penetrate to the "Philosophy" section: http://www.buddhistcc.com/bookshop/philosophy/index.html You can find this book available for purchase for US$8.00 (item #12). As the book can be easily ordered on-line (at a reaonable price), I can't see any reason for the publisher to allow me to photocopy it for you. I suggest that you borrow Stephen's copy and then decide if you want to order one for your permanent library. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Stephen - > > In a message dated 9/3/02 4:46:57 AM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... > writes: > > > > Hello Howard, > > I have this book and will be glad to loan it to you if the copyright thing > > is > > seen as a problem. I had great difficulty reading it, never getting beyond > > the first 15 pages or so, do to the large number of untranslated Pali > > footnotes (and one passage in the text, as I recall). Perhaps I can do a > > bit > > better now than a few years ago. > > I'd be way glad to loan it if it came back with translations! > > metta, stephen > > > > > ============================== > Thank you! That is very kind of you. I guess I'll wait to see what, if > anything, Rob is able to find out. If there is an objection to making and > distributing copies, then I will sure take you up on your kind offer! (But > you can bet that it will *not* come back with translations of the Pali! ;-) > > With metta, > Howard 15433 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 11:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Time for a change (a long post) Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/3/02 5:40:05 PM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > The link sent previously was to the publisher's on-line book store. > If you penetrate to the "Philosophy" section: > > http://www.buddhistcc.com/bookshop/philosophy/index.html > > You can find this book available for purchase for US$8.00 (item #12). > > As the book can be easily ordered on-line (at a reaonable price), I > can't see any reason for the publisher to allow me to photocopy it > for you. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: That certainly seems correct. Thank you for checking. ----------------------------------------------------- > > I suggest that you borrow Stephen's copy and then decide if you want > to order one for your permanent library. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, or perhaps I'll just order it. (I'll want to really go over the material slowly.) ------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > =========================== With metta and thanks, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15434 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 4:22pm Subject: ADL ch. 23 (2) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 23 (1) What is right understanding? The answer is: seeing nåma and rúpa as they are: impermanent, dukkha and non-self. Right understanding can be developed. When we still have wrong view, we take realities for self: we take seeing for self, we take visible object for self, we take feeling for self, we take saññå (remembrance or ``perception´´) for self, we take thinking for self, we take defilements for self, we also take good qualities such as mindfulness and wisdom for self. In being mindful of the characteristics of nåma and rúpa which appear, the wrong view of self can be eliminated; then there will be right understanding. So long as one has not become a sotåpanna one may deviate from the right Path, there can be wrong practice. There is wrong practice when, for example, one thinks that there should be awareness only of particular kinds of nåma and rúpa, instead of being aware of whatever kind of nåma or rúpa appears. People may for example believe that lobha, dosa and moha should not or cannot be objects of mindfulness. However, akusala cittas are realities which arise because of their appropriate conditions, they are part of one's daily life. If one selects the objects of awareness, one will continue to cling to a concept of self who could exert control over one's life. Some people believe that vipassanå can only be developed when sitting in a quiet place, but then they set rules for the practice, and thus, they will not be able to see that mindfulness too is anattå. The sotåpanna has, apart from ditthi, also eradicated other defilements. He has eradicated doubt or vicikicchå. Doubt is classified as one of the ``hindrances´´; it prevents us from performing kusala. We may doubt about the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha, about the right practice. The sotåpanna has no more doubt. Another akusala cetasika, eradicated by the sotåpanna, is stinginess, macchariya. The Visuddhimagga (XXII, 52) mentions five kinds of avarice: The kinds of avarice are the five, namely, avarice about dwellings, families, gain, Dhamma and praise, which occur as inability to bear sharing with others any of these things beginning with dwellings. The Atthasåliní (Expositor, Book II, part II, chapter II, 374, 375) gives an explanation of these five kinds of avarice concerning the monk's dwelling-place, the family he is used to visiting in order to receive the four requisites (robes, food, shelter and medicines), the four requisites themselves (mentioned as ``gain´´), knowledge of the Dhamma and praise (concerning personal beauty or virtues). It is explained that there is stinginess if one does not want to share any of these things with others. However, there is no stinginess if one does not want to share these things with someone who is a bad person or someone who would abuse these things. For instance, if one does not teach Dhamma to someone who will abuse Dhamma, there is no stinginess as to Dhamma. Thus we see that the eradication of stinginess does not mean sharing everything one has with anybody. The sotåpanna has eradicated stinginess; the five kinds of stinginess just mentioned do not arise anymore. Furthermore, the sotåpanna has eradicated envy, isså. Envy can arise with dosa-múla-citta (citta rooted in aversion). The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 172) states concerning envy: Envying is envy. It has the characteristic of being jealous of others' success. Its function is to be dissatisfied with that. It is manifested as averseness from that. Its proximate cause is another's success... The sotåpanna is an ariyan, a ``noble person´´, although not all defilements are eradicated by him. He is an ariyan, because at the moment of enlightenment, when the magga-citta arose, he became a different person; he is no longer a ``worldling´´, puthujjana. There are no more latent tendencies of wrong view, ditthi, and doubt, vicikicchå, accumulated in the citta, and there are no more inclinations to stinginess, macchariya, or envy, isså. What is a latent tendency? When we desire something we have lobha. When the lobha-múla-cittas have fallen away, there are other kinds of citta which are not accompanied by lobha. However, the lobha which arose before has been accumulated, it remains latent. When there are conditions for its arising, it can arise again with the akusala citta. Latent tendencies are accumulated in every citta, even in the bhavanga-citta (life-continuum) which does not experience an object through one of the sense-doors or the mind-door. The question may occur whether the latent tendency of ditthi is eradicated gradually or all at once. The answer is that in the course of the development of right understanding ditthi is gradually eliminated until all latent tendencies are eradicated at the attainment of enlightenment. One cannot attain enlightenment without having cultivated the right conditions. We see that in the Buddha's time some people could attain enlightenment quickly, even during a discourse; some could attain enlightenment after a more detailed explanation of the truth, whereas others had to develop the eightfold Path for a longer time before they could attain enlightenment. It all depends on how much wisdom has already been accumulated, also during previous lives. As to the attainment of enlightenment in the present time, the right conditions have to be cultivated; enlightenment cannot occur all of a sudden. If there is awareness of all kinds of nåma and rúpa appearing in daily life, paññå can investigate their characteristics and in this way it can gradually develop. We cannot expect a great deal of sati and paññå in the beginning. However, each moment of right awareness is fruitful, because it can condition further moments of awareness and thus it can be accumulated. When paññå realizes a phenomenon which appears as nåma or rúpa, clinging to the concept of self is gradually eliminated, until finally all latent tendencies of ditthi are eradicated by the magga-citta (lokuttara kusala citta) of the sotåpanna. Then ditthi will never arise again. 15435 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 4:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1) Hi Sarah, I also feel like I need to re-read the whole thing. I would definitely like to continue with another study thread. Anything would be fine with me. Maybe it should be something on-line unless someone wants to type or scan something. Any ideas Christine? Larry 15436 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 5:11pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Robert K. Thanks for your reply. Would it be fair to say that your position is that the practice of satipatthana or any other kusala activity is bound to be pervaded by defilements so it is better not to persue these activities? Larry 15437 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 5:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (2) Dear Nina, thanks very much for this (below). However, I'm still not clear on what A. Sujin is teaching with regard to satipatthana meditation. I get the feeling she thinks it is a waste of time or it would be better to contemplate the dhamma unencumbered by formalities of meditation technique or the concept of satipatthana meditation is ill conceived. Any light you could shed on this would be appreciated. I would like to see what Kom, Sarah, and Jon have to say on this as well. Get sort of a consensus view. thanks, Larry --------------- Nina wrote: L: What is A. Sujin's view on satipatthana meditation? Why doesn't she teach it? Does she teach a similar discipline for developing detachment? N: There should be development of satipatthana, that is, sati and panna, development of direct awareness and understanding of the characteristics of nama and rupa, very, very gradually. There may be a lot of thinking involved, but there can also be a moment of noting a characteristic without thinking. This may be seldom, but in this way the difference between thinking and sati can be known. The development of satipatthana will lead first to detachment from self, and later on from all namas and rupas. But together with satipatthana all perfections should be developed. They support panna. When the perfections are being developed there is a degree of giving up of clinging: dana, sila, renunciation, patience, metta, and the other perfections. Best wishes from Nina. 15438 From: Antony Woods Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 8:50pm Subject: Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Dear Howard and all, Here is an extract from Majjhima 95 about safeguarding the truth. "But to what extent, Master Gotama, is there the safeguarding of the truth? To what extent does one safeguard the truth? We ask Master Gotama about the safeguarding of the truth." "If a person has conviction, his statement, 'This is my conviction,' safeguards the truth. But he doesn't yet come to the definite conclusion that 'Only this is true; anything else is worthless.' To this extent, Bharadvaja, there is the safeguarding of the truth. To this extent one safeguards the truth. I describe this as the safeguarding of the truth. But it is not yet an awakening to the truth. "If a person likes something... holds an unbroken tradition... has something reasoned through analogy... has something he agrees to, having pondered views, his statement, 'This is what I agree to, having pondered views,' safeguards the truth. But he doesn't yet come to the definite conclusion that 'Only this is true; anything else is worthless.' To this extent, Bharadvaja, there is the safeguarding of the truth. To this extent one safeguards the truth. I describe this as the safeguarding of the truth. But it is not yet an awakening to the truth." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn095.html with metta / Antony. 15439 From: Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 5:03pm Subject: Some Thoughts on the Satipatthana Suttas, Pa~n~natti, and Dhammas Hi, all - I've looked over the Mahasatipatthana Sutta and Satipatthana Sutta for purposes of comparing them and for analysis of the four foundations, and a few things occur to me. First of all, as far as comparison is concerned, these seem to be basically the identical teaching, but with extraneous material on the four noble truths etc being inserted in the Mahasatipatthana Sutta. The common material is basically that of the Satipatthana Sutta. Now the more interesting part. As I looked over the first three foundations of mindfulness, especially the first, what I see being taken as objects of contemplation are primarily (referents of) pa~n~natti. There is the body, there is the breath, there are bodily postures, there are bodily organs, fluids, and tissues, there are decomposing corpses, and there are also feelings and states of mind. The fourth foundation, that of "dhammas", is described by Bhikkhu Bodhi in The Middle Length Sayings as contemplation of mind-objects. But as I look over what phenomena are included, it occurs to me that they are all cittas and cetasikas, they are all so called paramattha dhammas. It seems to me that the Satipatthana Sutta takes the student through the meditative process as follows: Begin by directing the mind to conventional objects (the referents of pa~n~natti) such as the the breath, bodily postures, bodily sensations and how they feel (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral), and states of mind (angry mind, happy mind, distracted mind etc) until one's concentration, mindfulness, energy, and investigation grow in power and balance to the point that one sees through the conventional objects to the elementary phenomena that compose them. Thus, by the time that one experientially reaches the fourth foundation, one is examining with wisdom the irreducible, direct elements of experience, and already has seen the conventional objects "dissolve", and then, as the enlightenment factors strengthen, one also sees through even these paramattha dhammas as dependently arisen, and thus su~n~na: anicca, dukkha, and anatta. The process begins by attending to what the ordinary worldling can normally be aware of, and continues to subtler and subtler levels of apprehension until the most subtle elements of experience are examined and seen through, leading the mind to freedom. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15440 From: Sarah and Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 10:33pm Subject: Moderator note - Frank & All Frank, In case you don't realise, your 'McYoga' post was real no-no for this list (and if a post has been sent in error, a quick follow-up note to that effect would be appreciated). Pls note the following from the Guidelines with regard to subject matter and length: ============================================== Posts We welcome any questions, answers, or comments, however light-hearted, relating to the Buddha's teachings as found in the texts of the Theravada tradition (including the Suttanta, Abhidhamma, Vinaya and the ancient commentaries). Good Practice ... Also, please avoid quoting large chunks of text that are available elsewhere on-line -- use links instead. ================================================ All, Please also keep in mind this para from the Guidelines with regard to trimming of posts: =============================================== For replies, delete any part of the original message that is not directly relevant to your reply. This saves the reader from having to scroll through large chunks of text, and saves archive space which may be limited in future. =============================================== Many thanks for your cooperation. As usual, any comments or queries on this should be made off-list only. Jon & Sarah ========== 15441 From: frank kuan Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 0:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Moderator note - Frank & All --- Sarah and Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Frank, > > In case you don't realise, your 'McYoga' post was > real no-no for this list > (and if a post has been sent > in error, a quick follow-up note to that effect > would be appreciated). > Actually, that post was made with complete mindfulness and full awareness of intention. Links to many excellent articles tend to go stale within 2 weeks, so I actually had to do EXTRA WORK to cut and paste from 5 pages on the website to ensure that everyone could see it. The subject matter was completely relevant to dhamma practice (subjective judgement of course), or else I would not have posted it. The moderators can run the list however they like, and I understand their point of view. My apologies. -fk 15442 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 1:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1) Hi Larry, Sarah and All, Have a look at 'Cetasikas' by Nina and see what you think. I'm happy to go along with any strong preference anyone has - there is nothing that I don't need to study and learn. Has anyone else got an idea of something they would really like the group to study together? http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Sarah, I also feel like I need to re-read the whole thing. I would > definitely like to continue with another study thread. Anything would be > fine with me. Maybe it should be something on-line unless someone wants > to type or scan something. Any ideas Christine? > > Larry 15443 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 1:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Larry (& Kom), In your posts to Kom, you mention (with regard to sections of the Satipatthana sutta) “overly contemplative and therefore necessarily conceptual”, “conceptual cognition”, “naming” and “panna is conceptual”. On the contrary, I understand all the sections in the sutta to be referring to paramattha dhammas and to the development of sati sampajanna (right awareness and understanding) of these objects. It will depend on accumulations which objects are objects at any given moment- no rule. The development of satipatthana is not conceptual, but the development of the Path. Let me quote from 2 past posts in support of these comments (apologies for being rather long for you): ***** QUOTE1. Sarah: When we were discussing the translations of the Satipatthana Sutta, Erik and I were discussing the limitations of ‘focussing’ and ‘comprehending’. Afterwards, I checked the detail in the Satipatthana Sutta commentary and sub-commentary on the use of sati-sampajanna and quote below from Soma Thera’s translation p.34: ***** "Sampajano = "Clearly comprehending." Endowed with knowledge called circumspection [sampajañña]. Clearly comprehending = Discerning rightly, entirely and equally [samma samantato samañca pajananto]. Rightly = Correctly [aviparitam]. Entirely = By knowing in all ways [sabbakarapajananena]. Equally = By reason of proceeding through the conveying of higher and higher spiritual attainments [uparupari visesavaha-bhavena pavattiya]. Satima = "Mindful." Endowed with mindfulness that lays hold of the body as a subject of meditation, because this yogavacara (the man conversant with contemplative activity) contemplates with wisdom after laying hold of the object with mindfulness. There is nothing called contemplation without mindfulness. Therefore the Master said: "Mindfulness is necessary in all circumstances, O bhikkhus, I declare."[17] Necessary in all circumstances = Everywhere in the state of becoming, in every sluggish and unbalanced state of mind, it is desirable. Or, that by the help of which the other proper Factors of Enlightenment [bojjhanga] are capable of being developed, is "necessary in all circumstances." Here, contemplation takes place by means of wisdom that is assisted by mindfulness. To point out the things by the influence of which the meditation of the yogi prospers, is the purpose of the words, "Ardent, clearly comprehending, and mindful." " ***** I think the following quotes, (p.22) also help us to see importance of panna (wisdom) as being foremost, even when we are discussing satipatthana: ***** "Since there is nothing called spiritual development [bhavana] without laying hold on something whatsoever in material form, feeling, consciousness and mental objects [kaya vedana citta dhammesu kiñci dhammam anamasitva] they (Santati and Patacara) too overcame sorrow and lamentation just by this Way of Mindfulness. For the hearers [savaka], namely, the disciples of the Buddha, there is no attainment of the Noble Path [Ariya Magga] possible, except by practicing the subject of meditation [kammatthana] of the Four Truths [Catu Sacca]. Spiritual development usually called meditation, is the development of wisdom [pañña bhavana]. Just the contemplation of material form (corporeality), of feeling, consciousness or mental objects, constitutes the cultivation of the Arousing of Mindfulness." ***** Sarah: In the commentary notes under ‘kayanupassi’, we read more detail about the objects of sati-sampajanna, what read to be the paramattha dhammas (p33): ***** "In this body, apart from the above mentioned collection, there is seen no body, man, woman or anything else. Beings engender wrong belief, in many ways, in the bare groups of things mentioned above. Therefore the men of old said: What he sees that is not (properly) seen; What is seen, that he does not (properly) see; Not seeing (properly) he is shackled clean; And he, the shackled fool, cannot get free. What he sees = What man or woman he sees. Why, is there no seeing of man or a woman with the eye? There is. "I see a woman," "I see a man." -- these statements refer to what he sees by way of ordinary perception. That perception, owing to wrong comprehension, does not get at the sense-basis [rupayatana] in the highest sense, philosophically, through the falsely determined condition of material form [viparita gahavasena miccha parikappita rupatta]. Or the meaning is: the absence of perception which is called the seeing of primary and derived materiality, beginning with things such as the hair of the head, owing to non-cognizability of the collective nature of an object like a man or woman by eye-consciousness [kesadibhutupadaya samuhasankhatam ditthi na hoti acakkhuviññana viññeyyatta]. What is seen that he does not properly see = He does not see, according to reality by the eye of wisdom, the sense-basis which exists, the collection of primary and derived materiality beginning with hair of the head and the like [yam rupayatanam kesadibhutupadaya samuhasankhatam dittham tam pañña-cakkhuna bhutato na passati]. Not seeing properly he is shackled = Not seeing this body as it actually is, with the eye of wisdom, he thinks: "This is mine, this am I, this is my self," and is bound with the fetter of defilement [imam attabhavam yathabhutam paññacakkhuna apassanto etam mama esohamasmi eso me attati kilesa bandhanena bajjhati]." ***** Sarah: We sometimes discuss the value of the abhidhamma when reading suttas and the following commentary note to the Satipatthana Sutta is one example (amongst many far more detailed ones) of this, followed by a reference to ‘objects visual’ as requested;-) (p.41): ***** "Consciousness and mental objects, too, should be contemplated upon by way of the diversity of the division of object (arammana], dominance [adhipati], conascence [sahajata], plane [bhumi], causal action [kamma], result [vipaka], non-causative functional process [kriya], and so forth [adi], beginning with impermanence [aniccadinam anupassananam vesena] and by way of the division of consciousness that is with passion and so forth come down in the portion of analytical exposition [niddesavare agatasaragadi bhedañca vasena]. Or the divisions of object... non-causative functional process and so forth. Contemplation should be done by way of the division of the blue and so forth pertaining to the variety of objects visual and so forth [rupadi arammana nanattassa niladi tabbhedassa); ..." ***** END QUOTE 1 QUOTE 2. Jon The objects of awareness under the Satipatthana Sutta are dhammas (realities), not concepts. The consciousness/mind section refers to the dhamma that is the moment of consciousness. The mind objects/mental objects section refers to the dhammas (realities) that can be the object of a moment of consciousness, and this in turn means any and all realities (including those covered by the other 3 sections of the sutta). To give an example. At a moment of seeing there is contact between the consciousness that sees and visible object. That visible object is a reality and also, at that precise moment, a mind object (it is the object of seeing consciousness). So the visible object at that moment falls under both the ‘rupas’ section and the ‘mind object’ section of the 4 satipatthanas. This helps remind us that the 4 sections in the sutta are merely ways of classifying realities and are not in themselves absolutes. Only dhammas (realties) can be the object of satipatthana, because only something that has its own characteristic that is capable of being experienced is considered to be a ‘dhamma’; anything that does not, is not. In the Satipatthana Sutta itself, the 'eligible' mind-objects are described in different ways. One of these ways is as the 5 khandhas (Aggregates), and these 5 khandhas encompass all dhammas (other than Nibbana). I have pasted below the passage from ‘The Way of Mindfulness’ Jon Section on Mental Objects 2. The Aggregates "And, further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging. "How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging? "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu thinks: 'Thus is material form [rupa]; thus is the arising of material form; and thus is the disappearance of material form. Thus is feeling [vedana]; thus is the arising of feeling; and thus is the disappearance of feeling. Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is the disappearance of perception. Thus are the formations [sankhara]; thus is the arising of the formations; and thus is the disappearance of the formations. Thus is consciousness [vinnana]; thus is the arising of consciousness; and thus is the disappearance of consciousness.' Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, internally ... and clings to naught in the world. "Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging." [ends] ********** END QUOTE 2 Larry, I hope I haven't strained your patience and you've found something useful here. Sarah p.s I really liked your comment to Rob M about studying abhidhamma. ============================================ 15444 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 1:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ADL ch. 20 (2) Hi Herman (& Rob M), Hope your phone line’s working Ok to get these posts.... While we were away you asked a very good question: --- egberdina wrote: > > I of course know zilch about asannasatta, and I know an equal amount > about rebirth. But it is said that the thought at death determines > the plane of existence in which the next thought takes place. I > presume asannasatta have no thought at death. Where are they reborn, > and why? ..... Rob M and Nina came to the rescue and explained that the next rebirth consciousness results from dying consciousness in the preceding life. I’ve been sharing (read: force feeding) everyone with extracts from my holiday reading on ‘Conditions’ and I meant to share this extra info with you which I thought you’d find interesting as it relates the same ‘laws’ to suspension of cittas in jhanas. http://www.zolag.co.uk/ This is a footnote in the chapter of Proximity condition (Anantara paccaya) and Contiguity condition (Samanantara paccaya) which show how “The preceding citta is the condition, paccaya, for the arising of the subsequent citta which is the conditioned dhamma (paccayupanna dhamma)” and also how “Our life is an unbroken series of cittas, succeeding one another without interval.” QUOTE FOOTNOTE “ In some cases there can be temporary suspension of citta, and then only rúpas arise and fall away. Those who have developed samatha up to the fourth stage of arúpa-jhåna, the “Sphere of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception “ and who have also realized the stage of enlightenment of the anågåmí, non-returner, and of the arahat, can attain “cessation” nirodha-samåpatti. This is the temporary suspension of citta, cetasikas and mind-produced rúpa. Rúpas produced by kamma, temperature and nutriment, in the case of human beings, and rúpas produced by kamma and temperature, in the case of beings in the Brahma plane, continue to arise. When they emerge from cessation, the first citta which arises is the phala-citta, fruition-consciousness (lokuttara vipåkacitta), which has nibbåna as its object. For the anågåmí it is the phala-citta of the anågåmí and for the arahat it is the phala-citta of the arahat. This citta is conditioned by the preceding citta, the arúpa-jhånacitta of the fourth stage which occurred prior to cessation. Thus, the force of proximity is not destroyed by the temporary suspension of citta. It is the same in the case of rebirth in the asañña-satta plane, the plane where there is only rúpa. When the lifespan in that plane is over and there is rebirth in the sensuous plane, the rebirth-consciousness is conditioned by the dying-consciousness which occurred prior to rebirth in the asañña-satta-plane. Thus, the force of proximity is not destroyed. “ Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 5:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: About Kerala and MahaBodhiSoceity & ROB EP Hi Krishnan, Thankyou for the extra personal details. Yes, it is less surprising to find that you are now in Bangalore and to hear about the Mahabodhi Society there. It’s great you had a chance to study some Pali there as well. Perhaps you’ll be able to help us out from time to time with it. You’re right about Palakkad, I don’t know it;-) I don’t want to pre-empt Rob Ep’ s reply to you, but I’d like to comment that I think the points you are making below are very perceptive indeed and show quite some Abhidhamma knowledge and understanding already. I look forward to hearing more from you. Sarah ============================ --- dark knight wrote: > Even though it's told that noting is a wonderfull > tool, > but while noting, aren't we involving our mental > faculties ?ie, labelling as "thinking", or > "imagining", etc. ? this process thus involves > recollection. In that view, how is it different from > thinking ? only that one knows that one is thinking. > Doesn't this also increase one's feeling of doership > or ego sense ? > > With Metta, > Krishnan. > > PS : As I understand very little of Abhidhamma, I > request all who are kind enough to clarify this doubt > using minimum of Abhidhamma. > POST TO ME --- dark knight wrote: > > It's a real surprise to hear that you are very > familiar with Kerala ! > Actually I am from Palakkad (don't tell me you know > abt palakkad !!), 15446 From: Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 1:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Thank you, Anthony. this is wonderful! :-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/4/02 12:43:34 AM Eastern Daylight Time, antony272b@h... writes: > > Dear Howard and all, > > Here is an extract from Majjhima 95 about safeguarding the truth. > > "But to what extent, Master Gotama, is there the safeguarding of the truth? > > To what extent does one safeguard the truth? We ask Master Gotama about the > > safeguarding of the truth." > > "If a person has conviction, his statement, 'This is my conviction,' > safeguards the truth. But he doesn't yet come to the definite conclusion > that 'Only this is true; anything else is worthless.' To this extent, > Bharadvaja, there is the safeguarding of the truth. To this extent one > safeguards the truth. I describe this as the safeguarding of the truth. But > > it is not yet an awakening to the truth. > > "If a person likes something... holds an unbroken tradition... has > something > reasoned through analogy... has something he agrees to, having pondered > views, his statement, 'This is what I agree to, having pondered views,' > safeguards the truth. But he doesn't yet come to the definite conclusion > that 'Only this is true; anything else is worthless.' To this extent, > Bharadvaja, there is the safeguarding of the truth. To this extent one > safeguards the truth. I describe this as the safeguarding of the truth. But > > it is not yet an awakening to the truth." > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn095.html > > with metta / Antony. > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15447 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 10:00am Subject: anapanasati, Part 4 We should go back to the third tetrad of the sutta on mindfulness of breathing: (IX) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in experiencing the (manner of) consciousness²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out experiencing the (manner of) consciousness². (X) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in gladdening the (manner of) consciousness²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out gladdening the (manner of) consciousness². (XI) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in concentrating the (manner of) consciousness²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out concentrating the (manner of) consciousness². (XII) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in liberating the (manner of) consciousness²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out liberating the (manner of) consciousness²- on that occasion, monks, a monk abides contemplating citta in citta, ardent, clearly comprehending, mindful, having put away covetousness and grief regarding the world. I do not say, monks, that there is mindfulness of breathing in one who is forgetful and does not clearly comprehend. That is why on that occasion, monks, a monk abides contemplating citta in citta, ardent, clearly comprehending, mindful, having put away covetousness and grief regarding the world. The Visuddhimagga states: IX: In the third tetrad the experiencing of the (manner of) consciousness must be understood to be through four jhanas. As regards the words in the third tetrad: ³(X) I shall breathe in...breathe out gladdening the (manner of) consciousness², the Visuddhimagga (VIII, 231) states that there is gladdening in two ways, namely through concentration and through insight. We read: ŒHow through concentration? He attains the two jhånas in which happiness (piti) is present. At the time when he has actually entered upon them he inspires the mind with gladness, instils gladness into it, by means of the happiness associated with the jhåna. How through insight? After entering upon and emerging from one of the two jhånas accompanied by happiness he comprehends with insight that happiness associated with the jhåna as liable to destruction and to fall, thus at the actual time of insight he inspires the mind with gladness, instils gladness into it by making the happiness associated with jhåna the object.¹ XI: Concentrating (samaadaha.m) the (manner of) consciousness:"evenly (samam) placing (adahanto) the mind, evenly putting it on its object by means of the first jhana and so on. Or alternatively when, having entered upon those jhanas and emerged from them, he comprehends with insight the consciousness associated with the jhana as liable to destruction and fall, then at the actual time of insight momentary unification of the mind arises through the penetration of the characteristics... When the yogavacara, the practitioner, concentrates on the meditation subject, in this case, breath, he needs right understanding and also samadhi that concentrates again and again and again, so that it can become access concentration and attainment concentration when he attains jhana. When he can have jhanacitta for many moments, there are no cittas of the sense sphere and no bhavangacittas in between. His concentration on the meditation subject is stable. The word evenly applies to jhana, when there is no disturbance by sense impressions. When he emerges from jhana and he can develop insight, there is momentray concentration with the citta that realizes the happiness of jhana as a dhamma arising and falling away. The Visuddhinmagga speaks about . The Vis. I, note 3 explains that no insight comes about without momentary concentration. As regards the clause: ³(XII) I shall breathe in... breathe out liberating the (manner of) consciousness², the Visuddhimagga explains that this also must be understood as pertaining to jhåna as well as to insight. In the first jhåna one is liberated from the ³hindrances², although they are not eradicated, and in each subsequent stage of jhåna one is liberated from the jhåna-factors, specific cetasikas which are developed in order to eliminate the hindrances. The jhåna-factors are subsequently abandoned when one is no longer dependent on them and one is able to attain a higher and more subtle stage of jhåna. After emerging from jhåna the jhånacitta is comprehended with insight. We read (Visuddhimagga VIII, 233): Œ... at the actual time of insight he delivers, liberates the mind from the perception of permanence by means of the contemplation of impermanence, from the perception of pleasure by means of the contemplation of dukkha (suffering), from the perception of self by means of the contemplation of not self, from delight by means of the contemplation of dispassion, from greed by means of the contemplation of fading away, from arousing by means of the contemplation of cessation, from grasping by means of the contemplation of relinquishment...² As to the words, , we read in a footnote (Vis. VIII, 234, note 64): Knowledge of Desire for Deliverance is one of the higher stages of insight knowledge (the sixth maha-vipassana ~naa.na), when panna has become more and more detached from conditioned realities, sees their danger and disadvantage. At the end of this tetrad, the Vis. states that this tetrad deals with contemplation of citta. The Commentary to the sutta, the Papa~ncasuudanii, explains the words of the sutta: , here this is the explanation: a monk who proceeds by the method, etc... although he makes the sign(nimitta) of the in-and-outbreathing the object, is nevertheless called someone who contemplates citta in citta, because the citta of that monk proceeds by establishing sati and sampaja~n~na (pa~n~naa) with regard to the object. Because there cannot be the development of mindfulness of breathing for someone who is forgetful and without clear comprehension. That is why, by experiencing the citta as object,(it is said) The Commentary on the Satipatthana Sutta (the Papa~ncasuudanii, translated by Ven. Soma) states that just as in the case of body and feelings, citta should be contemplated in seven ways: as impermanent; as being subject to dukkha; as anatta; by way of turning away from it and not by way of delighting in it; by freeing himself of passion for it; with thoughts making for cessation and not making for origination; and not by way of laying hold of it, by by way of giving it up. Nina: these contemplations refer to the stages of insight: in the course of insight there is a clearer understanding of the three characteristics of impermanence, dukkha and anatta, and hence a growing detachment from conditioned dhammas. When citta appears panna should see citta in citta, not a self in citta. Citta knows an object, it does not last and it is not self who knows an object. **** Nina 15448 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 10:00am Subject: omission of memory Dear Rob M, Ven. Nyanaponika in Abh Studies has in the Appendix: the Omission of Memory in the List. Maybe you have read it, but if not, I thought it would interest you. You were wondering about sa~n~naa, and the role of memory. He also mentions the later Buddhist schools. Best wishes from Nina. 15449 From: Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 1:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Sarah, I don't get it. I didn't make it all the way to the end of your post, but in what I did read, except for Jon's opinion, I didn't see anything about discriminating between concept and reality, or any description of a pure experience devoid of concept, or anything about the fundamental incomprehensibility (vis a vis clear comprehension) of concepts. Could you clarify? thanks, Larry ------------------------ Sarah wrote: Hi Larry (& Kom), In your posts to Kom, you mention (with regard to sections of the Satipatthana sutta) "overly contemplative and therefore necessarily conceptual", "conceptual cognition", "naming" and "panna is conceptual". On the contrary, I understand all the sections in the sutta to be referring to paramattha dhammas and to the development of sati sampajanna (right awareness and understanding) of these objects. It will depend on accumulations which objects are objects at any given moment- no rule. The development of satipatthana is not conceptual, but the development of the Path. Let me quote from 2 past posts in support of these comments (apologies for being rather long for you): ***** QUOTE1. Sarah: When we were discussing the translations of the Satipatthana Sutta, Erik and I were discussing the limitations of 'focussing' and 'comprehending'. Afterwards, I checked the detail in the Satipatthana Sutta commentary and sub-commentary on the use of sati-sampajanna and quote below from Soma Thera's translation p.34: ***** "Sampajano = "Clearly comprehending." Endowed with knowledge called circumspection [sampajañña]. Clearly comprehending = Discerning rightly, entirely and equally [samma samantato samañca pajananto]. Rightly = Correctly [aviparitam]. Entirely = By knowing in all ways [sabbakarapajananena]. Equally = By reason of proceeding through the conveying of higher and higher spiritual attainments [uparupari visesavaha-bhavena pavattiya]. Satima = "Mindful." Endowed with mindfulness that lays hold of the body as a subject of meditation, because this yogavacara (the man conversant with contemplative activity) contemplates with wisdom after laying hold of the object with mindfulness. There is nothing called contemplation without mindfulness. Therefore the Master said: "Mindfulness is necessary in all circumstances, O bhikkhus, I declare."[17] Necessary in all circumstances = Everywhere in the state of becoming, in every sluggish and unbalanced state of mind, it is desirable. Or, that by the help of which the other proper Factors of Enlightenment [bojjhanga] are capable of being developed, is "necessary in all circumstances." Here, contemplation takes place by means of wisdom that is assisted by mindfulness. To point out the things by the influence of which the meditation of the yogi prospers, is the purpose of the words, "Ardent, clearly comprehending, and mindful." " ***** I think the following quotes, (p.22) also help us to see importance of panna (wisdom) as being foremost, even when we are discussing satipatthana: ***** "Since there is nothing called spiritual development [bhavana] without laying hold on something whatsoever in material form, feeling, consciousness and mental objects [kaya vedana citta dhammesu kiñci dhammam anamasitva] they (Santati and Patacara) too overcame sorrow and lamentation just by this Way of Mindfulness. For the hearers [savaka], namely, the disciples of the Buddha, there is no attainment of the Noble Path [Ariya Magga] possible, except by practicing the subject of meditation [kammatthana] of the Four Truths [Catu Sacca]. Spiritual development usually called meditation, is the development of wisdom [pañña bhavana]. Just the contemplation of material form (corporeality), of feeling, consciousness or mental objects, constitutes the cultivation of the Arousing of Mindfulness." ***** Sarah: In the commentary notes under 'kayanupassi', we read more detail about the objects of sati-sampajanna, what read to be the paramattha dhammas (p33): ***** "In this body, apart from the above mentioned collection, there is seen no body, man, woman or anything else. Beings engender wrong belief, in many ways, in the bare groups of things mentioned above. Therefore the men of old said: What he sees that is not (properly) seen; What is seen, that he does not (properly) see; Not seeing (properly) he is shackled clean; And he, the shackled fool, cannot get free. What he sees = What man or woman he sees. Why, is there no seeing of man or a woman with the eye? There is. "I see a woman," "I see a man." -- these statements refer to what he sees by way of ordinary perception. That perception, owing to wrong comprehension, does not get at the sense-basis [rupayatana] in the highest sense, philosophically, through the falsely determined condition of material form [viparita gahavasena miccha parikappita rupatta]. Or the meaning is: the absence of perception which is called the seeing of primary and derived materiality, beginning with things such as the hair of the head, owing to non-cognizability of the collective nature of an object like a man or woman by eye-consciousness [kesadibhutupadaya samuhasankhatam ditthi na hoti acakkhuviññana viññeyyatta]. What is seen that he does not properly see = He does not see, according to reality by the eye of wisdom, the sense-basis which exists, the collection of primary and derived materiality beginning with hair of the head and the like [yam rupayatanam kesadibhutupadaya samuhasankhatam dittham tam pañña-cakkhuna bhutato na passati]. Not seeing properly he is shackled = Not seeing this body as it actually is, with the eye of wisdom, he thinks: "This is mine, this am I, this is my self," and is bound with the fetter of defilement [imam attabhavam yathabhutam paññacakkhuna apassanto etam mama esohamasmi eso me attati kilesa bandhanena bajjhati]." ***** Sarah: We sometimes discuss the value of the abhidhamma when reading suttas and the following commentary note to the Satipatthana Sutta is one example (amongst many far more detailed ones) of this, followed by a reference to 'objects visual' as requested;-) (p.41): ***** "Consciousness and mental objects, too, should be contemplated upon by way of the diversity of the division of object (arammana], dominance [adhipati], conascence [sahajata], plane [bhumi], causal action [kamma], result [vipaka], non-causative functional process [kriya], and so forth [adi], beginning with impermanence [aniccadinam anupassananam vesena] and by way of the division of consciousness that is with passion and so forth come down in the portion of analytical exposition [niddesavare agatasaragadi bhedañca vasena]. Or the divisions of object... non-causative functional process and so forth. Contemplation should be done by way of the division of the blue and so forth pertaining to the variety of objects visual and so forth [rupadi arammana nanattassa niladi tabbhedassa); ..." ***** END QUOTE 1 QUOTE 2. Jon The objects of awareness under the Satipatthana Sutta are dhammas (realities), not concepts. The consciousness/mind section refers to the dhamma that is the moment of consciousness. The mind objects/mental objects section refers to the dhammas (realities) that can be the object of a moment of consciousness, and this in turn means any and all realities (including those covered by the other 3 sections of the sutta). To give an example. At a moment of seeing there is contact between the consciousness that sees and visible object. That visible object is a reality and also, at that precise moment, a mind object (it is the object of seeing consciousness). So the visible object at that moment falls under both the 'rupas' section and the 'mind object' section of the 4 satipatthanas. This helps remind us that the 4 sections in the sutta are merely ways of classifying realities and are not in themselves absolutes. Only dhammas (realties) can be the object of satipatthana, because only something that has its own characteristic that is capable of being experienced is considered to be a 'dhamma'; anything that does not, is not. In the Satipatthana Sutta itself, the 'eligible' mind-objects are described in different ways. One of these ways is as the 5 khandhas (Aggregates), and these 5 khandhas encompass all dhammas (other than Nibbana). I have pasted below the passage from 'The Way of Mindfulness' Jon Section on Mental Objects 2. The Aggregates "And, further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging. "How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging? "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu thinks: 'Thus is material form [rupa]; thus is the arising of material form; and thus is the disappearance of material form. Thus is feeling [vedana]; thus is the arising of feeling; and thus is the disappearance of feeling. Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is the disappearance of perception. Thus are the formations [sankhara]; thus is the arising of the formations; and thus is the disappearance of the formations. Thus is consciousness [vinnana]; thus is the arising of consciousness; and thus is the disappearance of consciousness.' Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, internally ... and clings to naught in the world. "Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging." [ends] ********** END QUOTE 2 Larry, I hope I haven't strained your patience and you've found something useful here. Sarah p.s I really liked your comment to Rob M about studying abhidhamma. 15450 From: Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 1:49pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Some Thoughts on the Satipatthana Suttas, Pa~n~natti, and Dhammas Hi Howard, I like it. It looks like a good way to teach satipatthana. I still maintain though that the distinction between concept and reality is a conceptual distinction not found in experience. That is to say it is not possible to experience one without the other. If I were a rash person I might even say when a citta cognizes an object that is conceptuality, taking one thing, an experience, for another, the object. Of course conceptual distinctions could be useful. Larry 15451 From: robmoult Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 2:28pm Subject: Re: omission of memory Hi Nina, Thank you for the pointer. I will read this when I get home this weekend. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Rob M, > Ven. Nyanaponika in Abh Studies has in the Appendix: the Omission of Memory > in the List. Maybe you have read it, but if not, I thought it would interest > you. You were wondering about sa~n~naa, and the role of memory. He also > mentions the later Buddhist schools. > Best wishes > from Nina. 15452 From: Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 4:06pm Subject: ADL ch. 23 (3) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 23 (3) The sotåpanna has not eradicated all defilements. One may wonder whether he can still talk in an unpleasant way to others. Of the ten kinds of akusala kamma-patha (unwholesome courses of action) there are four akusala kamma-patha through speech which are: lying, slandering, rude speech and idle, useless talk. The sotåpanna has eradicated lying. He can still say unpleasant things about others or use harsh speech, but not to the extent that it would lead to rebirth in a woeful plane. The sotåpanna cannot be reborn in a woeful plane anymore. Useless talk is speech which has not as objective dåna, síla or bhåvanå. This is not eradicated by the sotåpanna, it can only be eradicated by the arahat. The question may arise whether it is necessary to classify defilements in such a detailed way. The purpose of the study of the Abhidhamma is right understanding of realities. If one does not study at all one will not be able to judge what is the right Path and what the wrong Path. We do not live in the Buddha's time; since we cannot hear the teachings directly from him, we are dependent on the teachings as they come to us through the scriptures. Therefore, it is beneficial to study the scriptures and also the Abhidhamma. It depends on one's personal inclination to what extent one will study the details about realities. Learning about the different ways of classifying defilements helps us to see their different aspects. For instance, ditthi is classified under the group of defilements known as the latent tendencies or proclivities (anusayas) and it is also classified as one of the åsavas, ``cankers´´ or ``influxes´´, which is another group of defilements. Furthermore, defilements are classified as ways of clinging (upådånas); as we have seen, three classes of ditthi are classified under this group of defilements. Defilements are also classified as ``bonds´´ (ganthas), as ``hindrances´´ (nívaranas), and in several other ways. Each way of classifying shows us a different aspect of defilements and thus we understand better how deeply accumulated defilements are and how difficult it is to eradicate them. Only magga-cittas (lokuttara kusala cittas) can eradicate them. Not all defilements can be eradicated by the magga-citta of the first stage of enlightenment. As we have seen, there are four stages of enlightenment (the stages of the sotåpanna, the sakadågåmí, the anågåmí and the arahat), and for each of these stages there is a magga-citta which experiences nibbåna and eradicates defilements. Defilements are progressively eradicated by the magga-citta at each of the four stages of enlightenment. Thus, there are four types of magga-citta. There are four types of phala-citta (lokuttara vipåkacitta or ``fruition-consciousness´´) which are the results of the four magga-cittas. Only the magga-citta eradicates defilements; the phala-citta, which also experiences nibbåna, is vipåka, result of the magga-citta. At the moment of enlightenment nibbåna is the object which is experienced by the lokuttara citta. Some people think that nibbåna is a place which one can reach, a plane of life. In order to have more understanding of what nibbåna is, we have to consider what our life now is: nåma and rúpa arising and falling away. Our life is dukkha, because what arises and falls away is unsatisfactory. If nibbåna would be a plane where we would continue to live, there would be no end to the arising and falling away of nåma and rúpa, no end to dukkha. Nibbåna, however, is the unconditioned dhamma, it does not arise and fall away. Nibbåna is therefore the end of the arising and falling away of nåma and rúpa, the end of birth, old age, sickness and death. Nibbåna is the end to dukkha. When one has attained the first stage of enlightenment, the stage of the sotåpanna, it is certain that there will eventually be an end to the cycle of birth and death, an end to dukkha. When the person who is not an arahat dies, the last citta of his life, the cuti-citta (dying-consciousness) is succeeded by the patisandhi-citta (rebirth-consciousness) of the next life and thus life goes on. So long as there are defilements life has to continue. The fact that we are here in the human plane is conditioned by defilements. Even if there is birth in a heavenly plane, in a rúpa-brahma plane or in an arúpa-brahma plane, it is conditioned by defilements. The arahat has no more defilements, he does not have to be reborn in any plane. The arahat has to die, because he was born and birth has to be followed by death. However, for him the cuti-citta will not be succeeded by a patisandhi-citta. Thus, for him there will not be the arising of nåma and rúpa in a new life any more, and this means the end to the cycle of birth and death. For some people this would seem to be the annihilation of life, something which is frightening. We can make ourselves believe that life is good and that it should continue forever, but if we develop insight we will see more and more that life is nåma-elements and rúpa-elements which arise because of their own conditions and then have to fall away; they are beyond control, nobody can cause them to remain. We cannot cause the arising of happy feeling, if it arises it does so because of its own conditions. It is only present for an extremely short while and then there may be unhappy feeling. The ideas we used to have about life and happiness will gradually be changed. If one still clings to the ``self´´ one is anxious about what will happen to the ``self´´ after one´s death. For the arahat the question of what will happen after his death does not occur; he has no more defilements and thus no more clinging to life. The ariyan knows that what the non-ariyan takes for happiness is dukkha; the non-ariyan takes for misery what the ariyan knows as happiness. The development of wisdom brings a kind of happiness which is different from what one used to take for happiness. Our defilements are the real cause of disturbance, worry and restlessness, they are the cause of all sorrow. Nibbåna is the end of lobha, dosa and moha, and thus the end of all sorrow. When one is not an ariyan one cannot really understand what nibbåna is. If we cannot experience yet the true nature of the conditioned dhammas which arise and fall away, we cannot experience the unconditioned dhamma, the dhamma which does not arise and fall away. 15453 From: egberdina Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 5:49pm Subject: Cittas as condition Hi all, It is often said that a citta and cetasikas are conditions for the next citta and cetasikas. (If I have got that wrong then please ignore the rest of this post). I have been wondering about this, and this is what I have come up with so far. A citta is a conditioned reality, and is manifested as experience, which is absolute. The citta, however, is not its own cause. It is not a thing in itself, but a coming together of a number of other things, which are not experienced. How can this citta then be a condition for the next or a future one? Wouldn't it be more coherent to say that the conditions for a citta are the conditions for the next or a future citta? If the conditions change or are different, the citta is different. As a parallel, we do not say that whatever is reflected in a mirror at a certain time is a condition for it being reflected again the next moment. Likewise seeing a slightly pale aquamarine is not a conditon for the seeing of a slightly pale aquamarine, but the conditions for the seeing of a slightly pale aquamarine are the conditions for that to arise again. (I wish I hadn't chosen a slightly pale aquamarine. From direct experience, it is a lot to type. Next time I'll just use blue :-) ) All the best Herman 15454 From: Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 3:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Some Thoughts on the Satipatthana Suttas, Pa~n~natti, and Dhammas Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/4/02 4:51:28 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > Hi Howard, I like it. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: I'm pleased. (As least one person on this list will like it! ;-)) ---------------------------------------------- It looks like a good way to teach satipatthana. I> > still maintain though that the distinction between concept and reality > is a conceptual distinction not found in experience. --------------------------------------------- Howard: Larry, you just brought a BIG gin to my face! Please carefully re-read this last sentence of yours and tell me if it doen't bring a grin to your face! ;-)) --------------------------------------------- That is to say it> > is not possible to experience one without the other. If I were a rash > person I might even say when a citta cognizes an object that is > conceptuality, taking one thing, an experience, for another, the object. -------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't think so. There's a lot of processing going on in our cognition, but vi~n~nana alone I don't think invoves conceptual processing. Recognition, on the other hand, definitely does. It may be true, and I suspect it is, that there are levels upon levels of conceptual construction, but at the base of all this is vi~n~nana of various sorts. Of course, vi~n~nana, itself, is a separative knowing, conditioned by our kammic formations,and while this doesn't make it conceptual, it does make it conditioned by avijja, thus, imperfect. ------------------------------------------------------ > Of course conceptual distinctions could be useful. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Sure can be! Even the Buddha adopted them in order to function "in this world" and to teach the Dhamma. ------------------------------------------------------ > > Larry > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15455 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Sep 3, 2002 11:19pm Subject: RE: [dsg] subtle point, to Kom Dear Nina, I asked her this questions in two different ways. One, I just gave her a print-out. The second one involved me botching your a question (on record, like usual), although I think I have got the answer nonetheless. The answer (that I want to hear and understand) is that she said Bodily Kamma is not committed only through kaya-vinnatti. Kaya-vinnatti is a way, but committing bodily-kamma doesn't necessarily involve this rupa. If one commits a kamma without wanting to communicate the meaning (communicating meaning such as the godfather nodding to his assasin to kill his enemy), then there is no kaya-vinnatti involves. The other reminders she gave in this area include: 1) There doesn't need to be a third party involved to communicate meaning. We may talk to ourselves, or signal bodily involving meanings even if there is no other third party around. 2) She said that if we understand that this rupa only lasts one citta moment, at the point where the citta conditions the communication of meanings, then we may understand this better. This is over my head, so I don't think I can explain any more. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 10:05 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] subtle point, to Kom > > > Dear Kom, I have a question for A. Sujin, but > only when there is time. The > Foundation has made studies of subtle points, and > these are in a report. One > of these is bodily intimation, kaya vi~n~natti > rupa, which is the rupa > conditioning the conveying of a meaning through > the bodysense, for example > through gestures. It is also the body-door of > kamma. I read in many passages > about the monk who is walking, such as in the > Fruits of Recluseship, the thought "Let me go forward" arises, the > mind-originated air element > arises together with that thought, producing > bodily intimation.> > He does not convey a meaning here, but can we say > it is the bodydoor of his > kusala kamma since he develops samatha and > vipassana while walking? > For a long time I have been wondering about this. > Do you have the report? If > not you could ask Kh Anop. It has many interesting items. > Have a very good and fruitful trip with A. Sujin, > take good care, > Nina. > > > 15456 From: Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 8:38pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Some Thoughts on the Satipatthana Suttas, Pa~n~natti, and Dhammas Hi Howard, I'm afraid you will have to explain your grin. I think my basic argument is that a concept is an equation that isn't quite true. One thing, a sound that is spelled h o w a r d, for example, equals another thing, i.e. you. In citta process citta equals arammana. I agree with the phenomenalist view that all arammanas are strictly speaking hypothetical, or inferred. Nevertheless it makes sense to assume that there are objects out there. All that we can know about those objects is citta. Therefore, for all practical purposes, citta equals arammana (but not really) and is necessarily conceptual [if you buy the basic premise]. Larry -------------------- Howard wrote: Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/4/02 4:51:28 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: Hi Howard, I like it. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm pleased. (As least one person on this list will like it! ;-)) ---------------------------------------------- It looks like a good way to teach satipatthana. I> still maintain though that the distinction between concept and reality is a conceptual distinction not found in experience. --------------------------------------------- Howard: Larry, you just brought a BIG gin to my face! Please carefully re-read this last sentence of yours and tell me if it doen't bring a grin to your face! ;-)) --------------------------------------------- That is to say it> is not possible to experience one without the other. If I were a rash person I might even say when a citta cognizes an object that is conceptuality, taking one thing, an experience, for another, the object. -------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't think so. There's a lot of processing going on in our cognition, but vi~n~nana alone I don't think invoves conceptual processing. Recognition, on the other hand, definitely does. It may be true, and I suspect it is, that there are levels upon levels of conceptual construction, but at the base of all this is vi~n~nana of various sorts. Of course, vi~n~nana, itself, is a separative knowing, conditioned by our kammic formations,and while this doesn't make it conceptual, it does make it conditioned by avijja, thus, imperfect. ---------------------------------------------- Of course conceptual distinctions could be useful. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Sure can be! Even the Buddha adopted them in order to function "in this world" and to teach the Dhamma. 15457 From: dark knight Date: Wed Sep 4, 2002 11:48pm Subject: A doubt regarding 'Noting'. Hello Robert Ep, I have a small doubt reg. "noting" mentioned in your mail attached below. Message: 11 Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2002 14:26:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Robert Epstein Subject: Re: Re: Walking meditation (was, A Minor Point ...etc) "...and in the Theravadan tradition I happened to be involved with at the time, would use the device of 'noting' the breath to involve the mind in the attention of breathing. One would 'note' gently with the mind 'rising' and 'falling' with the in and out breath, if the place of following the breath were the 'belly'. It was also possible to note breathing out and breathing in at the nostrils or with other locations of the breath. One would follow the attention and see where it went, if it departed from the breath and note what it did, such as 'thinking', 'imagining', 'feeling discomfort'; whatever the object of attention was. The noting was a gross method for sort of marking one's place and one would hopefully go beyond this to discern the exact sensation or thought or movement of the breath to the extent possible." Even though it's told that noting is a wonderfull tool, but while noting, aren't we involving our mental faculties ?ie, labelling as "thinking", or "imagining", etc. ? this process thus involves recollection. In that view, how is it different from thinking ? only that one knows that one is thinking. Doesn't this also increase one's feeling of doership or ego sense ? With Metta, Krishnan. PS : As I understand very little of Abhidhamma, I request all who are kind enough to clarify this doubt using minimum of Abhidhamma. 15458 From: epsteinrob Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 0:18am Subject: Re: A doubt regarding 'Noting'. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., dark knight wrote: > Hello Robert Ep, > > I have a small doubt reg. "noting" mentioned in your > mail attached below. > > Message: 11 > Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2002 14:26:29 -0700 (PDT) > From: Robert Epstein > Subject: Re: Re: Walking meditation (was, A Minor > Point ...etc) > "...and in the Theravadan tradition I happened > to be involved with at the time, > would use the device of 'noting' the breath to > involve the mind in the attention > of breathing. One would 'note' gently with the > mind 'rising' and 'falling' with > the in and out breath, if the place of following > the breath were the 'belly'. It > was also possible to note breathing out and > breathing in at the nostrils or > with other locations of the breath. One would > follow the attention and see where > it went, if it departed from the breath and > note what it did, such as > 'thinking', 'imagining', 'feeling discomfort'; > whatever the object of attention was. The > noting was a gross method for sort of marking > one's place and one would hopefully > go beyond this to discern the exact sensation > or thought or movement of the > breath to the extent possible." > > Even though it's told that noting is a wonderfull > tool, but while noting, aren't we involving our mental > faculties ?ie, labelling as "thinking", or > "imagining", etc. ? this process thus involves > recollection. In that view, how is it different from > thinking ? only that one knows that one is thinking. > Doesn't this also increase one's feeling of doership > or ego sense ? > With Metta, > Krishnan. Dear Krishnan, You are absolutely right that this technique uses the mental faculty. What it does is employ the mental faculty in an 'expedient means' of training it to harmonize with mindfulness. Since it is so hard to keep track of mental activity, this method allows the mind to be 'yoked' to the process underway. Since the thinking process is being used as a mindfulness practice, it takes it away from distraction and errant thoughts. The idea is to make the noting coincident with the breathing. If the mind stops paying attention to the breath, it is quickly obvious as the noting is no longer coordinated. In other practices, noting is not utilized. One may use noting or dispense with it, but the basic practice is the same. Best, Robert 15459 From: epsteinrob Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 0:31am Subject: Re: Cittas as condition --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > Hi all, > > It is often said that a citta and cetasikas are conditions for the > next citta and cetasikas. > (If I have got that wrong then please ignore the rest of this post). > > I have been wondering about this, and this is what I have come up > with so far. > > A citta is a conditioned reality, and is manifested as experience, > which is absolute. The citta, however, is not its own cause. It is > not a thing in itself, but a coming together of a number of other > things, which are not experienced. How can this citta then be a > condition for the next or a future one? Wouldn't it be more coherent > to say that the conditions for a citta are the conditions for the > next or a future citta? Couldn't be, then the second citta would be an exact duplicate of the first, and we'd be experiencing the same moment over and over again. but it does raise the question of what it is that interacts with the citta to change it into the next citta. It can't be the citta itself alone, or it too would merely replicate itself exactly, since it would have the exact same conditions as those which caused it. This is an interesting problem in the single citta theory. If the conditions change or are different, > the citta is different. The conditions for a specific citta change at every moment. Nothing ever stays the same for more than a moment. > As a parallel, we do not say that whatever is reflected in a mirror > at a certain time is a condition for it being reflected again the > next moment. No, but that which is reflected in the mirror is the condition for that which is next reflected in the mirror, not because of the mirror but because of the thing that is reflected and the way it changes. The mirror doesn't have to change for the object to change, and thus the reflection. Best, Robert 15460 From: Sarah Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 0:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Problem Of The Greater Mind Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Another comment is with respect to your statement "Maybe it's > easiest > to just consider nibbana as nama by default or to say realities consist > of > cittas, cetasikas, rupas and nibbana if that helps." Making nibbana a > category unto itself, with only cittas and cetasikas being nama has some > > virtue, but that's not the standard. ..... I think that different classifications are standard. Different ways of considering the same realities are helpful for different people and for all of us at different times. For example, the following extract is taken from the latest chapter from ADL. Here Nina is discussing different classifications of defilements” ***** “Learning about the different ways of classifying defilements helps us to see their different aspects. For instance, ditthi is classified under the group of defilements known as the latent tendencies or proclivities (anusayas) and it is also classified as one of the åsavas, ``cankers´´ or ``influxes´´, which is another group of defilements. Furthermore, defilements are classified as ways of clinging (upådånas); as we have seen, three classes of ditthi are classified under this group of defilements. Defilements are also classified as ``bonds´´ (ganthas), as ``hindrances´´ (nívaranas), and in several other ways. Each way of classifying shows us a different aspect of defilements and thus we understand better how deeply accumulated defilements are and how difficult it is to eradicate them.” ***** Back to the ‘standard’ for paramattha dhammas I mentioned, let me quote an extract from the end of the first chapter in ADL: ***** “Summarizing the four paramattha dhammas, they are: citta cetasika } conditioned dhammas (sankhara dhamma) rupa nibbana unconditioned dhamma (visankhara dhamma) When we study Dhamma it is essential to know which paramattha dhamma such or such reality is. If we do not know this we may be misled by conventional terms. We should, for example know that what we call 'body' are actually different rupa-paramattha dhammas, not citta or cetasika. We should know that nibbana is not citta or cetasika, but the fourth paramattha dhamma. Nibbana is the end of all conditioned realities. When an arahat, passes away, there is no more rebirth for him. All conditioned dhammas: citta, cetasika and rupa, are impermanent (anicca). All conditioned dhammas are 'dukkha' since they are impermanent. All dhammas are anatta, not-self (in Pali: sabbe dhamma anatta). Thus, the conditioned dhammas are impermanent and dukkha. But all dhammas, that is, the four paramattha dhammas, nibbana included, have the characteristic of anatta, not-self.” ***** >The standard, evidentally, is to > include > nibbana in the category of nama. ..... This ‘standard’ or classification doesn’t say nibbana is not nama. ..... >Now, given the detailed precision of > Abhidhamma, talking nibbana as nama by *default* seems quite anomalous. ..... I understand what you're saying. For myself, if one classification is not helpful or seems anomalous in any way, I just leave it and consider other aspects or categories. The aim is to have less confusion and more understanding rather than the reverse. My experience is that often what seems anomalous or confusing one day is often clarified later. Just like learning a new movement in Tai Chi or yoga, one can only take it so far at one time. Later it ‘works’ easily and one wonders how it could have seemed so complication or confusing before. The following paragraph is also from the latest chapter in ADL and precedes the one I just quoted on defilements: ***** “The purpose of the study of the Abhidhamma is right understanding of realities. If one does not study at all one will not be able to judge what is the right Path and what the wrong Path. We do not live in the Buddha's time; since we cannot hear the teachings directly from him, we are dependent on the teachings as they come to us through the scriptures. Therefore, it is beneficial to study the scriptures and also the Abhidhamma. It depends on one's personal inclination to what extent one will study the details about realities.” ***** Perhaps Dan, Lisa, Kom and Jim will come back from their discussions with Khun Sujin at Niagara Falls this weekend full of good reminders and explanations for us all;-) Sarah ===== 15461 From: egberdina Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 1:22am Subject: Re: Some Thoughts on the Satipatthana Suttas, Pa~n~natti, and Dhammas Hi Larry , Howard et al, Larry, in your scheme of things, at what stage of seeing, for example, does conceptualisation kick in? I would agree that naming, noting, categorising are conceptual, but does this always occur? Do you allow for seeing without naming? Would you call that seeing conceptual? All the best Herman PS Do you think Howard made a freudian slip when he said he had a gin all over his face? :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Howard, I like it. It looks like a good way to teach satipatthana. I > still maintain though that the distinction between concept and reality > is a conceptual distinction not found in experience. That is to say it > is not possible to experience one without the other. If I were a rash > person I might even say when a citta cognizes an object that is > conceptuality, taking one thing, an experience, for another, the object. > Of course conceptual distinctions could be useful. > > Larry 15462 From: Sarah Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 1:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Larry, --- LBIDD@w... wrote: "Hi Sarah, I don't get it. I didn't make it all the way to the end of your post......" ..... Thanks for the feedback;-). Let me try to clarify in point form here what I was trying to say or quote: 1.Contrary to popular opinion, understanding the suttas is not as simple as we’d like to believe;-) As you said to Rob M with regard to the abhidhamma being “deep, very deep” (or sth similar), I’d say the same with regard to suttas such as the Satipatthana Sutta or the Anapanasati Sutta as Nina is helping to show. 2. Opinions of K.Sujin’s or anyone else’ students are only of any value if they are supported by the Pali canon. This is why I was quoting from the commentaries. 3. What is true or ‘real’ can be tested and proved. There are bound to be reactions of all kinds and doubts in the process. 4.Back to the details I quoted yesterday - I’ll just run through a few points: Sampaja~n~na refers to panna (wisdom) and sati. “Discerning rightly, entirely and equally”. This is not conceptual understanding. 5. Sati is “necessary in all circumstances” including “in every sluggish and unbalanced state of mind, it is desirable”. In other words, no need to wait for a special time or place or practice. “Here, contemplation takes place by means of wisdom that is assisted by mindfulness”. Again this is not theoretical but direct understanding (panna). 6. “Spiritual development usually called meditation, is the development of wisdom (pa~n~na bhavana)”. It then continues to add that the objects of panna and sati are “material form (corporeality), of feeling, consciousness or mental objects”.These are all paramattha dhammas (realities), not concepts. 7.I quoted two sets of examples often causing most confusion. The first is the section of material form (rupa) under kayanupassi. We read that those that think they see “body, man, woman or anything else” are “shackled”.”Beings engender wrong belief, in many ways, in the bare groups of things mentioned above.” It explains that such a perception “owing to wrong comprehension, does not get at the sense-basis (rupayatana) in the highest sense." I t continues to refer to the “collection of primary and derived materiality” which needs to be seen by the “eye of wisdom”. In order to understand what rupayatana, primary and derived materiality etc are, we need to know a little from our Abhidhamma studies. The primary materiality refers to the 4 Great Elements of earth, water, fire, wind elements. Derived materiality (upada rupa) refers to the 24 derived rupas which depend on the 4 Greats. In other words, there are only realities, no concepts included. 8. To stress the importance of having some understanding of abhidhamma in order to understand the suttas and commentaries, I quoted a paragraph which started with: “Consciousness and mental objects, too, should be contemplated upon by way of the diversity of the division of object (arammana), dominance (adhipati), conascence (sahajata).......” In other words, understanding has to develop to realize the conditioned nature of realities or actualities. These are some of the conditions I have been referring to in recent posts. Don’t be misled by the use of ‘contemplated’ in this translation. It is talking about direct knowledge, not just thinking as now. Remember this is all from the commentary and subcommentary to the Satipatthana Sutta, not from the Abhidhamma. 9. Finally, I added Jon’s clear comments and the example he referred to under ‘mental objects’ or dhammanusati as often this is understood to refer to concepts again. With the quote given about the aggregates, it is clear that the ‘mental objects’ here refer to rupa, vedana, sanna, sankhara (the other 50 cetasikas) and vinnana (=citta) - all of course are paramattha dhammas. ***** Hope this clarifies, Larry. Let me just add two brief quotes from the latest ADL chapter which may clarify further the meaning of ‘satipathana meditation’ which you’ve been asking about: ***** “So long as one has not become a sotåpanna one may deviate from the right Path, there can be wrong practice. There is wrong practice when, for example, one thinks that there should be awareness only of particular kinds of nåma and rúpa, instead of being aware of whatever kind of nåma or rúpa appears.” “If there is awareness of all kinds of nåma and rúpa appearing in daily life, paññå can investigate their characteristics and in this way it can gradually develop. We cannot expect a great deal of sati and paññå in the beginning. However, each moment of right awareness is fruitful, because it can condition further moments of awareness and thus it can be accumulated. When paññå realizes a phenomenon which appears as nåma or rúpa, clinging to the concept of self is gradually eliminated, until finally all latent tendencies of ditthi are eradicated by the magga-citta (lokuttara kusala citta) of the sotåpanna. Then ditthi will never arise again.” ***** Best wishes. Let me know if you’d like a subcommentary to my commentary on yesterday’s post;-) Sarah ========= 15463 From: Sarah Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 2:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1) Hi Chris, Larry and All, --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Hi Larry, Sarah and All, > > Have a look at 'Cetasikas' by Nina and see what you think. I'm > happy to go along with any strong preference anyone has - there is > nothing that I don't need to study and learn. Has anyone else got an > idea of something they would really like the group to study together? > > http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html ..... I think this is a very good suggestion of yours, but we don’t have to rush any decision and it would be good to hear comments and requests from others. It might even encourage Lucy back;-) With recent remarks about copyright in mind, before I suggested BB’s CMA as one possibility (someone had mentioned it before we started with ADL I recall), I had written to B.Bodhi himself about this. I received a very friendly reply to say that as BPS president (until the end of this year only) he could give us permission if we wished to use it for this purpose (now or later I assume). (It seems he’s intending to stay on in the States at a monastery in New Jersey, Bodhi Monastery (named after him), but will be visiting Sri Lanka in November to discuss the future of BPS. He’s continuing with his medical treatments and seems very content where he is.) In any case, it might be better to just quote or scan sections when they are relevant as we tend to do now than to go through the entire text here which might be very difficult for those coming in part way through or just too much abhidhamma for most;-) We don’t want to kill off all interest after all. Sarah ===== 15464 From: Sarah Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 2:47am Subject: Re: PALI Hi Rob K, Back to the Kesamutti sutta (Kalama sutta) again. You wrote ages ago: ‘As you noted Bodhi and Soma both have ""it is proper for you, Kalamas, to doubt"" they use proper for the Pali word 'ala.m' and this is its meaning, as is 'indeed' 'truly ', (or woodwards you may 'well'...) I think if we understand that the Buddha was saying it is quite natural, lawful, 'the way things should be' -- that doubt arises when there are the conditions for doubt. I think Bodhi and Soma aren't suggesting that Doubt is 'good' - rather that it is very proper and right that it should arise in such circumstances.” ***** Yes, I agree and these seem very good comments. I just came across ala.m elsewhere and this prompted me to look it up in the big dictionary: “suitable, fitly, aptly, rightly...in affirmative sentences: part of assurance and emphasis = for sure, very much (so), indeed, truly.........eg ‘alam eva kaatu.m’ - to be sure, this is to be done = this is proper to be done. A little confusing. We both voted for Woodward’s translation below As the passage is so often quoted (i.e. suggesting one should have doubt and so on), I think it would be useful to have a breakdown of the following passage from one of our Pali experts sometime (no disrespect to your Pali expertise of course, Rob;-). Many thanks indeed for helping me to find this. Sarah ===== > The pali is kankha and viccikicca - both usually > akusala, and having similar meaning of doubt. > > ""sa.m no, > bhante, amhaaka.m hoteva ka"nkhaa hoti vicikicchaa– `ko > su naama imesa.m bhavata.m sama.nabraahma.naana.m sacca.m > aaha, ko > musaa'"ti? "Ala~nhi vo, kaalaamaa, ka"nkhitu.m ala.m vicikicchitu.m. > Ka"nkhaniiyeva pana ‚ vo .thaane vicikicchaa uppannaa".--- "" > > I like Woodward (PTS): "When we listen to them sir, we have doubt and > wavering as to which of these worthies is speaking truth and which > speaks falsehood' > Yes, kalamas, you may well doubt , you may well waver. In a doubtful > matter wavering does arise." > uppannaa, I believe,means to 'arise'. > --------- 15465 From: kenhowardau Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 3:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] A Question on Visual Image Processing --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 26-08-2002 19:56 schreef upasaka@a... op upasaka@a...: > Hi Howard, Ken H and all, Hi Nina, Thank you for this message. Once again, you have given me a lot to think about. You said to Howard: > I recognize myself in your question, it is what I used > to ask A. Sujin: how far does visible object extend? Her only answer: > visible object is just what appears through the eyes, that is all. At that > time I was not satisfied, and I guess neither will you now. I had to > consider more. What is the citta like, when we ask such questions? Thinking, > and thinking and thinking. Since one citta only experiences one object, > there cannot be seeing while there is thinking, and then we shall never, > never know what visible object is. I saw that thinking in that way does not > help and I stopped asking such questions. > When we see individual colours, there is defining, not seeing. > ----------- The understanding that visible object is "just what appears through the eyes, that is all," strikes me as entirely satisfactory and I think it is exactly what I need to hear. Having learnt the futility of trying to control mindfulness, I may be tending to dismiss the possibility of right mindfulness. What you have said, seems to be the middle way; neither `trying' nor `giving up.' Kind regards Ken H 15466 From: Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 5:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Cittas as condition Hi, Rob (and Larry) - Rob, I think your reply is excellent. I'd like to add my 2 cents. In a message dated 9/5/02 3:32:05 AM Eastern Daylight Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote:> Hi all, > > > > It is often said that a citta and cetasikas are conditions for the > > next citta and cetasikas. > > (If I have got that wrong then please ignore the rest of this post). > > > > I have been wondering about this, and this is what I have come up > > with so far. > > > > A citta is a conditioned reality, and is manifested as experience, > > which is absolute. > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not clear on what you mean by "absolute" here, Larry. The experience -including both the fact of its occurrence and its characteristics - is conditioned. If, by "absolute" you mean being an actual event (and not fiction), I agree. ------------------------------------------------------- The citta, however, is not its own cause. It is > > > not a thing in itself, but a coming together of a number of other > > things, which are not experienced. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Two questions here: 1) I don't think that the citta *is* the coming together of the needed conditions. The coming together of the conditions (in sufficiently appropriate proximity) results in the arising of the citta, but is not identical with it. This is a matter of dependency, as I see it, but not identity. 2) Why are the conditions necessarily not experienced? Mightn't some or even all of them be experienced? ------------------------------------------------------ How can this citta then be a > > > condition for the next or a future one? > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Why not? It's absence would result the the next (or future) one not arising, which is all that is required to make it a condition. --------------------------------------------------------- > > Wouldn't it be more coherent > > to say that the conditions for a citta are the conditions for the > > next or a future citta? > > Couldn't be, then the second citta would be an exact duplicate of the > first, and we'd be experiencing the same moment over and over again. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: Perfect answer! --------------------------------------------------- > > but it does raise the question of what it is that interacts with the > citta to change it into the next citta. It can't be the citta itself > alone, or it too would merely replicate itself exactly, since it would > have the exact same conditions as those which caused it. This is an > interesting problem in the single citta theory. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: I think that it is the fact that the current citta is not, itself, the sole condition for subsequent cittas, but other earlier cittas are also needed which is the telling point. Moreover, the current citta is not typically identical with any of the conditions that led to its arising, or even to a combination of them. It arose lawfully because of those conditions, but is, itself, novel. The current citta has numerous characteristics and involves numerous cetasikas of various types and intensities, none of which had to exist among the conditions that led to this citta, and these many characteristics and cetasikas serve as conditions that help determine the nature of subsequent cittas. ------------------------------------------------------- > > If the conditions change or are different, > > the citta is different. > > The conditions for a specific citta change at every moment. Nothing > ever stays the same for more than a moment. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: Perhaps. Are all "moments" of the same duration? Maybe so, maybe not. I suspect not, but, in any case, why is this important? ----------------------------------------------------- > > > As a parallel, we do not say that whatever is reflected in a mirror > > at a certain time is a condition for it being reflected again the > > next moment. > > No, but that which is reflected in the mirror is the condition for that > which is next reflected in the mirror, not because of the mirror but > because of the thing that is reflected and the way it changes. The > mirror doesn't have to change for the object to change, and thus the > reflection. > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: Again an excellent answer. Speaking conventionally, of course, the mirror is one of the conditions for seeing a reflection, the others being the objects reflected, the light bouncing off those objects towards the mirror, and the observer. The mirror is the condition least likely to change, but should any of them change, "what is reflected in the mirror" will change. Moreoever "what is reflected in the mirror" is unique only for a particular observer. For another observer, it is different. And, in a sense, what is reflected in the mirror for a given observer is in the mind of that observer, and DOES condition what is next reflected in the mirror for that observer, if anything at all. (Perhaps what the observer sees in the mirror causes him/her to immediately close his/her eyes or avert his/her gaze!) -------------------------------------------------- > > Best, > Robert > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15467 From: Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 5:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Some Thoughts on the Satipatthana Suttas, Pa~n~natti, and Dhammas Hi, Herman - In a message dated 9/5/02 4:22:46 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > PS Do you think Howard made a freudian slip when he said he had a gin > all over his face? :-) > =============================== Hah!! ;-)) I missed that!!! Yeah, probably *was* a Freudian slip. I've had no alcohol for at least 15 years (to follow the precept), but the enjoyment (and inclination) remains well and alive, though inactive and subdued! ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15468 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: dreams Dear Howard, It is so kind of you to react immediately to my post, giving a tip. I printed it out. Lodewijk said he will try. When he woke up he thought of your tip, but not during a nightmare. It is one of those things we have to accept. When awake he thinks of the perfections, the factors of enlightebnment, the factors of the eightfold Path. With many thanks, Nina. op 03-09-2002 20:01 schreef upasaka@a... op upasaka@a...:>> > ============================== > I hope your husband manages to find a "quick fix". If not, there is a > longer term procedure that might help, the cultivation of lucid dreaming, > where one is aware during a dream that it *is* a dream. (It is a bringing of > mindfulness into the dream state.) What is useful in this is, among other > things, the ability to take some control over what occurs in the dream, to > change things, to greet "monsters" with lovingkindness. It really can work, > but it requires regular practice. I used to engage in it a bit, and it is > quite amazing. (But I'm no expert at all.) 15469 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 10:00am Subject: degrees of akusala kamma patha Dear Rob M, there was a question posed to you about the degree of akusala kamma, and the text about this. Since you are on the way a lot, may I but in? The Expositor I, Book I, Part II, ch V, 97: about killing: I would like the Pali of physical virtue. I hope this clarifies, Nina. 15470 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 10:00am Subject: Perfections, Wisdom, Ch 5, no 5 Perfections, Wisdom, Ch 5, no 5 : We read in the ³Mahåniddesa, ³Attadanda Sutta²: The word ³man² is used here with regard to someone who is inclined to nibbåna. This means, that ³men² are people in this world who perform generous deeds, undertake síla, observe the fastday, prepare water for drinking and for other uses, sweep the grounds, pay respect to the stupa, develop kusala of the three dhåtus, elements 4), that should be developed. They do not develop kusala because of rebirth, because of a plane of existence they want to attain, because they want to continue in the cycle of birth and death. They have as their goal to depart from dukkha, they are humble and they are inclined to nibbåna. Because of this goal they will develop all kinds of kusala. They are called ³men², because they are inclined to nibbåna. Someone who has not understood the true meaning of dukkha may hope for the end of dukkha in as far as he sees dukkha as merely getting what he does not wish for. Or he may just want to have no more suffering. However, when someone has understanding of the meaning of dukkha, his goal is departing from dukkha, in the sense of being inclined to nibbåna, which is the end of dukkha inherent in all conditioned dhammas. This kind of understanding has as foundation listening to the Dhamma and seeing the danger in akusala, seeing the disadvantage, suffering and danger of rebirth, of the arising of nåma dhammas and rúpa dhammas. Akusala dhammas arise very often, since they are conditioned by all the akusala we have accumulated. If we see the benefit of the development of the perfections, we should find out whether in our daily life kusala arises often or whether it arises very seldom. When kusala arises we should know whether it has become firmer and whether it has reached already the degree of a perfection. Someone may have performed kusala time and again, also before he listened to the Dhamma but, after he listened to the Dhamma and he learnt that the perfections are an essential condition for the realization of the four noble Truths, his sincerity and unshakable determination to further develop kusala increases. We read in the Commentary to the ³Mahåniddesa² of the Khuddhaka Nikåya, the Commentary to the ³Guhattaka Sutta-niddesa², ³the Cave²: The term ³paññå² means: it penetrates. What does it penetrate? It penetrates the noble Truths, the Truth of, ³This is dukkha...² The noble Truth of dukkha is not merely dukkha which is suffering, oppressing us in daily life, such as loss of possessions, blame, pain etc. The noble Truth of dukkha is the truth that nothing is permanent, that whatever arises such as seeing, hearing, thinking, happiness or pain arises just for an extremely short moment and then disappears. Knowing, ³this is dukkha², means, knowing that what arises and falls away immediately is dukkha. We read further on in the Commentary quoted above: That kind of paññå is an indriya, a controlling faculty, in the sense of predominance, because it overcomes ignorance, avijjå. Whenever paññå does not arise, we are overcome by ignorance. The characteristic of paññå is the opposite of that of ignorance. Ignorance can be overcome when paññå arises. We read further on: This kind of paññå has the characteristic of illuminating and of penetration. As when a lamp burns at night in a four-walled house the darkness ceases, light manifests itself, so paññå has illuminating as its characteristic 5) . So long as the truth has not been realized we cannot speak of illumination. One merely begins to understand realities. However, paññå which has the characteristic of illuminating can realize the truth when the element of nåma, the element which experiences, appears through the mind-door. Then there is no characteristic of rúpa blended in with the characteristic of nåma-dhåtu, the element of nåma. That is the meaning of illumination 6). We read further on: To the wise at a single sitting the ten thousand world-spheres appear as of one light. ****** Footnotes: 4. These probably are: kusala which is of the sense sphere, kusala which is rúpa jhåna and kusala which is arúpa jhåna. 5. See also The Expositor, Atthasåliní, I, Book I, Part IV, Ch I, 122. 6. When insight knowledge arises the characteristic of nåma appears through the mind-door and nåma is clearly distinguished from rúpa. 15471 From: Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 6:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: dreams Hi, Nina - In a message dated 9/5/02 1:01:20 PM Eastern Daylight Time, nilo@e... writes: > Dear Howard, > It is so kind of you to react immediately to my post, giving a tip. I > printed it out. Lodewijk said he will try. When he woke up he thought of > your tip, but not during a nightmare. It is one of those things we have to > accept. > When awake he thinks of the perfections, the factors of enlightebnment, the > factors of the eightfold Path. > With many thanks, > Nina. > =========================== I hope it is helpful. What seems to be important is to keep the idea of being aware during dreaming up front in one's mind frequently during the waking state, and especially right before going to sleep and when temporarily awakening from sleep. Also suggested is "dream cultivation": planning, while still awake, on specific dream content and on reacting in specific ways to dream events, and also presetting in the mind a "cue" to notice in a dream, a cue that reminds one that he/she is dreaming - for example, noticing one's hands in the dream. Also, the intention to notice in a dream anything that is odd, abnormal, strange, or "impossible" sometimes bears fruit in anabling the dreamer to realize that "it is just a dream". There are many books and papers on this, but the main thing is regularity of practice. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15472 From: Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 10:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Some Thoughts on the Satipatthana Suttas, Pa~n~natti, and Dhammas Herman: "Larry, in your scheme of things, at what stage of seeing, for example, does conceptualisation kick in?" Hi Herman, off hand I would say at contact (please see recent reply to Howard on this thread). However, this is really a very difficult question, and basically I don't have a clue. This study is a work in progress depending on a better understanding of citta process and "reality". Larry 15473 From: Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 11:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Sarah, First, on the subject of concepts, I basically disagree with the received wisdom. What is a concept if not a ditthi? There are true and correct ditthi and untrue and incorrect ditthi. Panna is just a true ditthi. In its simplest form, a correct name. Understanding is a psychological phenomenon which I don't really understand (haha). So let's wait on that one. Second, as for meditation, what I am hearing as implication from you, Jon, Robert, and Nina is don't bother to meditate because you will probably get it wrong. Instead, just study and eventually the truth will accumulate in your continuum. I think this is bad advice. What I would like instead is for you to encourage people to meditate but be open to correction. Beyond that, what I would really like is for Acharn Sujin to give meditation instruction. As recent discussions have shown, there are many ways of implementing this 'only way' of satipatthana. I would like to see what sort of program she could come up with. Larry 15474 From: Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 7:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Some Thoughts on the Satipatthana Suttas, Pa~n~natti, and Dhammas Hi, Larry (and Herman) - In a message dated 9/5/02 1:57:03 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > Herman: "Larry, in your scheme of things, at what stage of seeing, for > example, does conceptualisation kick in?" > > Hi Herman, off hand I would say at contact (please see recent reply to > Howard on this thread). However, this is really a very difficult > question, and basically I don't have a clue. This study is a work in > progress depending on a better understanding of citta process and > "reality". > > Larry > ========================== As I see it, a concept is an idea that abstracts from a number of experiences, elementary or not, based on extracting of "patterns". I see the patterns as not residing solely in (and among) the elements of our experience alone, but as *emerging* from those experiences and from the mental processing i.e., with both of these as conditions for that emergence. Change the experiences or change the mode of processing (or the mental formations conditioning the mode of processing), and different patterns (and concepts) will emerge. Once concepts are formed, they serve as overlays/templates for direct experience - they serve as filters creating "the world that we live in". The concept-forming and the overlaying are done, I believe, at a level which is typically *way* below the threshhold of the worldling's awareness. So, for all *practical* purposes, but not ultimately, all is concept-only. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15475 From: Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 3:44pm Subject: ADLch. 23 (4) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 23 (4) As we have seen, there are four paramattha dhammas: citta, cetasika, rúpa and nibbåna. Citta, cetasika and rúpa are realities which arise and fall away, they are conditioned dhammas and thus dukkha. Nibbåna does not arise and fall away; it has no conditions through which it arises, it is an unconditioned dhamma. Nibbåna is the end to dukkha. If there were no cessation of dukkha the Buddha would not have taught the Path leading to the cessation of dukkha. However, since there is the cessation of dukkha, the Buddha taught the Path leading to it. We read in the Verses of Uplift (Udåna, chapter VIII, 3, Khuddaka Nikåya) that the Buddha, while he was staying in Anåthapindika's Park, said to the monks: Monks, there is a not-born, a not-become, a not-made, a not-compounded. Monks, if that unborn, not-become, not-made, not-compounded were not, there would be apparent no escape from this here that is born, become, made, compounded. But since, monks, there is an unborn... therefore the escape from this here that is born, become... is apparent. Nibbåna can be experienced at the attainment of enlightenment, but enlightenment cannot be attained unless paññå has been developed to the degree that it can experience the conditioned dhammas as they are: impermanent, dukkha and non-self (anattå). At the attainment of enlightenment the magga-citta (lokuttara kusala citta) directly experiences nibbåna. When the magga-citta has fallen away, it is succeeded immediately by the phala-citta (lokuttara vipåkacitta) which experiences the same object. When one performs kåmåvacara kusala kamma (kusala kamma of the sensuous plane of consciousness) the vipåka does not follow immediately. Even if the vipåka were to arise soon after the kamma, it could never arise in the same process of citta. When one attains rúpa-jhåna or arúpa-jhåna, the vipåkacitta, if it arises, only arises in a next life. It is different with the magga-citta, this has to be followed immediately, in the same process of citta, by the phala-cittas, which are two or three moments of citta, depending on the individual. When someone attains enlightenment of the stage of the sotåpanna, the magga-citta and the phala-cittas of the sotåpanna arise. The magga-citta of the sotåpanna eradicates the defilements which are to be eradicated at that stage, and this is once and for all. Thus, the magga-citta of the sotåpanna can arise only once in the cycle of birth and death. The phala-citta can arise again in other processes of citta if enlightenment has been attained with lokuttara jhånacitta. Someone who has developed jhåna and acquired ``mastery´´ in jhåna (Vis. IV, 131) and also develops insight can attain enlightenment with lokuttara jhånacitta, lokuttara citta accompanied by jhånafactors of one of the stages of jhåna. It is extremely difficult to acquire ``mastery´´ in jhåna; one should be able, for example, to determine when one enters jhåna and when one emerges from jhåna. Only if mastery has been acquired, jhåna can be a ``base´´ for insight, that is, an object of mindfulness in vipassanå. In that way the clinging to a self who attains jhåna can be eliminated. Those who attain enlightenment have different accumulations and according to one´s accumulations the lokuttara jhånacittas are accompanied by jhåna-factors of different stages of jhåna. The phala-citta which is accompanied by jhåna-factors can arise many times again, experiencing nibbåna with absorption. Cittas can be counted as eighty-nine or as a hundred and twenty-one. When cittas are counted as a hundred and twenty-one, there are, instead of eight lokuttara cittas, forty lokuttara cittas, and these are lokuttara cittas accompanied by the jhåna-factors of the different stages of jhåna. As we have seen, there are five stages of rúpa-jhåna and at each stage jhåna-factors are successively abandoned, until at the fifth stage (or at the fourth stage of the fourfold system) there are the remaining factors of samådhi (concentration) and upekkhå (indifferent feeling) which arises instead of sukha (pleasant feeling). Lokuttara cittas can be accompanied by jhåna-factors of each of the five stages of jhåna. For example, when lokuttara cittas are accompanied by jhåna-factors of the fifth stage of rúpa-jhåna, it means that they are accompanied by samådhi and upekkhå. As regards arúpa-jhånacittas, they have meditation subjects which are different from the meditation subjects for rúpa-jhåna, but the jhåna-factors which accompany them are the same as the jhåna-factors of the fifth stage of rúpa-jhåna, namely samådhi and upekkhå. Thus, the jhåna-factors of the five types of rúpa-jhåna have to be taken into account when we classify lokuttara jhånacittas, lokuttara cittas accompanied by jhåna-factors of the different stages of rúpa-jhåna and arúpa-jhåna. Consequently, each one of the eight lokuttara cittas can be reckoned as fivefold and then there are forty lokuttara cittas. When cittas are counted as eighty-nine, they can be summarized as follows: 12 akusala cittas 18 ahetuka cittas 8 mahå-kusala cittas 8 mahå-vipåkacittas 8 mahå-kiriyacittas 15 rúpåvacara cittas 12 arúpåvacara cittas 8 lokuttara cittas When cittas are counted as 121, there are, instead of 8 lokuttara cittas, 40 lokuttara cittas. The way to nibbåna seems to be extremely long and we may wonder how we could ever reach the goal. We should not be impatient and wish for a result that is far off. Instead, we should consider what we have to do at the present moment: to develop right understanding of the nåma and rúpa which appear right now. Thus we develop the condition for the attainment of nibbåna. 15476 From: kenhowardau Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 5:06pm Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1) Hi Larry, Christine, Sarah, . . . I'd like to enrol in the new abhidhamma class. When the idea of working our way through ADL was first mooted, I had good intentions of taking part. But, when it came to reading the quite large tracts of Abhidhamma, excellent though they were, I tended to suffer from Frank's complaint (zzzz). Having admitted that, I'd like to try again with whatever document you decide on. May I add though, that I'm not really interested in hearing how anyone agrees with some parts and disagrees with others. I'd rather we concentrate on understanding the original text. Kind regards Ken H --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Chris, Larry and All, > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Hi Larry, Sarah > and All, > > > > Have a look at 'Cetasikas' by Nina and see what you think. I'm > > happy to go along with any strong preference anyone has - there is > > nothing that I don't need to study and learn. Has anyone else got an > > idea of something they would really like the group to study together? > > > > http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html > ..... > I think this is a very good suggestion of yours, but we don't have to rush > any decision and it would be good to hear comments and requests from > others. It might even encourage Lucy back;-) > 15477 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 10:32pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Robert K. Thanks for your reply. Would it be fair to say that your position is that the practice of satipatthana or any other kusala activity is bound to be pervaded by defilements so it is better not to persue these activities? Larry __________ Dear Larry, What if there was only the next in breath or outbreath before death - would you use a method or would it be better to understand whatever is here right at this moment. In fact there is less time than that to have understanding because dhammas are falling away so fast. Death is happening now. Going back to my earlier post: "Think of seeing. It occurs almost an infinite number of times just in one day. Yet every moment of seeing arises because of very complex conditions - no one can make it arise, but if the conditions are there it must arise. We take it for granted but it is at least as amazing that seeing should arise as that satipatthana should arise. From this perspective, then, can you really tell someone how to have satipatthana; it is like trying to explain to someone how to see. If they good eyes (conditioned by kamma and other conditions) then they must see; but if they are without eyes...." Following this up we could spend all our life urging and showing the man without eyes different ways to see - but it wouldn't help. The only way is if he gains eyes somehow. In the same way what is most critical is to develop samma-ditthi (right understanding): >>Bhikkhus, just as the dawn is the forerunner and first indication of the rising of the sun, so is right view the forerunner and first indication of wholesome states. For one of right view, bhikkhus, right intention springs up. For one of right intention, right speech springs up. For one of right speech, right action springs up. For one of right action, right livelihood springs up. For one of right livelihood, right effort springs up. For one of right effort, right mindfulness springs up. For one of right mindfulness, right concentration springs up. For one of right concentration, right knowledge springs up. For one of right knowledge, right deliverance springs up. Anguttara Nikaya 10:121>>> If this factor -right view - is not present, or distorted then: >>>From wrong view proceeds wrong thinking; from that wrong speech. From wrong speech, wrong action. From wrong action, wrong living; from that wrong effort. From wrong effort proceeds wrong mindfulness; from that wrong concentration. From wrong concentration proceeds wrong knowledge. From wrong knowledge proceeds wrong release......>> Anguttara Nikaya Book of the tens XI (iii) 103 Wrongness So how does this right understanding develop? 'Middle Length Sayings' I (no. 43, Mahavedallasutta): >>>'There are two conditions, your reverence, for bringing right understanding into existence: the utterance of another (person) and wise attention. Your reverence, there are the two conditions for bringing wise attention into existence.'>>> Wise attention isn't limited to just thinking about the Dhamma, it includes direct attention in a wise way to the present moment: Samyutta Nikaya XXII.122 Silavant Sutta "A virtuous monk, Kotthita my friend, should attend in an appropriate way to the five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self. Which five? Form as a clinging-aggregate, feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness as a clinging-aggregate. A virtuous monk should attend in an appropriate way to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self. For it is possible that a virtuous monk, attending in an appropriate way to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant... not-self, would realize the fruit of stream-entry." It is easy enough for anyone to focus on the khandas, the objects of satipatthana such as feeling, rupa (heat, vibration ect) and some people assume that because they can sense subtle aspects of these (that they had never known about before) that this alone is satipatthana. But the measure is whether there is detachment from the idea of self experiencing the object (whether gross or subtle). I think pariyatti(theory) and pattipati(practice) go together. Kitagiri sutta (MN): "And how bhikkhus does the attainment of profound knowledge come by means of a gradual training...? .... he hears Dhamma; having heard Dhamma he remembers it; he tests the meaning of the things he has borne in mind; while testing the meaning, the things are approved of; there being approval of the things, chanda is born; with chanda born he makes an effort; having made the effort, he weighs it up; having weighed it up..."endquote Perhaps we think of this gradual training as a straight line? I think it is more accurate to think of it like a spiral. We (actually the formations) listen (or read), we test, we apply, we approve of the meaning.. we make an effort and then we listen again, test again, we apply again, we approve…and then back again for more listening, more testing, more application, again and again and again. Where is the practice and where is the theory? I don't think we can draw a line between the two. They are closely connected, they build on each other. And also all types of kusala support satipatthana bhavana - refer to the book by Nina: http://www.abhidhamma.org/perfections%20of%20enlightenment.htm We might start to develop right view but still hold onto our stingy ways (for example)- and then there is no sincerity, one is using anatta as an excuse . One does not see that our hair is on fire with kilesa. Robert 15478 From: egberdina Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 11:23pm Subject: Re: Cittas as condition (this one's for you Rob Epstein) Hi Rob Epstein, Good to be typing to you :-) Comments interspersed below. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "epsteinrob" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > It is often said that a citta and cetasikas are conditions for the > > next citta and cetasikas. > > (If I have got that wrong then please ignore the rest of this post). > > > > I have been wondering about this, and this is what I have come up > > with so far. > > > > A citta is a conditioned reality, and is manifested as experience, > > which is absolute. The citta, however, is not its own cause. It is > > not a thing in itself, but a coming together of a number of other > > things, which are not experienced. How can this citta then be a > > condition for the next or a future one? > > Wouldn't it be more coherent > > to say that the conditions for a citta are the conditions for the > > next or a future citta? > > Couldn't be, then the second citta would be an exact duplicate of the > first, and we'd be experiencing the same moment over and over again. I don't think this is necessarily correct. Cannot conditions change from moment to moment? The experiencing, to my way of thinking, is a product of the ingredients that are there. The next experience is a new ball game altogether. If the same experience persists it would simply mean that the conditions (ingredients) haven't changed. > but it does raise the question of what it is that interacts with the > citta to change it into the next citta. It can't be the citta itself > alone, or it too would merely replicate itself exactly, since it would > have the exact same conditions as those which caused it. This is an > interesting problem in the single citta theory. > I wonder if cittas change, or whether each one is a new ball game? If there are similarities, again I would atribute this to conditions being similar. > If the conditions change or are different, > > the citta is different. > > The conditions for a specific citta change at every moment. Nothing > ever stays the same for more than a moment. > > > As a parallel, we do not say that whatever is reflected in a mirror > > at a certain time is a condition for it being reflected again the > > next moment. > > No, but that which is reflected in the mirror is the condition for that > which is next reflected in the mirror, not because of the mirror but > because of the thing that is reflected and the way it changes. The > mirror doesn't have to change for the object to change, and thus the > reflection. I really do not see this at all. What is reflected is a result. You seem to be saying that a result becomes a cause for the next result. It is the causes that end up with the result. Same causes, same result, different causes, different result. > > Best, > Robert Right back at you Herman 15479 From: epsteinrob Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 11:51pm Subject: Re: Cittas as condition (this one's for you Rob Epstein) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > Hi Rob Epstein, > > Good to be typing to you :-) Same here. : ) > Comments interspersed below. Me too. Gee whiz, I seem to be copying you!! > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "epsteinrob" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > > > Hi all, > > > > > > It is often said that a citta and cetasikas are conditions for > the > > > next citta and cetasikas. > > > (If I have got that wrong then please ignore the rest of this > post). > > > > > > I have been wondering about this, and this is what I have come up > > > with so far. > > > > > > A citta is a conditioned reality, and is manifested as > experience, > > > which is absolute. The citta, however, is not its own cause. It > is > > > not a thing in itself, but a coming together of a number of other > > > things, which are not experienced. How can this citta then be a > > > condition for the next or a future one? > > > > Wouldn't it be more coherent > > > to say that the conditions for a citta are the conditions for the > > > next or a future citta? > > > > Couldn't be, then the second citta would be an exact duplicate of > the > > first, and we'd be experiencing the same moment over and over > again. > > I don't think this is necessarily correct. Cannot conditions change > from moment to moment? The experiencing, to my way of thinking, is a > product of the ingredients that are there. Are you saying that the ingredients are outside of the cittas themselves, 'in the world'? I think that Abhidhamma attempts not to make such an assertion. Which is also a problem for me in the sense that rupas and namas, which are distinguished as being objects of senses or objects of mind, as I understand it, do not refer to an actual complete object 'out there', but only to the momentary property of an object, such as hardness. In that case, it is hard to distinguish powerfully between a nama, mental construct, and rupa, object-property, which would also be a kind of mental construct. The next experience is a > new ball game altogether. If the same experience persists it would > simply mean that the conditions (ingredients) haven't changed. > > > but it does raise the question of what it is that interacts with > the > > citta to change it into the next citta. It can't be the citta > itself > > alone, or it too would merely replicate itself exactly, since it > would > > have the exact same conditions as those which caused it. This is > an > > interesting problem in the single citta theory. > > > > I wonder if cittas change, or whether each one is a new ball game? If > there are similarities, again I would atribute this to conditions > being similar. Well, the attributes of one citta are supposed to be passed on to the next one. This sets up a kind of contact between cittas I think, in which attributes are passed from one to the next, as I understand it. Otherwise, where would sanna, memory, and other cetasikas, get their information from? > > > If the conditions change or are different, > > > the citta is different. > > > > The conditions for a specific citta change at every moment. > Nothing > > ever stays the same for more than a moment. > > > > > As a parallel, we do not say that whatever is reflected in a > mirror > > > at a certain time is a condition for it being reflected again the > > > next moment. > > > > No, but that which is reflected in the mirror is the condition for > that > > which is next reflected in the mirror, not because of the mirror > but > > because of the thing that is reflected and the way it changes. The > > mirror doesn't have to change for the object to change, and thus > the > > reflection. > > I really do not see this at all. What is reflected is a result. You > seem to be saying that a result becomes a cause for the next result. > > It is the causes that end up with the result. Same causes, same > result, different causes, different result. I agree with this. Maybe I didn't use the analogy clearly. I'm just saying that the change in the reflection will reflect the change that is taking place in that which is reflected, not that the reflection affects the next reflection. > > > > > Best, > > Robert > > Right back at you > > Herman 15480 From: egberdina Date: Thu Sep 5, 2002 11:56pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Cittas as condition Hi Howard, Comments interspersed below. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob (and Larry) - > > Rob, I think your reply is excellent. I'd like to add my 2 cents. In a > message dated 9/5/02 3:32:05 AM Eastern Daylight Time, epsteinrob@Y... > writes: > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote:> Hi all, > > > > > > It is often said that a citta and cetasikas are conditions for the > > > next citta and cetasikas. > > > (If I have got that wrong then please ignore the rest of this post). > > > > > > I have been wondering about this, and this is what I have come up > > > with so far. > > > > > > A citta is a conditioned reality, and is manifested as experience, > > > which is absolute. > > > ------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm not clear on what you mean by "absolute" here, Larry. The > experience -including both the fact of its occurrence and its characteristics > - is conditioned. If, by "absolute" you mean being an actual event (and not > fiction), I agree. Herman: You probably meant Herman, not Larry. If I wasn't a concept I'd be miffed :-). By saying that experience is absolute I meant that it is irrefutable and undoubtable. Which pretty much means what you said, it is real. > ------------------------------------------------------- > The citta, however, is not its own cause. It is > > > > not a thing in itself, but a coming together of a number of other > > > things, which are not experienced. > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > > Two questions here: > > 1) I don't think that the citta *is* the coming together of the needed > conditions. The coming together of the conditions (in sufficiently > appropriate proximity) results in the arising of the citta, but is not > identical with it. This is a matter of dependency, as I see it, but not > identity. Herman: I agree that the conditions are not identical with the resulting citta. I say this because the conditions are not experienced , the citta is. > > 2) Why are the conditions necessarily not experienced? Mightn't some > or even all of them be experienced? > ------------------------------------------------------ Herman: Cittas are parramattha dhammas, they are irreducible (as experience). One can think about the conditions, then the experience is thinking. > > How can this citta then be a > > > > condition for the next or a future one? > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Why not? It's absence would result the the next (or future) one not > arising, which is all that is required to make it a condition. > --------------------------------------------------------- > Herman: Like I said to Robert Epstein, I don't see this at all. I view experience as a result, which does not modify the underlying conditions at all. Awareness is passive. Go on, brand me a heretic :-) > > > > Wouldn't it be more coherent > > > to say that the conditions for a citta are the conditions for the > > > next or a future citta? > > > > Couldn't be, then the second citta would be an exact duplicate of the > > first, and we'd be experiencing the same moment over and over again. > > > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Perfect answer! > --------------------------------------------------- > > Herman: I get the feeling you liked Robert's reply:-) > > but it does raise the question of what it is that interacts with the > > citta to change it into the next citta. It can't be the citta itself > > alone, or it too would merely replicate itself exactly, since it would > > have the exact same conditions as those which caused it. This is an > > interesting problem in the single citta theory. > > > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I think that it is the fact that the current citta is not, itself, the > sole condition for subsequent cittas, but other earlier cittas are also > needed which is the telling point. Moreover, the current citta is not > typically identical with any of the conditions that led to its arising, or > even to a combination of them. It arose lawfully because of those conditions, > but is, itself, novel. The current citta has numerous characteristics and > involves numerous cetasikas of various types and intensities, none of which > had to exist among the conditions that led to this citta, and these many > characteristics and cetasikas serve as conditions that help determine the > nature of subsequent cittas. > ------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > If the conditions change or are different, > > > the citta is different. > > > > The conditions for a specific citta change at every moment. Nothing > > ever stays the same for more than a moment. > > > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Perhaps. Are all "moments" of the same duration? Maybe so, maybe not. > I suspect not, but, in any case, why is this important? > ----------------------------------------------------- Herman: If a citta lasted a million years as opposed to a millisecond, we wouldn't know.(IMHO) Time is a measurement of change, if there is no change, there is no time. > > > > > > As a parallel, we do not say that whatever is reflected in a mirror > > > at a certain time is a condition for it being reflected again the > > > next moment. > > > > No, but that which is reflected in the mirror is the condition for that > > which is next reflected in the mirror, not because of the mirror but > > because of the thing that is reflected and the way it changes. The > > mirror doesn't have to change for the object to change, and thus the > > reflection. > > > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Again an excellent answer. Speaking conventionally, of course, the > mirror is one of the conditions for seeing a reflection, the others being the > objects reflected, the light bouncing off those objects towards the mirror, > and the observer. The mirror is the condition least likely to change, but > should any of them change, "what is reflected in the mirror" will change. > Moreoever "what is reflected in the mirror" is unique only for a particular > observer. For another observer, it is different. And, in a sense, what is > reflected in the mirror for a given observer is in the mind of that observer, > and DOES condition what is next reflected in the mirror for that observer, if > anything at all. (Perhaps what the observer sees in the mirror causes him/her > to immediately close his/her eyes or avert his/her gaze!) > -------------------------------------------------- > Herman: Perhaps the mirror was not a good example. Another example would be three sheaves standing in a field, supporting each other. For the purpose of the example, the experience is the three sheaves viewed as a unit. One cannot experience a single sheaf standing upright. This would be an abstraction. As long as the three are there, they will stand upright, take any away, it doesn't matter which one, they will all fall down, and there will not be the experience. The fact that they stand there, all three as one experienced unit, is not a condition for it to be so the next moment. It is the three sheaves separately that are conditions for it to be so. > > > > Best, > > Robert > > > > ============================ > With metta, > Howard > Me three Herman 15481 From: epsteinrob Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 0:04am Subject: Re: ADLch. 23 (4) Enjoyed reading this description. Thanks, Robert Ep. =========== --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > http://www.zolag.co.uk/ > > Abhidhamma In Daily Life > Chapter 23 (4) > > As we have seen, there are four paramattha dhammas: citta, cetasika, > rúpa and nibbåna. Citta, cetasika and rúpa are realities which > arise and fall away, they are conditioned dhammas and thus dukkha. > Nibbåna does not arise and fall away; it has no conditions through > which it arises, it is an unconditioned dhamma. Nibbåna is the end to > dukkha. If there were no cessation of dukkha the Buddha would not have > taught the Path leading to the cessation of dukkha. However, since there > is the cessation of dukkha, the Buddha taught the Path leading to it. We > read in the Verses of Uplift (Udåna, chapter VIII, 3, Khuddaka > Nikåya) that the Buddha, while he was staying in Anåthapindika's > Park, said to the monks: > > Monks, there is a not-born, a not-become, a not-made, a not-compounded. > Monks, if that unborn, not-become, not-made, not-compounded were not, > there would be apparent no escape from this here that is born, become, > made, compounded. > > But since, monks, there is an unborn... therefore the escape from this > here that is born, become... is apparent. > > Nibbåna can be experienced at the attainment of enlightenment, but > enlightenment cannot be attained unless paññå has been developed > to the degree that it can experience the conditioned dhammas as they > are: impermanent, dukkha and non-self (anattå). > > At the attainment of enlightenment the magga-citta (lokuttara kusala > citta) directly experiences nibbåna. When the magga-citta has fallen > away, it is succeeded immediately by the phala-citta (lokuttara > vipåkacitta) which experiences the same object. When one performs > kåmåvacara kusala kamma (kusala kamma of the sensuous plane of > consciousness) the vipåka does not follow immediately. Even if the > vipåka were to arise soon after the kamma, it could never arise in the > same process of citta. When one attains rúpa-jhåna or > arúpa-jhåna, the vipåkacitta, if it arises, only arises in a next > life. It is different with the magga-citta, this has to be followed > immediately, in the same process of citta, by the phala-cittas, which > are two or three moments of citta, depending on the individual. > > When someone attains enlightenment of the stage of the sotåpanna, the > magga-citta and the phala-cittas of the sotåpanna arise. The > magga-citta of the sotåpanna eradicates the defilements which are to > be eradicated at that stage, and this is once and for all. Thus, the > magga-citta of the sotåpanna can arise only once in the cycle of birth > and death. > > The phala-citta can arise again in other processes of citta if > enlightenment has been attained with lokuttara jhånacitta. Someone who > has developed jhåna and acquired ``mastery´´ in jhåna (Vis. IV, > 131) and also develops insight can attain enlightenment with lokuttara > jhånacitta, lokuttara citta accompanied by jhånafactors of one of > the stages of jhåna. It is extremely difficult to acquire > ``mastery´´ in jhåna; one should be able, for example, to > determine when one enters jhåna and when one emerges from jhåna. > Only if mastery has been acquired, jhåna can be a ``base´´ for > insight, that is, an object of mindfulness in vipassanå. In that way > the clinging to a self who attains jhåna can be eliminated. Those who > attain enlightenment have different accumulations and according to > one´s accumulations the lokuttara jhånacittas are accompanied by > jhåna-factors of different stages of jhåna. The phala-citta which is > accompanied by jhåna-factors can arise many times again, experiencing > nibbåna with absorption. > > Cittas can be counted as eighty-nine or as a hundred and twenty-one. > When cittas are counted as a hundred and twenty-one, there are, instead > of eight lokuttara cittas, forty lokuttara cittas, and these are > lokuttara cittas accompanied by the jhåna-factors of the different > stages of jhåna. As we have seen, there are five stages of > rúpa-jhåna and at each stage jhåna-factors are successively > abandoned, until at the fifth stage (or at the fourth stage of the > fourfold system) there are the remaining factors of samådhi > (concentration) and upekkhå (indifferent feeling) which arises instead > of sukha (pleasant feeling). Lokuttara cittas can be accompanied by > jhåna-factors of each of the five stages of jhåna. For example, when > lokuttara cittas are accompanied by jhåna-factors of the fifth stage > of rúpa-jhåna, it means that they are accompanied by samådhi and > upekkhå. > > As regards arúpa-jhånacittas, they have meditation subjects which > are different from the meditation subjects for rúpa-jhåna, but the > jhåna-factors which accompany them are the same as the jhåna-factors > of the fifth stage of rúpa-jhåna, namely samådhi and upekkhå. > Thus, the jhåna-factors of the five types of rúpa-jhåna have to be > taken into account when we classify lokuttara jhånacittas, lokuttara > cittas accompanied by jhåna-factors of the different stages of > rúpa-jhåna and arúpa-jhåna. Consequently, each one of the eight > lokuttara cittas can be reckoned as fivefold and then there are forty > lokuttara cittas. > > When cittas are counted as eighty-nine, they can be summarized as > follows: > > 12 akusala cittas > > 18 ahetuka cittas > > 8 mahå-kusala cittas > > 8 mahå-vipåkacittas > > 8 mahå-kiriyacittas > > 15 rúpåvacara cittas > > 12 arúpåvacara cittas > > 8 lokuttara cittas > > When cittas are counted as 121, there are, instead of 8 lokuttara > cittas, 40 lokuttara cittas. > > The way to nibbåna seems to be extremely long and we may wonder how we > could ever reach the goal. We should not be impatient and wish for a > result that is far off. Instead, we should consider what we have to do > at the present moment: to develop right understanding of the nåma and > rúpa which appear right now. Thus we develop the condition for the > attainment of nibbåna. 15482 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 0:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1) / Ken H Hey Ken H, once you indicate an interest it becomes not "whatever document YOU decide on" but "whatever document WE decide on" :) It will be great to have you join in. :) What do you reckon? Any suggestions? Preferably something on-line, so we can all access it .... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "kenhowardau" wrote: > Hi Larry, Christine, Sarah, . . . > > I'd like to enrol in the new abhidhamma class. When the > idea of working our way through ADL was first mooted, I > had good intentions of taking part. But, when it came to > reading the quite large tracts of Abhidhamma, excellent > though they were, I tended to suffer from Frank's > complaint (zzzz). > > Having admitted that, I'd like to try again with whatever > document you decide on. May I add though, that I'm not > really interested in hearing how anyone agrees with some > parts and disagrees with others. C> > > Kind regards > > Ken H > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > > Hi Chris, Larry and All, > > > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Hi Larry, Sarah > > and All, > > > > > > Have a look at 'Cetasikas' by Nina and see what you think. I'm > > > happy to go along with any strong preference anyone has - there > is > > > nothing that I don't need to study and learn. Has anyone else > got an > > > idea of something they would really like the group to study > together? > > > > > > http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html > > ..... > > I think this is a very good suggestion of yours, but we don't have > to rush > > any decision and it would be good to hear comments and requests from > > others. It might even encourage Lucy back;-) > > 15483 From: Sarah Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 0:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no. 3 Dear Nina,(Rob M and All), I’ve been appreciating the series on Perfections. Recently we read (ch5-3): “People who have developed paññå know that dukkha, suffering, arises because of clinging to rúpa. In order to abandon dukkha, we should eliminate clinging to rúpas. The dukkha in our life is caused by rúpas, because we cling and take delight in the sense objects of colour, sound, odour, flavour and tangible object. All these objects are the cause of diverse kinds of dukkha.” ***** When we have troubles or problems in a day, we’re so used to thinking in terms of stories and events. Without panna (right understanding) we foget about ‘guarding the sense doors’ and assume other external causes bring these troubles. We read: “Therefore the Buddha said, that he saw all beings being troubled because of rupa.” Rob M mentioned that it was difficult to find information about sense door and mind door processes (which he refers to as thought processes) in the first text of the Abhidhamma, the Dhammasangani. This prompted me to take a look with his comments in mind. I think that when we understand that these processes are just about realities being experienced now, we can read plenty of details about different mental states, about rupas, about kamma and about defilements. For example, with regard to the guarding of the sense doors and the troubles on account of rupas, we read: “What is it to have the door of the faculties unguarded? When a certain individual sees an object with the eye he is entranced with the general appearance, or in the details of it. He does not set himself to restrain that which might give occasion for wicked states, covetous, dejected, to flow in over him, were he to dwell unrestrained as to the sense of sight. He keeps no watch over his faculty of sight, nor does he attain to mastery over it. And so in like manner when he hears a sound with the ear........recognizes a mental object with the mind, he is entranced with the general appearance and in the details of it.........That these six faculties should be thus unguarded, untended, unwatched over, unrestrained, is what is called having the door of the faculties unguarded.” (Dhammasangani, 1345, PTS transl) ***** Of course this should all be read in the light of anatta - no self to do or not do anything. At the end of the section of Perfections (above), we read: “The perfection of truthfulness and the perfection of determination are a necessary foundation for being able to listen to the Dhamma. One should be unshakable in one’s determination to listen, no matter in what circumstances one may be.” Sometimes we may not be in the mood to listen or consider or apply the teachings. Often we are troubled on account of what has been seen, heard and so on. We are lost in stories and forget about the real cause of the troubles, i.e. the kilesa arising on account of these sense door experiences. Conditions impact on cittas all the time. On Sunday, Jon was getting out of a taxi and the driver was trying to give him too much change. Jon was having to be quite insistent to give the money back to the driver and as a result of the distraction didn’t notice that his wallet had fallen on the floor when he got out. He realised too late and the driver didn’t return with it, so he spent quite a long time making phone calls, filling out forms at the police station and later at immigration for his lost I.D. card and so on. An act of kindness and then so many stories and conditions for dosa, but also for acceptance and patience in between and further opportunities for guarding the sense doors and wise reflection whilst sitting in queues. I find the reminders about troubles on account of rupas so helpful. Just visible objects, sounds and other rupas being experienced and then all these stories and kilesa arising. How fortunate we are to have ‘good’ friends (thanks Sukin for the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘dear’) to point out these treasures to us and to be able to consider more about wholesome and unwholesome states. From the same section of Dhammasangani, 1341, we read: “What is patience? That patience which is long-suffering, compliance, absence of rudeness and abruptness, complacency of heart (khanti). What is loveableness? (soracca.m) That which is the absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word together. Besides, all moral self-restraint is lovely. What is amity ?(saakhalya.m) When all such speech as is insolent (a.n.dakaa), disagreeable (asaataa), scabrous (kakkasaa), harsh to others, vituperative (paraabhisajjanii) to others, bordering upon anger, not conducive to concentration, is put away, and when all such speech as is innocuous (niddosaa), pleasant to the ear, affectionate, such as goes to the heart, is urbane (porii), sweet and acceptable to people generally - when speech of this sort is spoken - polished, friendly and gentle language - this is what is called amity. What is courtesy? The two forms of courtesy: hospitality towards bodily needs and considerateness in matters of doctrine. When anyone shows courtesy it is in one of these two forms.” ***** Thank you, Nina or sharing your translation of K.Sujin’s ‘Perfections’ and for the example of friendship and amity here. We never know how our lives will unfold from moment to moment, but the reminders of truthfulness, -. the strength and courage to face up to our kilesa at this moment - and of ‘determination to listen, no matter in what circumstances’ are invaluable. Sarah ===== 15484 From: Sarah Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 2:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Larry, --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > First, on the subject of concepts, I basically disagree with the > received wisdom. What is a concept if not a ditthi? There are true and > correct ditthi and untrue and incorrect ditthi. Panna is just a true > ditthi. In its simplest form, a correct name. Understanding is a > psychological phenomenon which I don't really understand (haha). So > let's wait on that one. ..... I’m pretty confused here. Right and wrong view are cetasikas (mental factors) which accompany cittas. They are not concepts, but the thinking accompanied by right or wrong view can think about concepts. The cetasikas are real, the concepts are not. ..... > Second, as for meditation, what I am hearing as implication from you, > Jon, Robert, and Nina is don't bother to meditate because you will > probably get it wrong. Instead, just study and eventually the truth will > accumulate in your continuum. ..... I think that what you’re hearing is whether you meditate or not (according to your understanding of the word) will depend on conditions and whether you are or aren’t meditating at this moment, there are realities which can be known. Let me quote again from the Satip.com or sub com “Spiritual development usually called meditation, is the development of wisdom (pa~n~na bhavana).” ..... >I think this is bad advice. What I would > like instead is for you to encourage people to meditate but be open to > correction. Beyond that, what I would really like is for Acharn Sujin to > give meditation instruction. ..... According to what definition of meditation? According to the definition above of panna bhavana, I think we’d all encourage people to meditate. As Rob Ep wrote recently “we can *think* there is a self and be so convinced of it, while there really isn’t a being or entity.......there is only consciousness taking it all in, and that consciousness is just a function, it isn’t a‘you’ or an ‘I’. “Self’ seems to be a concept, a myth, an imposition of the mind on reality. It really is like a unicorn, it’s attractive but isn’t really there.” While we cling to an idea of self and control we tend to cling to an idea of fixing or limiting or setting rules for objects of awareness, not realizing that seeing, thinking and many other realities are already arising when we think of these concepts. As Rob K has been stressing with the example of seeing: “if the conditions are there it must arise.” This is the same for all realities. As for A.Sujin’s instruction, Larry, she’s in your country for a brief stay. Why not jump on a plane, head for California and ask for meditation instruction? ..... >As recent discussions have shown, there are > many ways of implementing this 'only way' of satipatthana. I would like > to see what sort of program she could come up with. ..... As I understand, there is only one way of developing satipatthana - the 8fold or rather 5fold path leading to higher insights. The program may not be the program you’re wishing to hear;-) Sarah ===== 15485 From: rikpa21 Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 3:42am Subject: Re: Meditation and Satipatthana --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: Hi Robert, > What if there was only the next in breath or outbreath before > death - would you use a method or would it be better to understand > whatever is here right at this moment. In fact there is less time > than that to have understanding because dhammas are falling away so > fast. Death is happening now. In the same way it would be an exercise in futility to attempt to play a Rachmaninov or Paganini concerto to perfection, without years of training in both musical theory and practicing rudiments of musical scales, chords, and so on, it is similarly futile to believe one can skip the rudiments of developing mindfulness (sati) & clear comprehension (sampajjana) without following the basic plot. There is a pedagogical and developmental progression implicit in the Dhamma taught by the Buddha: "It's not easy to teach the Dhamma to others, Ananda... "The Dhamma should be taught with the thought, 'I will speak step-by- step.'" Why "step by step"? The core of the Teaching is found in both progressive instruction /and/ in progressive development, since all of us are beginning not as arahants, but where we are. Each of us needs to be led, step-by-step, out of our delusion. "The Dhamma should be taught with the thought, 'I will speak explaining the sequence [of cause & effect].'" In other words, when this arises, that arises; when this ceases, that ceases. The teaching on paticca samuppada (dependent origination) is central to the Dhamma proclaimed by the Tathagata. The chain of causes-and-effects leading from suffering sentient being to the fully released arahant is based on a clearly enumerated set of conditions, causes, and effects. It does not arise spontaneously or without the appropriate conditions. > Going back to my earlier post: > > "Think of seeing. It occurs almost an infinite number of times just > in one day. Yet every moment of seeing arises because of very > complex conditions - no one can make it arise, but if the conditions > are there it must arise. We take it for granted but it is at least > as amazing that seeing should arise as that satipatthana should > arise. From this perspective, then, can you really tell someone how > to have satipatthana; it is like trying to explain to someone how to > see. To explain sati correctly, it is assumed one has developed true sati & sampajjana to the point one can clearly, and with high degree of insight, discern the suffering, impermanence, or the emptiness of the object of investigation--even at the mundane (lokiya) level. Without proper training in the basic practices outlined by the Buddha, though, how likely is it that one has well-established mindfulness & clear comprehension to the point this type of discernment is even a remote possibility? It is easy to believe there is true mindfulness of the present moment, when in fact there are only subtle conceptual elaborations regarding what is seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched, or cognized. Someone here recently mentioned the Zen practice of "shikantaza"-- which is the practice of taking whatever arises as the object of investigation. The Tibetan schools have many approaches that employ this type of mindfulness to whatever arises as well. In all cases, these are considered advanced practices for those who have already developed sati and samadhi to a very high degree, such that the mind can remain undistracted for long periods of time. Only mindfulness firmly established through diligent bhavana (cultivation) provides the proper conditions for clearly discerning these constantly changing phenomena. In other words, there can be much talk about "satipatthana", but if there is no emphasis on bhavana in the ways outlined by the Buddha, then it is only talk that does not lead to the abandonment of suffering. However, when one practices according to the Buddha's instructions, under the guidance of siritual friends with direct understanding of the path (kalyanamittatas), and one listens attentively, and considers carefully, and then puts the instructions into practice, correcting when correction is needed and leaving it alone when it's working, samma sati arises without conscious effort. With samma sati, samma samadhi arises without conscious effort. When these are well-established, this leads naturally to the arising of the seven factors of enlightenment to the point of supramundane (lokuttara) knowledge and vision. In this way, the development of the path is progressive (though I do really like your "spiral" analogy better that a pure, linear progression, since it resonates much more with my own experience of the Dhamma & discipline). By constrast, to skip the rudiments of bhavana (like seated meditation with favorable external conditions, such as quiet and so on) in favor of attempting to know that there is "just seeing", for example, there is little or no development--at least not of samma sati. There isn't enough of a "charge" (like building up the electrical potential in a capacitor) there to lead to the high degree of mindfulness and concentration that penetrates the thicket of conceptual elaborations and discerns the characteristics of dhammas directly. Lacking this degree of penetrative insight, there is no development of the path to the degree of realizing the path and its fruits. While the conditions for direct knowledge of the path (magga/phala- nana) are many, and it is difficult (from one perspoective), for those with highly developed mindfulness and concentration, it's also a lot easier than many suppose. In fact, if one has enough conventional Right View not to take what arises for "I, me, mine", or as something permanent, even intellectually, but has highly devloped mindfulnesss and concentration (built on a foundation of virtue, concentration, wisdom), it is, for many, "good enough" (which is all it need be--perfectionists need not apply) to realize the path & fruits. Again, it is assumed one is well-trained in morality (sila), concentration (samadhi), and wisdom (panna). The lowdown on the practice leading to the end of the effluents-- referring to the previous citations on instructions going step-by- step and emphasizing causes & conditions--the Buddha's "cheat sheet" on getting from point A (anguish) to point B (Buddhahood for those practicing the Bodhisattayana, or arahantship for those on the Sravakayana track) is most helpful: "Now, I tell you, clear knowing & release have their nutriment. They are not without nutriment. And what is their nutriment? The seven factors of awakening....And what is the nutriment for the seven factors of awakening? The four frames of reference....And what is the nutriment for the four frames of reference? The three forms of right conduct....And what is the nutriment for the three forms of right conduct? Restraint of the senses....And what is the nutriment for restraint of the senses? Mindfulness & alertness....And what is the nutriment for mindfulness & alertness? Appropriate attention....And what is the nutriment for appropriate attention? Conviction....And what is the nutriment for conviction? Hearing the true Dhamma....And what is the nutriment for hearing the true Dhamma? Associating with people who are truly good...." > The > only way is if he gains eyes somehow. In the same way what is most > critical is to develop samma-ditthi (right understanding): Right, and how does one develop samma ditthi to the degree of direct insight-knowledge? There is mundane samma ditthi, a precursor, of course. But there is also supramundane (lokuttara) samma ditthi--and this is the samma ditthi which is the aim of the path. > >>Bhikkhus, just as the dawn is the forerunner and first indication > of the rising of the sun, so is right view the forerunner and first > indication of wholesome states. > For one of right view, bhikkhus, right intention springs up. For > one of right intention, right speech springs up. For one of right > speech, right action springs up. For one of right action, right > livelihood springs up. For one of right livelihood, right effort > springs up. For one of right effort, right mindfulness springs > up. For one of right mindfulness, right concentration springs > up. For one of right concentration, right knowledge springs up. > For one of right knowledge, right deliverance springs up. > Anguttara Nikaya 10:121>>> Have to leave in this gerat citation. Thanks, Robert! :) > Wise attention isn't limited to just thinking about the Dhamma, it > includes direct attention in a wise way to the present moment: > It is easy enough for anyone to focus on the khandas, the objects > of satipatthana such as feeling, rupa (heat, vibration ect) and > some people assume that because they can sense subtle aspects of > these (that they had never known about before) that this alone is > satipatthana. But the measure is whether there is detachment from > the idea of self experiencing the object (whether gross or subtle). I find this a potentially misleading statement, since detachment implies an "experiencer". There are no views, nor is there "experience", at the moment of magga-nana. There is no possibility of any kind of view at all, since the direct perception of emptiness blocks the perception of conditioned realities for all but Buddhas, who can see both the dependently originated aspect and the emptiness of those dependently originated phenomena simultaneously. This knowledge is beyond even the range of arahants who still possesss the "obstructions to omnisience" completely removed by a Buddha. In emptiness there is no self, nor not-self, nor both, nor neither. It is the cessation of all fabrications, and is recognized as such only immediately afterwards, during "reviewing knowledge". > I think pariyatti(theory) and pattipati(practice) go together. > Kitagiri sutta (MN): > "And how bhikkhus does the attainment of profound > knowledge come by means of a gradual training...? > .... he hears Dhamma; > having heard Dhamma he remembers it; he tests the meaning of the > things he has borne in mind; while > testing the meaning, the things are approved of; there > being approval of the things, chanda is born; with > chanda born he makes an effort; having made the > effort, he weighs it up; having weighed it up..."endquote Again, great quote, Robert, worthy of repetition. Glad to see you appreciate the value of pariyatti & patipatti as concomitants of the Path. > We might start to develop right view but still hold onto our stingy > ways (for example)- and then there is no sincerity, one is using > anatta as an excuse . One does not see that our hair is on fire with Robert, you're starting to sound all Zen here. Using "anatta" as an excuse ("hey, it's all empty anyway, I can do whatever!) /and/ the "hair on fire" analogy used so often in Zen! Cheers, Erik 15486 From: jonoabb Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 4:13am Subject: [dsg] Re: Nibbana and Defilements/meditation Goggy --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "goglerr" wrote: ... > Hello Jon, > So sorry to reply u this late. You see, I was out of town for more > than a week and I just got back today. I'm trying to catch up with > all the messages. > > Well, the sutta is in Anguttara Nikaya, III, 29. It was translated as > alley-walk discourse in the PTS. I find that this translation is not > so good. If u could look up in the Pali text would be better. > > Goglerr I'm afraid my Pali is non-existent, so I'll have to make do with the PTS translation. This gives the 5 advantages of the 'alley-walk' as follows: 1/. it hardens one for travelling [comy: one is able to endure a long journey] 2/. it is good for striving 3/. it is healthy 4/. it's use tends to good digestion after one has eaten and drunk, munched and crunched 5/. the concentration won from (the thought of) an alley-walk lasts long. So done for the right reason, this walking back and forth is beneficial, and can be a support for kusala. Thanks for the reference. Jon 15487 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 4:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] There are people Ranil --- ranil gunawardena wrote: > Dear Jon, > > Replace the word people with beings to get the correct version of the > wording. However even if you say people heres how to derieve on whether > a > person will be enlighten or not. > > Once Buddha was asked a question. > "Are all buddists going to attain Nirvana? " > > Buddha said, > > "Yes, the people (beings?) who do what I have said to do, > No, the people who do not do what I have said to do" > > That was point 1. > > Point2, well all are in Sansara, and to get out... there is no where > else > other than sansara to be in :) > > ~meththa > ranil OK, now I get it (I think). You are saying that since the future Buddha is here (in samsara), it can't be such a bad place after all. Hmm, I'm not sure the future Buddha himself would agree with that proposition. If we were fortunate enough to meet him, he would probably tell us how dangerous it would be to have even the slightest satisfaction in our present state of affairs!! Jon 15488 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 4:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Vism study (rumoured) (Rob Ep) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > ... > Dear Jon, > I am somewhat chagrined that I have responded to these posts two weeks > late, and > also in reverse order. Hope that's not too confusing. I was happy to > find and > finally get to these very considered responses on your part, and thank > you much > for taking the time to take up these matters. > > Answering these posts has been very pleasureable, as the subjects are > close to my > heart and mind. I hope that's not an expression of moha on my part, I > mean, > enjoying the dialogue 'too much'. : ) > > Best, > Robert Ep. Great set of posts, Rob, and I appreciate the thought and care that has gone into them. I'm looking forward to getting back to you. Only problem is, I have rather limited posting time at the moment, due to work and other commitments. So if it takes a while for my replies to come through, please don't think I've ignored you. BTW, backwards order seems to work just fine (not for me though -- too methodical by nature, I'm afraid). Jon PS Your timing was good too, coming at a relatively slow time for the list. PPS Enjoying your thread with Kom. 15489 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 4:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Anapanasati and Mindfulness Practice Erik Thanks for coming in on this thread. The usual wealth of points to discuss ;-)) (and very eloquently put, too). I'll try and get back on some of them shortly. Jon --- rikpa21 wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > Hi Rob & Jon, > > Rob: > > How ever, [Jon] may be > > correct that sitting and focussing on the breathing in a formal > session may not be > > explicitly mentioned in the sutta. > > To get a bit Clintonian, this seems a case of it depending on what > the definition of 'is' is. The hermeneutical hair-splitting on this 15490 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 4:30am Subject: Re: [dsg] Putting the Anapanasati Sutta into practice Howard (and also Erik) (and Rob Ep indirectly) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > I will insert some comments below. But as an advance summary: I do not > see matters as you do here. No surprise there, Howard ;-)) However, your comments have been cause for thought, so I hope you don't mind if I ignore your suggestion to agree to disagree, for a bit longer at least... (and apologies for rearranging the order of your post). -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Whoever the person is, he/she must "go to the wilderness", must "sit down folding his legs crosswise", must "hold his body erect", must "set mindfulness to the fore". These things don't just happen! They are willful, Jon. They constitute deliberate practice, deliberate *training* (just as the Buddha said that the forest monk "trains himself"). The Anapanasati Sutta is not mere description of an event somehow occurring. It is prescription by way of description. It's like one person asking how to bake a cake, and getting the answer: "When a cake is being baked, first the ingredients are assembled, including flour, eggs, shorthening, and yeast, then ... " This is a method of instruction. ----------------------------------------------------------- I agree pretty much with what you say here, particularly in that the sutta is a form of instruction, as indeed is the case with all the suttas. The point I was trying to make about this part of the sutta [section B of the passage below], however, is that it introduces the *particular kind of person to or about whom the instruction that follows is being given*. That kind of person possesses certain qualities that cannot be emulated by someone living the life that you or I do, I believe (namely, the tranquillity and purity of living that comes from highly-developed samatha [based in this case on the breath]), in addition to well-developed mindfulness [satipatthana]. As I see it, this is a case of the Buddha informing a group of specially qualified people what they are capable of achieving, given their particular development and inclinations, if they are able to follow his instruction. To Erik: (I hope you don't mind me discussing here part of your recent message to Rob Ep and me). I'd like to suggest that this particular passage, "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, ... sits down folding his legs crosswise ... and setting mindfulness to the fore" [section B below] is *not* the answer to the question that precedes it, "Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination?" [at section A below], as you seem to imply. I think a close reading of the sutta will show that this is merely the preamble to the answer to that question. The 'meat' of the answer is the teaching on the Four frames of reference [section at C], following which the Buddha declares this to be the answer [at section D]. To my reading, the significance of the passage that begins "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, ... sits down folding his legs crosswise ... and setting mindfulness to the fore" is to say, "What follows only truly applies to someone like this". The Buddha is not saying "Here's what I'm suggesting as a good practice for all of you to do". He is actually setting down the context (prerequisites, even) for what is to follow. ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I would direct your attention to the following phrases in what you quoted above: "trains himself" "subduing greed" "putting aside greed & distress" "developed & pursued" -------------------------------------------------------------------- I appreciate your mentioning these phrases, Howard. On looking at them in more detail and their place in the passage as a whole [section C in the passage below] I see another way of analysing the passage that may be helpful. I notice that some of the phrases you mention refer to actions that *have been done, or are to be done, by the (hypothetical) monk*, while others seem to refer to the *effects of those actions*. As far as actions done (or to be done) by the monk are concerned, these include-- (a) *discerning the manner of his breathing*. (b) *training himself to be sensitive to the entire body, or to calm bodily fabrication* while breathing (c) *remaining mindfully focused* on the body in & of itself [body as body], As a consequence of these actions (and in particular the 'remaining mindfully focussed' at (c) above), the following is achieved-- (a) greed & distress with reference to the world are subdued ('put aside'). (b) mindfulness of breathing is developed and pursued (in such a way as to bring the 4 frames of reference to their conclusion). In other words, these last 2 mentioned things are descriptive of what happens as a result of the monk who has properly trained himself and remained mindfully focussed etc. Does this seem a fair reading to you? On this reading, the emphasis again seems to be on the development of mindfulness and understanding above anything else. Jon ************************************************ A.. "Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination? B. "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out..." C. (The Four Frames of Reference) "[1] Now, on whatever occasion a monk breathing in long discerns that he is breathing in long; or breathing out long, discerns that he is breathing out long; or breathing in short, discerns that he is breathing in short; or breathing out short, discerns that he is breathing out short; trains himself to breathe in... &... out sensitive to the entire body; trains himself to breathe in... &... out calming bodily fabrication: On that occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- subduing greed & distress with reference to the world. I tell you, monks, that this -- the in-&-out breath -- is classed as a body among bodies, which is why the monk on that occasion remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. "[2] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... "[3] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... "[4] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself ... D. "This is how mindfulness of in-&-out breathing is developed & pursued so as to bring the four frames of reference to their culmination ...">> ****************************************************** 15491 From: Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 1:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Cittas as condition Hi, Herman - In a message dated 9/6/02 3:17:35 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Comments interspersed below. > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Rob (and Larry) - > > > > Rob, I think your reply is excellent. I'd like to add my 2 > cents. In a > > message dated 9/5/02 3:32:05 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > epsteinrob@Y... > > writes: > > > > > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote:> > Hi all, > > > > > > > > It is often said that a citta and cetasikas are conditions for > the > > > > next citta and cetasikas. > > > > (If I have got that wrong then please ignore the rest of this > post). > > > > > > > > I have been wondering about this, and this is what I have come > up > > > > with so far. > > > > > > > > A citta is a conditioned reality, and is manifested as > experience, > > > > which is absolute. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > I'm not clear on what you mean by "absolute" here, Larry. > The > > experience -including both the fact of its occurrence and its > characteristics > > - is conditioned. If, by "absolute" you mean being an actual event > (and not > > fiction), I agree. > > Herman: You probably meant Herman, not Larry. If I wasn't a concept > I'd be miffed :-). ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Sorry. But don't both you and Larry now feel complimented? ;-)) ------------------------------------------------- > > By saying that experience is absolute I meant that it is irrefutable > and undoubtable. Which pretty much means what you said, it is real. --------------------------------------------------- Howard: Okay. Yes. --------------------------------------------------- > > > > ------------------------------------------------------- > > The citta, however, is not its own cause. It is > > > > > not a thing in itself, but a coming together of a number of > other > > > > things, which are not experienced. > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > > > Two questions here: > > > > 1) I don't think that the citta *is* the coming together of > the needed > > conditions. The coming together of the conditions (in sufficiently > > appropriate proximity) results in the arising of the citta, but is > not > > identical with it. This is a matter of dependency, as I see it, but > not > > identity. > > Herman: I agree that the conditions are not identical with the > resulting citta. I say this because the conditions are not > experienced , the citta is. > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: I suppose that, after the fact, the citta may be experienced (in memory, or somehow), but I think of the citta, when occurring, as a mind-moment which *is* an experiencing - a bare experiencing of an object, a rupa or a nama, together with a number of other mental operations pertaining to the same object. I see the *knowing* of the object as different from but interdependent with the object known. I view vi~n~nana as a selective producing of actuality from potentiality. I see it as a kammically conditioned selection operation. (Of course, I don't claim that one's own kamma is the sole condition for vi~n~nana.) ---------------------------------------------------- > > > > > 2) Why are the conditions necessarily not experienced? > Mightn't some > > or even all of them be experienced? > > ------------------------------------------------------ > > Herman: Cittas are parramattha dhammas, they are irreducible (as > experience). One can think about the conditions, then the experience > is thinking. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not talking about *thinking* about conditions. I'm talking about *experiencing* them. An *experienced* sight is condition for, say, a pleasant feeling. The condition is the image, and it is experienced. We may then also think about it - that's different from experiencing it. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > How can this citta then be a > > > > > condition for the next or a future one? > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Why not? It's absence would result the the next (or future) > one not > > arising, which is all that is required to make it a condition. > > --------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Herman: Like I said to Robert Epstein, I don't see this at all. > > I view experience as a result, which does not modify the underlying > conditions at all. Awareness is passive. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: An unseen image won't be pleasant. A seen image will lead to vedana. Contact leads to vedana, and contact involves experience. Acts of awareness have consequences. That makes them conditions. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Go on, brand me a heretic :-) ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Boo! Hiss! Heretic!! Okay? ;-)) ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > Wouldn't it be more coherent > > > > to say that the conditions for a citta are the conditions for > the > > > > next or a future citta? > > > > > > Couldn't be, then the second citta would be an exact duplicate of > the > > > first, and we'd be experiencing the same moment over and over > again. > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Perfect answer! > > --------------------------------------------------- > > > > > Herman: > I get the feeling you liked Robert's reply:-) > ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Naah! I just wanted him to have a warm, fuzzy feeling! ;-)) [Yeah, I liked it.] -------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > but it does raise the question of what it is that interacts with > the > > > citta to change it into the next citta. It can't be the citta > itself > > > alone, or it too would merely replicate itself exactly, since it > would > > > have the exact same conditions as those which caused it. This is > an > > > interesting problem in the single citta theory. > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > I think that it is the fact that the current citta is not, > itself, the > > sole condition for subsequent cittas, but other earlier cittas are > also > > needed which is the telling point. Moreover, the current citta is > not > > typically identical with any of the conditions that led to its > arising, or > > even to a combination of them. It arose lawfully because of those > conditions, > > but is, itself, novel. The current citta has numerous > characteristics and > > involves numerous cetasikas of various types and intensities, none > of which > > had to exist among the conditions that led to this citta, and these > many > > characteristics and cetasikas serve as conditions that help > determine the > > nature of subsequent cittas. > > ------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > If the conditions change or are different, > > > > the citta is different. > > > > > > The conditions for a specific citta change at every moment. > Nothing > > > ever stays the same for more than a moment. > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Perhaps. Are all "moments" of the same duration? Maybe so, > maybe not. > > I suspect not, but, in any case, why is this important? > > ----------------------------------------------------- > > Herman: If a citta lasted a million years as opposed to a > millisecond, we wouldn't know.(IMHO) Time is a measurement of change, > if there is no change, there is no time. > ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Good point. ------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > > > As a parallel, we do not say that whatever is reflected in a > mirror > > > > at a certain time is a condition for it being reflected again > the > > > > next moment. > > > > > > No, but that which is reflected in the mirror is the condition > for that > > > which is next reflected in the mirror, not because of the mirror > but > > > because of the thing that is reflected and the way it changes. > The > > > mirror doesn't have to change for the object to change, and thus > the > > > reflection. > > > > > --------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Again an excellent answer. Speaking conventionally, of > course, the > > mirror is one of the conditions for seeing a reflection, the others > being the > > objects reflected, the light bouncing off those objects towards the > mirror, > > and the observer. The mirror is the condition least likely to > change, but > > should any of them change, "what is reflected in the mirror" will > change. > > Moreoever "what is reflected in the mirror" is unique only for a > particular > > observer. For another observer, it is different. And, in a sense, > what is > > reflected in the mirror for a given observer is in the mind of that > observer, > > and DOES condition what is next reflected in the mirror for that > observer, if > > anything at all. (Perhaps what the observer sees in the mirror > causes him/her > > to immediately close his/her eyes or avert his/her gaze!) > > -------------------------------------------------- > > > Herman: Perhaps the mirror was not a good example. Another example > would be three sheaves standing in a field, supporting each other. > For the purpose of the example, the experience is the three sheaves > viewed as a unit. One cannot experience a single sheaf standing > upright. This would be an abstraction. As long as the three are > there, they will stand upright, take any away, it doesn't matter > which one, they will all fall down, and there will not be the > experience. The fact that they stand there, all three as one > experienced unit, is not a condition for it to be so the next moment. > It is the three sheaves separately that are conditions for it to be > so. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > Robert > > > > > > > ============================ > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > Me three > Herman > > ================================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15492 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 6:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Mind-process (was, Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata) Rob M --- robmoult wrote: ... > I would appreciate any links to detailed analysis of the thought > process. I find the Abhidhammathasangha to be quite light in this > area. Which of the original seven volumes did the thought process > appear in? I know it wasn't the first as I have a copy. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) Below is what Nyanatiloka says on the origins of the details on the mind process. Hope this is of interest. Jon citta-víthi, (as well as all terms for the various functions within the processes of conseiousness, such as ávajjana-citta, sampaticchana, santírana, votthapana, javana, tadárammana, bhavanga, cuti): None of these terms is found in the Sutta Canon. except javana, in Pts.M. Even in the Ahh. Canon (e.g. Patth) only javana and bhavanga are twice or thrice briefly mentioned. The stages, however, must have been more or less known. Cf. e.g Patth: ''Cakkhu-viññánam tam sampayuttaká ca dhammá (= cetasiká) mano-dhátuyá (performing the sampaticchana-function), tam sampayuttakánañ ca dhammánam (cetasikánani) anantara-paccayena paccayo. Mano-dhátu ... manoviññána-dhátuya (performing the santírana and votthapana function).... Purimá purimá kusalá dhammá (javaná) pacchimánam pacchimánam kusalánam dhammánam (javanacittánam) anantara-paccayena paccayo... avyákatánam dhammánam (tadárammana- and bhavanga-cittánam....)." 15493 From: egberdina Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 7:25am Subject: Why I would not join in on a study of Vis... Hi all, Recently Vicki and I went to see "I am Sam". The main character, amongst the twists and turns of the plot, explains his life in terms of the lyrics of Beatles songs and anecdotes about their life. So far so good. Language is metaphorical. It is all about establishing connections between this and that. Understanding one's life in terms of Beatles lyrics is no different to understanding it in terms of the Bible, Koran, or Donald Duck biographies. A problem looms on the horizon with the attempt at "correct" interpretation of language. This is insanity gone mad. Take the Beatles lyrics. We who live in the same lifetime as the Beatles are unable to resolve whether "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" is a song about an LSD episode or a crayon drawing made by a little girl in kindergarten. Going back to the authors does not resolve the question. There are entrenched views, and that is that. Given these difficulties (entrenched views) when the sources are contemporary, how much more valueless will be the determinations as to the "correct" meaning of the Buddha's sayings arrived at by studying the interpretations of someone who lived many generations after the original insights were first put into words. Anders wrote something quite significant recently. "The point that I am trying to make (having found the words for it know, I think), is that Buddhism is NOT about having correct understanding of the scriptures, which I think many strive for. It is about getting to the understanding that produced the scriptures. The scriptures should not be verification for your own understanding. Rather, your understanding should be verification of the scriptures." One needs to assess for themselves whether a statement like this can be discarded as being arrogant. If yes, it is likely that the aim of any study one undertakes is just to find confirmation of entrenched views. And if that is the case, that is unfortunately all one will find. All the best Herman 15494 From: abhidhammika Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 8:31am Subject: Nibbana Has No Cause Dear Dhamma friends The following conversation took place between Suan Lu Zaw and Therasa in the form of questions and answers. Theresa asked the following. "About the Four Noble Truths, -- The 2nd Noble Truth is the cause of the 1st Noble truth , and -- the 4th Noble Truth is the cause of the 3rd noble truth . Is that right ?? " Suan Lu Zaw answered the above question as follows. "The 2nd Noble Truth is the cause of the 1st Noble Truth. But, the 4th Noble Truth is NOT the cause of the 3rd Noble Truth." Therasa also asked the following. Is the 1st noble truth conditioned ?? ... Suan answerd Yes. Is the 2nd noble truth conditioned ?? ... Suan answerd Yes. Is the 3th noble truth conditioned ?? ... Suan answerd No. Is the 4th noble truth conditioned ?? ... Suan answerd Yes. Suan Lu Zaw additionally answered as follows. The Buddha's teachings are sometimes counter-intuitive. Even though it looked like the Path Truth as the cause of the Cessation Truth, it doesn't work that way. What the Path Truth does is to eradicate the results of our actions. That is to say, the actions carried out in line with the 4th Noble Truth no longer produce any result. The Buddha has explained the above phenomenon in Vitthaara Suttam on Kamma. To read a fresh translation of this Suttam and a modern psychological commentary on that Suttam, please visit The Science And Academic Journal Of Bodhiology on http://www.bodhiology.org . Now, the 3rd Noble Truth has been taught by the Buddha in order to confirm that the actions carried out under the 4th Noble Truth indeed no longer produce any result. Therefore, I have answered that the 3rd Noble Truth is not the result of the 4th Noble Truth. Hope that my answers satisfied your puzzle. With kind regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org 15495 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 10:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] subtle point, to Kom Dear Kom, Thank you for replying, were you in an internet cafe? You took a lot of trouble. Maybe the monk who is walking conveys to himself, with mindfulness, that he is going forward now, and then there is kaya vinnatti. Looking forward to a report on the discussions at Niagara falls (sound, I am sure) and other places, With appreciation, Nina. op 04-09-2002 08:19 schreef Kom Tukovinit op kom@a...: > > The answer (that I want to hear and understand) is that she > said Bodily Kamma is not committed only through > kaya-vinnatti. Kaya-vinnatti is a way, but committing > bodily-kamma doesn't necessarily involve this rupa. If one > commits a kamma without wanting to communicate the meaning > (communicating meaning such as the godfather nodding to his > assasin to kill his enemy), then there is no kaya-vinnatti > involves. > > The other reminders she gave in this area include: > 1) There doesn't need to be a third party involved to > communicate meaning. We may talk to ourselves, or signal > bodily involving meanings even if there is no other third > party around. > 2) She said that if we understand that this rupa only lasts > one citta moment, at the point where the citta conditions > the communication of meanings, then we may understand this > better. This is over my head, so I don't think I can > explain any more. 15496 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 10:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] the Middle Way Dear Ken H, Howard and all, Ken, I should thank you, you made a very pointed remark: We know that we can be mindful naturally, that no preparation is necessary, but that does not mean that we should be lazy. I tend to forget viriya cetasika, its importance, but now I am reminded translating A. Sujin, the perfection of energy. It is a factor of enlightenment, a perfection and it is called . Some quotes: N: Viriya overcomes laziness, and when we read above: do not delay kusala, we can remember that kusala includes mindfulness of nama and rupa. Kom and Larry were discussing satipatthana and Kom mentioned that A. Sujin always teaches satipatthana. She keeps on explaining what seeing is, what visible object is. No matter we look around or in a mirror, only visible object appears through eyesense. That is satipatthana. The paramattha dhammas which are the objects of satipatthana are so near, but we are lazy and tend to forget. This reminds me about Howard's post on the four applications of mindfulness, are the first three about concepts? He wrote: Yes, one sees through the conventional objects to the elementary phenomena that compose them. However, I do not think this happens as a process starting at the first application and only happening at the fourth. When we read about the parts of the body it looks as if these are concepts. I looked up the Co. on the , Ch III, the Thirtytwo fold Aspect (See illustrator of Ultimate Meaning). It is used as a subject of Samatha and it is also included in Mindfulness of the Body. In Samatha one sees the aspect of the foulness and the aim is overcoming attachment to the body. When someone has accumulated skill for jhana he can attain it. We read: He should see the body parts as elements. We read: The Co states at the end that How could this happen without developing all the stages of insight which has paramattha dhammas as object? Those who have no inclination to develop jhana can be reminded to develop understanding of the true nature of realities when they hear about the parts of the body. It depends on the individual's inclinations, there is no rule. Body parts are so near, they are with us all the time. We are attached to them, we find them important, but they are only rupa elements. The same goes for the other subjects included in Mindfulness of the Body, such as breath. The jhanacitta experiences with absorption a nimitta, a of breath. In vipassana, one is mindful of the paramattha dhamma: the tangible object, or the three Elements of Earth, Fire or Wind. One should see rupa in the body. With appreciation, Nina. op 05-09-2002 12:02 schreef kenhowardau op kenhowardau@y...: > > Thank you for this message. Once again, you have given > me a lot to think about. > ----------- > > The understanding that visible object is "just what > appears through the eyes, that is all," strikes me as > entirely satisfactory and I think it is exactly what I > need to hear. Having learnt the futility of trying to > control mindfulness, I may be tending to dismiss the > possibility of right mindfulness. What you have said, > seems to be the middle way; neither `trying' nor `giving > up.' > 15497 From: Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 10:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Robert K. Admit it. You have a strong aversion to formal meditation practice. Recognizing this aversion when it arises is the only way to let go of it. Reasoning wont change your mind. Larry 15498 From: Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 11:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Sarah, Instead of saying concepts are not real why don't we say they are non-existent. If you agree to that we can translate your assertion into something like this: Thinking (ditthi) with concepts is real = thinking with non-existents exists. Is this what you are saying? As for satipatthana I believe you lot do understand satipatthana correctly; however, you also seem to have a totally unreasonable aversion to formal practice. This is a great pity. I look forward to the day when you can join the rest of your brothers and sisters on the ground of this great earth. Larry 15499 From: robmoult Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 6:40pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Mind-process (was, Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata) Hi Jon, This confirms what I already suspected. Thanks for the effort of researching this. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob M > > --- robmoult wrote: > ... > > I would appreciate any links to detailed analysis of the thought > > process. I find the Abhidhammathasangha to be quite light in this > > area. Which of the original seven volumes did the thought process > > appear in? I know it wasn't the first as I have a copy. > > > > Thanks, > > Rob M :-) > > Below is what Nyanatiloka says on the origins of the details on the mind > process. Hope this is of interest. > > Jon > > citta-víthi, > (as well as all terms for the various functions within the processes of > conseiousness, such as ávajjana-citta, sampaticchana, santírana, > votthapana, javana, tadárammana, bhavanga, cuti): > None of these terms is found in the Sutta Canon. except javana, in Pts.M. > Even in the Ahh. Canon (e.g. Patth) only javana and bhavanga are twice or > thrice briefly mentioned. > The stages, however, must have been more or less known. Cf. e.g Patth: > ''Cakkhu-viññánam tam sampayuttaká ca dhammá (= cetasiká) mano- dhátuyá > (performing the sampaticchana-function), tam sampayuttakánañ ca dhammánam > (cetasikánani) anantara-paccayena paccayo. Mano-dhátu ... > manoviññána-dhátuya (performing the santírana and votthapana function).... > Purimá purimá kusalá dhammá (javaná) pacchimánam pacchimánam kusalánam > dhammánam (javanacittánam) anantara-paccayena paccayo... avyákatánam > dhammánam (tadárammana- and bhavanga-cittánam....)." > > > 15500 From: robmoult Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 7:34pm Subject: Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi All, For a number of reasons, I have decided to insert a "special class" into the Abhidhamma course syllabus on September 15 (the topic of the neutral cetasikas will be shifted until September 22). The topic of the next class will be "Buddhist Theory of Causation and Einstein's Theory of Relativity". I intend to summarize a book with this title (by Filita P. Bharucha) that I picked up recently in Colombo. I have been interested in this subject for many years, but never researched it. As a PhD thesis, the book includes a lot of math. The good news is that I took a number of courses in modern physics at university that covered the math behind Einstein's theories. That was 20 years ago, but I should be able to "dust off the cobwebs" sufficiently to present the concepts in layperson's language. Is there anybody in the DSG who has a similar interest and background so that we can enter into a discussion over the next week as I prepare my Class Notes? Does anybody know of documents or books (preferrably on-line) that cover this topic? The following books in my library touch on this subject very lightly: - The Tao of Physics by Fritjof Capra - The Dancing Wu Li Masters by Gary Zukav - Abhidhamma Studies by Nyanaponika Thera (Chapter on "The Problem of Time") Let me leave you with a stimulating quote by Werner Heisenberg, one of the fathers of quantum mechanics: "The path comes into existence only when we observe it." (Heisenberg was talking about the path of nuclear particles.) Thanks, Rob M :-) 15501 From: Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 3:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/6/02 2:22:02 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > Hi Sarah, > > Instead of saying concepts are not real why don't we say they are > non-existent. If you agree to that we can translate your assertion into > something like this: > > Thinking (ditthi) with concepts is real = thinking with non-existents > exists. > > Is this what you are saying? > > As for satipatthana I believe you lot do understand satipatthana > correctly; however, you also seem to have a totally unreasonable > aversion to formal practice. This is a great pity. I look forward to the > day when you can join the rest of your brothers and sisters on the > ground of this great earth. > > Larry > > ================================= Larry, suppose there is a wooden boat called 'Anicca', composed of 500 boards of various sizes and shapes. One board is removed (it was warped) and replaced by another board of the same size and shape. Is this still the boat Anicca? Sure, most people would say. But what about when half the boards are replaced? Or 2/3? Or all the boards!? When all the boards have been replaced by new ones of the same sizes and shapes is this still the Anicca? Most people would say "yes", but that it was completely rebuilt. What makes it the same boat? Why is it still the same good old Anicca? Answer: It is because of CONVENTION, and ONLY convention. There is the concept of 'The Anicca', and we filter our experience through that concept. But what is actually the case? (1) The concept of 'The Anicca" is a real thought, mentally constructed, and observable through the mind door, and (2) it is "well founded" (as opposed to the concept of 'unicorn') in that it a mental construct which is applicable to certain collections of observed, interrelated phenomena but (3) its referent, the alleged boat, The Anicca, exists only conventionally and not in reality. In actuality, no matter how hard we look, we can't really find The Anicca, but only boards of various sizes and shapes. (The same applies, of course, to those boards! But that's another story.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15502 From: Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 3:46pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/6/02 10:35:54 PM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Let me leave you with a stimulating quote by Werner Heisenberg, one > of the fathers of quantum mechanics: > "The path comes into existence only when we observe it." > > (Heisenberg was talking about the path of nuclear particles.) > ======================== Ya see? another phenomenalist!! ;-)) With metta, howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15503 From: robmoult Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 7:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi Howard, Have you got the book, "Buddhist Phenomenology - A Theravadin Perspective" by Chandra B. Varma? If you are into Husserl, I think that you would really like it. If you want to order it, it will cost you US$16 and here is the site: http://www.dkpd.com/servlet/subjdisp? offset=600&subname=RELIGION:PHILOSOPHY [put this address on one line and search in alphabetical order, it is on screen #25] Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > > > Let me leave you with a stimulating quote by Werner Heisenberg, one > > of the fathers of quantum mechanics: > > "The path comes into existence only when we observe it." > > > > (Heisenberg was talking about the path of nuclear particles.) > > > ======================== > Ya see? another phenomenalist!! ;-)) > > With metta, > howard 15504 From: Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 9:04pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi Rob, here's something: http://faculty.virginia.edu/consciousness/ Larry 15505 From: Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 9:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Howard, what is thinking? Larry 15506 From: robmoult Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 9:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi Larry, Thanks for the excellent lead. I notice that there is a portion dedicated to my pet subject, "free will". Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Rob, here's something: > http://faculty.virginia.edu/consciousness/ > > Larry 15507 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 6, 2002 11:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi Larry, and all, Thanks for this very interesting link, maybe a bit over my head - I have no maths or physics so I haven't attempted to read anything so far except Chapter 13. But I like the stories in Ch. 13 very much. There is one metaphor of a puppet and robot, different to the usual puppet teachings, and one on a snake and a rope that is also a little different, but emphasises absolute 'no control'. (I wonder why we inherit the fruits of our actions if we have absolutely no control in the first place?). 'Manifestation' is a different term for the self? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Rob, here's something: > http://faculty.virginia.edu/consciousness/ > > Larry 15508 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 0:20am Subject: Re: Meditation and Satipatthana --- Dear Erik, Somehow or other it seems to me that we are not very far apart these days. I agree with most of your points so just want to clarify a little(sorry for sniping some of your excellent pieces) In dhammastudygroup@y..., "rikpa21" wrote: > > Someone here recently mentioned the Zen practice of "shikantaza"-- > which is the practice of taking whatever arises as the object of > investigation. The Tibetan schools have many approaches that employ > this type of mindfulness to whatever arises as well. In all cases, > these are considered advanced practices for those who have already > developed sati and samadhi to a very high degree, such that the mind > can remain undistracted for long periods of time. _______________ I appreciate that the aim of many meditation techniques is to concentrate and so minimize distraction. But I also know - as I think you do- that 'distraction' is only concept (whatever it is) and that it is aversion to the distraction that is the problem. So there are two ways to go: either develop samatha by means of wholesome concentration on an object such as death; or know the reality of the moment(then the 'distraction becomes the object). I think no rule as to which is best or when to apply- it is our own path of inquiry that will teach us when one or the other is right. > By constrast, to skip the rudiments of bhavana (like seated > meditation with favorable external conditions, such as quiet and so > on) in favor of attempting to know that there is "just seeing", for > example, there is little or no development--at least not of samma > sati. You know we have only 4 postures - sitting, walking, lying and standing. So any awareness has to occur during this time. I used to have rather subtle thoughts, still do, that another time, another place another posture, another feeling, would be a better condition for awareness. Gradually I've begun to learn- just a tad and not very often- that there is only the here and now. That investigating what is here now is more fundamental and basic than getting into an ideal external situation. Because that ideal doesn't really exist - it is a concept tied up with craving that obscures the present moment. I think then the quiet places become more common - little moments while in a crowd that are there more often than we realise. But you would be taking this the wrong way if you think this means I am saying don't go off to quiet places. Robert 15509 From: egberdina Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 0:48am Subject: Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Larry, Seeing as Howard is sometimes given to calling me Larry, I'm sure he won't mind me butting in. I hope you don't mind either. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Howard, what is thinking? > > Larry I think that one predominant aspect of thinking is that it is non- vocalised or pre-vocalised speech. Wishing you all the best Herman 15510 From: egberdina Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 1:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi Rob M, This is probably only slightly related to your original question, but it may still be of interest. There is some research in process in Australia which promises to demonstrate that the speed of light is not constant, but variable. All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Larry, > > Thanks for the excellent lead. I notice that there is a portion > dedicated to my pet subject, "free will". > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > > Hi Rob, here's something: > > http://faculty.virginia.edu/consciousness/ > > > > Larry I'm a seeking a Enter city or ZIP Age: to Show only profiles with photos 15511 From: robmoult Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 2:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi Herman, Are you referring to the theory that the speed of light in the universe has been decreasing over time? I will probably mention this as an aside during the presentation to shake people up (i.e. current models are still being refined). Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > Hi Rob M, > > This is probably only slightly related to your original question, but > it may still be of interest. > > There is some research in process in Australia which promises to > demonstrate that the speed of light is not constant, but variable. > > All the best > > Herman > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > > Hi Larry, > > > > Thanks for the excellent lead. I notice that there is a portion > > dedicated to my pet subject, "free will". > > > > Thanks, > > Rob M :-) > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > > > Hi Rob, here's something: > > > http://faculty.virginia.edu/consciousness/ > > > > > > Larry 15512 From: kenhowardau Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 4:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1) / Ken H --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hey Ken H, once you indicate an interest it becomes not "whatever > document YOU decide on" but "whatever document WE decide on" :) > It will be great to have you join in. :) > > What do you reckon? Any suggestions? Preferably something on-line, > so we can all access it .... Thanks Christine, I'll get the hang of this joining-in business one day. :-) There's so much to choose from, we might have to toss a coin. I'd like to add The Ten Perfections to the list -- no shortage of on-line material there, thanks to Nina and K. Sujin. Kind regards Ken H 15513 From: Sarah Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 5:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Larry, --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Sarah, > Thinking (ditthi) with concepts is real = thinking with non-existents > exists. ..... I’d like to change it to: “Thinking (i.e cittas accompanied by various cetasikas which many or many not include ditthi) OF concepts is real = Thinking OF non-existents exists”. The concepts or ‘non-existents’ are phantoms of the imagination. ..... > As for satipatthana I believe you lot do understand satipatthana > correctly; however, you also seem to have a totally unreasonable > aversion to formal practice. This is a great pity. I look forward to the > day when you can join the rest of your brothers and sisters on the > ground of this great earth. ..... May I be very cheeky and quote your reply to Rob M: “All I can say is been there, done that". What I mean to suggest is merely that some of us here understand and appreciate exactly what you’re saying and where you’re coming from. When I first met Rob K, he may not have used your exact words, but the sentiment was strikingly similar and I think that contrary to the assertion about the aversion to formal practice, most of us have come from a background of an incredible amount of attachment for it. In my own case, in spite of considerable attachment, the relief and joy of no longer needing to follow any ‘rules’ in terms of time, place and action for the development of satipatthana was (and has been ever since) tremendous. For me, this understanding was what brought my ‘practice’ back down to earth. No longer were long hours working in difficult conditions or family problems seen as an interruption to practice. No longer were the crowds or hours travelling on public transport considered as cutting into thedevelopment of sati (awareness). No longer were temple and forest life considered as more favourable. No longer were my interests and hobbies and natural tendencies in need of suppression. No longer was there an idea of a persona or aura to be cultivated. Perhaps, of most importance, no longer was there an illusion of having gained higher insights than was the case. In other words, the bump back down to earth coincided with the understanding of many of the wrong views accumulated. We can only know for ourselves on this score and I’m sure neither Rob K nor I or anyone else here minds in the slightest how much or little F.M. anyone else does. It’s a matter of individual interest and inclination. just as now, there are many changing cittas - kusala and akusala. To be very cheeky and quote you back once again: “I've learned more about the dhamma through abhidhamma study than any other way. If you are like me, what you have right now is an attitude problem. Attitude changes from moment to moment, day to day. You could look at this attitude as it arises and recognize it as an impermanent phenomenon, "not me". Everyone changes all the time, but I hope you will stay with abhidhamma. You have made an excellent contribution to this group ........People can get sutta study anywhere, but abhidhamma study is rare. If it doesn't provide you with an answer to every question that pops into your head, maybe you need to rest the head. This stuff is deeper than deep. Let it work on you.” ***** Larry, I can’t say it better than that. Thankyou for putting the words into my mouth;-) Very best wishes, Sarah ===== 15514 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 3:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] Why I would not join in on a study of Vis... Hi, Herman - See, I paid attention to whom was replying to this time! ;-) If I found that could manage to take the time to do the matter justice yet still get my work done, I believe I *would* participate in such a study. I would do this for at least the following resons: 1) Buddhaghosa's work lies at the dead (no innuendo here!) center of the commentarial tradition of Theravada, and it is (a) the Tipitaka plus (b) the commentarial tradition plus (c) the practice lineages that *constitute* Theravada. 2) As many reservations as I have about certain aspects of Theravada (in the Abhidhamma, the commentaries, and the practice of some) and as much of value as I find in parts of Mahayana, I find myself clearly a Theravadin, and believe, thus, that it is encumbant upon me to come to better understand this tradition. 3) I've owned a copy of the Visuddhimagga for years, and have yet to really get through it. (The best I've done is look at parts of it from time to time.) I don't like to have significant works just sitting around un-read! ;-)) With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/6/02 10:26:08 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > Hi all, > > Recently Vicki and I went to see "I am Sam". The main character, > amongst the twists and turns of the plot, explains his life in terms > of the lyrics of Beatles songs and anecdotes about their life. > > So far so good. Language is metaphorical. It is all about > establishing connections between this and that. Understanding one's > life in terms of Beatles lyrics is no different to understanding it > in terms of the Bible, Koran, or Donald Duck biographies. > > A problem looms on the horizon with the attempt at "correct" > interpretation of language. This is insanity gone mad. > > Take the Beatles lyrics. We who live in the same lifetime as the > Beatles are unable to resolve whether "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" > is a song about an LSD episode or a crayon drawing made by a little > girl in kindergarten. Going back to the authors does not resolve the > question. There are entrenched views, and that is that. > > Given these difficulties (entrenched views) when the sources are > contemporary, how much more valueless will be the determinations as > to the "correct" meaning of the Buddha's sayings arrived at by > studying the interpretations of someone who lived many generations > after the original insights were first put into words. > > Anders wrote something quite significant recently. > > "The point that I am trying to make (having found the words for it > know, I think), is that Buddhism is NOT about having correct > understanding of the scriptures, which I think many strive for. It is > about getting to the understanding that produced the scriptures. The > scriptures should not be verification for your own understanding. > Rather, your understanding should be verification of the scriptures." > > One needs to assess for themselves whether a statement like this can > be discarded as being arrogant. If yes, it is likely that the aim of > any study one undertakes is just to find confirmation of entrenched > views. And if that is the case, that is unfortunately all one will > find. > > > > All the best > > > Herman > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15515 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 3:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/6/02 10:57:13 PM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Have you got the book, "Buddhist Phenomenology - A Theravadin > Perspective" by Chandra B. Varma? > > If you are into Husserl, I think that you would really like it. > > If you want to order it, it will cost you US$16 and here is the site: > > http://www.dkpd.com/servlet/subjdisp? > offset=600&subname=RELIGION:PHILOSOPHY > > [put this address on one line and search in alphabetical order, it > is on screen #25] > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > =============================== Thanks for this. No, I've never studied Husserl - my phenomenalism is on the informal side, and is influenced by the Dhamma and by William James. BTW, this book is one of three I ordered two days ago! ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15516 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 3:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/7/02 12:06:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Howard, what is thinking? > > Larry > > ============================= My definition might be "Thinking is the flow of thoughts and the manipulation of same." An alternative definition: "Thinking is the one thing we so-called Buddhists do too much of"! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15517 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 3:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi, Robert and Erik - In a message dated 9/7/02 3:21:31 AM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > --- > Dear Erik, > Somehow or other it seems to me that we are not very far apart these > days. I agree with most of your points so just want to clarify a > little(sorry for sniping some of your excellent pieces) > In dhammastudygroup@y..., "rikpa21" wrote: > > > Someone here recently mentioned the Zen practice of "shikantaza"-- > > which is the practice of taking whatever arises as the object of > > investigation. The Tibetan schools have many approaches that employ > > this type of mindfulness to whatever arises as well. In all cases, > > these are considered advanced practices for those who have already > > developed sati and samadhi to a very high degree, such that the > mind > > can remain undistracted for long periods of time. > _______________ > > I appreciate that the aim of many meditation techniques is to > concentrate and so minimize distraction. But I also know - as I think > you do- that 'distraction' is only concept (whatever it is) and that > it is aversion to the distraction that is the problem. So there are > two ways to go: either develop samatha by means of wholesome > concentration on an object such as death; or know the reality of the > moment(then the 'distraction becomes the object). I think no rule as > to which is best or when to apply- it is our own path of inquiry that > will teach us when one or the other is right. > > > > By constrast, to skip the rudiments of bhavana (like seated > > meditation with favorable external conditions, such as quiet and so > > on) in favor of attempting to know that there is "just seeing", for > > example, there is little or no development--at least not of samma > > sati. > > You know we have only 4 postures - sitting, walking, lying and > standing. So any awareness has to occur during this time. I used to > have rather subtle thoughts, still do, that another time, another > place another posture, another feeling, would be a better condition > for awareness. Gradually I've begun to learn- just a tad and not > very often- that there is only the here and now. That investigating > what is here now is more fundamental and basic than getting into an > ideal external situation. Because that ideal doesn't really exist - > it is a concept tied up with craving that obscures the present moment. > I think then the quiet places become more common - little moments > while in a crowd that are there more often than we realise. > > But you would be taking this the wrong way if you think this means I > am saying don't go off to quiet places. > > > Robert > =========================== I find myself on both sides of this fence. To see a biological specimen clearly and with intricate detail, we use a powerful microscope with clean and well polished lenses. Analogous to this is, I believe, a mind with powerful concentration and mindfulness. However, a biologist studies specimens with his bare eyes as well, with much benefit. Likewise, I think that an ongoing mindfulness practice at "ordinary times" is also essential. I feel a bit like Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof (and, more generally, from Shalom Aleichem stories) who says "Yes, you're right!", and turning to the one who has said the opposite, "Yes, you're right too!" ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15518 From: robmoult Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 8:08am Subject: Was Plato a Buddhist? (sorry, long post) Hi All, Ever since I was a teenager, I was intrigued by Plato's allegory of the cave. I have reproduced it below as a dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon (Glaucon is basically a "yes-man" and his comments are in square brackets). Plato starts this allegory in a Buddhist way, but then ends up getting muddled when he applies this to mundane issues (politics, role of a philosopher, etc.). I understand that Plato claimed that he could remember his previous lives, but believed that there was a maximum of ten rebirths. I am curious. Has anybody in the DSG studied Plato? Can somebody make a summary of the main similarities / differences between Plato and Buddha? Thanks, Rob M :-) ======= The Allegory of the Cave - Plato's Republic Book VII And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened:, Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets. [I see.] And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent. [You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.] Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave? [True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?] And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows? [Yes, he said.] [And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them? And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy, when one of the passers- by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow? [No question, he replied.] To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images. [That is certain.] And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,, what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing And when to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them, will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him? [Far truer.] And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him? [True, he said.] And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities? [Not all in a moment, he said.] He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day? [Certainly.] Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is. [Certainly.] He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold? [Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about it.] And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them? [Certainly, he would.] And if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer, Better to be the poor servant of a poor master, and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner? [Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.] Imagine once more, I said, such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness? [To be sure, he said.] And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death. [No question, he said.] This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed, whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed. [I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.] Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted. [Yes, very natural.] And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, when they returned to the den they would see much worse than those who had never left it. himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice? [Anything but surprising, he replied.] Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he has a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den. [That, he said, is a very just distinction.] But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes? [They undoubtedly say this, he replied.] Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good. [Very true.] And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth? [Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.] And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue, how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eye- sight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness? [Very true, he said.] But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below, if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now. [Very likely.] Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or Neither rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able educated ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest. [Very true, he replied.] Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all, they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now. [What do you mean?] I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labors and honors, whether they are worth having or not. [But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?] You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State. [True, he said, I had forgotten.] Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. That is why each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst. [Quite true, he replied.] And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light? [ Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.] Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State. [Most true, he replied.] And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other? [Indeed, I do not, he said.] And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight. [No question.] Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of the state. 15519 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 10:02am Subject: anapanasati, part 5 Part 5. We have to go back to the fourth tetrad of the sutta: (XIII) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in contemplating impermanence²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out contemplating impermanence². (XIV) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in contemplating fading away²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out contemplating fading away². (XV) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in contemplating cessation²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out contemplating cessation². (XVI) He trains thus ³I shall breathe in contemplating relinquishment²; he trains thus ³I shall breathe out contemplating relinquishment². (then as translated by Ven. Nyanatiloka:) <..on that occasion, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides contemplating mental objects in mental objects, ardent, clearly comprehending, mindful ,having put away covetousness and grief with regard to the world. Having see with understanding what is the abandoning of covetousness and grief, he becomes one who looks on with complete equanimity. That is why on that occasion, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides contemplating mental objects in mental objects, ardent, clearly comprehending, mindful ,having put away covetousness and grief with regard to the world. That is how respiration-mindfulness, developed and repeatedly practised, perfects the four foundations of mindfulness.> **** The Visuddhimagga (VIII, 237) states about the fourth tetrad, ŒThis tetrad deals only with pure insight while the previous three deal with serenity and insight.¹ As regards the words of the fourth tetrad, ³(XIII) I shall breathe in... breathe out contemplating impermanence², the Visuddhimagga (VIII, 234) states: Œ ... Impermanence is the rise and fall and change in those same khandhas, or it is their non-existence after having been; the meaning is, it is the break-up of produced khandhas through their momentary dissolution since they do not remain in the same mode. Contemplation of impermanence is contemplation of materiality, etc., as ³impermanent² in virtue of that impermanence...¹ As regards the clause: ³(XIV) I shall breathe in... breathe out contemplating fading away², the Visuddhimagga states that there are two kinds of fading away, namely: ³fading away as destruction² which is the ³momentary dissolution of formations² (conditioned realities) and ³absolute fading away² which is nibbåna. The text (Visuddhimagga VIII, 235) states: Œ... Contemplation of fading away is insight and it is the path, which occur as the seeing of these two. It is when he possesses this twofold contemplation that it can be understood of him ³He trains thus, I shall breathe in... shall breathe out contemplating fading away.² ¹ The same method of explanation is applied to the clause ³contemplating cessation² (XV). And with regard to the clause (XVI) ³contemplating relinquishment², the Visuddhimagga states: ³relinquishment is of two kinds too, that is to say, relinquishment as giving up, and relinquishment as entering into.² ³Giving up² is the giving up of defilements, and ³entering into² is the entering into nibbåna, the Visuddhimagga explains. We read: The fourth tetrad pertains to the contemplation of dhammas (mental objects) in dhammas. We read in the Commentary to the Sutta (translated by Ven. Nyanatiloka) about the explanations of the words of the sutta: : here covetousness is the hindrance of lust. By grief the hindrance of ill will is pointed out. For this tetrad is stated by way of insight. And contemplation of mental objects is sixfold... Of that contemplation, the section on the hindrances is the beginning... Accordingly, he said, in order to point out the beginning of the contemplation of mental objects. (phaana.m) means it is the knowledge of abandoning, thus, that is intended... N: The Co refers to higher stages of insight knowledge leading to more detachment from conditioned realities: fading away (viraaga~naa.na), cessation (nirodha ~naa.na), and relinquishment (pa.tinissagga). We read further on: : because one who proceeds by the method, etc., is one who looks on with complete equanimity after successively seeing with understanding not only the mental objects beginning with the hindrances, but also the knowledge of the abandoning of the mental objects stated under the heading of covetousness and grief. Therefore, it should be understood that Nina: In the Way of Mindfulness, Co translated by Ven. Soma, it is stated that just as in the case of body, feeling and citta, the mental objects should be contemplated in seven ways: as impermanent; as being subject to dukkha; as anatta; by way of turning away from it and not by way of delighting in it; by freeing himself of passion for it; with thoughts making for cessation and not making for origination; and not by way of laying hold of it, by by way of giving it up. As we have seen, the hindrances are classified under the mental objects, and they include also the khandhas, the sense-bases (ayatanas), the seven factors of enlightenment and the four Truths. I shall paste part of Jon¹ s post and quote from The Way of Mindfulness, Co translated by Ven. Soma: Jon: The mind objects/mental objects section refers to the dhammas (realities) that can be the object of a moment of consciousness, and this in turn means any and all realities (including those covered by the other 3 sections of the sutta). Only dhammas (realties) can be the object of satipatthana, because only something that has its own characteristic that is capable of being experienced is considered to be a dhamma’; anything that does not, is not. In the Satipatthana Sutta itself, the 'eligible' mind-objects are described in different ways. One of these ways is as the 5 khandhas (Aggregates), and these 5 khandhas encompass all dhammas (other than Nibbana). I have pasted below the passage from The Way of Mindfulness: Section on Mental Objects 2. The Aggregates "And, further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging. "How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging? "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu thinks: 'Thus is material form [rupa]; thus is the arising of material form; and thus is the disappearance of material form. Thus is feeling [vedana]; thus is the arising of feeling; and thus is the disappearance of feeling. Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is the disappearance of perception. Thus are the formations [sankhara]; thus is the arising of the formations; and thus is the disappearance of the formations. Thus is consciousness [vinnana]; thus is the arising of consciousness; and thus is the disappearance of consciousness.' Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, internally ... and clings to naught in the world. "Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging." [ends] ***** 15520 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 10:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: dreams Dear Howard, thank you very much for the additional tips. Lodewijk is very grateful and will try. It will work in the long run. With appreciation, Nina. op 05-09-2002 19:47 schreef upasaka@a... op upasaka@a...: > =========================== > I hope it is helpful. 15521 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 11:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Sarah, Concepts: I'm not sure what a concept is. Sometimes it seems that "concept" means "sankhata," any compound. So for clarity's sake let's say "concept" means "word." When people say words are not real that is loose talk in the sense of being not precise. Anything that can be clung to must be a khandha. People do cling to words. So what do you mean when you say words are not real? Meditation: Actually this study of abhidhamma has opened my eyes to what meditation _should_ be. I completely agree with you that there is a tremendous amount of muddling around in so-called meditation. Most of the time I have no idea what I am doing. The study of anapanasati and satipatthana has made me eager to understand more and apply it in meditation. I will leave you and the rest of the gang in peace as to your own path, that is a matter of individual accumulations. But I strongly disagree that meditation is something suited only to an elite few. Meditation is for anyone. Larry 15522 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 11:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Herman and Howard, My initial thought was that there are two kinds of thinking: mechanical and discursive. Possibly the mecanical underlies the discursive. What I am mostly interested in though is the discursive. This is what I most often grasp and cling to. So in order to have confidence that thinking is "not me" I would like to know the components of thought and how thinking works. It occured to me that posssibly sanna forms thoughts but I'm not sure. Any insights? Larry 15523 From: frank kuan Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 1:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana --- LBIDD@w... wrote: >> I will leave you and the rest of the gang in peace > as to your own path, > that is a matter of individual accumulations. But I > strongly disagree > that meditation is something suited only to an elite > few. Meditation is > for anyone. Sadhu. -fk 15524 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 0:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/7/02 2:35:49 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > Hi Herman and Howard, > > My initial thought was that there are two kinds of thinking: mechanical > and discursive. Possibly the mecanical underlies the discursive. What I > am mostly interested in though is the discursive. This is what I most > often grasp and cling to. So in order to have confidence that thinking > is "not me" I would like to know the components of thought and how > thinking works. It occured to me that posssibly sanna forms thoughts but > I'm not sure. Any insights? > > Larry > ========================== I'm no expert on this. For me, it is sufficient to know a thought when I see one! (Obviously thoughts are formations, and clearly [to me] sa~n~na plays a role in their creation). I think there are several sorts of thinking that are counterproductive, among which are trains of thought that one is "lost" in (i.e., seriously unmindful of), trains of thoughts that have compulsive aspects to them, and trains of thought that reinforce, even cultivate, craving, aversion, and ego gratification. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15525 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 4:08pm Subject: Re: Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hello Rob M, Perhaps you might begin with a discussion of how the Dhamma and science are related, if you haven't already done so. I remember — and it seems long ago — reading Jayatilleke and Rahula giving very positive accounts of how Buddhism was quite rational / experimental and very much in accord with science. The actual practice seems to be a mix of hostility (they don't mix) and supermarket tabloid illiteracy (though I do look forward to seeing the two-headed Romanian violinist when he tours). Obviously science doesn't have all the answers; 'scientism' (the belief that the methods and objects recognized in science are the only appropriate techniques and elements) is rejected even by scientists. But do we agree with the Dalai Lama that the Dhamma must ultimately yield to science? Even so this gives a lot of wiggle room (like the Kalama sutta ;-). Cartesian dualism (nama-rupa as separate realities) is way on the outs, but certainly not eliminated. Psychic powers are sort of a joke, but who can really know? Rebirth has nothing to be said for it but clearly remains possible. But there are some things that won't be overturned by any future scientific revisions: e.g., we'll never return to a flat earth or geocentric universe. Fairly limited though, it seems. Let me offer to two examples of dead ideas, one peripheral, one more central. Jivitindriya, or the life faculty, came up recently in discussing killing. If this is seen as some sort of elan vital, something that separates the living from the inorganic creating the former, it's long defunct. (Of course it can be seen as just life itself; then an interesting and useful inquiry becomes possible about death and life signs.) Shouldn't it be discarded? Is there anything you would discard, and why/not? We know that people can only consciously register images flashed for many hundreds of a second; a bit slower and they subliminally imprint, as can be demonstrated by their effects on behavior, but are not consciously seen. But much faster (still in the several hundreds of a second) and they can't be seen. So the theory that moments of consciousness last only a few billionths of a second (or less!) is beyond rational belief. Something else to dispose of, or reconcieve? If not, again, what are the criteria? metta, stephen 15526 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 4:09pm Subject: Phenomen-alism/ology + Plato Hello all, There was, throughout most of the twentieth century, a split between British and continental philosophy. It is, in many ways, ongoing, though things are much more fluid now. The subject distinction of this post falls on completely different sides of this divide. Phenomenalism is a (British, or Anglo-American) theory of perception. In Mill's famous words, that 'objects are the permanent possibility of sensation.' Talk about external objects is to be replaced by talk about possible experiences. Howard notes that this was James view, as it was Russell's. This is a view that pretty much ended with the work of the latter Wittgenstein and company and has not really been active since before the second world war. Perhaps it will stage a comeback, the problem of qualia certainly being unresolved within analytic philosophy. (I would recommend Paul's "Is There a Problem with Sense data" and Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" for anyone tempted into this approach. Perhaps Howard can offer a positive work; I know of none that aren't difficult. Something by Ayer, perhaps?). Phenomenology, of which I know much less, was a continental program; I don't know if it's a currently active program, or in it what form. I suspect that neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty have too many advocates. It is an attempt to describe consciousness in abstraction from its (intentional) contents. The point of this post being that they are two separate and not to be conflated philosophies. However, the use of the 'epoche', or bracketing of experience (the suspension of belief) appears to give priority to experience, or certain forms of putatively elementary experiences. This despite Husserl's contention that he had resolved the mind/body dichotomy, giving equal billing to both. As such it does appear to parallel phenomenalism; and that's precisely why both have fallen on hard times. Just as Wittgenstein undermined Cartesian dualism by showing the problems with the inner spectator theory of mind and the meaninglessness of language (ostensive definition) used in such contexts, so Merleau-Ponty put experience back into reality, into it's world and body involving context. metta, stephen BTW, I'm sure there must be some parallels between Buddhism and Plato, but not, I think, the metaphor of the cave. What we see and experience (in this story) are mere shadows of the forms, which are independent, real, changeless entities — sort of anti-Buddhist objects. They cause things (i.e., trees, humans), which are their pale imitations. Forms are entities of a special kind in that they can only be known rationally, not through the senses (except, possibly, obscurely, when we're dead — unembodied direct apprehension). The sun in the story is the supreme form, the Form of the Good. Knowing the forms is knowledge, knowing through the senses is opinion. The political stuff is a bunch of malarkey about how only those who have direct, mystical experience of The Good are fit to rule. They'd be the very last. 15527 From: Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 8:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] anapanasati, part 5 "Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is the disappearance of perception." Hi Nina and all, I was wondering what is used as object for mindfulness of perception. I thought possibly memory. Larry 15528 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 9:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Larry Thanks for inviting me in on this thread, and sorry to take so long to respond. --- LBIDD@w... wrote: ... > Second, as for meditation, what I am hearing as implication from you, > Jon, Robert, and Nina is don't bother to meditate because you will > probably get it wrong. Instead, just study and eventually the truth will > accumulate in your continuum. I think this is bad advice. What I would > like instead is for you to encourage people to meditate but be open to > correction. Beyond that, what I would really like is for Acharn Sujin to > give meditation instruction. As recent discussions have shown, there are > many ways of implementing this 'only way' of satipatthana. I would like > to see what sort of program she could come up with. My view on the usefulness or appropriateness of formal meditation practice issue is simple: anything that's supported by the Tipitaka or ancient commentaries, either expressly or implicitly, as being appropriate for the development of the path is to be encouraged (but if it's not, then not). In determining what falls within this ambit, I don't believe one can rely on generally held ideas among Buddhist groups, or on the assurances of others. I think it's necessary to look at the texts for oneself. Nor do i think one can simply rely on results of just any 'practice' that seem to match things found in the texts; the 'practice' must be as indicated by the Buddha from the outset, otherwise the results cannot be the real thing -- they will give a 'false positive'. I've just been looking again through the Satipatthana Sutta, this time focussing on what I might call the 'operative words', that is, the key terms used by the Buddha in describing how each of the 4 foundations/arousings of mindfulness is carried out. I list these out below. I think they make interesting reading. [Body] Mindful, he breathes in thinking, 'I breathe in long,' he understands 'thinking thus, he trains himself understands: 'I am going'; is a person practising clear comprehension reflects... thinking thus thinks of his own body thus [Feeling] experiencing a pleasant feeling, understands... [Consciousness] understands the consciousness with lust [Mental objects] knows with understanding [5 hindrances] thinks: 'Thus is material form...' [5 khandhas] understands the eye and material forms [6 sense-bases] knows with understanding: 'I have the enlightenment factor [7 enlightenment factors] understands: 'This is suffering,' [4 noble truths] This doesn't seem to me like the language of formal meditation practice. Do you see anything here, or elsewhere in the sutta, that points to a formal meditation practice? Jon 15529 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 9:53pm Subject: Searching for 'Courage' in the Teachings Dear Group, I have been thinking a lot recently around the subject of Courage. I couldn't find much on 'courage' in the scriptures - though there was much on fear and terror. Some Pali words related to courage are: courage (nt.) viriya. (f.) dhiti; abhãrutà. (m.) parakkama; courageous (adj.) såra; vãra; dhitimantu; viriyavantu;; courageously (adv.) savikkamaü; courageousness (nt.) såratta; vãratta, which don't bring anything much up on a Search. Then it occurred to me that as others of the admired 'worldly' qualities are not so admired within Buddhism ("righteous anger" springs to mind) - perhaps there are reasons why some types of courage are also not admired? Not sure. To me, Courage is more than the absence of fear. Courage is the 'not giving in to' or the 'overcoming' of fear. I know what it is in the worldly sense - it comes from the Old French word for 'heart' - it is the strength to do or face something that one finds frightening. It means feeling fear, but enduring that feeling, standing firm against whatever comes, and doing what needs to be done despite it. It is the quality for which, on a public level, civilian and military awards are given. But it is when that quality is exhibited privately (whether by a human or animal), with usually no recognition, that I feel it is most to be admired. I also looked at related words like 'encourage' which means 'give hope or courage' and 'inspire wtih confidence'. A friend told me about the cetasika Saddha (confidence) and how courage could be related to it. http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas27.html I had previously called Saddha 'faith' (with the negative connotations that word carries for one coming from a 'faith-based' religion). As well, I looked at the Bhayabherava Sutta (Fear and Dread) and the Buddha's words "Whenever recluses or brahmins unpurified in verbal conduct ...unpurified in mental conduct ... unpurified in livelihood resort to remote jungle-thicket resting places in the forest ... they evoke unwholesome fear and dread." My understanding at this point is that firming up courage and overcoming fear depends on two things 1. Somehow increasing the power of ones Saddha and 2. Somehow decreasing the power of ones Defilements. Just have to find out how ..... metta, Christine 15530 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 10:13pm Subject: Re: Why I would not join in on a study of Vis... Dear Herman, ------------------------------------- You said: "Take the Beatles lyrics. We who live in the same lifetime as the Beatles are unable to resolve whether "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" is a song about an LSD episode or a crayon drawing made by a little girl in kindergarten. Going back to the authors does not resolve the question. There are entrenched views, and that is that." ------------------------------------- Is that really so? It seems it is easily resolvable by checking the consistent statements of the author and of those reliable ones who knew him - it seems that there is verifiable evidence as to the real inspiration for the song. "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" http://www.snopes.com/music/hidden/lucysky.htm "Looking back at this matter nowadays, however, there is little question but that John's explanation was an accurate and honest one. He did not merely claim that the title was a coincidental invention of his own but offered a specific, external explanation of its origins; he provided this explanation at the time the song was released; he maintained the same explanation for the rest of his life; and his explanation is corroborated by others." --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > Hi all, > > Recently Vicki and I went to see "I am Sam". The main character, > amongst the twists and turns of the plot, explains his life in terms > of the lyrics of Beatles songs and anecdotes about their life. > 15531 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 10:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1)/ Ken H Dear Ken H,and All, I wholeheartedly agree with you when you say : "May I add though, that I'm not really interested in hearing how anyone agrees with some parts and disagrees with others. I'd rather we concentrate on understanding the original text. Kind regards Ken H" -------------------------------------------- Amicable discussions of the Teachngs are a wonderful thing and help to arrive at a deeper understanding, but there are no winners in 'debates' over practice, or disputing the validity of parts of the Dhamma. Implying others are wrong, not as widely read or mislead is not fruitful. Providing what is posted agrees with the Tipitaka, let each tread their own path. Some have mentioned others as not having the 'experience'. No-one knows the life history of others on this List. No-one knows the citta of another. As the Home Page states, this is a Theravadin Dhammastudy List set up to discuss the Three Baskets of the Tipitaka and their Commentaries, and IMO, our main focus should be studying of those texts. with much metta, Christine ----------------------------------------- An excerpt from the Pasura Sutta Among those who live above confrontation not pitting view against view, whom would you gain as opponent, Pasura, among those here who are grasping no more? So here you come, conjecturing, your mind conjuring viewpoints. You're paired off with a pure one and so cannot proceed. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/suttanipata/snp4-08.html --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "kenhowardau" wrote: > Hi Larry, Christine, Sarah, . . . > > I'd like to enrol in the new abhidhamma class. 15532 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Sep 7, 2002 11:19pm Subject: Re: Einstein's Theory of Relativity/ Stephen Hello Stephen, I wonder if you could kindly expand on each of your following statements: "the Dalai Lama [said] that the Dhamma must ultimately yield to science? Even so this gives a lot of wiggle room (like the Kalama sutta ;-). Cartesian dualism (nama-rupa as separate realities) is way on the outs, but certainly not eliminated. Psychic powers are sort of a joke, but who can really know? Rebirth has nothing to be said for it but clearly remains possible." with gratitude in anticipation of an elucidating reply - metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Rob M, > Perhaps you might begin with a discussion of how the Dhamma and science are > related, if you haven't already done so. 15533 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 0:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Samatha, Samadhi and Right Concentration Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - ... > ------------------------------------------------------ > Howard: ... > All I mean is making it a point to pay attention to what is going > on, > to notice when there is a lapse in that, and particularly, by repeated > attempts to turn this attentiveness into a *habit*. If that is *willing* > something I'm not sure. It is certainly goal-directed bahavior. > ------------------------------------------------------- Sounds pretty much like plain old *willing* to me ;-)). Is there perhaps an underlying assumption that 'making it a point to pay attention to what is going on' is kusala or more likely to be so than not, or even a kind of satipatthana? Satipatthana involves the direct experience of dhammas by consciousness that is accompanied by kusala factors of a very high level. To my understanding, the conditions for such mental states to arise cannot be willed into being, and they do not include 'goal-directed behaviour' (oh that it were so!!). Jon 15534 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 0:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] rupas out there Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - ... > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > ... My "phenomenalism", > however, is not very detailed - it is just a > general thrust, a perspective. > If I were to adopt some existing fully detailed > phenomenalist theory, it would surely be > incompatible with the Dhamma at some points. > ------------------------------------------------ If your phenomenalism yields to the dhamma whenever there is an inconsistency, then I wonder what value it has for you, or why you think of yourself as a phenomenalist ;-)) (better hope no-one on the exec committee of the Phenomenalist Society had read your post!) What I can relate to, however, is something you have mentioned in earlier posts, namely the affinity you feel for phenomenalism because it was your interest in it that in a sense 'led' you to the dhamma. I think many of us have come to the teachings through unconventional routes that we viewed at the time as an indispensable part of our 'awakening'/'softening up' (in my own case, it was Javanese mysticism). But I would suggest that in fact these experiences were not the causative factors that we think of them as. The true cause must have been previous exposure to and acceptance of the teachings -- if it had not been for deeply ingrained past accumulations, no amount of exposure to dhamma-like concepts would have been sufficient. Seeing things in this light perhaps makes it easier to let go of the 'connection' to other views, which can in fact be a hindrance to progress on the path. My thoughts on it anyway ;-)) Jon 15535 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 1:14am Subject: Sutta reference wanted, please. Dear All "…though with pious heart a disciple took refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, his reward would have been greater if he had, with pious heart, undertaken to keep the precepts: ... "though with pious heart he undertook to keep the precepts, greater still would have been his reward if he had conceived even a passing thought of amity and goodwill." Does anyone know the sutta that this extract comes from? I would be most grateful for a reference (I found this excerpt at http://vmc128.8m.com/greatgifts/, but there is no reference with it). Thanks in advance. Jon 15536 From: egberdina Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 1:43am Subject: Re: Why I would not join in on a study of Vis... Hi Howard, Having been in communication with you for quite some time now, and having discussed a wide range of topics, I believe you to be an assiduous student of reality. I believe your rigour, and unbiased (without fear or favour) attitude, will always yield a deeper understanding of whatever it is that you study. If it comes to be, I would certainly be interested in your appraisals of whatever is put forth as being the "correct" interpretation of the Vis..... (don't know how to spell it) Be well Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Herman - > > See, I paid attention to whom was replying to this time! ;-) > If I found that could manage to take the time to do the matter > justice yet still get my work done, I believe I *would* participate in such a > study. I would do this for at least the following resons: > 1) Buddhaghosa's work lies at the dead (no innuendo here!) center of > the commentarial tradition of Theravada, and it is (a) the Tipitaka plus (b) > the commentarial tradition plus (c) the practice lineages that *constitute* > Theravada. > 2) As many reservations as I have about certain aspects of Theravada > (in the Abhidhamma, the commentaries, and the practice of some) and as much > of value as I find in parts of Mahayana, I find myself clearly a Theravadin, > and believe, thus, that it is encumbant upon me to come to better understand > this tradition. > 3) I've owned a copy of the Visuddhimagga for years, and have yet to > really get through it. (The best I've done is look at parts of it from time > to time.) I don't like to have significant works just sitting around un-read! > ;-)) > > With metta, > Howard 15537 From: egberdina Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 1:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Einstein's Theory of Relativity Hi Rob, I think that's the one. Here's a link. www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/ 08/07/tech/main517850.shtml There's nothing quite like a paradigm shift, is there :-) All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Herman, > > Are you referring to the theory that the speed of light in the > universe has been decreasing over time? > > I will probably mention this as an aside during the presentation to > shake people up (i.e. current models are still being refined). > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > > Hi Rob M, > > > > This is probably only slightly related to your original question, > but > > it may still be of interest. > > > > There is some research in process in Australia which promises to > > demonstrate that the speed of light is not constant, but variable. > > > > All the best > > > > Herman 15538 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 2:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Nutriment / Rob Ep Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: ... <> The 'definition' I gave was just my own clumsy attempt at expressing what would have been better left to the texts cited by Nina (and copied again below). From the Atthasalini, a more accurate definition would be, 'That which is present in food that preserves beings, keeps them alive'. As mentioned both in the Nyanatiloka extract and by Nina, this rupa can only be experienced through the mind-door. To my understanding, this for all practical purposes means it is unlikely to be experienced by us in a lifetime. However, to answer the main thrust of your post, the fact that a rupa needs a sentence or so to describe its characteristic doesn't mean it is any less a rupa. The rupas that we commonly call simply 'visible object' or 'sound' are in fact more accurately described as 'the phenomena experienced through the eye- or ear-door'. Jon http://www.zolag.co.uk/rupas.txt Nutrition is another kind of rúpa which has to arise with every kind of materiality. It can be exerienced only through the mind-door. The "Dhammasangaùi" (§ 646) mentions food such as boiled rice, sour gruel, flour, etc., which can be eaten and digested into the "juice" by which living beings are kept alive. The "Atthasåliní" (II, Book II, Ch III, 330) explains that there is foodstuff, the substance which is swallowed (kabaîinkåro åhåro, literally, morsel-made food), and the "nutritive essence"(ojå). The foodstuff which is swallowed fills the stomach so that one does not grow hungry. The nutritive essence present in food preserves beings, keeps them alive. The nutritive essence in gross foodstuff is weak, and in subtle foodstuff it is strong. After eating coarse grain one becomes hungry after a brief interval. But when one has taken ghee (butter) one does not want to eat for a long time (Atthasåliní, 331). 15539 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 2:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Nutriment Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > Thank you for the following information. I must say, though - > this > business strikes me as 1) a mixing of actuality and concept, and 2) > pseudo-scientific from the modern perspective. > > With metta, > Howard As to your (1), I think we probably tend to equate 'rupas' with 'sense-door object'. However, this is not really so. While all objects that are experienced through the 5 sense-doors are indeed rupas, the reverse is not true. Only 7 of the 28 rupas are directly experienced through a sense-door. The remaining 21, nutrition among them, can be experienced only through the mind-door. However, this does not make it any more a concept and any less a rupa As to your (2), again I think we tend to associate rupas with their scientific counterparts bearing the same name/label. However, the 2 are not the same. The rupa that is sound, for example, is incapable of detection by scientific instruments. Jon 15540 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 2:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] The purpose of samatha / Rob Ep Rob Ep Just to supplement the answers I gave in an earlier post (that you apparently only got around to reading after you wrote this -- and which you say largely answers your questions) --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Jon, <> To be a little more precise, what I said (or should have said) is that samatha and vipassana are 2 quite different aspects of kusala, and must be understood separately. The prior development of samatha to a particular stage or level is not a prerequisite for the development of satipatthana/vipassana at this present moment. And conversely, a person's level of samatha development tells us nothing about their level of understanding of dhammas, or their potential for such. <> It is an appropriate form of kusala for development by someone leading the homeless life to its fullest purity. I think if you look carefully at the texts you will find that in many suttas where samatha is being discussed, the real focus of the teaching is on how, for a monk in whom samatha is already highly developed or who has the potential for such, samatha can form the basis for enlightenment (the 'both ways' enlightenment). <> No, not inconsequential, since all kusala supports the development of vipassana; it's just that it's not an absolute prerequisite, if we are talking about the separate development of (mundane) samatha. Not to be confused with the samadhi that arises together with each moment of satipatthana, that is also developed together with the other (path) factors arising at those moments and that culminates in samma-samadhi of the Noble Eightfold Path at the moment of supramundane path consciousness (= magga citta, = enlightenment). Jon 15541 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 2:59am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Kalapas According to Nyanatiloka Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - ------------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: As external, mind-independent entities, rupas are mere concept, Jon! They are only hypothesized, not observed. The hair, from the Abhidhammic perspective, is mere pa~n~natti. So, WHERE are these "external", mind-independent rupas? (They don't exist in the hair or as part of the hair, since the hair is mere pa~n~natti.) If one adopts neither a realist (objectivist) standpoint nor a phenomenalist one, I don't see how to answer such a question. [For a realist, the hair is real and out there, with the so-called rupas being mere characteristics of that hair or physical parts of it. For the Buddhist phenomenalist, the rupas are internal - the objective aspects/poles of moments of experience, and the hair is conceptually constructed from these rupas.] ------------------------------------------------------------- You say, "As external, mind-independent entities, rupas are mere concept". Well, rupas are never concept, that is the whole point. But I think what you are pointing out is that when we hypothesise about rupas we are in the realm of concepts (because of the hypothesising). No argument from me there. Yes, hair is mere pannatti, no argument there either ;-)). However, the rupas that we take for 'hair' are not concepts. So when [what we take for] 'hair' is touched, what is actually happening is that consciousness arising at the body-door experiences the rupa that is hardness/softness, and that is followed by many mind-door moments that experience and then think about that object. The question we are now considering is whether, at times when there is no such touching, the hardness/softness that if touched would be taken as hair still arises. I agree that this is hypothesising about dhammas (you raised it, though, not me ;-))), and that is why I have not attempted to express any thoughts of my own on the matter. However, I do think that the texts disclose a clear position on this question. The fact that we cannot say *where* that hardness would be arising is really beside the point, imv. ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I do see experience as consisting of single events - discernings of objects. The discernment operation (vi~n~nana) and its object co-occur, arise together, and are mutually dependent. This is the mutual dependence of vi~n~nana and namarupa, likened to two mutually supporting sheaves. Whether or not there exist rupas that are more than mere potentialities for being objects of discernent, that are self-existing, independent things is unknowable - for only what is observable is truly knowable. ----------------------------------------------------- Yes, I agree that "Whether or not there exist rupas that ... are self-existing, independent things" is unknowable to us (and that's why it puzzles me that you would so persistently assert an answer based on your own experience and/or conjecture!). Nevertheless, the Abhidhamma position on it seems clear enough. Jon 15542 From: egberdina Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 3:40am Subject: Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Robert, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > --- > Dear Erik, > But you would be taking this the wrong way if you think this means I am saying don't go off to quiet places. > > Robert Sorry to be only referring to a snippet of your original post. I did appreciate the whole contribution, but I wished to express my gratitude that this last line was included. The suttas can make tedious reading for the uninitiated, because they can seem repetititve while applying the same teaching to many different categories of circumstance. But in so doing, they are a complete statement. I think by adding your last line, as quoted above, you have made a complete statement, and thereby have made it much more valuable than just listing the particular point(s) you may have been trying to emphasise. There is an ongoing to and fro at DSG about formal meditation versus no formal meditation. I meditated formally and regularly for at least ten years, before I had the slightest inkling that the object of the meditation was me. (self). This awakening did not render the last ten years useless. It is not possible for me to prove that the meditation led to the realisation. Or that it didn't. But this I know. I never went into meditation with some sort of preconceived idea of what the result should be. Newton's laws apply to the mind as well (IMHO) To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. If one meditates with craving, aversion is sure to follow. I am glad that you have shared that you seek out silence from time to time. Nobody can read the suttas and think that The One Who Knows did any differently. All the best Herman 15543 From: egberdina Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 4:53am Subject: Re: Why I would not join in on a study of Vis... Hi Christine, The link you posted was interesting. Knowing full well that there is no such thing as value-free research, I wondered why you posted the link, as it seemed to prove my point :-). Despite what John Lennon has said about the matter, many believe the opposite. This is also clearly stated in the site you referenced. Have guilty men ever protested their innocence till the moment they were hung? All the best Herman PS I have no special attachment to my line of argument. I am simply suggesting that the determination of what anybody means by saying "X" is subjective to the nth degree (n being a pretty big number - font size not implied here:-)). And that the likelyhood of arriving at flawed determinations increases exponentially as one is removed from the original source by time and cultural context . Clearly, many believe that Buddhaghosa gave a word for word exposition of what the Buddha really meant. So be it. It is of note to me that Buddhaghosa wrote the exposition at all. Clearly there were matters that were not understood. One does not shine a torch in broad daylight. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Herman, > > ------------------------------------- > You said: "Take the Beatles lyrics. We who live in the same lifetime > as the > Beatles are unable to resolve whether "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" > is a song about an LSD episode or a crayon drawing made by a little > girl in kindergarten. Going back to the authors does not resolve the > question. There are entrenched views, and that is that." > ------------------------------------- > Is that really so? It seems it is easily resolvable by checking the > consistent statements of the author and of those reliable ones who > knew him - it seems that there is verifiable evidence as to the > real inspiration for the song. > > "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds" > http://www.snopes.com/music/hidden/lucysky.htm > "Looking back at this matter nowadays, however, there is little > question but that John's explanation was an accurate and honest one. > He did not merely claim that the title was a coincidental invention > of his own but offered a specific, external explanation of its > origins; he provided this explanation at the time the song was > released; he maintained the same explanation for the rest of his > life; and his explanation is corroborated by others." > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > Recently Vicki and I went to see "I am Sam". The main character, > > amongst the twists and turns of the plot, explains his life in > terms > > of the lyrics of Beatles songs and anecdotes about their life. > > 15544 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 1:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Samatha, Samadhi and Right Concentration Hi, Jon - In a message dated 9/8/02 3:43:37 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Jon - > ... > > ------------------------------------------------------ > > Howard: > ... > > All I mean is making it a point to pay attention to what is going > > on, > > to notice when there is a lapse in that, and particularly, by repeated > > attempts to turn this attentiveness into a *habit*. If that is *willing* > > something I'm not sure. It is certainly goal-directed bahavior. > > ------------------------------------------------------- > > Sounds pretty much like plain old *willing* to me ;-)). > > Is there perhaps an underlying assumption that 'making it a point to pay > attention to what is going on' is kusala or more likely to be so than not, > or even a kind of satipatthana? Satipatthana involves the direct > experience of dhammas by consciousness that is accompanied by kusala > factors of a very high level. To my understanding, the conditions for > such mental states to arise cannot be willed into being, and they do not > include 'goal-directed behaviour' (oh that it were so!!). > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Ahh. Well, good, Jon - so there's nothing I need to do. What will be, will be. That's good. It certainly makes my life easier - less complicated. If I sleepwalk through my days and exert no effort to do otherwise, that's unfortuanate, but just my accumulations. If "the direct experience of dhammas " should happen, that will be nice, and, if not, well - c'est la vie. Nothing to do. Nothing to cultivate. I apologize for the irony, Jon, but this is how I evaluate what you are saying. There is nothing for us to do, no actions that we should or can take. What is it, then, to be a practicing Buddhist? If, to put into practice the teachings of the Buddha does not require *doing* something, exercising of will, then everyone is a Buddhist practitioner. I'm sorry, but this no-exercise-of-volition position just escapes me. (I'm speaking conventionally here, Jon. I know that there is no "us" to be doing anything. I know there is no "you" and no "me" - but still I write to you! ;-) ------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Jon > > ========================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15545 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 2:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] rupas out there Hi, Jon - In a message dated 9/8/02 3:56:27 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Jon - > ... > > ------------------------------------------------ > > Howard: > > ... My "phenomenalism", > > however, is not very detailed - it is just a > > general thrust, a perspective. > > If I were to adopt some existing fully detailed > > phenomenalist theory, it would surely be > > incompatible with the Dhamma at some points. > > ------------------------------------------------ > > If your phenomenalism yields to the dhamma whenever there is an > inconsistency, then I wonder what value it has for you, or why you think > of yourself as a phenomenalist ;-)) (better hope no-one on the exec > committee of the Phenomenalist Society had read your post!) > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, as I've said before, phenomenalism makes sense to me and it also provides a perspective which supports my understanding of the Dhamma. However, I don't think of myself as a "phenomenalist". In fact, I don't even truly *characterize* my self as a "Buddhist". If I pidgeonhole myself into any of a variety of categories, I am clinging to an identity. I would rather let go of any identity. I would rather be free. Yes, I used the word 'rather', which means I have expressed a preference. One starts where one is. I still have preferences. ;-)) --------------------------------------------------------- > > What I can relate to, however, is something you have mentioned in earlier > posts, namely the affinity you feel for phenomenalism because it was your > interest in it that in a sense 'led' you to the dhamma. I think many of > us have come to the teachings through unconventional routes that we viewed > at the time as an indispensable part of our 'awakening'/'softening up' (in > my own case, it was Javanese mysticism). But I would suggest that in fact > these experiences were not the causative factors that we think of them as. > The true cause must have been previous exposure to and acceptance of the > teachings -- if it had not been for deeply ingrained past accumulations, > no amount of exposure to dhamma-like concepts would have been sufficient. > ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, previous exposure, and - who knows? - maybe even previous *practice*! ------------------------------------------------- > > Seeing things in this light perhaps makes it easier to let go of the > 'connection' to other views, which can in fact be a hindrance to progress > on the path. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't feel the need for a purity of Buddhist view, Jon. In any case, when I read the Kalakarama Sutta and the Bahiya Sutta I see a phenomenalist understanding expressed. That is how I understand the Dhamma. Many others do as well. Many do not. It is certainly not encumbant on anyone to see it that way - nor is it verboten. ------------------------------------------------------ > > My thoughts on it anyway ;-)) > > Jon > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15546 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 2:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Why I would not join in on a study of Vis... Hi, Herman - In a message dated 9/8/02 4:44:20 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Having been in communication with you for quite some time now, and > having discussed a wide range of topics, I believe you to be an > assiduous student of reality. I believe your rigour, and unbiased > (without fear or favour) attitude, will always yield a deeper > understanding of whatever it is that you study. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Wow. I find myself a bit embarrassed. In any case, I thank you for the kind words. I particularly appreciate them coming from you, as I admire your honesty and intelligence. ------------------------------------------------------ > > If it comes to be, I would certainly be interested in your appraisals > of whatever is put forth as being the "correct" interpretation of the > Vis..... (don't know how to spell it) > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Well, I don't attach all that much certainty to my own appraisals. It's just that, ultimately, it is my own appraisal (based on the input of others, on my own interior experience, and on my reasoning) that I have to depend on. I think that is the way it is for each of us. ------------------------------------------------------- > > Be well > > > Herman ======================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15547 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 7:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Mind-process Dear Rob M and Jon, I would like to expand somewhat on the process of cittas. I wrote before on this, but now more on the Path of Discrimination, Treatise on Knowledge,Ch XVII, Behaviour, Cariyaa, under behaviour of consciousness. Cittas are classified as dhatus, elements, see below, Nyanatiloka. Here they are explained as directing onto the object, but we have to keep in mind that such moments are extremely fast. We see here the name of adverting, but we do not see the names of receiving and investigating, they are just two more moments of vipaka after seeing, they just experience visible object and then they are gone immediately. Then we read about the other sense-door processes and then about , kiriyacitta which is mind-door adverting citta, and also resultant mind-principle . This is vipakacitta in the mind-door process, later on named tadarammana-citta. Now about the javanas, named here as such: What is behaviour of unknowing (a~naa.na caariya): The same of hate, delusion and other akusala cetasikas. And also with regard to the other sense objects and mental object. It is interesting that here is stressed akusala as behaviour of ignorance. And about behaviour of knowledge, panna, functional indeterminate adverting for the purpose of contemplating impermanence, the contemplation of impermanence is a behaviour of knowledge. Here are the stages of insight mentioned, up to the stages of enlightenment. You see, the nucleus of the process is there. It does not matter that names are different, they have their own place in the order of the process, which is citta niyama: certainty, definiteness. It is like a natural law. It could not be altered, it is amazing when we come to think of it. How do cittas know? They cannot do otherwise but follow this way, viithi. The Path of Discrimination is Part of the Khuddaka Nikaya, thus of the Suttanta. As to the Abhidhamma, the first Book, Dhs, enumerates cittas arising in different processes. The Vibhanga, the Book of Analysis, under Analysis of Elements, refers to the processes. So does the Patthana, Conditional Relations, under: contiguity-condtion, anantara paccaya. As to the Commentaries, Buddhagosa did not give his own ideas, his explanations were firmly based on the Tipitaka. Hoping that this clarifies, best wishes, Nina. op 06-09-2002 15:16 schreef Jonothan Abbott op jonoabb@y...: > > --- robmoult wrote: > ... >> I would appreciate any links to detailed analysis of the thought >> process. I find the Abhidhammathasangha to be quite light in this >> area. Which of the original seven volumes did the thought process >> appear in? I know it wasn't the first as I have a copy. > -)> Jon: Below is what Nyanatiloka says on the origins of the details on the mind > process. Hope this is of interest. > > citta-víthi, > (as well as all terms for the various functions within the processes of > conseiousness, such as ávajjana-citta, sampaticchana, santírana, > votthapana, javana, tadárammana, bhavanga, cuti): > None of these terms is found in the Sutta Canon. except javana, in Pts.M. > Even in the Ahh. Canon (e.g. Patth) only javana and bhavanga are twice or > thrice briefly mentioned. > The stages, however, must have been more or less known. Cf. e.g Patth: > ''Cakkhu-viññánam tam sampayuttaká ca dhammá (= cetasiká) mano-dhátuyá > (performing the sampaticchana-function), tam sampayuttakánañ ca dhammánam > (cetasikánani) anantara-paccayena paccayo. Mano-dhátu ... > manoviññána-dhátuya (performing the santírana and votthapana function).... > Purimá purimá kusalá dhammá (javaná) pacchimánam pacchimánam kusalánam > dhammánam (javanacittánam) anantara-paccayena paccayo... avyákatánam > dhammánam (tadárammana- and bhavanga-cittánam....)." > > > 15548 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 7:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Kind speech and self-exmination Dear Sarah, I liked very much your observations about trouble caused by rupas, the example of the lost wallet when Jon got out of the taxi. Then the examples from the abhidhamma, Dhsg. Another illustration that the Abhidhamma is not theoretical :-) A. Sujin in her book on Metta is also expanding on this passage. Now I cannot resist quoting from A. Sujin's Perfections on Energy, about self-examination, the Anumana Sutta: This reminded me to examine myself before going to sleep. I had neglected this. I realized the countless, countless moments of forgetfulness. But I know that they are conditioned. The passes on like a movie picture, stronger moments of akusala stand out, but there are so many moments of ignorance, unnoticed, forgotten already. Many moments of slight bodily pain when knocking a hand or touching the hot lamp, and then aversion. But no awareness. Sarah, you said that you, before going to sleep, think of kusala you can perform the next day. An excellent advice. Could you elaborate more on this? If others can write about their experience of self-examination, it will be very inspiring, I am sure. With much appreciation, Nina. op 06-09-2002 09:29 schreef Sarah op sarahdhhk@y...: . Often we are troubled on account of what has been seen, heard > and so on. We are lost in stories and forget about the real cause of the > troubles, i.e. the kilesa arising on account of these sense door > experiences. > >> From the same section of Dhammasangani, 1341, we read: > > “What is patience? > That patience which is long-suffering, compliance, absence of rudeness and > abruptness, complacency of heart (khanti). > What is loveableness? (soracca.m) > That which is the absence of excess in deed, in word, and in deed and word > together. > Besides, all moral self-restraint is lovely. > What is amity ?(saakhalya.m) > When all such speech as is insolent (a.n.dakaa), disagreeable (asaataa), > scabrous (kakkasaa), harsh to others, vituperative (paraabhisajjanii) to > others, bordering upon anger, not conducive to concentration, is put away, > and when all such speech as is innocuous (niddosaa), pleasant to the ear, > affectionate, such as goes to the heart, is urbane (porii), sweet and > acceptable to people generally - when speech of this sort is spoken - > polished, friendly and gentle language - this is what is called amity. > What is courtesy? > The two forms of courtesy: hospitality towards bodily needs and > considerateness in matters of doctrine. When anyone shows courtesy it is > in one of these two forms.” > 15549 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 7:19am Subject: Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no 6 Perfections, Ch 5, no. 6 Paññå is illumination which is nåma dhamma, it is understanding which penetrates the characteristics of realities which were never before penetrated. Formerly someone may have heard about them and understood in theory about them, but he may not yet have directly realized them. Paññå can grow and it can become illumination. As we read, even when we sit in one place, the ten thousand world-spheres can appear as of one light. This means that paññå understands thoroughly and penetrates the characteristic of nåma dhamma when nåma dhamma appears. Nåma dhamma arises in the planes of the five khandhas, in the heavenly planes, in the rúpa-brahma planes, in the arúpa-brahma planes 7) , or in whatever world of the countless worldsystems, but it has only one characteristic: nåma dhamma is only the reality which experiences, the element, dhåtu, which experiences an object. When paññå penetrates the characteristics of realities, ten thousand worldsystems appear as of one light, which means that paññå clearly understands the characteristics of realities, no matter where they arise. We read further on: A man introduces an oil-lamp into a dark house; the lamp so introduced disperses the darkness, produces light, sheds lustre, makes objects visible, so, understanding as it arises dispels the darkness of ignorance, produces the light of wisdom, sheds the lustre of knowledge, makes plain the four noble Truths. Thus understanding has illuminating as its characteristic. While we are listening to the Dhamma at this moment, we are developing the perfection of paññå together with the perfections of energy and patience, so that in the future paññå that is illumination, that clearly understands realities, will arise. We read further on: And as a clever surgeon knows which food is suitable, and which is not, evenso is understanding... Here we see that paññå should be developed in daily life so that it thoroughly knows and penetrates the characteristics of realities. We read: Evenso, understanding as it arises knows states as kusala or akusala, serviceable or unserviceable, low or exalted, black or pure, similar or dissimilar. And this was said by the ³General of the Dhamma² (Såriputta): ³It knows; thus, monk, it is in consequence called understanding. And what does it know? This is dukkha, etc. Thus it should be expanded. And thus knowing should be regarded as the characteristic of understanding. Here is another view: Understanding has the penetration of intrinsic nature, unfaltering penetration as its characteristic, like the penetration of an arrow shot by a skilled archer; illumination of the object as its function, as it were a lamp; non-perplexity as its proximate cause, as it were a good guide in the forest. This is the characteristic of paññå which knows everything as it really is. When satipatthåna does not arise, we spend our day with ignorance: we do not know which kind of akusala citta arises, what degree of lobha accompanies akusala citta, and we cannot clearly distinguish between attachment arising through the eyes, the ears or the mind-door. The whole day we are ignorant of the truth of realities. When paññå arises, it knows precisely which dhammas are kusala and which are akusala. There is no need to ask someone else whether it is kusala or akusala that arises, because paññå is able to understand this. Paññå knows which dhammas are beneficial and which are not. When akusala citta arises paññå clearly understands it; it knows the danger of akusala and it knows that akusala should not increase. When kusala citta arises paññå clearly understands it and it knows the benefit of kusala. Footnote 7. Birth in the rúpa-brahma planes is the result of rúpa jhåna, and birth in the arúpa-brahma planes is the result of arúpa jhåna. 15550 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 7:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] Phenomen-alism/ology + Plato Hi Stephen and Rob, Berkeley is also a good place to look for western parallels. I like him better than modern phenomenalists because his relinquishment is more profound. Substitute kamma for God and you have Buddhism, almost. Larry 15551 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 9:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Jon: "This doesn't seem to me like the language of formal meditation practice. Do you see anything here, or elsewhere in the sutta, that points to a formal meditation practice?" Hi Jon, it all looks formal to me. I suspect what you are objecting to is giving up ordinary activities (objectives) and confining yourself to these activities. If not, and you can carry out these activities in a sustained way throughout daily life, then Bravo! you are an accomplished master. Larry 15552 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 0:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] anapanasati, part 5 Hi Larry, yes, this is used for sanna, the khandha of sanna. Nina. op 08-09-2002 05:40 schreef LBIDD@w... op LBIDD@w...: > "Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus > is the disappearance of perception." >I was wondering what is used as object for mindfulness of perception. I thought possibly memory. 15553 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 0:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Sutta reference to Jon Dear Jon, Gradual Sayings, book of the Nines, Ch II, § 10, Velama. It continues: ...had he made become, just for a fingersnap, the perception of impermanence. Nina. op 08-09-2002 10:14 schreef Jonothan Abbott op jonoabb@y...: > > "…though with pious heart a disciple took refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma > and the Sangha, his reward would have been greater if he had, with pious > heart, undertaken to keep the precepts: ... > "though with pious heart he undertook to keep the precepts, greater still > would have been his reward if he had conceived even a passing thought of > amity and goodwill." >> > 15554 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 2:06pm Subject: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? Dear Group, I initially posted this message elsewhere but would be very interested to hear any thoughts anyone here may have. metta, Christine Subject: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? > --- In Triplegem@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Recently on a number of lists, members have had differences about the > Buddha's teaching based on translations of the Tipitaka. It occurs > to me that 21st century Buddhists are at the mercy of the vigilance, > ethics, and competence of translators and of the translators > interests and biases (unconscious or otherwise). The Internet is > both a wonderful and a terrible tool. It presents information to > thousands who would never buy the books. When reading from the > internet, the majority of Buddhists have no ability to > discern 'truth' from 'almost truth' or 'error' in translations. They > can be 'blinded with science' - post up a few 'cut and pasted' > paragraphs in Pali, tell them the meaning, and hardly a one would be > able to confirm or deny this meaning. I certainly wouldn't. (And > this is even before being influenced by the colloquial usage of > words in different countries speaking the same modern language.) > Below there are two different translations of absolutely non- > controversial verses of The Chapter of Ones (Anguttara Nikaya) which > show the ordinary differences in a translation: > ------------------------------------------ > Numerical Discourses of the Buddha 'An Anthology of Suttas from the > Anguttara Nikaya'. Translated and edited by Nyanaponika Thera & > Bhikkhu Bodhi. The Chapter of Ones 2. > > "No other thing do I know, O monks, on account of which unarisen > sensual desire arises and arisen sensual desire increases and becomes > strong so much as on account of this: a beautiful object. For one > who attends improperly to a beautiful object, unarisen sensual desire > arises and arisen sensual desire increases and becomes strong." > --------------------------------------------- > Translated from The Anguttara-Nikaya Ekanipata from the combined text > of the Pali Text Society > Edited by The Rev. Richard Morris, M.A., LL.D, Second Edition > and the Vipassana Research Institute edition > (the verse in Pali can be viewed on this site also.) > > "I see no other single Thing of more power to cause the appearance of > Wanting if not Present in the Here and Now, or, if Present in the > Here and Now, to cause it's growth and increase as The Beautiful > Feature (SUBHA-NIMITTAM, The Mark, or Sign of Beauty) in a thing. > The Mark of Beauty, Beggars, if not traced back to its origins > (YONISO MANASIKARO traced back in the mind to it's origins, or womb), > causes the appearance of Wanting if not Present in the Here and Now, > or, if Present in the Here and Now, it's growth and increase." > http://www.buddhadust.org/TheOnes/theonesenglish1-97.htm > ----------------------------------------------- > The first translation seems more elegant. Personally, I prefer the > second translation as it is clearer to me and uses more everyday > language - but I have no idea which is 'more correct'. The first > doesn't mention Here and Now (which is important to my understanding > of what the Buddha taught), nor does it instruct (or urge, rouse, or > encourage:)) us to trace back the Mark of Beauty to its origins. > > Would learning Pali really help? > > metta, > Christine > --- End forwarded message --- 15555 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 2:14pm Subject: Re: Searching for 'Courage' in the Teachings --- Dear Christine, In the cullavamsa - smaller chronicle on the history of sri lanka- there was a king who was overthrown by an evil minister (or someoone - I forget some details). This usurper wanted the King to suffer greatly and so had him put into a new wall while still alive and had the his men slowly seal up the wall so that he would suffocate. the king thought to himself: this one has destroyed my present life and now wants to ruin my future ones (because he wanted the king to be fearful and angry). But the king reflected wisely and showed no agitation as he was entombed. One of the greatest things I have learnt in Dhamma is that nothing and no one can ever make us have akusala because it is conditioned within this stream of nama and rupa. Akusala -such as fear- can't be stopped by 'us' (because no 'us');but knowing that in any situation kusala can still arise is a powerful condition for viriya (energy) and saddha (faith) that supports kusala. The understanding of anatta is a very strong condition for courage because it means there is proportionally(to the degree of understanding) less clinging to 'self' who needs to be protected etc. Robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Group, > > I have been thinking a lot recently around the subject of Courage. > I couldn't find much on 'courage' in the scriptures - though there > 15556 From: onco111 Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 3:03pm Subject: DSG: Live in Niagara Our trip: We left Ithaca at about 1:00 to make the drive to Niagara to meet KS and company. After grabbing a sandwich from a Deli, dealing with the international women's problem, and a couple of wrong turns, Lisa and I made it to Niagara Falls by 5:00, an hour later than we expected. We needed to leave again at 7:00, so the meeting was to be short. We found Jim and Amara waiting patiently in the lobby of the hotel. After exchanging pleasantries for a minute or so, Amara called KS over. She had been engaged in a Thai discussion with a dozen or so folks from the group, but she came right over to meet Lisa and me. Amara got the discussion started by mentioning that she told KS that I sometimes talked about Dhamma with my children. I began to talk a little about my kids and Dhamma. KS listened politely, but I don't think ANYONE really likes to hear parents talk about their kids. She leaned way forward to listen, and when she spoke, it was in a quiet voice, almost a whisper. Afterwards, Lisa said she was glad she had been sitting between KS and me because otherwise she would not have been able to hear anything. Jim was sitting on the far side of a coffee table and must not have heard much of anything at all. Amara sat next to KS. Clearly, Amara could hear because she would occasionally make comments. Kom came at about 6:00 and sat a few feet away from Amara, and I don't suppose he heard very much. Beyond prompting KS to talk, I said little in the two hours, preferring instead to listen to her. The long trip for such a short discussion was well worth it, but we didn't really get to know Jim, Kom, and Amara much beyond seeing their faces and hearing their voices. Jim lives not far from here (6 or so hours' drive), so we hope to visit him sometime before we leave this part of the country. I'm sure we'll meet Kom and Amara again sometime, and I look forward to those days. The first taste of dsg Live was precious, and I hope to elaborate in a short series of posts to come. Dan 15557 From: onco111 Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 3:04pm Subject: Episode I: Swimming pool Maras Episode I: Amara introduces me and mentions that I sometimes talk Dhamma with my kids (well, with the older one anyway -- he's 6). I VERY briefly tell KS and Amara about a couple of chats with Matt. Here's a longer version of the "swimming pool Maras" (from an e-mail I sent to Sarah earlier this summer). It's a story about my son's first few days of swimming lessons this summer. Monday: Matt barely touches the water -- he dips in, up to his waist and immediately pops out. He stands on the side of the pool with a terrified look for the next 40 minutes. We talk about how to defeat a Mara disguised as a swimming pool. Tuesday: An enthusiastic Matt climbs into the water. With chattering teeth, he clings tightly to the ladder the whole time, shaking his head furiously whenever the teacher says anything to him. Afterwards, we talk about defeating two Maras the next day: The one disguised as a ladder, and the one disguised as a bar-bell (looks like a giant plastic Q-tip that kids cling to to keep from sinking). The Q-tip Mara says, "Oh, that water is so deep. You won't be able to touch the bottom. Be very scared! Kids can drown so easy." The ladder Mara is in cahoots with the Q-tip Mara: "That's right. You don't want to drown. Cling to me, and I'll keep you nice and safe." The way to defeat both Maras in one swift stroke is to ride the Q-tip Mara. There is no way he can stand up to that attack. Wednesday: A confident Matt steps into the pool, drapes his arms over the Q-tip Mara, and paddles around a little. Afterwards, he is ecstatic. He tells his friend: "In swimming lessons, I not only got into the water, I got on a bar-bell." He tells his Mom: "Swimming lessons were great. I even put my face under the water." He tells his Dad: "Tomorrow, I'm going to put my whole head under the water." Thursday: We shall see. We shall see. The water Mara is very strong and fights hard to prevent you from putting your whole head under. You can defeat him fairly easily, though, if you know his tricks and understand that the fear is just his poison, not You. [By the time the week was over, Matt was loving the swimming lessons, and the teachers were ecstatic about his progress. With huge grins, they gave high-fives to each other when they mentioned Matt.] I mention to KS that Matt usually is very receptive to hearing about Dhamma, but sometimes he covers his ears and screams to get away from the talk. KS tells me to tell him that no matter what he does, he can't escape Dhamma. This, I will do. Dan 15558 From: onco111 Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 3:05pm Subject: Episode II: Vedana Episode II: My first question Dan: What is vedana? KS: Feeling. [I've heard vedana glossed that way before. I've also heard it glossed as "sensation." If it is "sensation", what would be the vedana in a moment of seeing? The light-induced stimulation of the retina sending an electrical signal via the optic nerve to brain and the consequent sensation "light"? Or is it some bodily impression accompanying the stimulation of the retina? Mr. Goenka explains, "...every dhamma, anything that arises on the mind -- even a slight thought -- starts flowing with a sensation on the body: vedanaa samosaranaa sabbe dhammaa....Therefore, so far as this tradition is concerned, the sensation on the body cannot be missed....Every moment there must be awareness of sensation arising and passing." This poses great difficulty if a moment of seeing is distinct from a moment of feeling, which certainly seems to be the case. How could there be awareness of body sensation at a moment of seeing (or hearing or thinking) if they are distinct? Impossible! Do "seeing" and "body sensation" coarise?] [Having studied with Goenka and his students for a decade or so, these questions kept popping into my mind. To clear up some of that confusion, I continued.] Dan: In a moment of seeing, what is the vedana? KS: In this moment, is it pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral? Dan: Uh, ummm... KS: It is neutral. [Lightbulbs flashing in Dan's mind...] Amara: Was the long drive up here worth it? Dan: It certainly was. I think back to how KS's explanation fits so well with Bhikkhu Bodhi's definition of 'vedana' as: "the affective tone of experience - - pleasure, pain, or neutral feeling -- which occurs on every occasion of experience through any of the six sense faculties." Issue resolved. Dan 15559 From: robmoult Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 3:51pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Mind-process Hi Nina, Most of the descriptions of Cetasikas in my Class Notes are extracted from your "Cetasikas" book. Once again, you have provided excellent source material for my efforts with this posting. Nina, your writings have had a great influence on me, helping me with my understanding of the Dhamma. The clarity of your writings have helped me be more effective in applying the Dhamma in my own life and passing along the message of the Dhamma to others. Nina, your influence on those with whom you have interacted directly (personally or through your writings) is significant. In turn, those with whom you have interacted directly have influenced others and therefore there is a much larger audience of those with whom you have interacted "indirectly". I picture this as concentric ripples in a pond, the influence ever spreading but the focus remaining the same. Of course, the size and power of the "ripples" in the pond depends on the size and weight of the initiating object. In this case, the "ripples" are large and powerful because the initiating object is based on the Dhamma. This legacy will continue long after the nama-rupa named "Nina" is gone. Saddhu, Saddhu, Saddhu. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15560 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 0:24pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Episode I: Swimming pool Maras Hi, Dan - Your relating of your visit with KS et al is vert interesting. Thanks. I'll make on ebrief comment. In a message dated 9/8/02 6:04:51 PM Eastern Daylight Time, dhd5@c... writesabout his six-year old : > I mention to KS that Matt usually is very receptive to hearing about > Dhamma, but sometimes he covers his ears and screams to get away from > the talk. ========================== My wife often reacts in exactly the same manner! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15561 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 0:44pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Episode II: Vedana Hi, Dan - In a message dated 9/8/02 6:06:19 PM Eastern Daylight Time, dhd5@c... writes: > > Episode II: My first question > > Dan: What is vedana? > KS: Feeling. > > [I've heard vedana glossed that way before. I've also heard it > glossed as "sensation." If it is "sensation", what would be the > vedana in a moment of seeing? The light-induced stimulation of the > retina sending an electrical signal via the optic nerve to brain and > the consequent sensation "light"? Or is it some bodily impression > accompanying the stimulation of the retina? Mr. Goenka > explains, "...every dhamma, anything that arises on the mind -- even > a slight thought -- starts flowing with a sensation on the body: > vedanaa samosaranaa sabbe dhammaa....Therefore, so far as this > tradition is concerned, the sensation on the body cannot be > missed....Every moment there must be awareness of sensation arising > and passing." This poses great difficulty if a moment of seeing is > distinct from a moment of feeling, which certainly seems to be the > case. How could there be awareness of body sensation at a moment of > seeing (or hearing or thinking) if they are distinct? Impossible! > Do "seeing" and "body sensation" coarise?] > > [Having studied with Goenka and his students for a decade or so, > these questions kept popping into my mind. To clear up some of that > confusion, I continued.] > > Dan: In a moment of seeing, what is the vedana? > KS: In this moment, is it pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral? > Dan: Uh, ummm... > KS: It is neutral. > > [Lightbulbs flashing in Dan's mind...] > > Amara: Was the long drive up here worth it? > Dan: It certainly was. > > I think back to how KS's explanation fits so well with Bhikkhu > Bodhi's definition of 'vedana' as: "the affective tone of experience - > - pleasure, pain, or neutral feeling -- which occurs on every > occasion of experience through any of the six sense faculties." Issue > resolved. > > Dan > ============================== I've had the same issues with vedana, also because of Mr Goenka's formulation. It was either Sarah or Nina (I'm sorry, ladies - I forget which of you) who cleared it up for me. Vedana is, indeed, a feeling of pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality conditioned by some bodily sensation (rupa) or by a thought or memory (nama). So a pain, for example, is a feeling of unpleasantness conditioned by a bodily sensation such as a throbbing or pressure or sharpness etc. The throbbing or pressure or sharpness etc is rupa, and the feeling of unpleasantness conditioned by it is the pain vedana. And neither of these is the aversion - the aversive reaction is sankhara. This is how I now understand the matter. I may still be off in some way on this, and I stand to be corrected. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15562 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 0:50pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Episode I: Swimming pool Maras Hi, Dan and all - In a message dated 9/8/02 7:24:28 PM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Your relating of your visit with KS et al is vert interesting. Thanks. > I'll make on ebrief comment. > ============================= The preceding gibberish should read: "Your relating of your visit with KS is very interesting. Thanks. I'll make one brief comment." With mush-mouthed metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15563 From: frank kuan Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 5:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Episode II: Vedana > I think back to how KS's explanation fits so well > with Bhikkhu > Bodhi's definition of 'vedana' as: "the affective > tone of experience - > - pleasure, pain, or neutral feeling -- which occurs > on every > occasion of experience through any of the six sense > faculties." Issue > resolved. Exactly. How we react to feeling each moment - with pleasure, aversion, ignorance, or understanding the nature of feeling is what's important. Right there is our dukkhometer measuring the quality of happiness we experience right now. Knowing whether cheetahs move at the speed of light or whether they arise concurrently with lobsters and other atomic realities doesn't really matter. -fk 15564 From: onco111 Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 6:08pm Subject: Episode III: Samma this, samma that; miccha this, miccha that Episode III: Samma this, samma that; miccha this, miccha that Dan [full version of the Dhs. quote not given in the conversation]: In Dhammasangani, I read that "right effort" is "...mental endeavor, riddance of lethargy, exerting harder and harder, endeavoring higher and higher, having sustained desire to strive, not relinquishing the task, discharging the task well, endeavor as the faculty of endeavor, power of endeavor, right effort." By contrast, I read that "wrong effort" is "...mental endeavor, riddance olathargy, exerting harder and harder, endeavoring higher and higher, having sustained desire to strive, not relinquishing the task, discharging the task well, endeavor as the faculty of endeavor, power of endeavor, wrong effort." KS [without even hearing the question first]: Effort is effort. Whether it is wrong effort or right effort depends on the other cetasikas. [And Dan delighted in the words.] [I brought up an interview I heard on the radio. A man was given a shotgun as a gift after never having owned any gun before. He'd always thought it strange that people hunted and enjoyed killing animals. But then, he practiced with his gun and learned. He talked of how calm and focussed the mind had to be and how sharp the concentration, in order to properly aim the gun at an animal, pull the trigger, and hit the target. Even the miccha-est of miccha samadhi can feel very calm and clean and pure. The fruits of concentration are alluring, and attachment to miccha samadhi grows and grows. KS seemed to have little comment on my stories. I'm glad -- a reminder to me that I came to hear her, not to talk her ear off. Better to turn on her voice again with questions about Dhamma.] Dan 15565 From: onco111 Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 6:09pm Subject: Episode IV: Lobha Episode IV: Lobha KS: Which do you want more, lobha or pañña? Dan: Lobha! KS+Amara: [laughter]. KS: Lobha is a very effective teacher. It's so easy to follow. 15566 From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 8:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] "doing" something in Buddhism Hello, Howard, Hope all is well and that the new school year is going smoothely for you. Usually am silent, but thought I'd write this time. "We" all like to think there must be a "will" do carry on some sort of practice, but when "we" think so, it is merely a "self" doing the thinking. Included in Right Understanding then, is first, the intellectual understanding that there is no self that can will "us" to carry out any action, be it getting up in the morning, etc. Owing to conditions, cittas and cetasikas arise, which condition thoughts at the mind door, which condtion action: getting up in the morning, brushing the teeth, studying, etc. Can "you" control what thoughts enter "your" mind? Included with those cittas and cetasikas constantly arising and falling away, are accumulations and inclinations that are constantly being accrued over the aeons. There is no free will in the Judeo-Christian sense, but there is no fatalism either. So, our actions are determined by conditions, but with the understanding that previous actions have led "us" to this point. Within each sense door and mind door process of cittas and cetasikas arising and falling away, the first part of the process is mostly vipaka: the result of kammic actions from the past. Whatever rupa objects are perceived through the sense doors and mind door is vipaka, the first part of the process. There is no control over this. One cannot "will" what sounds will be heard or what colors will be perceived, etc. The second part of the process is the kammic part: it is here that a "value judgement" is made of the object: it is "marked" by sanna (perception, a cetasika) as either "kusala" (wholesome) or "akusala" (unwholesome). There is no self that can will an action to occur, but rather the processes of zillions and zillions (is there such a number?) of cittas and cetasikas rising and falling, all conditioned, as described by Paticcasamuppada (sp?). So, how can "one" "practice" in the Buddhist sense? It is through lots of reading, listening, writing in on this discussion group, among other things, all of it the study of Dhamma, that will condition kusala cittas and cetasikas to arise so that "one" will continue to be interested in doing this, leading to more kusala cittas and cetasikas to arise later, slowly leading to sati and panna to arise (these are also cetasikas). When these do arise, and they are mostly imperceptable at first, they act as conditions for further study, as well as validating what we have learned on the intellectual level. So, the fact that you take the time each day to read all the letters, ponder on what various people have written in, and write responses which help you clarify your own understanding (as well as help all of us immeasurably) in ways we cannot directly pinpoint, is all part of the practice of Dhamma. All of these kusala actions are "accrued" and act as condition for more kusala to arise later (the same happens for akusala actions as well). Anumodhana (having joy for the dana--generosity--of others) to you for sharing your wisdom and understanding with us, and especially to Sarah and Jon for providing this forum, as one means of "carrying out" the practice. with metta, Betty > > Howard: > > ... > > > All I mean is making it a point to pay attention to what is going > > > on, > > > to notice when there is a lapse in that, and particularly, by repeated > > > attempts to turn this attentiveness into a *habit*. If that is *willing* > > > something I'm not sure. It is certainly goal-directed bahavior. > > > ------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Sounds pretty much like plain old *willing* to me ;-)). > > > > Is there perhaps an underlying assumption that 'making it a point to pay > > attention to what is going on' is kusala or more likely to be so than not, > > or even a kind of satipatthana? Satipatthana involves the direct > > experience of dhammas by consciousness that is accompanied by kusala > > factors of a very high level. To my understanding, the conditions for > > such mental states to arise cannot be willed into being, and they do not > > include 'goal-directed behaviour' (oh that it were so!!). > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Ahh. Well, good, Jon - so there's nothing I need to do. What will be, > will be. That's good. It certainly makes my life easier - less complicated. > If I sleepwalk through my days and exert no effort to do otherwise, that's > unfortuanate, but just my accumulations. If "the direct experience of dhammas > " should happen, that will be nice, and, if not, well - c'est la vie. Nothing > to do. Nothing to cultivate. > I apologize for the irony, Jon, but this is how I evaluate what you > are saying. There is nothing for us to do, no actions that we should or can > take. What is it, then, to be a practicing Buddhist? If, to put into practice > the teachings of the Buddha does not require *doing* something, exercising of > will, then everyone is a Buddhist practitioner. I'm sorry, but this > no-exercise-of-volition position just escapes me. (I'm speaking > conventionally here, Jon. I know that there is no "us" to be doing anything. > I know there is no "you" and no "me" - but still I write to you! ;-) > Outgoing messages scanned and certified safe by Stop-Sign, the Personal Alarm Service. http://defender.veloz.com/dlp_ban/?n=tl&sp=08.out002 15567 From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 8:04pm Subject: Fw: [dsg] "doing" something in Buddhism Sorry if this gets sent 2X; was not sure it went the first time, Betty _______________________ ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala" To: Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 10:00 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] "doing" something in Buddhism > Hello, Howard, > Hope all is well and that the new school year is going smoothely for you. > Usually am silent, but thought I'd write this time. "We" all like to think > there must be a "will" do carry on some sort of practice, but when "we" > think so, it is merely a "self" doing the thinking. Included in Right > Understanding then, is first, the intellectual understanding that there is > no self that can will "us" to carry out any action, be it getting up in the > morning, etc. Owing to conditions, cittas and cetasikas arise, which > condition thoughts at the mind door, which condtion action: getting up in > the morning, brushing the teeth, studying, etc. Can "you" control what > thoughts enter "your" mind? > > Included with those cittas and cetasikas constantly arising and falling > away, are accumulations and inclinations that are constantly being accrued > over the aeons. There is no free will in the Judeo-Christian sense, but > there is no fatalism either. So, our actions are determined by conditions, > but with the understanding that previous actions have led "us" to this > point. > > Within each sense door and mind door process of cittas and cetasikas arising > and falling away, the first part of the process is mostly vipaka: the result > of kammic actions from the past. Whatever rupa objects are perceived through > the sense doors and mind door is vipaka, the first part of the process. > There is no control over this. One cannot "will" what sounds will be heard > or what colors will be perceived, etc. The second part of the process is the > kammic part: it is here that a "value judgement" is made of the object: it > is "marked" by sanna (perception, a cetasika) as either "kusala" (wholesome) > or "akusala" (unwholesome). There is no self that can will an action to > occur, but rather the processes of zillions and zillions (is there such a > number?) of cittas and cetasikas rising and falling, all conditioned, as > described by Paticcasamuppada (sp?). > > So, how can "one" "practice" in the Buddhist sense? It is through lots of > reading, listening, writing in on this discussion group, among other things, > all of it the study of Dhamma, that will condition kusala cittas and > cetasikas to arise so that "one" will continue to be interested in doing > this, leading to more kusala cittas and cetasikas to arise later, slowly > leading to sati and panna to arise (these are also cetasikas). When these do > arise, and they are mostly imperceptable at first, they act as conditions > for further study, as well as validating what we have learned on the > intellectual level. > > So, the fact that you take the time each day to read all the letters, ponder > on what various people have written in, and write responses which help you > clarify your own understanding (as well as help all of us immeasurably) in > ways we cannot directly pinpoint, is all part of the practice of Dhamma. All > of these kusala actions are "accrued" and act as condition for more kusala > to arise later (the same happens for akusala actions as well). > > Anumodhana (having joy for the dana--generosity--of others) to you for > sharing your wisdom and understanding with us, and especially to Sarah and > Jon for providing this forum, as one means of "carrying out" the practice. > > with metta, > Betty > > > > Howard: > > > ... > > > > All I mean is making it a point to pay attention to what is > going > > > > on, > > > > to notice when there is a lapse in that, and particularly, by repeated > > > > attempts to turn this attentiveness into a *habit*. If that is > *willing* > > > > something I'm not sure. It is certainly goal-directed bahavior. > > > > ------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > Sounds pretty much like plain old *willing* to me ;-)). > > > > > > Is there perhaps an underlying assumption that 'making it a point to pay > > > attention to what is going on' is kusala or more likely to be so than > not, > > > or even a kind of satipatthana? Satipatthana involves the direct > > > experience of dhammas by consciousness that is accompanied by kusala > > > factors of a very high level. To my understanding, the conditions for > > > such mental states to arise cannot be willed into being, and they do not > > > include 'goal-directed behaviour' (oh that it were so!!). > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Ahh. Well, good, Jon - so there's nothing I need to do. What will > be, > > will be. That's good. It certainly makes my life easier - less > complicated. > > If I sleepwalk through my days and exert no effort to do otherwise, that's > > unfortuanate, but just my accumulations. If "the direct experience of > dhammas > > " should happen, that will be nice, and, if not, well - c'est la vie. > Nothing > > to do. Nothing to cultivate. > > I apologize for the irony, Jon, but this is how I evaluate what you > > are saying. There is nothing for us to do, no actions that we should or > can > > take. What is it, then, to be a practicing Buddhist? If, to put into > practice > > the teachings of the Buddha does not require *doing* something, exercising > of > > will, then everyone is a Buddhist practitioner. I'm sorry, but this > > no-exercise-of-volition position just escapes me. (I'm speaking > > conventionally here, Jon. I know that there is no "us" to be doing > anything. > > I know there is no "you" and no "me" - but still I write to you! ;-) > > > Outgoing messages scanned and certified safe by Stop-Sign, the Personal Alarm Service. http://defender.veloz.com/dlp_ban/?n=tl&sp=08.out002 15568 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 4:25pm Subject: Re: Einstein's Theory of Relativity/ Christine Hello Christine, >I wonder if you could kindly expand on each of your following >statements: I can try. >"the Dalai Lama [said] that the Dhamma must ultimately yield to science? I believe this has come up especially in the context of dating suttas, some of which have been shown to be significantly later than they are reputed to be; ultimately, I believe he has said, this dating, if definitive, should be accepted. This is a big deal since supposedly some were written and hidden away through the centuries, giving them their putative legitimacy. Considering the large number of conferences he has hosted with western scientists he has shown a great interest in dialogue and harmonizing the Dhamma with science. I believe that if the Dhamma conflicts with science then science wins; but it's difficult to find a real conflict, one where science actually trumps. Does anyone hold that the earth is flat with four continents around a huge mountain? Well, then they're wrong. Does anyone believe that the Agganna sutta genesis is literally true? It isn't. So I gave a few examples of possible conflicts to show that they aren't resolved (and, possibly, they aren't resolvable) by scientific methods. >Even so this gives a lot of wiggle room (like the Kalama sutta ;-). Imagine the various sages coming back into town and being told the Buddha has since visited and convinced them to only accept what they find right within their own experience. I rather doubt they'd maliciously twist their mustaches and mutter "Foiled again." They'd say "Cool, do that." I suspect that even animal sacrificing Satanist think they're right. (Pol Pot, who killed 2 million people, thought he was right at his little trial at the end of his life.) Christians tell me all the time how they were previously rotten and Jesus turned them around; they *know* he exists from personal experience; their (rather tiresome) Kalama sutta. (And, from time to time, someone posts an anti-Kalama statement on DSG: Been at it 10 or 20 years with little to no apparent results? Then abandon the medieval scholastic approach? No, just keep at it.) As an independent epistemological criteria it's porous. >Cartesian dualism (nama-rupa as separate realities) is way on the outs, but >certainly not eliminated. Searle (in "Minds, Language, Society," I think) remarked that he was surprised, sharing a platform with the Dalai Lama, that he believed in mind/body dualism; apparently Cartesian dualism wasn't just a western error! You'd be hard pressed to find a Cartesian in philosophy or any of the brain sciences; perhaps Eccles and Popper were the last major voices. And they were so far out in the wilderness virtually no one even bothered to discuss them. It has few adherents in philosophy, is absent in cognitive science (natch), and (this isn't my field) doesn't really have any standing in neuroscience. So it's very unpopular, and under sustained and seemingly withering criticism. But it still remains possible, say, that the brain is a transmitter of an independent consciousness, like some kind of radio receiver. So all the correlation's hold (e.g., damage this part and hearing goes) but the interpretation changes. Dualism has not been, if even such is possible, refuted. It could come back, in some revised form, and supplant mind/brain identity theory, functionalism, and non-reductive monism (my favorite), the current hot trends. >Psychic powers are sort of a joke, but who can really know? There's not much I can say here without being rude; this stuff is childish. But there's no a priori reason why it's impossible. >Rebirth has nothing to be said for it but clearly remains possible." Damage the brain and consciousness is damaged, in fairly predictable ways. Destroy the occipital lobe and vision goes. Powerful local damage produces those strange cases Oliver Sacks discusses. Massive damage, massive loss of function: mental retardation. Destroy the brain => no consciousness. Everything seems to point that way. But again, it's far from a sure thing. Who knows? >with gratitude in anticipation of an elucidating reply - Oh, I think you're being a bit sarcastic, something not completely unknown to me ;-) metta, stephen 15569 From: Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 4:33pm Subject: Re: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? At least the situation isn't like the Tao Te Ching where it's almost impossible to tell if two people are even translating the same verse. And where most of the 'translators' don't even know Chinese! I think we would all? agree that there are a large number of Pali words that should not be translated (e.g., dukkha, metta, panna). I find that a significant part of my study involves finding out what they mean, and a translation would hinder, not help. metta, stephen 15570 From: robmoult Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 8:56pm Subject: Mindfulness in Daily Life Hi Jon (and others), In last week's class, I did a review of mindfulness (sati) and was asked, "I can appreciate how one develops mindfulness during a mediation retreat, but how can we make mindfulness part of our daily lives?" Jon, I remember posing a similar question to you when we met in Hong Kong. Perhaps it is a measure of my deepening understanding or your direct / indirect influence on me, but I was able to give an immediate reply as follows: "Don't confuse mindfulness (sati) with concentration (samadhi). Concentration can take time to develop and a conducive environment, such as a retreat, certainly helps. Mindfulness is not an action of doing something, it is an act of un-doing; not thinking, not judging, not associating, not planning, not imagining and not wishing. When we talk, we use words, the domain of papanca. To function in daily life, we live in the world of concepts, papanca again. However, we can all take a one second vacation from time to time to abandon papanca to practice mindfulness of nama and rupa. As we develop a skill of abandoning papanca and practicing mindfulness in daily lives, we can use this tool during our mediation practice." Do you agree with my response? Next week, I want to revisit this important question again at the beginning of the class. I want to expand on it further and talk about the time between lying down in bed at night and falling asleep. At this time, the mind has a tendency to move to the past (I should have said this..., why did that person do that...), or to the future (tomorrow, I have to remember to...) or move into a fantasy world (I wonder what it would be like to be that character in the film...). I am going to propose to the class that this is an excellent time to practice mindfulness (without the pain of the full lotus position). I am new to this concept of practicing mindfulness in daily life. I seek the advice of other DSGrs on how to present it effectively. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15571 From: robmoult Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 9:01pm Subject: Re: Einstein's Theory of Relativity/ Christine Hi Stephen, I value your input. Would you be willing to review and discuss my document before I present it? If so, I suggest that we do it off-line so that we can exchange email attachments. Please give me your email address and you can expect something preliminary from me in a few days. Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: If there are other DSGrs who would like to be included in this off-line discussion, please let me know. PPS: The final version of the paper (whatever we agree upon) will be included in the October version of Class Notes, so that all DSGrs can view it. 15572 From: epsteinrob Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 9:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The purpose of samatha / Rob Ep Hi Jon. Thanks for the additional comments! I tend to think that samatha and vipassana support each other, although I'm not knowledgeable enough to back this up. It makes sense to me that deep peace and calm with concentration would have the potential to allow for clear seeing. But I will wait to gather more information before attempting to say more. Robert Ep ============== --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > Just to supplement the answers I gave in an earlier post (that you > apparently only got around to reading after you wrote this -- and which > you say largely answers your questions) 15573 From: epsteinrob Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 9:11pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Nutriment --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Jon - > > > > Thank you for the following information. I must say, though - > > this > > business strikes me as 1) a mixing of actuality and concept, and 2) > > pseudo-scientific from the modern perspective. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > As to your (1), I think we probably tend to equate 'rupas' with > 'sense-door object'. However, this is not really so. > > While all objects that are experienced through the 5 sense-doors are > indeed rupas, the reverse is not true. Only 7 of the 28 rupas are > directly experienced through a sense-door. The remaining 21, nutrition > among them, can be experienced only through the mind-door. However, this > does not make it any more a concept and any less a rupa Dear Jon, Could you please explain how 'nutrition' and the other non-sensory dhammas are rupas, and why and how they are mind-door objects rather than sense-door objects? Thanks, Robert 15574 From: epsteinrob Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 9:17pm Subject: Re: Nutriment / Rob Ep Hi Jon. What I am having trouble understanding is not the fact that it takes a description to refer to the nutritive characteristic or essence, but how it is a rupa that can be experienced, rather than thought about or conceptualized. How is it, even if not in this lifetime, that 'nutritive essence' can be an actual object for the mind? How would a citta encounter it? It seems to me that the nutritive capacity of food is a concept. When nutrition leaves food and enters the body and continues it's journey to feed the cells and organs, there is nothing in that process that we could actually call 'nutrition'. That is a conceptual tag-word for a complex series of processes, just like everything else in life. It appears, although I am happy to be corrected, that these rupas, such as 'nutrition', are concepts elevated to the status of rupas for philosophical reasons. I think it would be important to be able to distinguish a rupa that has that general or abstract a description from a concept. Best, Robert Ep. ========== --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > ... > < characteristic in the moment apart from thought? Surely, one can only > encounter a characteristic that is actually present in the rupa itself, > not something that has to be adduced of it? How can one perceive in the > moment that an object is capable of being food?>> > > The 'definition' I gave was just my own clumsy attempt at expressing what= > would have been better left to the texts cited by Nina (and copied again > below). From the Atthasalini, a more accurate definition would be, 'Tha= t > which is present in food that preserves beings, keeps them alive'. > > As mentioned both in the Nyanatiloka extract and by Nina, this rupa can > only be experienced through the mind-door. To my understanding, this for= > all practical purposes means it is unlikely to be experienced by us in a > lifetime. > > However, to answer the main thrust of your post, the fact that a rupa > needs a sentence or so to describe its characteristic doesn't mean it is > any less a rupa. The rupas that we commonly call simply 'visible object'= > or 'sound' are in fact more accurately described as 'the phenomena > experienced through the eye- or ear-door'. > > Jon > > http://www.zolag.co.uk/rupas.txt > Nutrition is another kind of rúpa which has to arise with every kind > of materiality. It can be exerienced only through the mind-door. The > "Dhammasangaùi" (§ 646) mentions food such as boiled rice, sour gruel, > flour, etc., which can be eaten and digested into the "juice" by which > living beings are kept alive. The "Atthasåliní" (II, Book II, Ch III, > 330) explains that there is foodstuff, the substance which is > swallowed (kabaîinkåro åhåro, literally, morsel-made food), and the > "nutritive essence"(ojå). The foodstuff which is swallowed fills the > stomach so that one does not grow hungry. The nutritive essence > present in food preserves beings, keeps them alive. The nutritive > essence in gross foodstuff is weak, and in subtle foodstuff it is > strong. After eating coarse grain one becomes hungry after a brief > interval. But when one has taken ghee (butter) one does not want to > eat for a long time (Atthasåliní, 331). 15575 From: epsteinrob Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 9:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1)/ Ken H Hi Christine. I'm not sure whose debates you are referring to here, so I don't know if it was directed in part towards myself or others -- that is part of the danger in making a general statement. It does make me nervous however, since a lot of my discussions tend to be ones that challenge parts of the Abdhidhamma that I either don't understand or that don't add up to me. I always invite clarification and have a feeling of friendship in pursuit of understanding with those who are here. My goal is ultimately understanding the path, so even if I am skeptical of some of the ideas that are expressed here - and others are of mine - I think we are involved in a healthy endeavor together. I have always been assured by Jon and Sarah that my views are welcome, and I am sure that is true for others here as well. While I agree with you that it is a mistake to make personal remarks, that is the only place I would draw the line, since the differing ways we interpret the Dhamma is part of what we have to offer each other. I just want to make sure that people are not going to start thinking that the only legitimate way to participate here is to look into the meanings of the commentaries, rather than share or even debate their diverse but sincere views. Best, Robert Ep. ======================= --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Ken H,and All, > > I wholeheartedly agree with you when you say > > : "May I add though, that I'm not > really interested in hearing how anyone agrees with some > parts and disagrees with others. I'd rather we > concentrate on understanding the original text. > Kind regards > Ken H" > -------------------------------------------- > Amicable discussions of the Teachngs are a wonderful thing and help > to arrive at a deeper understanding, but there are no winners > in 'debates' over practice, or disputing the validity of parts of the > Dhamma. Implying others are wrong, not as widely read or mislead > is not fruitful. Providing what is posted agrees with the Tipitaka, > let each tread their own path. Some have mentioned others as not > having the 'experience'. No-one knows the life history of others on > this List. No-one knows the citta of another. As the Home Page > states, this is a Theravadin Dhammastudy List set up to discuss the > Three Baskets of the Tipitaka and their Commentaries, and IMO, our > main focus should be studying of those texts. > > with much metta, > Christine > ----------------------------------------- > > An excerpt from the Pasura Sutta > > Among those who live above confrontation > not pitting view against view, > whom would you gain as opponent, Pasura, > among those here > who are grasping no more? > So here you come, > conjecturing, > your mind conjuring > viewpoints. > You're paired off with a pure one > and so cannot proceed. > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/suttanipata/snp4-08.html > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "kenhowardau" wrote: > > Hi Larry, Christine, Sarah, . . . > > > > I'd like to enrol in the new abhidhamma class. 15576 From: epsteinrob Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 9:41pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Jon, Jumping in, the following things make this Sutta a possible description of meditation practice to me: 1/ To me it sounds like 'mindfulness meditation'. In other words, there is an attempt at each stage to focus mindful or understanding awareness towards the object of discernment. So it may not sound like some forms of meditation, but it does sound like mindfulness practice to me. 2/ There is one basic object of the mindfulness, the breath, and this to me makes it an organized practice, or meditation practice. One imagines, at least I do, that to focus on these attributes of the breathing with mindfulness, one would have to be sitting and concentrating. It does not sound like a 'general' practice, to be undertaken while going through normal activities. 3/ The attributes of the four foundations of mindfulness and other objects discussed in the Sutta are presented in an organized, graded fashion. It seems to me that this progression would represent a course of progress that one would move through in working with this 'set' over a period of time, in other words, a number of sessions. This also seems to me to be a meditatitve practice, and a structured progression, rather than something to be applied in a more happenstance way. 4/ I like the portions you have selected for scrutiny. I think the thoughtfulness and understanding that the Buddha requires from this practice is indeed striking, and points to a deep sense of what mindfulness might consist of, whether we apply it as a formal practice or as a daily focus upon arising phenomena. Best, Robert Ep. ====================== --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > I've just been looking again through the Satipatthana Sutta, this time > focussing on what I might call the 'operative words', that is, the key > terms used by the Buddha in describing how each of the 4 > foundations/arousings of mindfulness is carried out. I list these out > below. I think they make interesting reading. > > [Body] > Mindful, he breathes in > thinking, 'I breathe in long,' he understands > 'thinking thus, he trains himself > understands: 'I am going'; > is a person practising clear comprehension > reflects... thinking thus > thinks of his own body thus > > [Feeling] > experiencing a pleasant feeling, understands... > > [Consciousness] > understands the consciousness with lust > > [Mental objects] > knows with understanding [5 hindrances] > thinks: 'Thus is material form...' [5 khandhas] > understands the eye and material forms [6 sense-bases] > knows with understanding: 'I have the enlightenment factor [7 > enlightenment factors] > understands: 'This is suffering,' [4 noble truths] > > This doesn't seem to me like the language of formal meditation practice. > Do you see anything here, or elsewhere in the sutta, that points to a > formal meditation practice? > > Jon 15577 From: epsteinrob Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 9:53pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Jon, Whoops, in my response here I was really thinking of the anapanasati sutta. The satipatthana sutta, which I am slightly less familar with, seems to be organized in a way which is applicable to meditation, and some sections seem to indicate particular meditations and contemplations that can be done with specific objects. But it is also obvious that sections of it are meant to be applied to daily life. I can't imagine the mindfulness of standing, sitting, going forward and backward, etc., to be descriptive of a particular 'meditation'. It is obvious there that Buddha means practitioners to be mindful of what is taking place whenever they stand, sit, walk, or lie down, throughout daily living. If find the anapanasati sutta to be more in the form of a systematic meditation manual. By the way, I found the satipatthana sutta and commentary at this URL: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/misc/wayof.html. I know you are familiar with access to insight; just thought I'd post it in case any of us want to take a look. Looks like the whole commentary is there, and I hope to read it when I have the time. Best, Robert Ep. ================ --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "epsteinrob" wrote: > Hi Jon, > Jumping in, the following things make this Sutta a possible description > of meditation practice to me: > > 1/ To me it sounds like 'mindfulness meditation'. In other words, > there is an attempt at each stage to focus mindful or understanding > awareness towards the object of discernment. So it may not sound like > some forms of meditation, but it does sound like mindfulness practice > to me. ... 15578 From: Sarah Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 10:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Larry, Just speaking for myself, I’m quite happy NOT to be left ‘in peace’ ....I always appreciate your comments and consideration here, Larry. Like Rob Ep just said, I too “have a feeling of friendship in pursuit of understanding with those who are here” and appreciate that we all have very different backgrounds and accumulations which affect how we communicate, study and develop this understanding. I also agree with you that it’s not true to say “that meditation is something only suited to an elite few.” and true to say that “meditation is for anyone”. However, there are many ways of understanding ‘meditation’ and for myself, I’m really only interested in what is meant by bhavana (meditation) - samatha and vipassana-- as I understand the term from the texts and as it applies to life at this moment. I’ve already explained at length why this is so. I appreciate that others have a different understanding when they read the same texts and this keeps us in discussion;-) Concepts do not need to be in words. A small baby doesn’t have any vocabulary, but there is still the thinking of concepts and the ideas about colours, smells, tastes , sounds and bodily impressions. As concepts are not ultimately real (even though they may represent actualities), they do not have the characteristics of impermanence and unsatisfactoriness. We cannot refer to them as ‘sankhata’ or formed up. Clinging can cling to anything now, including concepts. Concepts are not, however, included in the 5 khandhas.which represent all the paramattha dhammas (ultiamte realities) apart from nibbana, of course. However, if there were no khandhas now, could there be any thinking about concepts? So we can say that when there is clinging to concepts, it’s on account of the 5 khandhas - on account of rupas, of consciousness, of feelings and so on. Sarah ===== 15579 From: Sarah Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 11:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Mind-process (was, Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata) Dear Rob M and Jon (and anyone else not put off by processes and Pali terms), I know the following is too late for your lecture on processes, Rob, but it may at least be helpful for your Notes. ..... > Below is what Nyanatiloka says on the origins of the details on the mind > process. Hope this is of interest. > > Jon > > citta-víthi, > (as well as all terms for the various functions within the processes of > consciousness, such as ávajjana-citta, sampaticchana, santírana, > votthapana, javana, tadárammana, bhavanga, cuti): > None of these terms is found in the Sutta Canon. except javana, in > Pts.M. > Even in the Ahh. Canon (e.g. Patth) only javana and bhavanga are twice > or > thrice briefly mentioned ..... However, in the commentaries to the Abhidhamma texts, there is a wealth of detail. The following is from Sammohavinodani, Dispeller of Delusion (Commentary to the Vibhanga),.PTS (1750f). We read these details about the citta vithi (process of cittas). As you may not have a copy of this text, I’ll quote quite fully . ***** Furthermore, “clear comprehension through non-delusion” should here be understood also by way of a) “full understanding of the root” (muulapari~n~na), b) of “visiting” (aagantukabhaava) and c) of “temporariness” (taavakaalikabhaava). Firstly a) by way of “full understanding of the root”: Life continuum and adverting, seeing follows, then receiving, Investigation, determining, and then impulsion comes as seventh (DA i 194; MA i 262; SA iii 191) Herein, the life continuum (bhavanga) occurs accomplishing the function of a factor (anga) of rebirth process existence (uppatti bhava). by interrupting (aavattetvaa) that, the functional mind element (kriyaa manodhaatu) occurs accomplishing the function of adverting (aavajjana). Upon the ceasing of that, eye consciousnes (cakkhuvi~n~naana) occurs accomplishing the function of seeing (dassana). Upon the ceasing of that, (kamma) resultant mind element (vipaaka manodhaatu) occurs accomplishing the function of accepting (sa.mpa.tichana). Upon the cessation of that, (kamma) resultant mind consciousness element (vipaaaka manov~n~naanadhaatu) occurs accomplishing the function of investigation (santiirana). Upon the cessation of that, functional mind consciousness element (kriyaa-manovi~n~naanadhaatu) occurs accomplishing the function of determing (votthapana). Upon the cessation of that, impulsion (javana) impels (javati) seven times. Herein, in the first impulsion (by itself) there is no looking towards and looking away by way of lusting, hating or being deluded, (thinking:) ‘This is a woman, this is a man.’ The same is the case with the rest of the seven impulsions (singly). Nevertheless it is when these (impulsions), after breaking up, fall one on top of another, like soldiers on the battlefield, that there comes to be looking towards and looking away by way of lusting, etc (thinking:) ‘this is a woman, this is a man.’ Thus should “clear comprehension through non-delusion” here be understood by way of “full understanding of the root”. b) but when a visible datum comes into focus in the eye door, impulsion arises at the end when, following the disturbance in the life continuum, adverting, etc have arisen and ceased with the accomplishment of their respective function. That (impulsion) is like a visitor in the eye door which is the home of the previously arisen adverting and so on. And as it is improper for a visitor who has entered another’s house to ask for something, to give orders, when the owners of the home sit in silence, so lusting and hating or becoming deluded in the eye door which is the home of adverting, etc is improper when adverting, etc do not lust or hate or become deluded. Thus should “clear understanding through non-delusion” be understood by way of “visiting”. c) But those consciousnesses ending with determining which arise in the eye door break up together with their associated states just there (where they arose), they do not see each other and they are brief and temporary. Herein, in a house where all the human (occupants except one) are dead and the remaining one is due to die that very moment, it is improper for him to delight in dancing, singing, etc; so indeed, when adverting and so on with their associated states are dead in that same eye door and also the impulsion that remains is due to die that very moment, it is improper for it to delight by way of lusting, hating and becoming deluded. Thus should “clear comprehension through non-delusion” be understood by way of “temporariness”. ***** The entire section is full of helpful detail and reminders about anatta. Here are two more brief ones: “Herein, what single person moves forward? Or to what single person does the moving forward belong? For in the highest sense there is only a going of elements, a standing of elements, a sitting of elements, a lying dowin of elements. For in each portion, together with the materiality, “ ‘Tis another consciousness that rises, another consciousness that ceases; Like to a river’s (flowing) stream that occurs in unbroken succession” (DA i 193; MAi 261; SA iii 190)” ***** “Likewise the eye is the eye element; the visible datum is the visible datum element; the seeing is the eye consciousness element; the states associated therewith beginning with feeling are the mental datum element. In this way “looking towards and looking away” is stated in terms of these four elements. Herein, what single person looks towards, what person looks away?” ***** Rob, there are several other places in this text where details of the processes are given and where registration cittas (tadaarammana) are given too (eg 178 and 706f) which gives details of various processes at the time of death and rebirth in great detail - we learn about ‘dying in confusion’, ‘when one is going looking the other way, they cut off his head with a sharp sword from behind...’, ‘rapid dying’ when ‘they squash a fly sitting on the handle of a spade...’ and all the details of the citta vithi (process) that follow and the variations. There is far more detail than I can begin to convey here and quite probably the answers to points you raised on variations of citta vithi. If you would like any more detail or clarification, I can try to help;-) Christine, let me know if you'd like to hear what happens to the poor squashed fly, too;-( Btw, in an earlier series of posts I discussed (with quotes) the early origins of the Abhidhamma and Commentaries back to the Ist Council. Sarah ===== 15580 From: kenhowardau Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 11:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1)/ Ken H Dear Christine, I think we are in agreement on the points that matter but in one, minor, area, I've noticed a subtle difference: If you think back to the meeting at Andrew's place, there were a couple of occasions when someone openly expressed disagreement, not with the interpretations, but with the Dhamma itself. On those occasions, I felt compelled to point out, in the nicest possible way of course, that we were there to learn the Buddhadhamma -- we hadn't driven all that way to listen to "The World According to Fred Smith!" I seem to remember that you were decidedly more tolerant than I was. Come to think of it, so were all the others. :-) I think we agree, however, on one aspect of this, an aspect that goes far beyond mere etiquette: The Dhamma may not be a teaching of blind obedience, but it does need to be taken as one's ONLY refuge. We can't have a bet each way. Ehi-passika means, "come and see;" it doesn't mean, "stand outside and peek in." I'm not making excuses for intolerance, but if we can point out to someone that he is not honestly trying to see what the Buddha taught, then we might be saving him, and ourselves, a lot of wasted time. Kind regards Ken H P.S. The above is mere opinion and might easily be wrong. :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Ken H,and All, > > I wholeheartedly agree with you when you say > > : "May I add though, that I'm not > really interested in hearing how anyone agrees with some > parts and disagrees with others. I'd rather we > concentrate on understanding the original text. > Kind regards > Ken H" > -------------------------------------------- > Amicable discussions of the Teachngs are a wonderful thing and help > to arrive at a deeper understanding, but there are no winners > in 'debates' over practice, or disputing the validity of parts of the > Dhamma. Implying others are wrong, not as widely read or mislead > is not fruitful. Providing what is posted agrees with the Tipitaka, > let each tread their own path. Some have mentioned others as not > 15581 From: robmoult Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 11:34pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Mind-process (was, Upekkha vs. Tatramajjhattata) Hi Sarah, This is wonderful! --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob M and Jon (and anyone else not put off by processes and Pali > terms), > > I know the following is too late for your lecture on processes, Rob, but > it may at least be helpful for your Notes. > ..... As it turns out, it is not too late for my lecture on process. I am doing a review of kusala cetasikas now (buys me some time) and following that I will do my "Einstein" lecture. The process lecture is at least two weeks away, maybe three (depending on how the review goes). > There is far more detail than I can begin to convey here and quite > probably the answers to points you raised on variations of citta vithi. If > you would like any more detail or clarification, I can try to help;-) Please send more! Please send more! Thanks, Rob M :-) 15582 From: robmoult Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 11:44pm Subject: PTS Printing in India Hi All, I was at one of my local Buddhist Bookstores at lunch today and they told me that the Pali Text Society would now be printing their books in India. The bookstore said that the price would drop signficantly and the first batch of books would be available in January or February. The bookstore was also hoepful that the Indian company would be more responsive than PTS. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15583 From: Sarah Date: Sun Sep 8, 2002 11:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] subtle point, to Kom Dear Nina & Kom, --- Nina van Gorkom wrote > Maybe the monk who is walking conveys to himself, with mindfulness, that > he > is going forward now, and then there is kaya vinnatti. ..... I’m not sure how relevant this is and I know you’ll have read these details before. Nina, do you have the ‘revised’ PTS edition of Sammohavinodani? We have the 1996 edition which includes a lot of Pali terms and is very user friendly. I note it was revised by Lance Cousins, Nyanaponika and C. Shaw. The section of relevance is in the chapter ‘Classification of the Jhanas’ and immediately preceds the part (1751f)I just quoted for Rob M on citta vithi (processes). The following are quotes from the section 1741 - 1751 . ***** “But ‘clear comprehension through non-delusion’ is not being deluded as regards moving forward and so on. That should be understood thus: here a bhikkhu, when moving forward or moving backward, unlike the blind ordinary man who deludes himself as regards moving forward, etc (by imagining;) ‘A self moves forward, the moving forward is produced by a self’ or : ‘I move forward, the moving forward is produced by me,’ is one who is not so deluded; when the consciousness ‘I (will) move forward’ arises, together with that same consciousness there arises the consciousness originated air element, which produces (bodily) intimation (vi~n~natti). thus this framework of bones called the body moves forward by means of the diffusion of the air element due to the action of consciousness.” *** “There is no self inside which looks towards or looks away; but when the consciousness ‘I (will) look towards’ arises, together with that same consciousness there arises the consciousness-originated air element which produces intimation. Thus the lower eyelid drops down and the upper eyelid jumps up by means of the diffusion of the air element due to the action of consciousness. There is no one who opens with a contrivance. After that, eye consciousness arises accomplishing the function of seeing. But here clear comprehension in this way is called ‘clear comprehension through non-delusion’ “. ***** Nina, there is plenty more detail in between these quotes, but I know you have access to it. There are also some details on these points and citta vithi (processes) in the sub-commentay to the Satipatthana Sutta under ‘clear comprehension of walking and so forth’ as I remember. Sarah ===== 15584 From: christine_forsyth Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 1:03am Subject: Re: Einstein's Theory of Relativity/ Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Christine, > >I wonder if you could kindly expand on each of your following > >statements: > I can try. <<<<<<<>>>>> > >with gratitude in anticipation of an elucidating reply - > Oh, I think you're being a bit sarcastic, something not completely unknown to > me ;-) > metta, stephen Hello Stephen, Thanks for your post, certainly clarifies your thoughts. Having managed to get into trouble with RobEp, Ken H, and you over my manner of posting today - I think I'll quit while I'm way behind. :-) metta, Christine 15585 From: christine_forsyth Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 1:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (1)/ Ken H/ROB EP Hi Robert Ep, and Ken H, I always look forward to, and find valuable, any posts either of you care to send. I take your point about the danger in making such general statements and unreservedly apologise for the offense given. metta, Christine 15586 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 4:30am Subject: Re: [dsg] Sutta reference to Jon Many thanks, Nina. Much appreciated. --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Jon, > Gradual Sayings, book of the Nines, Ch II, § 10, Velama. > It continues: ...had he made become, just for a fingersnap, the > perception > of impermanence. > Nina. > > op 08-09-2002 10:14 schreef Jonothan Abbott op jonoabb@y...: > > > > > "…though with pious heart a disciple took refuge in the Buddha, the > Dhamma > > and the Sangha, his reward would have been greater if he had, with > pious > > heart, undertaken to keep the precepts: ... > > "though with pious heart he undertook to keep the precepts, greater > still > > would have been his reward if he had conceived even a passing thought > of > > amity and goodwill." > >> > > > > > 15587 From: egberdina Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 4:39am Subject: Re: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? Dear Christine, You asked for it:-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Group, > > I initially posted this message elsewhere but would be very > interested to > hear any thoughts anyone here may have. > > metta, > Christine > > Subject: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? > > > > --- In Triplegem@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > > Recently on a number of lists, members have had differences about > the > > Buddha's teaching based on translations of the Tipitaka. It occurs > > to me that 21st century Buddhists are at the mercy of the vigilance, > > ethics, and competence of translators and of the translators > > interests and biases (unconscious or otherwise). 21st century buddhists and non-buddhists alike are at the mercy of ignorance more than anything else. Not the type of ignorance that is mitigated by scholarship. More the ignorance that prevents the insight into what is happening right here, right now. You are perhaps familiar with the Leunig cartoon of a man with his arm around his little son, sharing with him the delight of seeing the sunrise on TV, whilst the sun is seen to rise through a side window. The sun doesn't rise in books. If the book helps you to find the window, good and well. Perhaps the book may show you where the door is. But to go there, you need to leave the TV and the book behind. If you really want to find the truth , you have to be prepared to forsake everything, absolutely everything. The book says that too. Anatta for starters. A little, true story. I am greatly indebted to my father. At age 50, he discarded his entire theology/philosophy library. (He also was a minister of religion). Imagine the four walls of a roomy study, lined with shelves from the floor to the ceiling, not a vacant square centimetre, all the shelves jam-packed with hefty tomes on you-name- it, anything to do with spiritual quests. What happened? A small germ had taken root. God is not found in books. He quit the church, and his garden did better out of it, too. All the best Herman 15588 From: debanstis Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 4:50am Subject: Hi from Aus Hi, My name is Deb, I am new to your group, I have always been interested in Theravada Buddhism and travelled through Sri Lanka and Thailand. I am a beginner to "terms", so I hope to gain a deeper understanding of Theravada Buddhism from the interactive context of this group. So, I may lurk for awhile before I post again. Thankyou in advance, Deb from Australia 15589 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 2:48am Subject: Re: [dsg] "doing" something in Buddhism Hi, Betty - It's nice to hear from you. In a message dated 9/8/02 11:03:53 PM Eastern Daylight Time, beyugala@k... writes: > > Hello, Howard, > Hope all is well and that the new school year is going smoothely for you. > Usually am silent, but thought I'd write this time. "We" all like to think > there must be a "will" do carry on some sort of practice, but when "we" > think so, it is merely a "self" doing the thinking. Included in Right > Understanding then, is first, the intellectual understanding that there is > no self that can will "us" to carry out any action, be it getting up in the > morning, etc. Owing to conditions, cittas and cetasikas arise, which > condition thoughts at the mind door, which condtion action: getting up in > the morning, brushing the teeth, studying, etc. Can "you" control what > thoughts enter "your" mind? ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: There is no I, we, or self. Agreed. But there is willing. It is conditioned. Among the conditions are chanda and decision. (In the following, whenever the words 'I' 'we', etc are used, please know that it is conventional speech, and is so intended.) The reason I am writing to you is that I willed it. I could have chosen not to, but my wish was to reply, and so I exercised my will and did so. You and others on the list can opt for formal meditation - or not. It is your choice. It IS a choice. And we all make the choice, one way or another. Everything is conditioned. So what? Why is cetana the one cetasika that so many on DSG treat as an unwanted child. No one seems to mind to conventionally say "I think such and such", or "I felt such and such", but there is great upset should anyone say that "I chose/willed to do such and such"! --------------------------------------------------- > > Included with those cittas and cetasikas constantly arising and falling > away, are accumulations and inclinations that are constantly being accrued > over the aeons. There is no free will in the Judeo-Christian sense, but > there is no fatalism either. So, our actions are determined by conditions, > but with the understanding that previous actions have led "us" to this > point. -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I have no disagreement with this. Actions that are unconditioned, if they existed, would be random and of no interest to anyone. --------------------------------------------------------- > > Within each sense door and mind door process of cittas and cetasikas > arising > and falling away, the first part of the process is mostly vipaka: the > result > of kammic actions from the past. Whatever rupa objects are perceived > through > the sense doors and mind door is vipaka, the first part of the process. > There is no control over this. One cannot "will" what sounds will be heard > or what colors will be perceived, etc. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: That is true. (However, one can initiate, following one's wishes, to cover one's ears or avert one's eyes [a practice, BTW, sometimes suggested by the Buddha], or move away from the present location to avoid certain experiences. That is the exercise of volition. ------------------------------------------------------- The second part of the process is the> > kammic part: it is here that a "value judgement" is made of the object: it > is "marked" by sanna (perception, a cetasika) as either "kusala" > (wholesome) > or "akusala" (unwholesome). There is no self that can will an action to > occur, but rather the processes of zillions and zillions (is there such a > number?) of cittas and cetasikas rising and falling, all conditioned, as > described by Paticcasamuppada (sp?). > ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Right. There is no agent. There is willing, but no willer - just as there is thinking but no thinker, seeing but no seer, etc. ------------------------------------------------------------- > > So, how can "one" "practice" in the Buddhist sense? It is through lots of > reading, listening, writing in on this discussion group, among other > things, > all of it the study of Dhamma, that will condition kusala cittas and > cetasikas to arise so that "one" will continue to be interested in doing > this, leading to more kusala cittas and cetasikas to arise later, slowly > leading to sati and panna to arise (these are also cetasikas). > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: "One" DECIDES to do that studying. "One" wills it. I find it fascinating that people on this list are very ready to recommend engaging in the practice of study, as if that took no volition but somehow just happens, but not anywhere near ready to speak in the same way about meditating and guarding the senses, both of which require unrelenting and powerful acts of will to be carried out in any useful way. The Buddha spoke far more of energetically pursuing sila, of guarding the senses, and of meditating, both formally and informally, than he did of studying his teachings. He even brought a mentally impaired man to some degree of awaking by means of the meditative practice of mindfully rubbing a cloth! But so many here turn this upside down, approving of willful study but disapproving (as hopeless or uncontrollable) other practices. --------------------------------------------------------- When these do> > arise, and they are mostly imperceptable at first, they act as conditions > for further study, as well as validating what we have learned on the > intellectual level. > > So, the fact that you take the time each day to read all the letters, > ponder > on what various people have written in, and write responses which help you > clarify your own understanding (as well as help all of us immeasurably) in > ways we cannot directly pinpoint, is all part of the practice of Dhamma. > All > of these kusala actions are "accrued" and act as condition for more kusala > to arise later (the same happens for akusala actions as well). > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: So the Buddha's path has become one of reading and writing (and thinking over the content). Could *this* be the declining of Gotama's dispensation? ;-) --------------------------------------------------------- > > Anumodhana (having joy for the dana--generosity--of others) to you for > sharing your wisdom and understanding with us, and especially to Sarah and > Jon for providing this forum, as one means of "carrying out" the practice. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I truly do appreciate your saying that I may have something worthwhile to contribute from time to time. Thank you. As far as the "issue" of this post and the post of mine to which this is a reply is concerned, however, it still seems to me that there has not been a real addressing of the matter of how one is to engage in Buddhist practice, including study, without willing to do so. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > with metta, > Betty > ============================== Thanks very much for writing, Betty. With metta, Howard Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15590 From: robmoult Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 7:20am Subject: Re: Hi from Aus - Question? Hi Deb, Welcome to the group! You might want to download the "Class Notes" from the files section - it's pretty light on "terms" (i.e. not too much Pali). I am confused about something. The Internet is pretty much global, so there is equal opportunity for people of many nationalities to join in this discussion group. Why is it that so, so many of the members of this group are from Australia? A wildly disproportionate percentage... any theories? Perhaps it is something in the drinking water :-) ? Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "debanstis" wrote: > > Hi, > My name is Deb, I am new to your group, I have always been interested > in Theravada Buddhism and travelled through Sri Lanka and Thailand. > I am a beginner to "terms", so I hope to gain a deeper understanding > of Theravada Buddhism from the interactive context of this group. > So, I may lurk for awhile before I post again. > Thankyou in advance, > Deb from Australia 15591 From: Sarah Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 7:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Searching for 'Courage' in the Teachings Dear Chris, I’ve been reflecting quite a bit on ‘courage in the scriptures’ and perhaps some of these personal reflections and notes will be useful for you or others. There was also quite a lot of dicussion of relevance (I think) arising from the India series, so I’ll include some reminders from it as well as other posts. --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Group, > > I have been thinking a lot recently around the subject of Courage. > I couldn't find much on 'courage' in the scriptures - though there > was much on fear and terror. ...... > Then it occurred to me that as others of the admired 'worldly' > qualities are not so admired within Buddhism ("righteous anger" > springs to mind) - perhaps there are reasons why some types of > courage are also not admired? Not sure. ***** To be a quality to be ‘admired within Buddhism’ it will have to be reflect a wholesome or pure state of mind. As we know with these wholesome mental states, they are momentary and not to be confused with so called ‘wordly qualities’ which often are related to a story of situation. When I hear the word ‘courage’, it’s a reminder to have courage to really understand realities as they are, not as we’d like them to be. I particularly reflect on the aspect of knowing our kilesa when it comes to courage. Hiri (moral shame) and otappa (fear of blame) are the wholesome qualities which are the proximate cause of sila (morality) and which see the shame in unwholesome states: “..For when conscience (hiri) and shame (ottapa) are in existence, virtue arises and persists; and when they are not, it neither arises nor persists.....”. These states are the opposite of shamelessness and recklessness. There is courage to develop skilful states. They accompany other skilful states such as right effort ‘..for the non-arising of evil unskilled states that have not arisen....for the getting rid of evil unskilled states that have arisen....’ and so on. Under the perfection of sila in the Cariyapitaka com (B.Bodhi’s transl of Brahmajala Sutta & coms p287), we read how the bodhisattva is courteous in conduct, helps those who are sick. “When he receives well-spoken advice he expresses his appreciation. He praises the noble qualities of the virtuous and patiently endures the abuse of antagonists....when he commits a transgression he acknowledges it as such and confesses it to his co-religionists. Afterwards he perfectly fulfils the right practice.” ..... Hmm, if I were to acknowledge all my ‘transgressions’ to my ‘co-religionists’ here, I’m not sure there’d be room for anything else. Still, I find the reminders useful. Perhaps even more, when I consider courage, I think of sacca (truth) parami. In the chapter ‘The Perfection of Truthfulness’ in her own series on the Perfections, Nina writes: “The function of truthfulness is verifying according to fact. What are the facts? Our ignorance and the many defilements which arise are facts. We should not be deluded abour realities. Do we want to know them as they are, or do we pretend to be more virtuous and wise than we actually are? It takes courage to verify according to fact, but sincerity is indispensable for the development of right understanding. We may take akusala citta for kusala citta, but we have to verify the truth. For example, when we are helping others we may think that there are kusala cittas all the time, but is this true? “Helping can be very superior”, Bhante Dhammadhara reminded us.” ..... This reminder really rings a bell for me. When my students are happy or get good results, it’s easy for me to kid myself about all the kusala helping and yes, even the ‘superior’ helping. Indeed it takes courage to be honest with oneself at these times and not to 'pretend to be more virtuous and wise' than we really are. As Herman just suggested (I think), it's easy to blind oneself with book knowledge and again take akusala study for kusala wisdom. Nina just wrote about ‘Self Examination’ and there is a sutta with the same title (AN, Bk of Tens,51, B.Bodhi transl): ***** “....for a monk, self-examination is very helpful for the growth of wholesome qualities: “Am I often covetous or often not covetous? do i often hve ill will in my heart or am I often free of it?......... When, by such self-examination, a monk finds that he is often covetous, full of ill will, slothful, excited, doubtful, angry, mentally defiled, bodily restless, lazy and unconcentrated, then he should apply his utmost zeal and energy, effort and exertion, as well a unremitting mindfulness and clear comprehension, to the abandoning of all those evil, unwholesome qualities. Just as a man whose clothes or turban are on fire would apply his utmost zeal and energy, effort and exertion, as well as mindfulness and clear comprehension, so that he may extinguish the fire; even so, the monk should apply his utmost zeal and energy...for the abandoning of those evil, unwholesome qualities.” ***** I left the last paragraph about the turban in just for Sukin;-) Of course, all these reminders of wholesome and unwholesome states should be read in the light of anatta and non-control. Sacca (truthfulness) parami is followed by adhitthana (determination) parami because it takes determination to perfect sacca. Another perfection in the recent series by A.Sujin mentions nekkhama (renunciation) in the light of courage: “the perfection of renunciation does not merely mean leaving the household life and becoming a monk. Renunciation means having the energy and courage to eliminate the clinging we all have to visible object, sound and the other sense objects.” ..... We don’t usually think about courage with regard to ‘eliminating clinging’ or ‘guarding the sense doors’, but then as Larry has reminded us, the dhamma is ‘deeper than deep’. There have been reminders to have ‘patience, bravery and cheerfulness’ (athaan rarung in Thai). Nina wrote more on this and said: “When people do not see any result in being aware of seeing, visible object, hearing, sound and all objects appearing through the six doors they become disheartened, they give up. But as I learnt from a text of the Mahaniddesa given by Jim about jhaayati, reflection, we have to examine realities closely, often, frequently, in various ways, continuously. Pa~n~naa has to go on discriminating nama and rupa, not once or twice”. ..... When we’re concerned about our results and impatient for changes and development, there is no courage. Rob K wrote “...the Dhamma of the Buddha is about leading out of samsara and that doesn't happen overnight. The Buddha had the patience to develop the parami over 4 uncountable aeons and 100,000 kappas and (as Kom said) we can get the courage to carry on by knowing that it is no easy task.” Indeed the Bodhisatta had to listen to twenty four Buddhas before attaining Buddhahood eventually in his last life. Ken H replied to Azita along the same lines: “Are any of us honestly ready to give up ignorance in exchange for final extinction of the khandhas? For the time being, I'll settle for your `courage, patience and good cheer.' “ Again Nina wrote “We need patience to listen to the Dhamma, to consider often the different cittas of our life, kusala or akusala. Instead of aversion of our akusala we should have the patience to study and consider the different cittas arising because of conditions. Also energy, viriya is indispensable, to have courage, to continue studying and considering the dhammas of our daily life. When we make efforts to help others it is tiring, but then we need patience and energy, courage, not delaying kusala, not giving it up, making false excuses. “ ..... In another section from the India series, Nina writes “Each day Acharn Sujin exhorted us to take courage and to be cheerful. We read in the ‘Kindred Sayings’ (I, Sågåtha vagga, IV, Måra, Ch II, §6, The Bowl): On one occasion, at Såvatthí, the Exalted One was instructing, inciting and inspiring the monks by a sermon on the five khandhas of grasping (upadåna khandhas). And the monks with their whole mind applied, attentive and intent, listened with rapt hearing to the Dhamma. The Commentary (the Såratthappakåsiní) explains that the Buddha was instructing, teaching under different aspects the specific and general characteristics of the khandhas of grasping. The Buddha was enlightening, inciting and inspiring them. The Commentary explains that he exhorted them to have energy and endeavour. As we read in the sutta text, the monks listened with enthusiasm, with rapture, to the dhamma. Thus, this text reminds us to be courageous and not to give up developing understanding, an d to be cheerful, glad about the Dhamma. We discussed courage and cheerfulnes s because of the Dhamma several times. Acharn Sujin explained that when akusala citta arises we may dislike it, we may feel bad about it, but akusala can be realized as only a conditioned reality. Then we shall not tr y to do something else but the development of right understanding of what appears now, even if it is akusala. We have accumulated akusala for countless lives, and thus there are conditions for its arising. We shall no t be downhearted but we can be courageous and glad to be able to know the truth. We may be discouraged about our lack of awareness and understanding, our lack of progress. We should not expect the arising of a great deal of understanding when it has not yet been accumulated. Understanding should be developed very naturally in our daily life and in that way we can live happily, without anxiety. We can rejoice in the Dhamma we learnt and take courage to continue developing right understanding.” ***** Let me finish with these reminders I find so helpful from ‘Life’s Brevity’, AN, Bk of 7s, 150 (B.Bodhi transl): “Short is the life of human beings, O brahmins, limited and brief; it is full of suffering, full of tribulation. This one should wisely understand. One should do good and live a pure life; for none who is born can escape death. “Just as a dew-drop on the tip of a blade of grass will quickly vanish at sunrise an will not last ong; even so, brahmins, is human life like a dew-drop. It is short, limited and brief; it is full of suffering, full of tribulation. This one should wisely understand. One should do good and live a pure life; for none who is born can escape death.” ***** Best wishes for ‘courage, patience and good cheer’. Sarah ===== 15592 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Searching for 'Courage' in the Teachings Dear Christine, You found the word viriya, and this is courage. Further see below, you got the meaning, courage to eradicate defilements. The Ch on the perfection of Energy, viriya, is about all the aspects of viriya, and you will see all after the Ch on Wisdom. Now I shall just quote a part of it: End quotes. N: We need courage to be aware of nama and rupa in daily life, and when there is the perfection of viriya we do not become downhearted when progress is so slight that it cannot be noticed. But we continue inspite of obstacles. There is no fear for an unhappy rebirth, no stress that we should become a sotapanna in this life in order to be safe from an unhappy rebirth. Because of viriya we do not delay being aware even of such a thought, we can be aware of it as just a kind of nama that is conditioned. As Rob K reminded us, there is fire on our head, a sense of urgency is the proximate cause of viriya. That means even our wish for a faster way to the realization of the four noble Truths should be realized right now as only a nama, a kind of thinking. Then we are not lazy and inert, any moment is a moment fit for awareness. We have to become heroes. Best wishes from Nina. op 08-09-2002 06:53 schreef christine_forsyth op cforsyth@v...: > Dear Group, > > I have been thinking a lot recently around the subject of Courage. > I couldn't find much on 'courage' in the scriptures - though there > was much on fear and terror. Some Pali words related to courage are: > courage (nt.) viriya. (f.) dhiti; abhãrutà. (m.) parakkama; > courageous (adj.) såra; vãra; dhitimantu; viriyavantu;; > courageously (snip) > To me, Courage is more than the absence of fear. Courage is the 'not > giving in to' or the 'overcoming' of fear. I know what it is in the > worldly sense - it comes from the Old French word for 'heart' - it is > the strength to do or face something that one finds frightening. It > means feeling fear, but enduring that feeling, standing firm against > whatever comes, and doing what needs to be done despite it. (snip) > My understanding at this point is that firming up courage and > overcoming fear depends on two things 1. Somehow increasing the > power of ones Saddha and 2. Somehow decreasing the power of ones > Defilements. Just have to find out how ..... 15593 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 10:00am Subject: philosophy Dear Stephen, Your post was interesting but many difficult points, and thus, I asked my sister. I like to learn more because it helps me to understand different backgrounds of people. I get more interested now in philosophy. My sister explained at least a little about the quantum theory. Best wishes from Nina. 15594 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 4:29pm Subject: ADL ch. 24 (1) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 24 (1) Enlightenment One cannot attain enlightenment without having cultivated the right conditions. We read in the Kindred Sayings (V, Mahå-vagga, Book XI, Kindred Sayings on Streamwinning, chapter I, §5, Såriputta) about four conditions for becoming a sotåpanna (streamwinner). The sutta states: Now the venerable Såriputta went to see the Exalted One, and on coming to him saluted him and sat down at one side. To the venerable Såriputta so seated the Exalted One said this: `` `A limb of stream-winning! A limb of stream-winning!´ is the saying, Såriputta. Tell me, Såriputta, of what sort is a limb of stream-winning.´´ ``Lord, association with the upright is a limb of stream-winning. Hearing the good Dhamma is a limb of stream-winning. Applying the mind is a limb of stream-winning. Conforming to the Dhamma is a limb of stream-winning.´´ ``Well said, Såriputta! Well said, Såriputta! Indeed these are limbs of stream-winning. Now again, Såriputta, they say: `The stream! The stream!´ Of what sort is the stream, Såriputta?´´ ``The stream, lord, is just this ariyan eightfold way, to wit: Right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.´´ ``Well said, Såriputta! Well said, Såriputta! The stream is just this ariyan eightfold way. Now again, Såriputta, they say, `Streamwinner! Streamwinner!´ Of what sort is a streamwinner, Såriputta?´´ ``Whosoever, lord, is blessed with this ariyan eightfold way--such an one of such a name, of such and such a clan, is called `Streamwinner´.´´ The first condition, association with the righteous person, is most important. It would not be possible to find the right path by oneself. Only Buddhas have accumulated such wisdom that they can find the Path by themselves, without the help of a teacher. Other people, however, need the teachings of a Buddha in order to find the right path, because ignorance has been accumulated for an endlessly long time. We need association with the right person, the good friend in Dhamma, who can point out to us the right path, because our defilements prevent us from finding the right path. Our friend in Dhamma can encourage us to develop right understanding of nåma and rúpa. The question may arise what one should do if one is not able to find the right friend in Dhamma. Is reading the scriptures not a condition to find the path leading to enlightenment? It is true that reading the scriptures is also very helpful since they can encourage us to be mindful of nåma and rúpa in daily life. We might, however, interpret the teachings in the wrong way. It depends on conditions whether we come into contact with the right person who can help us to understand the teachings as well as the practice in accordance with the teachings. Accumulated kusala kamma can be the condition for us to meet the right person. When we have heard the Dhamma from the right person, we should ``apply the mind´´; this is the third condition. We should not blindly follow the person who teaches us Dhamma, but we should investigate the scriptures ourselves, ponder over the Dhamma, and consider it carefully, in order to test the truth. The real test of the truth is the practice itself. Therefore, the fourth condition is ``conforming to the Dhamma´´, which is the development of the eightfold Path. By being mindful of the phenomena appearing through the six doors we can find out ourselves whether it is true that these phenomena are only nåma and rúpa, arising because of conditions. We can investigate ourselves whether they are impermanent or permanent, whether they are dukkha or happiness, whether they are non-self, anattå, or ``self´´. We can find out through the practice itself whether we really understand the teachings. If we practise in the wrong way we may eventually find out that this does not lead to right understanding of the realities of our daily life. Through the development of the eightfold Path we will have more confidence (saddhå) in the Buddha´s teachings. We will have more confidence when we experience that through right understanding of nåma and rúpa in daily life there will be less clinging to ``self´´. Lokuttara cittas cannot arise without the cultivation of the right conditions. Some people wish for an end to dukkha but they do not develop understanding in daily life. They hope that one day lokuttara cittas will arise. The Buddha pointed out that the realization of the four noble Truths is difficult, and he said this, not in order to discourage people, but in order to remind them not to be heedless. 15595 From: azita gill Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 4:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Hi from Aus --- debanstis wrote: > > Hi, > My name is Deb, > So, I may lurk for awhile before I post again. > Thankyou in advance, > Deb from Australia > > dear Deb. Welcome to the group, I am also a 'lurker', who posts occasionally, but reads fairly often. I'm sure you will find many interesting items on this site. We are an easy going mob, and you will read lots of Dhamma, which is why we are here of course, enjoy and hope you benefit. I too, am from Aus. Cheers, Azita. > > 15596 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 4:55pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Dear Larry, I think we are now using the terms conceptual in different ways. Before we continue, I want to see if we can agree on some terms/meanings. Paramatha dhamma: actual realities: dhamma that appears to the nama/consciousness without any thinking involved. Hardness appears to the mind without thinking. If you hit something hard in the dark, you may not know what you hit, but the hardness appears nonetheless. If you feel around what you hit a bit, and make out a shape of a table, then you think "table" (maybe without naming). Hardness is paramatha dhamma, table is a concept. Paramatha dhamma and concepts appear to the nama, alternating very rapidly. It is hard to separate realities and concept, but only realities have its own sabhava, its own "essence", its own chracteristics, its own function; concepts don't have any of this. Can you agree to the terms above (which is commonly used in DSG and Nina's books)? If you could, then can you tell me which is which: 1) Is hardness paramatha dhamma or concept? 2) Is visible object paramatha dhamma or concept? 3) Is lobha paramatha dhamma or concept? > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2002 1:36 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana 15597 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 7:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Sarah, I believe our question is why are concepts not realities. I thought about this for about two hours and could neither answer it nor disprove it. I found faults with reasons on both sides of the question. Ultimately I think my problem is in not understanding either. So.... I give up. Larry 15598 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 8:26pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Kom, I've forgotten what our original question was but I could comment on these questions: "1) Is hardness paramatha dhamma or concept? 2) Is visible object paramatha dhamma or concept? 3) Is lobha paramatha dhamma or concept?" Hardness is just hardness, it would never be "table" unless one were trying to identify by touch. So there is a definite difference here between sensation and concept. However, there *could* be a very subtle concept involved in hardness sensation. I don't know. I'd have to take a closer look, somehow. Visual sensation usually (if not always) identifies something but not with name and meaning (concept). Concept is added later but what is this identity? Subtle concept? If so, how to separate visual sensation and concept? Even an unknown is identified as an unknown. By the way, something interesting happens when a name is added to an un-named identity. It becomes severely limited. I'm not sure what to make of this, but it's worth investigating. Lobha is very interesting. Supposedly this is a cetasika but it seems to me it is more like rupa with concept. Vedana is the same way. There are bodily sensations involved with desire or pleasant feeling, for example. But they are more than body sensation; I can't think what that 'more' could be if not concept or "subtle concept". By the way, how do you separate concept from vitakka and vicara or ditthi? Larry ps: what did Tan Acharn Sujin talk about? 15599 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 5:02pm Subject: Re: [dsg] philosophy Hello Nina, Thanks for the post. Perhaps your sister can come over and explain quantum physics to me! What a crazy bunch of theories, many of which are apparently true. I come from a background of analytic philosophy (insofar as I have any academic background), which has been both helpful and a hindrance. It's given me, let's say, some different ideas. I have numerous disagreements with the abhidhammic approach, some of which are over rather basic premises. I hope you will be game to discuss some of them with me as they crop up. I read your book ADL (among others) a few summers back and found it a model of clarity. Despite our differences I certainly have no hostility to the abhidhamma, finding in it a helpful spiritual psychology. metta, stephen 15600 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 9:04pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concepts) Larry, > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:26 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana > > > Hi Kom, > > I've forgotten what our original question was but > I could comment on > these questions: > > "1) Is hardness paramatha dhamma or concept? > > 2) Is visible object paramatha dhamma or concept? > > 3) Is lobha paramatha dhamma or concept?" > > Hardness is just hardness, it would never be I think we agree on this one. Hardness is hardness. There is nothing beyond the hardness. Hardness is a paramatha dhamma with its own characteristics which is different from heat or cold, or tension, or visible object, or sound. > "table" unless one were > trying to identify by touch. So there is a > definite difference here > between sensation and concept. Whenever there is hardness that appears, there is a consciousness that cognizes this hardness. The hardness appears as the object to the consciousness. The hardness doesn't cognize, but the consciousness does. Both of these are paramatha dhamma. > However, there > *could* be a very subtle > concept involved in hardness sensation. I don't > know. I'd have to take a > closer look, somehow. Often, immediately after the hardness appears, the consciousness in the mind door often thinks of the object. When we see the visible object, we associate the object with shapes, with the different colors, with its being something (like a monitor, English letters), and finally we may associate it with a name. All these associations sometimes don't happen. We also experience visible objects through out the day without (much) thinking about the object. The visible object is paramatha dhamma: its characteristics are different from hardness, heat, or tangible object. The consciousness is paramatha dhamma: it sees the visible object. The associations are what we (in DSG) call thinking. The shape, the meaning of the visible object, the name all don't have their own characteristics and don't exist in the ultimate way (because they have no characteristics.) > Visual sensation usually (if not always) > identifies something but not > with name and meaning (concept). Concept is added > later but what is this > identity? Subtle concept? If so, how to separate > visual sensation and > concept? Even an unknown is identified as an > unknown. Let me know if what what is discussed above hasn't clarified this section. > Lobha is very interesting. Supposedly this is a > cetasika but it seems to > me it is more like rupa with concept. Vedana is > the same way. There are > bodily sensations involved with desire or > pleasant feeling, for example. > But they are more than body sensation; I can't > think what that 'more' > could be if not concept or "subtle concept". Lobha also has its own characteristics. Its characteristic is the attachment to its object. Do you feel the attachment toward something you like? That's the characteristics lobha. Lobha is nothing beyond its characteristics. It is not you: it is just a dhamma. Lobha toward a visible object is different from the visible object. It has the object as its aramana, where as the object has no cognition function, which is unlike lobha. Lobha is nama: its characteristic is the attachment toward its object. Lobha is not concept. Concept has no characteristics; the characteristic of lobha is the attachment. Do you have disagreement to what I said? Is there any part that is unclear? kom 15601 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 5:07pm Subject: Re: Hi from Aus - Question? >Why is it that so, so many of the >members of this group are from Australia? A wildly disproportionate >percentage... any theories? Perhaps it is something in the drinking >water :-) ? Creosote. metta, stephen ---Hello Christine ;-) 15602 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 9:15pm Subject: [dsg] Vitakka and concepts Larry, I am separating this thread out to keep things more manageable. > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:26 PM > By the way, how do you separate concept from > vitakka and vicara or > ditthi? Vitakka is a paramatha dhamma. Its characteristics is to touch its object. When the consciousness through the mind door thinks of something, vitakka touches that something. Vitakka can have concept as its aramana, but concept cannot have anything as aramana. Concept is not real: it is neither nama nor rupa, it doesn't exist, and it doesn't cognize anything. Vicara is a paramatha dhamma. Its characteristics is to follow its object. When the consciousness through the mind door thinks of something, vicara follows that something. Vicara, except in jhana cittas, always is con-ascent with vitakka. Therefore, vicara has the same aramana as the vitakka that it is con-ascent with. Vitaka is different from vicara: they both have their distinct characteristics that are not the same as one another. They are paramatha dhamma. I think it would be fruiful for us to keep at discussing the differences between paramatha dhamma and concept until this is clear. Otherwise, studying further teachings would just bring more confusions and mis-understanding. kom 15603 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 9:55pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concepts) Hi Kom, I'm afraid I still don't understand how concepts don't have characteristics. How do we tell them apart if they don't have characteristics? I believe concepts are defined as name and meaning. Aren't name and meaning characteristics? Also, I'm not real sure what is attachment. Larry 15604 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 10:14pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concepts) Dear Larry, > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 9:56 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and > Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) > (realities/concepts) > > > Hi Kom, > > I'm afraid I still don't understand how concepts > don't have > characteristics. What's the difference between a hardness and a table? A visible object and a person? When you see a car on TV? What is truly there? What isn't? > How do we tell them apart if > they don't have > characteristics? The citta cognizes both realities and concepts. The function of the citta is to know the differences between what appears. > I believe concepts are defined > as name and meaning. > Aren't name and meaning characteristics? Name and meaning are concepts. Shape or form is also concept. Concept can be only cognized by the mind door. What are the characteristics of name and meaning? > > Also, I'm not real sure what is attachment. > Desire, lust, wanting, hope, wishful thinking, longing, greed, feeling toward a loved one. These are the different shades and degrees of attachment. kom 15605 From: Sarah Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 4:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hi from Aus Hi Deb, Thanks for sharing your intro and a few comments. I hope you find it useful reading and participating here. --- debanstis wrote: > > Hi, > My name is Deb, I am new to your group, I have always been interested > in Theravada Buddhism and travelled through Sri Lanka and Thailand. .... Interesting....perhaps we'll hear more in due course. ..... > I am a beginner to "terms", so I hope to gain a deeper understanding > of Theravada Buddhism from the interactive context of this group. > So, I may lurk for awhile before I post again. ..... Please don't be put off by the "terms" and ask for any clarification. We'd all prefer to have you participating in your 'own' language. There is a simple Pali glossary at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Pali_Glossary ..... > Thankyou in advance, > Deb from Australia ..... Whereabouts are you in Oz? I'm not sure there are more Australian members than Canadian ones, Rob M, but maybe the Aussies are a more vocal lot;-) Btw, Anthony, many thanks for sharing a little more about yourself. Perhaps we'll get together when we're next in Sydney. (...just thinking about when we arranged to meet Anthony B. there.....he was rather nervous about meeting beings from cyberspace -- no photos in those days -- and decided that the Town Hall steps would be a 'safe' and 'public' place. But unknown to him, on the assigned day the Town Hall was closed off to the public. Luckily he'd said he'd be wearing a red shirt and there weren't too many men in red shirts wandering around the area......). This reminds me, if you or Deb or Krishnan or anyone else cares to share a pic in the DSG photo album (click on photos on left side of home page), we'd all be very glad to 'see' you. Rob Ed, many thanks for sharing yours recently. This will help people not to get the 4 Robs mixed up. Sarah ====== 15606 From: abhidhammika Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 7:33am Subject: Re: Hi from Aus: Greeting From Another Aussie Dhamma Bloke Dear Deb How are you? Welcome to the DSG assembly of dhamma friends. Greeting from another Aussie Dhamma Bloke from Canberra! With kind regards, Suan Lu Zaw http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "debanstis" wrote: Hi, My name is Deb, I am new to your group, I have always been interested in Theravada Buddhism and travelled through Sri Lanka and Thailand. I am a beginner to "terms", so I hope to gain a deeper understanding of Theravada Buddhism from the interactive context of this group. So, I may lurk for awhile before I post again. Thankyou in advance, Deb from Australia 15607 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 10:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] DSG: Live in Niagara Dear Dan, I enjoyed reading your report, also about Matt, written with such sense of humor, I had a good time with your posts. This is priceless the way you described it: lobha as teacher instead of panna. Yes, we all have mostly lobha leading us. I am glad you found it worth while, and I hope Jim also had a fruitful time. You had kusala viriya, to take the efforts in traveling rather far and back again. A. Sujin wrote about an elderly person who had viriya to travel far to the Foundation. I do appreciate your kusala citta, and I quote: With much appreciation, Nina. op 09-09-2002 00:03 schreef onco111 op dhd5@c...: > > The long trip for such a short discussion was well worth it, > > The first taste of dsg Live was precious, 15608 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 10:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Mind-process Dear Rob M Thank you for your kind words and encouragement. But don't forget: whatever I learnt is due to A. Sujin. The end of your post is a good marana sati. Best wishes for success with your class and with appreciation, Nina. op 09-09-2002 00:51 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@j...: (snip) This > legacy will continue long after the nama-rupa named "Nina" is gone. > > Saddhu, Saddhu, Saddhu. > 15609 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 10:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] subtle point Dear Sarah Thank you very much. I have an older edition, less Pali. But I have the Pali of Fruits of Recluseship, and this is the same sort of passage. What is difficult for me: what is the monk conveying to himself here by kayavinnatti? I go forward with mindfulness? Nina. op 09-09-2002 08:47 schreef Sarah op sarahdhhk@y...: > I’m not sure how relevant this is and I know you’ll have read these > details before. Nina, do you have the ‘revised’ PTS edition of > Sammohavinodani? We have the 1996 edition which includes a lot of Pali > terms and is very user friendly. I note it was revised by Lance Cousins, > Nyanaponika and C. Shaw. > ***** > “But ‘clear comprehension through non-delusion’ is not being deluded as > regards moving forward and so on. That should be understood thus: here a > bhikkhu, when moving forward or moving backward, unlike the blind ordinary > man who deludes himself as regards moving forward, etc (by imagining;) ‘A > self moves forward, the moving forward is produced by a self’ or : ‘I move > forward, the moving forward is produced by me,’ is one who is not so > deluded; when the consciousness ‘I (will) move forward’ arises, together > with that same consciousness there arises the consciousness originated air > element, which produces (bodily) intimation (vi~n~natti). thus this > framework of bones called the body moves forward by means of the diffusion > of the air element due to the action of consciousness.” > 15610 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 1:07pm Subject: Re: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? Dear Herman, Comments inserted below: --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: Dear Christine, Herman: You asked for it:-) ---------------------------------- Chris: I'm quivering in terror, but claiming the parliamentary Right of Reply... :-) -------------------------------- "christine_forsyth" wrote: > > Recently on a number of lists, members have had differences about > the > > Buddha's teaching based on translations of the Tipitaka. It occurs > > to me that 21st century Buddhists are at the mercy of the vigilance, > > ethics, and competence of translators and of the translators > > interests and biases (unconscious or otherwise). --------------------------------- Herman: 21st century buddhists and non-buddhists alike are at the mercy of ignorance more than anything else. Not the type of ignorance that is mitigated by scholarship. More the ignorance that prevents the insight into what is happening right here, right now. --------------------------------- Chris: Why Herman! we agree completely (how can this have happened :-))..... You say: "insight into what is happening right here, right now" - like ... while I am sitting on a hard chair reading and typing a reply to your post, and inhaling the aroma while tasting some hot chamomile tea? And feeling my usual mixed emotions at your words :)? Not in a special place, on a special seat, in a special posture, doing a special activity.....? :-):-) --------------------------------- Herman: You are perhaps familiar with the Leunig cartoon of a man with his arm around his little son, sharing with him the delight of seeing the sunrise on TV, whilst the sun is seen to rise through a side window. --------------------------------- Chris: I'm a Leunig fan - at least of those cartoons a Buddhist lady will admit to appreciating :-) --------------------------------- Herman: The sun doesn't rise in books. If the book helps you to find the window, good and well. Perhaps the book may show you where the door is. But to go there, you need to leave the TV and the book behind. If you really want to find the truth, you have to be prepared to forsake everything, absolutely everything. The book says that too. ---------------------------------- Chris: Are you assuming that people who study the Tipitika have never lived life to the full and had other types of worldly and spiritual experiences and practices? That we sprang from our mother's wombs wrapped in cotton wool, wearing blinkers, reading glasses and ear muffs, and clutching a Pali dictionary :) I value the Tipitaka as something more than just old tomes, written by pious bushies who were somehow not quite as intelligent and perceptive as the average 'modern' person. I believe the Tipitaka to be the actual Teachings of the Buddha, meticulously preserved at great human cost. (Inexpressible thanks to those at Aluvihara, those before them and those since) I am not a naive bibliophile who hasn't had the experience of formal meditation (and if only I would 'try it', I would have the scales fall from my eyes....). ---------------------------------- Herman: Anatta for starters. ---------------------------------- Chris: Is that the one about there being no-self who can control consciousness, making mind-states happen at will? :-) ---------------------------------- A little, true story. I am greatly indebted to my father. At age 50, he discarded his entire theology/philosophy library. (He also was a minister of religion). Imagine the four walls of a roomy study, lined with shelves from the floor to the ceiling, not a vacant square centimetre, all the shelves jam-packed with hefty tomes on you-name- it, anything to do with spiritual quests. What happened? A small germ had taken root. God is not found in books. He quit the church, and his garden did better out of it, too. ------------------------------- Chris: Thanks for sharing about your father Herman - I too lived for many years with a devotion to God. I know what it is to be seduced by the rapture of mystical experience - better by far to know what is Real. I don't live in a 'nice' cocoon of how I imagine the world to be. There is no control, no safety, no protection for this bag of khandas.. I am immersed everyday in the depths of the misery humans are capable of inflicting on themselves and others - and deal constantly with beings blindly under the sway of their defilements - learning a little about the great breadth and depth of my own as well. Not through books or the TV news, but through the ever changing good and evil I witness in myself and in my daily work. The Dhamma-Vinaya is used as a tool, a roadmap, a way of heading for home out of the suffering and chaos of life. Not as a substitute for experience. ----------------------------- All the Best Herman ----------------------------- And also to you, Herman, Christine 15611 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 2:12pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Mind-process Hi Nina, Whereas money gets smaller when shared, appreciation is like merit (also like love); it grows bigger when shared. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Rob M > Thank you for your kind words and encouragement. But don't forget: whatever > I learnt is due to A. Sujin. The end of your post is a good marana sati. > Best wishes for success with your class and with appreciation, > Nina. > > op 09-09-2002 00:51 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@j...: > > (snip) > This > > legacy will continue long after the nama-rupa named "Nina" is gone. > > > > Saddhu, Saddhu, Saddhu. > > 15612 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 2:23pm Subject: RE: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (2) Dear Larry, Here's my take: > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2002 5:35 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (2) > > > Dear Nina, thanks very much for this (below). However, I'm still not > clear on what A. Sujin is teaching with regard to satipatthana > meditation. I get the feeling she thinks it is a waste of time or it > would be better to contemplate the dhamma unencumbered by formalities of > meditation technique or the concept of satipatthana meditation is ill > conceived. Any light you could shed on this would be appreciated. > > I would like to see what Kom, Sarah, and Jon have to say on this as > well. Get sort of a consensus view. > > thanks, Larry > --------------- > Nina wrote: > > L: What is A. > Sujin's view on satipatthana meditation? Why doesn't she teach it? Does > she teach a similar discipline for developing detachment? > N: There should be development of satipatthana, that is, sati and panna, > development of direct awareness and understanding of the characteristics > of nama and rupa, very, very gradually. There may be a lot of thinking > involved, but there can also be a moment of noting a characteristic > without thinking. This may be seldom, but in this way the difference > between thinking and sati can be known. The development of satipatthana > will lead first to detachment from self, and later on from all namas and > rupas. But together with satipatthana all perfections should be > developed. They support panna. When the perfections are being developed > there is a degree of giving up of clinging: dana, sila, renunciation, > patience, metta, and the other perfections. > Best wishes > from Nina. > A. Sujin constantly teaches about Satipatthana and its "practice" (pati-pati). However, she does not encourage people to "practice" the way that many contemporary "meditation" teachers teach. She teaches that it is impossible to develop wisdom from ignorance, i.e., without first gaining understanding what the 4 noble truths really are. She doesn't encourage people to jump into "meditation" by following others, and making hasty conclusion about the benefits of such meditation based on their (or others') ignorance about realities, sati, and the objects of sati. This goes back to our previous discussion. Without understanding Paramatha dhamma and concepts, we may have the wrong idea that the Buddhas talk about concepts when he talks about Kandhas, Ayatnas, Dhatus, and objects of Satipatthana. Therefore, we must first understand the differences between paramatha dhamma and concepts; otherwise, we are bound to get confused. kom 15613 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 2:45pm Subject: Driving to the 'Middle Way' Hi All, I use Office XP on my computer and it has a feature called "Smart Tags" that tries to help me when it can. I was typing in a quote from a Sutta that included the words 'Middle Way' (capitalized, but no quotes). A smart tag box appeared and asked me if I wanted to: - Add this to my address book - Add this to my list of contacts - Display a map - Display driving instructions Oh, I wish it were that easy :-) Thanks, Rob M :-) 15614 From: Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 3:18pm Subject: ADL ch. 24 (2) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 24 (2) We read in the Kindred Sayings (V, Mahå-vagga, Book XII, Kindred Sayings about the Truths, chapter V, §5, The keyhole) that, when the Buddha was staying at Vesålí in Great Grove, Ånanda went into Vesålí on his rounds for almsfood. In Vesålí he saw the Licchavi youths practising archery. He then went to see the Buddha and said: ``Here, lord, robing myself in the forenoon and taking bowl and outer robe I set out for Vesålí on my begging rounds. Then, lord, I saw a number of Licchavi youths in the gymnasium making practice at archery, shooting even from a distance through a very small keyhole, and splitting an arrow, shot after shot, with never a miss. And I said to myself, lord: `Practised shots are these Licchavi youths! Well practised shots indeed are these Licchavi youths, to be able even at a distance to splinter an arrow through a very small keyhole, shot after shot, with never a miss!´ ´´ ``Now what think you, Ånanda? Which is the harder, which is the harder task to compass: To shoot like that or to pierce one strand of hair, a hundred times divided, with another strand?´´ ``Why, lord, of course to split a hair in such a way is the harder, much the harder task.´´ ``Just so, Ånanda, they who penetrate the meaning of: This is dukkha, this is the arising of dukkha, this is the ceasing of dukkha, this is the practice that leads to the ceasing of dukkha, pierce through something much harder to pierce. Wherefore, Ånanda, you must make an effort to realize: This is dukkha. This is the arising of dukkha. This is the ceasing of dukkha. This is the practice that leads to the ceasing of dukkha.'' One might feel discouraged when reading this sutta; it would seem that it is impossible to attain enlightenment. However, if one develops the right Path, not the wrong Path, one will realize the four noble Truths; one will attain enlightenment. The way to realize the four noble Truths is to be mindful of the realities which appear now: seeing, visible object, lobha, dosa or any other reality. We should not be discouraged when we do not seem to make rapid progress. Most people cling to a result and they become impatient when they do not notice an immediate result; clinging to a result, however, is not helpful for the development of wisdom, it is akusala. Some people feel that the development of samatha can give a more immediate result. Samatha, when it has been developed in the right way, has tranquillity as its result. When jhåna is attained, lobha, dosa and moha are temporarily eliminated. However, the attainment of jhåna is extremely difficult and many conditions have to be cultivated. If one develops samatha, the five hindrances are bound to arise: there will be sensuous desire, ill-will, sloth and torpor, restlessness, worry and doubt. until ``access-concentration´´ or jhåna have been attained. The aim of vipassanå is not tranquillity, but the eradication of wrong view and eventually of all defilements. This goal may seem far off, but each short moment of right awareness of nåma and rúpa is very fruitful; it will help to eliminate clinging to the concept of self. While one is mindful, there are no lobha, dosa or moha. Although tranquillity is not the aim of vipassanå, at the moment of right mindfulness there is kusala citta, and kusala citta is accompanied by calm. Vipassanå or insight is the development of right understanding of all nåmas and rúpas which present themselves in daily life. Insight is developed in different stages and in the course of its development the characteristics of nåma and rúpa will be understood more clearly, and their arising and falling away will be known through direct experience. When insight has been developed stage by stage, the nåma and rúpa which present themselves through the six doors can be clearly seen as impermanent, dukkha and non-self, anattå. When paññå has been developed to the degree that enlightenment can be attained, the unconditioned reality, nibbåna, is directly experienced. The direct experience of nibbåna is different from thinking about nibbåna. Nibbåna is directly experienced during a mind-door process of cittas. Nibbåna cannot be experienced through any of the five senses, it can be experienced only through the mind-door. In the process during which enlightenment is attained, the manodvåråvajjana-citta (the mind-door-adverting-consciousness) takes as its object one of the three characteristics of reality: impermanence, dukkha or anattå. This means that the reality presenting itself at that moment is seen either as impermanent, or as dukkha or as anattå. Anicca, dukkha and anattå are three aspects of the truth of conditioned realities. Thus, if one sees one aspect, one also sees the other aspects. However, the three characteristics cannot be experienced at the same time, since citta can experience only one object at a time. It depends on one's accumulations which of the three characteristics is realized in the process of cittas during which enlightenment is attained: one person views the reality appearing at that moment as impermanent, another as dukkha, and another again as non-self, anattå. The mano-dvåråvajjana-citta, mind-door-adverting-consciousness, of that process adverts to one of these three characteristics and is then succeeded by three or four cittas which are not yet lokuttara cittas, but mahå-kusala cittas (kusala cittas of the sense-sphere) accompanied by paññå. The first mahå-kusala citta, which is called parikamma or preparatory consciousness, still has the same object as the mano-dvåråvajjana-citta. Whichever of the three characteristics of conditioned realities the mano-dvåråvajjana-citta adverted to, the parikamma realizes that characteristic. The parikamma is succeeded by the upacåra or proximity consciousness which still has the same object as the mano-dvåråvajjana citta. This citta, the second mahå-kusala citta in that process, is nearer to the moment the lokuttara cittas will arise. The upacåra is succeeded by the anuloma, which means conformity or adaptation. This citta still has the same object as the mano-dvåråvajjana-citta. Anuloma is succeeded by gotrabhú which is sometimes translated as change of lineage. This citta is the last kåmåvacara citta in that process. There is gotrabhú in samatha and in vipassanå. Gotrabhú is the last kåmåvacara citta in a process before a citta of another plane of consciousness arises. The other plane of consciousness may be rúpåvacara, arúpåvacara or lokuttara. In samatha, gotrabhú is the last kåmåvacara citta before the rúpa-jhånacitta or the arúpa-jhånacitta arises. In vipassanå, gotrabhú is the last kåmåvacara citta of the non-ariyan before the lokuttara citta arises and he becomes an ariyan. The object of the gotrabhú arising before the lokuttara cittas is different from the object of gotrabhú in samatha; the gotrabhú preceding the lokuttara cittas experiences nibbåna. It is the first citta in that process which experiences nibbåna, but it is not lokuttara citta. At the moment of gotrabhú the person who is about to attain enlightenment is still a non-ariyan. Gotrabhú does not eradicate defilements. Gotrabhú is succeeded by the magga-citta which eradicates the defilements that are to be eradicated at the stage of the sotåpanna. The magga-citta is the first lokuttara citta in that process of cittas. When it has fallen away it is succeeded by two (or three) phala-cittas (fruition-consciousness) which are the result of the magga-citta and which still have nibbåna as the object. As we have seen, the magga-citta is succeeded immediately by its result, in the same process of citta. The magga-citta cannot produce vipåka in the form of rebirth, such as the kusala citta of the other planes of consciousness. The phala-cittas are succeeded by bhavanga-cittas. Some people do not need the moment of parikamma (preparatory consciousness) and in that case three moments of phala-citta arise instead of two moments. 15615 From: Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 2:40pm Subject: illogical? Hello all, Rob has raised some questions that I can't fully answer without exploring Buddhist logic. Buddhism has some interesting ways of classifying things (e.g., by characteristics, functions, manifestations, and proximate causes) that are very useful, and novel, but I'm not sure its logic makes much sense. Isn't it just borrowed? Rob has referred, in particular, to the Cula-Malunkovada where it's said that 4 (every?) possibilities of a Tathagata after death are wrong: that he exists, doesn't exist, both exists and doesn't exist, neither exists nor doesn't exist. Now I think it's always used this way: as meaning 'every possibility'. And then they are all rejected. Ignoring, for the moment, the special problems about existence (in passing, one needs to be cautious about regarding 'existence' as a predicate: The bird is blue, fast, *exists*.) what does this mean, as a logical structure—in itself? If the above is correct, that it simply means 'every possibility," then: x, not-x, both, neither. As such there's no reason to see it as anything but a 2 valued or bivalent logic with four possibilities. As such nothing remarkable; acceptable to Aristotle. Looking closer things become murky. We seem to have: x, not-x, x & not-x, not(x or not-x). (Or: All S is P, no S is P, S is P & not-P, S is not P nor not-P.) X or not-x is no problem, but what of the other two? The last, not x or not-x, can be seen as saying the predicate doesn't apply; S is neither P nor not-P because P is not applicable to S. Still 2 valued, no problem. But x & not-x appears to be a straightforward contradiction; so nonsense? But perhaps this can be read as: 'Every S is P' and 'No S is P' which are contraries, i.e., they both can't be true, but they can both be false. But now it can't be read as an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities. Let's stop and ask: anyone care to sort this out? Anyone see anything—KEY POINT—that suggests a more than 2 valued (T or F) logic here? (Some non-Aristotelian position on existence that suggests we do or don't and something else?) The thought also occurs that this is a poor adumbration of the square of opposition, and the use of "some" could sort things out. But here's a simpler way to put it: P is (all) x, P is (all) not-x, P is partly x and partly not-x, P is neither x nor not-x. So, for an example, (given rebirth) does my self (P) continue to exist after death (x)? To say yes (P is x) is eternalism, to say no (P is not-x) is annihilationism. Easy ;-) Now the other two. 'Both' would mean partly continues to exist and partly ceases to exist; e.g., that consciousness continues but the body dies. Sounds good (logically that is, not an overt contraction), and is also to be rejected. And the fourth: neither continues to exist (since there's no self to begin with to be reborn) nor ceases to exist (as the self didn't exist in the first place). But this last is confusing. It could also mean continues in some attenuated state between existence and nonexistence (so we're now in a 3 valued logic?). Since individuality continues but not as a self there's continuity, without identity. So we also have the well known neither the same nor different. If this just means 'doesn't apply' it seems relatively straightforward and 2 valued: T or F. But if it means something else is it at odds with Aristotelian logic? Are we into a 3 or 4 valued logic concerning existence? I'm more or less arguing not. (I'm using Aristotle because he's approximately contemporaneous, but also because there are also paraconsistent logics of more than 2 truth values, which I know essentially nothing about, and wonder if they may apply here.) If anyone actually read this far give yourself a chocolate. If anyone can actually reply I may give you one! metta, stephen 15616 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 6:59pm Subject: Re: illogical? --- Dear Stephen, Did the Tathagatha exist before death? Robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello all, > Rob has raised some questions that I can't fully answer without exploring > Buddhist logic. Buddhism has some interesting ways of classifying things > (e.g., by characteristics, functions, manifestations, and proximate causes) > that are very useful, and novel, but I'm not sure its logic makes much sense. > Isn't it just borrowed? > Rob has referred, in particular, to the Cula-Malunkovada where it's said that > 4 (every?) possibilities of a Tathagata after death are wrong: that he > exists, doesn't exist, both exists and doesn't exist, neither exists nor > doesn't exist. Now I think it's always used this way: as meaning 'every > possibility'. And then they are all rejected. Ignoring, for the moment, the > special problems about existence (in passing, one needs to be cautious about > regarding 'existence' as a predicate: The bird is blue, fast, *exists*.) what > does this mean, as a logical structureâ€"in itself? > > If the above is correct, that it simply means 'every possibility," then: x, > not-x, both, neither. As such there's no reason to see it as anything but a 2 > valued or bivalent logic with four possibilities. As such nothing remarkable; > acceptable to Aristotle. > > Looking closer things become murky. We seem to have: x, not-x, x & not-x, > not(x or not-x). (Or: All S is P, no S is P, S is P & not-P, S is not P nor > not-P.) X or not-x is no problem, but what of the other two? The last, not x > or not-x, can be seen as saying the predicate doesn't apply; S is neither P > nor not-P because P is not applicable to S. Still 2 valued, no problem. But x > & not-x appears to be a straightforward contradiction; so nonsense? But > perhaps this can be read as: 'Every S is P' and 'No S is P' which are > contraries, i.e., they both can't be true, but they can both be false. But > now it can't be read as an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities. > > Let's stop and ask: anyone care to sort this out? Anyone see anythingâ€"KEY > POINTâ€"that suggests a more than 2 valued (T or F) logic here? (Some > non-Aristotelian position on existence that suggests we do or don't and > something else?) > > The thought also occurs that this is a poor adumbration of the square of > opposition, and the use of "some" could sort things out. But here's a simpler > way to put it: P is (all) x, P is (all) not-x, P is partly x and partly > not-x, P is neither x nor not-x. So, for an example, (given rebirth) does my > self (P) continue to exist after death (x)? To say yes (P is x) is > eternalism, to say no (P is not-x) is annihilationism. Easy ;-) Now the other > two. 'Both' would mean partly continues to exist and partly ceases to exist; > e.g., that consciousness continues but the body dies. Sounds good (logically > that is, not an overt contraction), and is also to be rejected. And the > fourth: neither continues to exist (since there's no self to begin with to be > reborn) nor ceases to exist (as the self didn't exist in the first place). > But this last is confusing. It could also mean continues in some attenuated > state between existence and nonexistence (so we're now in a 3 valued logic?). > Since individuality continues but not as a self there's continuity, without > identity. > So we also have the well known neither the same nor different. If this just > means 'doesn't apply' it seems relatively straightforward and 2 valued: T or > F. But if it means something else is it at odds with Aristotelian logic? Are > we into a 3 or 4 valued logic concerning existence? I'm more or less arguing > not. (I'm using Aristotle because he's approximately contemporaneous, but > also because there are also paraconsistent logics of more than 2 truth > values, which I know essentially nothing about, and wonder if they may apply > here.) > > If anyone actually read this far give yourself a chocolate. If anyone can > actually reply I may give you one! > > metta, stephen 15617 From: Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 3:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi, Robert (and Stephen) - In a message dated 9/10/02 10:01:04 PM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Dear Stephen, > Did the Tathagatha exist before death? > Robert > ======================== Answer: No. (Except in a conventional sense.) Now that takes care of the 1st alternative. The third and fourth might be dismissed simply as logical contradictions. However, what is the basis for dismissing the 2nd altrnative: The Tathagata doesn't exist (after death(? At first reading one would take the denial of the 1st alternative to constitute the affirmation of the second. As I see it, the solution must lie in the meaning of the negation operator in combination with the meaning of existence. Perhaps 'to exist' means to exist intrinsically/essentially as a separate self-sufficient entity, and 'to not exist' is not the mere denial of the first, but, rather, means to not exist in any manner whatsoever. That is, the assertion is an extreme, and the denial is an opposite, antipodal extreme. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15618 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 8:08pm Subject: Re: illogical? Hi Stephen, Let me clarify my question a bit: I am intrigued that Malunkyaputta offered four options: - X - NOT X - X AND (NOT X) - NOT (X AND (NOT X)) I am asking if "traditional logic" usually limits itself to the first two options. This is of interest to me because logic in quantum theory makes use of the last two options. I am asking this question because I want to make the point that the Suttas had a wider perspective than "traditional logic". BTW, when asked this question, the Buddha did not say that all four options were wrong. He refused to answer. Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: So, do I get a chocolate? --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello all, > Rob has raised some questions that I can't fully answer without exploring > Buddhist logic. Buddhism has some interesting ways of classifying things > (e.g., by characteristics, functions, manifestations, and proximate causes) > that are very useful, and novel, but I'm not sure its logic makes much sense. > Isn't it just borrowed? > Rob has referred, in particular, to the Cula-Malunkovada where it's said that > 4 (every?) possibilities of a Tathagata after death are wrong: that he > exists, doesn't exist, both exists and doesn't exist, neither exists nor > doesn't exist. Now I think it's always used this way: as meaning 'every > possibility'. And then they are all rejected. Ignoring, for the moment, the > special problems about existence (in passing, one needs to be cautious about > regarding 'existence' as a predicate: The bird is blue, fast, *exists*.) what > does this mean, as a logical structureâ€"in itself? > > If the above is correct, that it simply means 'every possibility," then: x, > not-x, both, neither. As such there's no reason to see it as anything but a 2 > valued or bivalent logic with four possibilities. As such nothing remarkable; > acceptable to Aristotle. > > Looking closer things become murky. We seem to have: x, not-x, x & not-x, > not(x or not-x). (Or: All S is P, no S is P, S is P & not-P, S is not P nor > not-P.) X or not-x is no problem, but what of the other two? The last, not x > or not-x, can be seen as saying the predicate doesn't apply; S is neither P > nor not-P because P is not applicable to S. Still 2 valued, no problem. But x > & not-x appears to be a straightforward contradiction; so nonsense? But > perhaps this can be read as: 'Every S is P' and 'No S is P' which are > contraries, i.e., they both can't be true, but they can both be false. But > now it can't be read as an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities. > > Let's stop and ask: anyone care to sort this out? Anyone see anythingâ€"KEY > POINTâ€"that suggests a more than 2 valued (T or F) logic here? (Some > non-Aristotelian position on existence that suggests we do or don't and > something else?) > > The thought also occurs that this is a poor adumbration of the square of > opposition, and the use of "some" could sort things out. But here's a simpler > way to put it: P is (all) x, P is (all) not-x, P is partly x and partly > not-x, P is neither x nor not-x. So, for an example, (given rebirth) does my > self (P) continue to exist after death (x)? To say yes (P is x) is > eternalism, to say no (P is not-x) is annihilationism. Easy ;-) Now the other > two. 'Both' would mean partly continues to exist and partly ceases to exist; > e.g., that consciousness continues but the body dies. Sounds good (logically > that is, not an overt contraction), and is also to be rejected. And the > fourth: neither continues to exist (since there's no self to begin with to be > reborn) nor ceases to exist (as the self didn't exist in the first place). > But this last is confusing. It could also mean continues in some attenuated > state between existence and nonexistence (so we're now in a 3 valued logic?). > Since individuality continues but not as a self there's continuity, without > identity. > So we also have the well known neither the same nor different. If this just > means 'doesn't apply' it seems relatively straightforward and 2 valued: T or > F. But if it means something else is it at odds with Aristotelian logic? Are > we into a 3 or 4 valued logic concerning existence? I'm more or less arguing > not. (I'm using Aristotle because he's approximately contemporaneous, but > also because there are also paraconsistent logics of more than 2 truth > values, which I know essentially nothing about, and wonder if they may apply > here.) > > If anyone actually read this far give yourself a chocolate. If anyone can > actually reply I may give you one! > > metta, stephen 15619 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 8:22pm Subject: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi Howard, In fact, the logic of quantum theory includes the last two options (both exists and not exists, neither exists nor not-exists). Let's not get caught up in the logic of quantum theory at the moment. My paper will explain this in more detail. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert (and Stephen) - > > In a message dated 9/10/02 10:01:04 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > Dear Stephen, > > Did the Tathagatha exist before death? > > Robert > > > ======================== > Answer: No. (Except in a conventional sense.) > Now that takes care of the 1st alternative. The third and fourth might > be dismissed simply as logical contradictions. However, what is the basis for > dismissing the 2nd altrnative: The Tathagata doesn't exist (after death(? At > first reading one would take the denial of the 1st alternative to constitute > the affirmation of the second. As I see it, the solution must lie in the > meaning of the negation operator in combination with the meaning of > existence. Perhaps 'to exist' means to exist intrinsically/essentially as a > separate self-sufficient entity, and 'to not exist' is not the mere denial of > the first, but, rather, means to not exist in any manner whatsoever. That is, > the assertion is an extreme, and the denial is an opposite, antipodal > extreme. > > With metta, > Howard 15620 From: Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 4:51pm Subject: Re: illogical? Hello Robert and Rob and Howard, The question, to me, wasn't about the Tathagata existing before death or after, but the logic of the 4 positions in themselves and what they mean; in abstraction from any content. With validity but not with truth. (I have no problems with Howard's reply; perhaps they can only be explicated as existential operations, and then not simply on the basis of for 'every' or 'some' x...) As Rob wrote, >Let me clarify my question a bit: >I am intrigued that Malunkyaputta offered four options: >- X >- NOT X >- X AND (NOT X) >- NOT (X AND (NOT X)) >I am asking if "traditional logic" usually limits itself to the >first two options. >This is of interest to me because logic in quantum theory makes use >of the last two options. Yes, I understand that. But is that true, and what is one to make of those last two options, especially the second which appears to be an outright contradiction. (Care to construct a truth table for the last two Howard? Somehow that seems to be missing the point?) Thus my convoluted post (which was partly to try and sort some of this out myself). >PS: So, do I get a chocolate? No, because you're the one who got me into this messy question ;-) But I'll give you this: Despite my earlier statement on existence having no graduations however quantum phenomena exist it ain't like *anything* in the world we live in. metta, stephen 15621 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 10:02pm Subject: Re: illogical? Hi Stephen, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > >PS: So, do I get a chocolate? > No, because you're the one who got me into this messy question ;-) > But I'll give you this: Despite my earlier statement on existence having no > graduations however quantum phenomena exist it ain't like *anything* in the > world we live in. Sorry, Stephen. Experiments have shown that quantum theory is a more accurate model of the world that we live in as compared to the model that 99.99% of the population perceive :-) If it makes you feel any better, Einstein objected to the probability elements of quantum theory as well; he said, "God does not play dice!" After reading the messages from Howard and yourself, I have come to the conclusion that the last two options have no place in "conventional" logic. This is what I suspected. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15622 From: abbott_hk Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 1:26am Subject: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Dear Christine, I've certainly given others plenty of time to add comments and I said I'd be slow on this;-) I appreciated the info you supplied (although I had thought you'd be supplying links for BOTH sides of the discussion - probably why I've delayed....hmmm;-)) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Sarah, and All, > > I am still reading around the first point of whether it is possible > to decide what are 'lesser and minor rules' ..... seems to me that if > the Arahats were not prepared to make a decision regarding this, that > the modern Sangha will not be prepared to either. (though "not > acting" IS a decision.) ..... I agree that "not acting" IS a decision and I think we've discussed the reasons for this. ..... > http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha184.htm > The second point of Prof. G. P. M. Malalasekara, for consideration > when assessing the possibility of restoring the order of Buddhist > nuns is: > > "Second, it is possible to make use of an injunction issued by the > Buddha that stipulates, "I permit you monks, to confer full > ordination on nuns."[25] There are references in the texts that show > that some regulations were amended, altered, or abrogated by the > Buddha himself on various occasions under special circumstances. The > absence of Bhikkhuniis in Theravaada clearly being a special > circumstance, these textual references should be sufficient cause for > granting monks the authority to ordain nuns with a clear conscience > that no transgression of the Vinaya rules has been committed. Those > who oppose the restoration of the Bhikkhunii Sa"ngha on the grounds > of Vinaya technicalities seem to ignore this relevant injunction." > > > It seems from my reading that, in the past, in the time of the > Buddha, there were eight methods of conferring higher ordination. In > the course of time, the eighth came to be regarded as the one and > only procedure for admitting a novice to Higher Ordination. What > would stand in the way of re-visiting each of these methods(apart > from the first)? And, in particular, the one quoted above? ...... I've put the 8 methods at the end of the post. Interesting, thank you. I'm having some trouble following the logic here, Chris. It's true that the rules were continually amended, altered and added to by the Buddha himself and we read the contexts and reasons for this. Infringements would lead to new rules and so on. Of course in the Buddha's case, this was always done with his omniscience and knowledge about what was necessary for the preservation and harmony of the Sangha and the endurance of the Teachings. I referred in the `courage' post to the previous 24 Buddha eras which the present Buddha could recall.He knew directly about the bhikkhuni orders and the impact on the preservation of the Dhamma in a way that even wise followers like Ananda could not comprehend. If the great arahats at the Ist Council did not feel qualified to make amendments, how would `we' be qualified to do so? As I remember, the 2nd Council (about 100yrs after the Buddha's parinibbana) was held because of a dispute over 10 minor rules which became a serious controversy. A very large number of monks, the Vajjians, refused to accept the Council's decisions and the schism almost `finished' the tradition of the Vinaya as left by the Buddha. We know that in other traditions there have been many changes to all parts of the Tipitaka and the strict adherence by the monks at all the Councils to the vinaya may seem extreme to us, but I think it is largely thanks to the Elder Yasa and the 700 monks who stood firm at this 2nd Council in not accepting amendments, that the entire Tipitaka, including the Vinaya has been preserved so very intact as it is `til today. I also question whether we really are only talking about "Vinaya technicalities" as Prof Malalasekera suggests. I'm sure the monks who raised the `ten points' would have also considered these as mere `technicalities' and in our ignorance, rules about not eating after midday and not using money may seem so, but I believe they were all made for very good reasons. Probably, if one cares to study the history, one will find that the Vajjians also thought there were `special circumstances' to make amendments with `clear conscience'. What do you think? Perhaps Betty or Azita or Deb may have comments too. Sarah ====== > http://www.thanhsiang.org/paper2/dip2-9.html > > "As recorded in the Bhikkhuni Khandhaka of the Cullavagga Pali, > Mahapajapati Gotami was conferred both Ordination and the Higher > Ordination by her mere acceptance of eight strict conditions (Attha > Garudhamma). Again with reference to Addhakasi, a former courtesan, > the Buddha even empowered the monks to confer Higher Ordination > through an emissary. Before the decentralisation of powers pertaining > to disciplinary matters there was an intermediate phase in the > monastic order of nuns where nuns were admitted to Higher Ordination > following the formal act of procedure by nuns as well as by monks. As > the motion and the announcement are pronounced eight times before > both communities, this particular method is called Atthavacika. > > ................. there were eight methods of conferring Higher > Ordination during the time of the Buddha: > > 1 . Ehi bhikkhu (Come, 0 Monk) > > 2 . Saranagamana (Taking refuge in the triple gem) > > 3 . Ovadapatiggahana (Acceptance of advice) > > 4. Panhabyakarana (Answering questions) > > 5. Atthagarudhamma (Acceptance of eight strict rules) > > 6 . Duta (Through an emissary) > > 7. Atthavacika (By the pronouncement of eight times) > > 8. Natticatuttha kamma (By three announcements)" 15623 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 1:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Larry, I think your discussion with Kom about concepts and realities is very helpful for everyone and really touches on the essentail aspects of satipatthana and meditation. If there isn’t an appreciation of what exactly paramattha dhammas are and the distinction between these and sammuti sacca (wordly truth), then there cannot be any development of satipatthana. You said: “I believe our question is why are concepts not realities. I thought about this for about two hours and could neither answer it nor disprove it. I found faults with reasons on both sides of the question. Ultimately I think my problem is in not understanding either. So.... I give up.” Don’t give up! I think you’re beginning to raise important questions for everyone to consider. I have little to add to Kom’s clear comments. Concepts can only be experienced by thinking (not necessarily in words as discussed). As they don’t *exist*, they don’t have characteristics to be known by sati and panna. Hardness can be known, but not a table. We can think about scientific theories and proofs or philosophies, we can think about the good deeds we’ll do tomorrow, we can think about hardness even. It may be conventionally wise or even wise-in-a-kusala sense of wise thinking, but it’s still only thinking about concepts. A moment of awareness of thinking at these times as just a nama experiencing its object, is far more precious. Only moments of direct awareness of paramatha dhammas (realities) takes us closer to the end of samsara. I hope you continue the discussion with Kom and remember that ideas about ‘giving up’ are just more moments of thinking about concepts too. I also recommend this small booklet by A.Sujin “Realities and Concepts” http://www.abhidhamma.org/sujin3.htm Sarah ====== 15624 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 2:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] Episode III: Samma this, samma that; miccha this, miccha that Hi Dan, Great to read these ‘episodes’...look forward to any more. --- onco111 wrote: > Episode III: Samma this, samma that; miccha this, miccha that > > Dan [full version of the Dhs. quote not given in the conversation]: > In Dhammasangani, I read that "right effort" is "...mental endeavor, > riddance of lethargy, exerting harder and harder, endeavoring higher > and higher, having sustained desire to strive, not relinquishing the > task, discharging the task well, endeavor as the faculty of endeavor, > power of endeavor, right effort." By contrast, I read that "wrong > effort" is "...mental endeavor, riddance olathargy, exerting harder > and harder, endeavoring higher and higher, having sustained desire to > strive, not relinquishing the task, discharging the task well, > endeavor as the faculty of endeavor, power of endeavor, wrong > effort." > > KS [without even hearing the question first]: Effort is effort. > Whether it is wrong effort or right effort depends on the other > cetasikas. > > [And Dan delighted in the words.] ..... Great quote and comment. Reminds me also of similar ones for chanda (zeal), samadhi (concentration) and other factors which can be wholesome or unwholesome. I also like your story and reminders at the end of the post (and KS's response;-)). I particularly liked this quote from it: >“Even the miccha-est of miccha > samadhi can feel very calm and clean and pure. The fruits of > concentration are alluring, and attachment to miccha samadhi grows > and grows.” .... I think you will appreciate some of the quotes I put in this post on similar themes if you didn’t read it before: Right and Wrong Path and Jhana factors http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/m11231.html Thanks so much for reporting back to us and I hope Lisa found it rewarding or at least ‘food for some wise thought’ as well. Sarah ===== > [I brought up an interview I heard on the radio. A man was given a > shotgun as a gift after never having owned any gun before. He'd > always thought it strange that people hunted and enjoyed killing > animals. But then, he practiced with his gun and learned. He talked > of how calm and focussed the mind had to be and how sharp the > concentration, in order to properly aim the gun at an animal, pull > the trigger, and hit the target. Even the miccha-est of miccha > samadhi can feel very calm and clean and pure. The fruits of > concentration are alluring, and attachment to miccha samadhi grows > and grows. KS seemed to have little comment on my stories. I'm glad -- > a reminder to me that I came to hear her, not to talk her ear off. > Better to turn on her voice again with questions about Dhamma.] 15625 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 3:32am Subject: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Dear Sarah, Your willingness to continue with this topic when you support the current Theravada position that restoration of a Bhikkhuni Sangha is impossible, is really appreciated. Thank you for persevering with this, but I feel the subject has been in abeyance too long to pick up again (672 posts ago) - I think the lack of response is probably a sign that the members aren't particularly interested in discussing the topic, or feel it is too contentious. As for myself, I don't know enough to maintain a worthwhile discussion and would rather reflect on other areas; I am not looking to debate the issue. As one of my original posts said "I have no particular barrow to push on this issue other than that I have never seen it explained comprehensively in such a way as to give understanding to those, like me, genuinely wondering" .....[how the present position came to be]. Hearing why the six points raised by Prof. G. P. Malalasekara are invalid and when, and whether, the eight methods of ordination previously used were specifically changed by the Buddha or just fell into disuse would have been valuable - but I don't have the contacts, time or the capacity to research the area. For anyone interested, the six points are at: http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha184.htm and the eight methods are at: http://www.thanhsiang.org/paper2/dip2-9.html Previous discussion can be traced from message http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/14735 Thanks again, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abbott_hk" wrote: > Dear Christine, > > I've certainly given others plenty of time to add comments and I > said I'd be slow on this;-) 15626 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Episode III: Samma this, samma that; miccha this, miccha that Dear Dan , I liked your example about the shooter. I used to go hunting and it certainly took real concentration and calm (in the akusala way)to be proficient at it. I was also an amateur boxer (briefly) and the week or so before the fight was a very focused time - I think something that many boxers find compelling and even slightly addictive. Robert Dan:I brought up an interview I heard on the radio. A man was given a > > shotgun as a gift after never having owned any gun before. He'd > > always thought it strange that people hunted and enjoyed killing > > animals. But then, he practiced with his gun and learned. He talked > > of how calm and focussed the mind had to be and how sharp the > > concentration, in order to properly aim the gun at an animal, pull > > the trigger, and hit the target. Even the miccha-est of miccha > > samadhi can feel very calm and clean and pure. The fruits of > > concentration are alluring, and attachment to miccha samadhi grows > > and grows. KS seemed to have little comment on my stories. I'm glad -- > > a reminder to me that I came to hear her, not to talk her ear off. > > Better to turn on her voice again with questions about Dhamma.] > > > 15627 From: Egberdina Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:07am Subject: Re: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? Hi there, Christine, I did a lot of cutting to arrive here. Some comments follow below what is left. > A little, true story. I am greatly indebted to my father. At age 50, > he discarded his entire theology/philosophy library. (He also was a > minister of religion). Imagine the four walls of a roomy study, lined > with shelves from the floor to the ceiling, not a vacant square > centimetre, all the shelves jam-packed with hefty tomes on you-name- > it, anything to do with spiritual quests. > > What happened? > > A small germ had taken root. God is not found in books. > > He quit the church, and his garden did better out of it, too. > ------------------------------- > Chris: Thanks for sharing about your father Herman - I too lived for > many years with a devotion to God. I know what it is to be seduced > by the rapture of mystical experience - better by far to know what > is Real. > I don't live in a 'nice' cocoon of how I imagine the world to be. > There is no control, no safety, no protection for this bag of > khandas.. I am immersed everyday in the depths of the misery humans > are capable of inflicting on themselves and others - and deal > constantly with beings blindly under the sway of their defilements - > learning a little about the great breadth and depth of my own as > well. Not through books or the TV news, but through the ever > changing good and evil I witness in myself and in my daily work. > The Dhamma-Vinaya is used as a tool, a roadmap, a way of heading for > home out of the suffering and chaos of life. Not as a substitute for > experience. I cannot make a judgement as to whether or not learning Pali would help you on your way out of suffering. I know one thing, which is what my initial reply was intended to convey. Whatever tools, roadmaps, practises, we employ, if they become things in themselves, for themselves, objects of clinging, then they will not help us, but hinder us. If we are not prepared to dispense with our various rafts when they are not serving a liberating purpose anymore, they have become millstones around our neck. All the Best Herman 15628 From: Egberdina Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:37am Subject: Re: illogical? Hi all, I would really like a chocolate. So I wish to add the following. The formulation - NOT (X AND (NOT X)) includes the negation of a negation (double negation). This is meaningless in some systems of logic. "Is the negation of the negation of A equivalent to A? That depends on what denial is, and hence what negative particles mean. In logic the classical answer is 'yes', and accordingly operations of eliminating and introducing double negatives are permitted. Intuitionist logic disallows the elimination." http://www.xrefer.com/entry/552921 I don't think I have not earned my chocolate :-) All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Stephen, > > Let me clarify my question a bit: > > I am intrigued that Malunkyaputta offered four options: > - X > - NOT X > - X AND (NOT X) > - NOT (X AND (NOT X)) > > I am asking if "traditional logic" usually limits itself to the > first two options. > > This is of interest to me because logic in quantum theory makes use > of the last two options. > > I am asking this question because I want to make the point that the > Suttas had a wider perspective than "traditional logic". > > BTW, when asked this question, the Buddha did not say that all four > options were wrong. He refused to answer. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > PS: So, do I get a chocolate? > > 15629 From: Egberdina Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:51am Subject: Negation in Pali /Abhidhamma Hi all, I would be interested to learn from those in the know how negation is obtained in Pali. In English we might prefix a word with a- or just use the word not. Is negation used at all in the Abhidhamma? What sort of mind object is a negated object? How is it classified, if at all? Would the construct "not nibbana" have any meaning at all? All the best Herman 15630 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 1:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/10/02 12:57:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > Hi Kom, > > I'm afraid I still don't understand how concepts don't have > characteristics. How do we tell them apart if they don't have > characteristics? I believe concepts are defined as name and meaning. > Aren't name and meaning characteristics? > > Also, I'm not real sure what is attachment. > > Larry > > ============================ I'm not sure about Kom on this issue, but some folks here seem to use the word 'concept' not as a kind of thought, but rather as the (alleged) referent of a such a thought. I understand a concept to be a thought that is constructed from a number of (interrelated!) fundamental, direct elements of experience. There is nothing "behind" a concept except those elements from which it was constructed and the relations among them. The thought has characteristics (as a thought), but there is no single thing "behind" it to have characteristics. Now, a concept (for example, the concept of the boat 'Anicca' I had discussed, but you haven't commented on! ;-) is used as a template to overlay certain experiences which are then grasped as constituting a single, actually existing "thing" such as "the keyboard I'm typing on". Now, "the keyboard I'm typing on" does, in my estimation, have conventional existence - the "conventional" part being due to its dependence (as an apparent self-existing object) on the overlaying concept of 'keyboard' (whether named or not). The reality is that a multitude of direct experiences are currently compounded by the mind into a multlayered construct which sufficiently matches our general 'keyboard' template for us to "experience a keyboard". Now, that seemingly real object which is "the keyboard I'm typing on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does not truly have any characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: (groups of) the direct experiences which the mind compounds into this percept are viewed as its characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to say that both the general concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that which is the mind-constructed percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now both fall under the range of the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the former "concept" and the latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on DSG seem to *also* call the (only conventionally existing) intended *referents* of these by the name "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that creates confusion for those of us who do not use language that way. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15631 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 1:46am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi, Stephen (and all) - In a message dated 9/10/02 11:52:17 PM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > > >- X > > >- NOT X > > >- X AND (NOT X) > > >- NOT (X AND (NOT X)) > ========================= Shouldn't the last of these be NOT (X OR (NOT X))? [In fact, the propositional formula NOT (X AND (NOT X)) is *true* - it is a tautology!! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15632 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 7:31am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Dear Howard, > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > I'm not sure about Kom on this issue, but > some folks here seem to use > the word 'concept' not as a kind of thought, but > rather as the (alleged) > referent of a such a thought. I understand a > concept to be a thought that is > constructed from a number of (interrelated!) > fundamental, direct elements of > experience. There is nothing "behind" a concept > except those elements from > which it was constructed and the relations among > them. The thought has > characteristics (as a thought), but there is no > single thing "behind" it to > have characteristics. Now, a concept (for > example, the concept of the boat > 'Anicca' I had discussed, but you haven't > commented on! ;-) is used as a > template to overlay certain experiences which are > then grasped as > constituting a single, actually existing "thing" > such as "the keyboard I'm > typing on". Now, "the keyboard I'm typing on" > does, in my estimation, have > conventional existence - the "conventional" part > being due to its dependence > (as an apparent self-existing object) on the > overlaying concept of 'keyboard' > (whether named or not). The reality is that a > multitude of direct experiences > are currently compounded by the mind into a > multlayered construct which > sufficiently matches our general 'keyboard' > template for us to "experience a > keyboard". Now, that seemingly real object which > is "the keyboard I'm typing > on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does > not truly have any > characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: > (groups of) the direct > experiences which the mind compounds into this > percept are viewed as its > characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to > say that both the general > concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that > which is the mind-constructed > percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now > both fall under the range of > the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the > former "concept" and the > latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on > DSG seem to *also* call the > (only conventionally existing) intended > *referents* of these by the name > "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that > creates confusion for those of > us who do not use language that way. > > With metta, > Howard > Thanks for your clear explanation of realities and concepts. I have a few comments: 1) I believe the pali differentiates all what the mind cognizes into paramatha dhamma and pannatti (also sometimes called dhamma). Whatever is not paramatha is pannatti. The usage of pannatti or concept to describe concept, percept, its referrent, naming, etc. is just a one-to-one mapping from Pali usage. Although you may be right that it's confusing to some to use the word concept to describe all that is not paramatha, I think it is better for people who are not familiar with Pali. Also, we refer quite a bit to existing literature that uses the word concept in this manner. 2) All pannatti, when cognized by the mind---regardless of whether or not it is concept, percept, referent, naming---has no characteristics. The elements that we combine into (some) pannatti do, but pannatti doesn't. When the seeing consciousness sees a visible object, the visible object has the characteristics of impacting the eye, or appearance of visible object, or brightness, etc. The mind immediately afterward cognizes pannatti (based on repeated cognition of the visible object which has characteristics) which are shapes, forms, distinction of colors, meaning, names, and maybe stories: these don't have characteristics. 3) When we talk about all the vipassana nana (the clear comprehension of realities as they are), we see that they are all clear comprehension of things that exist in the paramatha sense, and not the pannatti sense. The Buddha encourages us to see the rising and falling away, the impermanence of all things: this happens (directly, instead of thinking about it) only with objects with paramatha characteristics. The pannatti, due to its absence of characteristics, cannot be a direct object of the ti-lakkhana: what rises and falls away if it doesn't have characteristics at the first place? kom 15633 From: robmoult Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 8:11am Subject: Re: Negation in Pali /Abhidhamma Hi Herman, As far as I know, in Pali one negates a word by adding an 'a': - Opposite of lobha is alobha - Opposite of dosa is adosa - Opposite of moha is amoha There are some gramatically rules to handle words starting with vowels, but I am not sure how they work. Nibanna is usually described using negatives (not conditioned, etc.) so negating one of these descriptive terms would be a double negative (which I think is a no-no). Does this answer your question? There are many other DSGrs with much better knowledge of Pali than I, so if you need more detail, I will probably not be able to help. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Egberdina" wrote: > Hi all, > > I would be interested to learn from those in the know how negation is > obtained in Pali. In English we might prefix a word with a- or just > use the word not. > > Is negation used at all in the Abhidhamma? What sort of mind object > is a negated object? How is it classified, if at all? > > Would the construct "not nibbana" have any meaning at all? > > All the best > > Herman 15634 From: robmoult Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 8:20am Subject: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi Howard, Yes you are correct - unfortunately Herman wins the chocolate as he identified the same mistake three posts earlier :-) To stop this discussion from degenerating into a debate on logic (perhaps not appropriate for a Dhamma Study Group), let me quote the relevant Sutta: In the Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta, Malunkyaputta asked the Buddha to clarify if: 'After death a Tathagata exists', 'After death a Tathagata does not exist', 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist'. (This is the famous poison arrow sutta). Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Stephen (and all) - > > In a message dated 9/10/02 11:52:17 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > oreznoone@a... writes: > > > > > > >- X > > > > >- NOT X > > > > >- X AND (NOT X) > > > > >- NOT (X AND (NOT X)) > > > ========================= > Shouldn't the last of these be NOT (X OR (NOT X))? [In fact, the > propositional formula NOT (X AND (NOT X)) is *true* - it is a tautology!! > > With metta, > Howard 15635 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 10:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] philosophy Hello Stephen, thank you for your nice post. You are most welcome to discuss Abhidhamma, and if you have disagreements as you say, it is good to hear different points. Best wishes from Nina. op 10-09-2002 06:02 schreef oreznoone@a... op oreznoone@a...: > Thanks for the post. Perhaps your sister can come over and explain quantum > physics to me! > I have numerous disagreements with the abhidhammic approach, some of which > are over rather basic premises. I hope you will be game to discuss some of > them with me as they crop up. I read your book ADL (among others) a few > summers back and found it a model of clarity. Despite our differences I > certainly have no hostility to the abhidhamma, finding in it a helpful > spiritual psychology. 15636 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 10:01am Subject: Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no 7 Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no 7. As we read in the Commentary, paññå knows the characeristics of the dhammas that are low or exalted, dark or pure. We read further on: Again, the development of paññå with the aim to realize the four noble Truths is walking a very long way, namely traversing the cycle of birth and death. If paññå arises we can understand that the cycle of birth and death we have traversed thus far is extremely long. So long as paññå has not become accomplished, the path leading to the end of the cycle is still extremely long. Thus, as we read, for the development of paññå we have an extremely long way to go. We have to go to the further shore, into the direction of nibbåna, where, according to the Commentary, ³we never went yet, not even in our dreams². We need all ten perfections, because we have such an amount of defilements. It is not sufficient to only develop the perfection of paññå. If we do not understand what the perfections are and in what way we should develop them in our daily life, we cannot realize the four noble Truths, but we have merely vain expectations of achieving this. We do not know ourselves as we truly are and we do not understand that we need the perfections which are a supporting condition for the development of kusala and for the elimination of akusala dhammas. When we have understood that satipatthåna should be developed together with the perfections, there are conditions for the perfection of generosity, the giving away of things for the benefit of someone else, for the perfection of síla, the abstention from akusala kamma and the perfection of renunciation: detachment from visible object, sound and the other sense objects. This is a very gradual process, but at times someone may notice that he is inclined to become more detached from sense objects, that he has had already enough of them, and that he should not indulge in them too much. With regard to the perfection of paññå, most people are longing for paññå, but the perfection of paññå, that is, paññå that understands the characteristics of realities, cannot arise if one does not develop it. Generally people wish to know the truth of realities, but they should carefully investigate whether, at the moment of seeing, of the experience of the other sense objects or of thinking, they have the sincere desire (chanda) to know and to understand the characteristics of the realities that are appearing at those very moments. When someone really sees the benefit of paññå he needs to have energy and endurance, because the development of paññå is a difficult task which takes an endlessly long time. Understanding of the level of listening is only a foundation, it is not the perfection of paññå that is the condition for the realization of the four noble Truths. The perfection of paññå evolves with the development of the understanding of the characteristics of realities that are appearing. This includes the development of understanding of the level of listening, of considering realities, and also of the level of awareness of realities at this moment. 15637 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 3:49pm Subject: ADL ch. 24 (3) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 24 (3) Summarizing the cittas in the process during which enlightenment is attained, they are the following: mano-dvåråvajjana-citta parikamma (preparatory consciousness; for some people not necessary) upacåra (proximity consciousness) anuloma (conformity or adaptation) gotrabhú (change of lineage) magga-citta phala-citta (two or three moments, depending on the individual) Nibbåna can be the object of kåmåvacara cittas which arise after the lokuttara cittas have fallen away. Before someone becomes an ariyan there can only be speculation about nibbåna. For the ariyan, however, it is different. Since he has directly experienced nibbåna, he can review his experience afterwards. We read in the Visuddhimagga (XXII, 19) that the person who attained enlightenment reviews, after the lokuttara cittas have fallen away, the path, the fruition, the defilements which have been abandoned, the defilements which are still remaining and nibbåna. He reviews these things in different mind-door processes of citta. Some people think that enlightenment could not occur in daily life, they believe that it is necessary to be in a solitary place in order to attain nibbåna. The development of vipassanå is the development of right understanding of all realities occurring in daily life. When paññå has been developed to the degree that enlightenment can be attained, enlightenment can occur in the middle of one's daily activities. As we have seen, the attainment of enlightenment is only a few moments of citta which arise and fall away within split seconds. We read in the Discourse to Díghanakha (Middle Length Sayings II, no. 74) that the Buddha taught Dhamma to the wanderer Díghanaka on Vulture's Peak near Råjagaha. He taught him about the getting rid of wrong views and about the impermanence of conditioned realities. Såriputta, who was an ariyan but had not yet attained arahatship, was also present at the time of that discourse. We read: Now at that time the venerable Såriputta was standing behind the Lord, fanning the Lord. Then it occurred to the venerable Såriputta: ``The Lord speaks to us of getting rid of these things and those by means of super-knowledge, the Well-farer speaks to us of casting out these things and those by means of superknowledge´´. While the venerable Såriputta was reflecting on this, his mind was freed from the cankers without clinging. But to the wanderer Díghanakha there arose the stainless, spotless vision of dhamma, that whatever is of the nature to arise all that is of the nature to stop... Såriputta attained arahatship, but he did not go into solitude in order to attain it; he was fanning the Buddha. Díghanakha listened to the Buddha and then became a sotåpanna. We read in the Kindred Sayings (III, Khandhå-vagga, Middle Fifty, chapter 4, §89, Khema) that Khemaka, who was an anågåmí, attained arahatship while he was preaching and monks who were listening attained arahatship as well. We read: Now when this teaching was thus expounded the hearts of as many as sixty monks were utterly set free from the åsavas, and so was it also with the heart of the venerable Khemaka... If one is on the right Path, paññå can be developed, no matter what the circumstances are, even to the degree of enlightenment. People may wonder whether it would be possible to notice it when a person attains nibbåna. But can one see whether someone else is mindful or not mindful? Who knows the cittas of other people? We cannot know when someone else is mindful of nåma and rúpa or when he attains nibbåna. The question may arise whether all four stages of enlightenment (the stages of the sotåpanna, the sakadågåmí, the anågåmí and the arahat) can be attained in the course of one life. We read in the suttas about disciples of the Buddha who attained the ariyan state but not yet arahatship and realized arahatship later on in life. Ånanda, for example, did not attain arahatship during the Buddha's life, but he became an arahat after the Buddha had passed away, the evening before the first great council was to start (the ``Illustrator of Ultimate meaning´´, commentary to the ``Mangala-sutta´´ or ``Good Omen Discourse´´, Minor Readings, Khuddaka Nikåya). 15638 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 3:25pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi, Kom - I understand what you write below, and I agree with much of it. However, as I see it, thoughts, whether simple or mentally constructed from simpler ones, are mind-objects, and they have characteristics. A memory, for example, of a picture has visual characteristics; some thoughts are clear, some are fuzzy; a tune that "keeps going through ones head" is an auditory thought; the concept of a musical note is elementary; a concept of a symphony is compound; the concept of 'hardness' is "paramatthic" (to coin an adjective! ;-)) In any case, thoughts - and concepts are thoughts - have characteristics. Thoughts are just as much experienced as hardness is and as itches are. Thoughts are not imagined. What they represent very often are, but *they* are not. However, what is not imagined does not, perforce, have inherent existence. All dhammas are without core, being dependent on many conditions for their existence. With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/11/02 10:32:40 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kom@a... writes: > > Dear Howard, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > > I'm not sure about Kom on this issue, but > > some folks here seem to use > > the word 'concept' not as a kind of thought, but > > rather as the (alleged) > > referent of a such a thought. I understand a > > concept to be a thought that is > > constructed from a number of (interrelated!) > > fundamental, direct elements of > > experience. There is nothing "behind" a concept > > except those elements from > > which it was constructed and the relations among > > them. The thought has > > characteristics (as a thought), but there is no > > single thing "behind" it to > > have characteristics. Now, a concept (for > > example, the concept of the boat > > 'Anicca' I had discussed, but you haven't > > commented on! ;-) is used as a > > template to overlay certain experiences which are > > then grasped as > > constituting a single, actually existing "thing" > > such as "the keyboard I'm > > typing on". Now, "the keyboard I'm typing on" > > does, in my estimation, have > > conventional existence - the "conventional" part > > being due to its dependence > > (as an apparent self-existing object) on the > > overlaying concept of 'keyboard' > > (whether named or not). The reality is that a > > multitude of direct experiences > > are currently compounded by the mind into a > > multlayered construct which > > sufficiently matches our general 'keyboard' > > template for us to "experience a > > keyboard". Now, that seemingly real object which > > is "the keyboard I'm typing > > on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does > > not truly have any > > characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: > > (groups of) the direct > > experiences which the mind compounds into this > > percept are viewed as its > > characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to > > say that both the general > > concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that > > which is the mind-constructed > > percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now > > both fall under the range of > > the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the > > former "concept" and the > > latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on > > DSG seem to *also* call the > > (only conventionally existing) intended > > *referents* of these by the name > > "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that > > creates confusion for those of > > us who do not use language that way. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > Thanks for your clear explanation of realities and concepts. > I have a few comments: > > 1) I believe the pali differentiates all what the mind > cognizes into paramatha dhamma and pannatti (also sometimes > called dhamma). Whatever is not paramatha is pannatti. The > usage of pannatti or concept to describe concept, percept, > its referrent, naming, etc. is just a one-to-one mapping > from Pali usage. Although you may be right that it's > confusing to some to use the word concept to describe all > that is not paramatha, I think it is better for people who > are not familiar with Pali. Also, we refer quite a bit to > existing literature that uses the word concept in this > manner. > > 2) All pannatti, when cognized by the mind---regardless of > whether or not it is concept, percept, referent, > naming---has no characteristics. The elements that we > combine into (some) pannatti do, but pannatti doesn't. When > the seeing consciousness sees a visible object, the visible > object has the characteristics of impacting the eye, or > appearance of visible object, or brightness, etc. The mind > immediately afterward cognizes pannatti (based on repeated > cognition of the visible object which has characteristics) > which are shapes, forms, distinction of colors, meaning, > names, and maybe stories: these don't have characteristics. > > 3) When we talk about all the vipassana nana (the clear > comprehension of realities as they are), we see that they > are all clear comprehension of things that exist in the > paramatha sense, and not the pannatti sense. The Buddha > encourages us to see the rising and falling away, the > impermanence of all things: this happens (directly, instead > of thinking about it) only with objects with paramatha > characteristics. The pannatti, due to its absence of > characteristics, cannot be a direct object of the > ti-lakkhana: what rises and falls away if it doesn't have > characteristics at the first place? > > kom > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15639 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 3:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/11/02 11:21:24 AM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > Yes you are correct - unfortunately Herman wins the chocolate as he > identified the same mistake three posts earlier :-) > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: I missed that. Good! I'm getting too fat anyway!! --------------------------------------------------- > > To stop this discussion from degenerating into a debate on logic > (perhaps not appropriate for a Dhamma Study Group), let me quote the > relevant Sutta: > > In the Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta, Malunkyaputta asked the Buddha to > clarify if: 'After death a Tathagata exists', 'After death a > Tathagata does not exist', 'After death a Tathagata both exists & > does not exist' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does > not exist'. (This is the famous poison arrow sutta). > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > ================================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15640 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:26pm Subject: Re: illogical? Howard, Herman, Rob Howard: >Shouldn't the last of these be NOT (X OR (NOT X))? [In fact, the >propositional formula NOT (X AND (NOT X)) is *true* - it is a tautology!! Oops. That's what I had in the original post. Now as this is the Law of Excluded Middle it can almost be said to define "tautology." As you know it's possible to prove anything (literally) from a contradiction. So the Buddha's use of "Both exists and not exists" (x & not-x) is, on face value, nonsense. Consequently my musings on what it might mean (partly x and partly not-x is the best I can come up with). The form given just can't be the accurate formulation of the tetralemma. Herman, Ahhh, intuitionist logic. Brings back my student days; unfortunately not enough to actually recall what it means :-) (Problems with material implication as I dubiously recall.) Now as you can make this reference throw your hat in the ring: what are the last two statements if not the above and a virtual definition of "contradiction"? Can these two statements be subsumed under syllogistic logic or are they something new which the Buddha foresaw? >I don't think I have not earned my chocolate :-) I'd send one for sure but the moderators don't allow attachments ;-) metta, stephen Rob, just in passing: "Physics takes its start from everyday experience, which it continues by more subtle means. It remains akin to it, does not transcendent it generically; it cannot enter into another realm. Discoveries in physics cannot in themselves—so I believe—have the authority of forcing us to put an end to the habit of picturing the physical world as a reality." Edwin Schrodinger 15641 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:29pm Subject: An early Halloween treat Where is Ted Williams? Ted Williams is dead. Immediately upon dying his consciousness was reborn. His patisandhi / rebirth consciousness determined the character of some new being. But, possibly many such beings from today... Ted Williams is frozen. In a few hundred years he may be thawed out, repaired, brought back to life. But where's his consciousness then? Perhaps it waited around after all — but how did it know this would happen and revival wasn't a pipe dream? Does he get a clean bill of karmic health? Is he the zombie Ted Williams, apparently just the same but without some vital inner component? metta, stephen 15642 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 9:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi Sarah, Kom and Howard, Here are a couple of quotes. What is the meaning? Larry: from "A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma" Chapter VIII #29. Therein, the material phenomena are just the aggregate of matter. Consciousness and mental factors, which comprise the four immaterial aggregates, and Nibbana, are the five kinds that are immaterial. They are also called "name" [nama]. What remains are concepts, which are twofold: concept as that which is made known [atthapannatti], and concept as that which makes known [namapannatti]. #30. Concept as What is Made Known: How? There are such terms as "land," "mountain," and the like, so designated on account of the mode of transition of the respective elements; such terms as "house," "chariot," "cart," and the like, so named on account of the mode of formation of materials; such terms as "person," "individual," and the like, so named on account of the five aggregates; such terms as "direction," "time," and the like, named according to the revolution of the moon and so forth; such terms as "well," "cave," and the like, so named on account of the mode of non-imppact and so forth; such terms as kasina signs and the like, so named on account of respective elements and distinguished mental development. All such diffrerent things, though they do not exist in the ultimate sense, become objects of consciousness in the form of shadows of (ultimate) things. They are called concepts because they are thought of, reckoned, understood, expressed, and made known on account of, in consideration of, with respect to, this and that mode. This kind of concept is so called because it is made known. #31. Concept as What Makes Known Then, as it makes known, it is called concept. It is described as name, nomenclature, etc. It is sixfold: (1) a (direct) concept of the real; (2) a (direct) concept of the unreal; (3) a concept of the unreal by means of the real; (4) a concept of the real by means of the unreal; (5) a concept of the real by means of the real; (6) a concept of the unreal by means of the unreal. [real and unreal are translations of vijja and avijja] As, for instance, when it makes known what really exists in the ultimate sense by a term such as "matter," "feeling," and so forth, it is called a (direct) concept of the real. When it makes known what does not really exist in the ultimate sense by a term such as "land," "mountain," an so forth, it is called a (direct) concept of the unreal. The rest should be respectively understood by combining both as, for instance, "possessor of sixfold direct knowledge," "woman's voice," "eye-consciousness," and "king's son." #32 Summary By following the sound of speech through the process of ear-consciousness, and then by means of the concept conceived by (the process in the) mind-door that subsequently arises, meanings are understood. These concepts should be understood as fashioned by worldly convention. from"Paramattha-manjusa" Visuddhimagga Atthakatha (825) These modes, [that is, the three characteristics,] are not included in the aggregates because they are states without individual essence (asabhava-dhamma); and they are not separate from the aggregates because they are unapprehendable without the aggregates. But they should be understood as appropriate conceptual differences (pannatti-visesa) that are reason for differentiation in the explaining of the dangers in the five aggregates, which are allowable by common usage in respect of the five aggregates 15643 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 5:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi, Larry (and Sarah and Kom) - In a message dated 9/12/02 12:10:44 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Sarah, Kom and Howard, > > Here are a couple of quotes. What is the meaning? > > Larry ============================= The best that I can say is that the text talks of two main kinds of concepts, the first being the intended referents of what I would actually call concepts [and I think these alleged referents should *not* be called concepts], and the second being the concepts proper. The latter category is further split into two subcategories: the concepts of paramattha dhammas, and the "compound concepts" whose alleged referents seem to be experienced only by virtue of superimposing the concepts on what is directly experienced. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15644 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 11:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi Larry, As Howard has just commented, there are various categories of pannatti (concepts) and as Kom has explained, whatever category they come under -- whether a concept of the real or the unreal or a combination of the two --, they do not exist in the ultimate sense. In addition to the excellent quotes you have provided from CMA c.8 and Vism, you may find these notes Jon posted (also from CMA) helpful. If not, let us know where the ‘sticking’ points are in them. Further useful posts from the archives can be found under Useful Posts -‘Concepts’ and ‘Concepts and Realities’ at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ Sarah ===== ***** 1. Message 2918 Subject: Realities, concepts and dhammas The following are from the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi and published by the BPS. (Numbers preceded by # are the numbers of sections in the original text. ‘Guide’ refers to the commentarial writings on the original text. The short headings are mine.) Ultimate realities are what the Abhidhamma is all about- #2: The things contained in the Abhidhamma are fourfold from the standpoint of ultimate reality (paramatthato): consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), matter (rupa), and Nibbana. Ultimate realities are distinguished from so-called ‘conventional’ realities- #2 Guide: According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are 2 kinds of realities—the conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). What are ‘conventional realities’? #2 Guide: Conventional realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (pannatti) and conventional modes of expression (vohaara). They include such entities as living beings, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. How are conventional realities different from ultimate realities?- #2 Guide: The Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate validity, for the objects which they signify [ie. the living beings, men, women, animals etc] do not exist in their own right as irreducible realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are products of mental construction (parikappanaa), not realities existing by reason of their own nature. What are ultimate realities?- #2 Guide: Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their own extrinsic nature (sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Hence the word ‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived from ‘parama’ = ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing. ***** 2. Message 2932 Subject: Realities, concepts and dhammas - 2 Dear Friends Continuing a quick look at Ch I, section 2 from the Abhidhammata Sangaha on realities and concepts: ‘Ultimate’ has a second meaning – the ultimate objects of right knowledge- Guide to #2 Ultimate realities are not only the ultimate existents, they are also the ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional realities. Concepts do not possess ultimacy. It is the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs – the dhammas – that form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma. Ultimate realities are knowable only to wisdom- Guide to #2 Ultimate realities are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person cannot see them. His mind is obscured by concepts. Only by means of wise attention to things (yoniso manasikara) can one see beyond the concepts. Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the domain of ultimate or supreme knowledge. So to summarise this post and the previous one- There are 2 kinds of realities – conventional (sammuti) and ultimate (paramattha). It is the ultimate realities that the Abhidhamma is concerned with. Ordinary people like us see the world in terms of conventional realities (eg people and things). However, these are just concepts (pannatti) and expressions (voharaa), products of mental construction (parikappana). Ultimate realities have their own intrinsic nature (sahaava), they are the dhammas. They are ultimate in 2 senses. First, they cannot be reduced any further, and second, they are things that can be known only by the highest knowledge. As to whether concepts are 'dhammas', the word dhamma has many meanings. When classifying by way of objects of the 6 doorways, the objects of the mind-door are called 'dhammaarammana' (translated as 'mental objects'), and these include concepts. Abhidhammattha Sangaha, Ch III #16 Mental object (dhammarammana) is sixfold: Sensitive matter (pasaadarupa), subtle matter (sukhumarupa), consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), Nibbana, and concepts. Guide to #16 Concepts - the class of convential realities, things which do not exist in the ulitmate sense - also fall into the category of mental object. I hope this helps to clarify some of the references to realities and concepts in the posts on this list. Jonothan ********** 15645 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 11:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Time for a change (a long post) Hi Rob M. Well, you asked me for more quotes and this prompted me to pull out the texts to try and check a few of your comments from an earlier post of yours: --- robmoult wrote: > Hi All, > > I am reading a book, "Buddhist Psychology of Perception" by E. > Sarachchandra, ..... > There is a chapter of the book titled, "Developments in the Twelfth > Century", where the theory of moments was introduced into the > Abhidhamma, to merge/adapt/refute positions of the Yogacara and > Sautrantika schools which also had developed similar theories at > that time. ..... I don’t understand any ‘theory’ to have been introduced into the Abhidhamma in the 12th century. Sorry, this doesn’t make any sense to me or maybe I’m misunderstanding the statement. ..... > As I delve into the details of the thought process in preparation > for my class, I come to the conclusion that if I want anything more > than a very simple overview, I am wandering into the realm > of "speculative theories" put forth by philosophers. ..... When I read the Abhidhamma and commentaries, I don’t come across any ‘speculative theory’ by any ‘philosopher’. hmmm...I’ll leave this for now. ..... >The > philosophers can't agree; there is a different view of the > importance of the registration citta as explained in the Visuddhi > Magga (early concept; registration is an exceptional case, rarely > occurring), the Abhidhammatthasangaha (late concept; registration > occurs in most thoughts) and the Atthasalini (wavers between early > and late concepts). I even find that some of the "simple overview" > was added later into the Abhidhamma and is not clearly supported in > the Suttas. For example, it appears as though the registration citta > was introduced by Buddhaghosa. In brief, I am starting to lose faith > in the accuracy and authenticity of the Abhidhamma. ..... Yesterday Hong Kong closed down for a typhoon, so I took the chance to check most the many references and footnotes (often lengthy in Vism) to all these texts you mentioned with regard to tadarammana (registration) consciousness, as well as the very detailed notes in Sammohavinodani. It’s not that I have any great interest in the registration or determining cittas, but I wanted to try and understand your comments and the suggestions of these differences which are a condition for you to ‘lose faith...’. Frankly, I couldn’t find these differences and you’ll have to add more detail of where you found these comments in these texts. Furthermore, I didn’t come across any comments about ‘concepts’, ‘early or late’ or of ‘registration is an exceptional case’. Let me give a few brief references: 1.CMA (B.Bodhi’s Abid. Sangaha), 111 (8): “The word tadaaramma.na means literally “having that object”, and denotes the function of taking as object the object that had been apprehended by the javanas. This function is exercised for two mind-moments immediately after the javana phase in a sense-sphere cognitive process when the object is either very prominent to the senses or clear to the mind. When the object lacks special prominence or clarity, as well as in other types of cognitive process apart from the sense-sphere process, this function is not exercised at all. Following registration (or the javana phase when registration does not occur) the stream of consciousness again lapses back into the bhavanga” . Later it also refers to the 11 kinds of this vipaka citta. *** 2.Sammohavinodani, PTS, 699: It gives long details about when the same 11 kinds ‘do not take that object ‘(tadaramma.na.m na ga.nhanti)....It also gives more details about processes and so on. 3. Atthasalini, PTS, 264: “And it becomes a result as the registration (or retention) with respect to a vivid object at the six doors. How?..When a boat goes across a fierce current, the water is cleft and follows the boat a little distance, and then goes along with the current. So when at the six doors the vivid object, being deceitful, presents itself, apperception takes place; after this happens, there comes the turn for the subconscious life-continuum. But this consciousness, not allowing this turn, seizes the object which was seized by apperception, arises in the first or second conscious interval, and descends even into the life-continuum.Or similarly, when a herd of cattle cross a stream - so the simile might be expanded. Thus this element of mind-cognition, from seizing that object seized by apperception, results in an act of registration..” Later it also gives descriptive examples of where and when the object is ‘weak’ and ‘this is another occasion without effect’. 4.Visuddhimagga: at 1V, n13, there is a helpful long footnote for you: “An already-formed nucleus of the cognitive series, based on the Sutta Pitaka material, appears in the Abhidhamma Pitaka.” Quotations which follow show “how the commentary expands the Abhidhamma Pitaka treatment.” X1V, 122 - “if the object is a very vivid one in the five doors, or is clear in the mind door....” Again the 11 kinds of registration XV11,129 -2 names for registration (explained in detail in Sammohavinodani). “It is variable as to door and object, it is invariable as to physical basis, and it is variable as to position and function.” ***** > Here is another quote from the book, "... the Abhidhamma does not > make any attempt to explain the phenomenon of memory, for, having > postulated process without substance, they were without any known > equipment for explaining it, and were obliged to merely recognize it > as a fact." Why is it that the Abhidhamma does not give a clear > description on the function of memory? I think that memory is a very > important topic that deserves a detailed explanation. ..... The Abhidhamma is a detailed explanation of realities as expounded by the Buddha (at least some of us believe;-)). While we continue to think of a memory as a story and concept, it’s impossible to understand the underlying realities. There is no lack of 'equipment' or explanation, but there is considerable ignorance when we read the details about the various processes and about the namas and rupas which make up the experience. Like Herman mentioned with regard to Pali translations, the problem does not lie in the texts or translations so much as the accumulated ignorance. If we are interested to know about the reality and function of sanna or vitakka or vicara or other mental factors, it is quite different from wishing to understand the function of memory as explained by scientists and psychologists, for example. We can know all the mechanisms of the brain (or I dare I say of quantam theory) and not be a jot closer in absolute terms to understanding anything about paramattha dhammas being experienced now.(Of course the same can be said about the abhidhamma if it is merely studied as a thoretical subject or explanation;-)) Just a few thoughts. If you don’t have any of the texts and wish me to type out a particular reference (I don’t have access to a scanner). I’ll be happy to do so when I can. Thanks for the stimulating discussion, Rob and looking f/w to seeing you ‘live’ again next week. Hope you didn’t get caught in the typhoon here and in Southern China. Sarah ===== 15646 From: ven.yanatharo.bikkhu Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 11:39pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Ms Sara, As I said for the last two years no Theravada monk in Australia, I contacted all the temples 12 months ago) will participate or ordain a female as a monk. I will always oppose it. And to ordain a female monk you nedd a minimum of FIVE ORDAINED FEMALES MONKS, at the moment there is no even one. With all my respect you should close this debate because it will go no where. Metta. Venerable Yanatharo, Buddhist Chaplain University of Canberra -----Mensaje original----- De: abbott_hk [mailto:abbott_hk@y...] Enviado el: Miércoles, Septiembre 11, 2002 06:26 p.m. Para: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Asunto: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Dear Christine, I've certainly given others plenty of time to add comments and I said I'd be slow on this;-) I appreciated the info you supplied (although I had thought you'd be supplying links for BOTH sides of the discussion - probably why I've delayed....hmmm;-)) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Sarah, and All, > > I am still reading around the first point of whether it is possible > to decide what are 'lesser and minor rules' ..... seems to me that if > the Arahats were not prepared to make a decision regarding this, that > the modern Sangha will not be prepared to either. (though "not > acting" IS a decision.) ..... I agree that "not acting" IS a decision and I think we've discussed the reasons for this. ..... > http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha184.htm > The second point of Prof. G. P. M. Malalasekara, for consideration > when assessing the possibility of restoring the order of Buddhist > nuns is: > > "Second, it is possible to make use of an injunction issued by the > Buddha that stipulates, "I permit you monks, to confer full > ordination on nuns."[25] There are references in the texts that show > that some regulations were amended, altered, or abrogated by the > Buddha himself on various occasions under special circumstances. The > absence of Bhikkhuniis in Theravaada clearly being a special > circumstance, these textual references should be sufficient cause for > granting monks the authority to ordain nuns with a clear conscience > that no transgression of the Vinaya rules has been committed. Those > who oppose the restoration of the Bhikkhunii Sa"ngha on the grounds > of Vinaya technicalities seem to ignore this relevant injunction." > > > It seems from my reading that, in the past, in the time of the > Buddha, there were eight methods of conferring higher ordination. In > the course of time, the eighth came to be regarded as the one and > only procedure for admitting a novice to Higher Ordination. What > would stand in the way of re-visiting each of these methods(apart > from the first)? And, in particular, the one quoted above? ...... I've put the 8 methods at the end of the post. Interesting, thank you. I'm having some trouble following the logic here, Chris. It's true that the rules were continually amended, altered and added to by the Buddha himself and we read the contexts and reasons for this. Infringements would lead to new rules and so on. Of course in the Buddha's case, this was always done with his omniscience and knowledge about what was necessary for the preservation and harmony of the Sangha and the endurance of the Teachings. I referred in the `courage' post to the previous 24 Buddha eras which the present Buddha could recall.He knew directly about the bhikkhuni orders and the impact on the preservation of the Dhamma in a way that even wise followers like Ananda could not comprehend. If the great arahats at the Ist Council did not feel qualified to make amendments, how would `we' be qualified to do so? As I remember, the 2nd Council (about 100yrs after the Buddha's parinibbana) was held because of a dispute over 10 minor rules which became a serious controversy. A very large number of monks, the Vajjians, refused to accept the Council's decisions and the schism almost `finished' the tradition of the Vinaya as left by the Buddha. We know that in other traditions there have been many changes to all parts of the Tipitaka and the strict adherence by the monks at all the Councils to the vinaya may seem extreme to us, but I think it is largely thanks to the Elder Yasa and the 700 monks who stood firm at this 2nd Council in not accepting amendments, that the entire Tipitaka, including the Vinaya has been preserved so very intact as it is `til today. I also question whether we really are only talking about "Vinaya technicalities" as Prof Malalasekera suggests. I'm sure the monks who raised the `ten points' would have also considered these as mere `technicalities' and in our ignorance, rules about not eating after midday and not using money may seem so, but I believe they were all made for very good reasons. Probably, if one cares to study the history, one will find that the Vajjians also thought there were `special circumstances' to make amendments with `clear conscience'. What do you think? Perhaps Betty or Azita or Deb may have comments too. Sarah ====== > http://www.thanhsiang.org/paper2/dip2-9.html > > "As recorded in the Bhikkhuni Khandhaka of the Cullavagga Pali, > Mahapajapati Gotami was conferred both Ordination and the Higher > Ordination by her mere acceptance of eight strict conditions (Attha > Garudhamma). Again with reference to Addhakasi, a former courtesan, > the Buddha even empowered the monks to confer Higher Ordination > through an emissary. Before the decentralisation of powers pertaining > to disciplinary matters there was an intermediate phase in the > monastic order of nuns where nuns were admitted to Higher Ordination > following the formal act of procedure by nuns as well as by monks. As > the motion and the announcement are pronounced eight times before > both communities, this particular method is called Atthavacika. > > ................. there were eight methods of conferring Higher > Ordination during the time of the Buddha: > > 1 . Ehi bhikkhu (Come, 0 Monk) > > 2 . Saranagamana (Taking refuge in the triple gem) > > 3 . Ovadapatiggahana (Acceptance of advice) > > 4. Panhabyakarana (Answering questions) > > 5. Atthagarudhamma (Acceptance of eight strict rules) > > 6 . Duta (Through an emissary) > > 7. Atthavacika (By the pronouncement of eight times) > > 8. Natticatuttha kamma (By three announcements)" 15647 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 11:57pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Dear Ven Yanatharo, Firstly, welcome to DSG. I hope you are finding some of the other discussions more useful and we’ll be glad to hear more from you on them. I note that you are also based in Australia, in Canberra, like Suan. Thank you also for you concern about this topic. I understand it is an issue which people tend to feel very emotional about and agree with you and Christine that if it cannot be discussed rationally and calmly it’s better for it to be left aside. Thank you for your kind consideration. In any case, I only know a tad more about it than I do about quantum physics (about which I know nilch) and will happily leave both aside. Best wishes, Sarah ===== --- "ven.yanatharo.bikkhu" wrote: > Ms Sara, As I said for the last two years no Theravada monk in > Australia, I > contacted all the temples 12 months ago) will participate or ordain a > female > as a monk. 15648 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 1:38am Subject: [dsg] Thoughts / Realities / Concepts / Mind Objects Dear Howard, I have broken off this piece from the main paramatha/concepts discussions as this is becoming quite a bit more detailed. I don't think this discussion will come to a conclusion, but I want to relate some information that I received on K. Sujin's trip to you. > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > > I understand what you write below, and I > agree with much of it. Aren't your breaking your disagreement streak? ;-) > However, as I see it, thoughts, whether simple or > mentally constructed from > simpler ones, are mind-objects, and they have > characteristics. I am not sure if you differentiate the "thinking" and what is thought of or not. Thinking, the thinking conciousness, vitaka, vicara, and all the associated dhammas are paramatha (with characteristics). I think this we agree on. What is thought of we might not agree. I understand that when the mind combines repeated cognition of paramatha objects, even if it hasn't become an "entity" per se yet, what is cognized (but not the cognition itself) is already pannatti, as it has no characteristics as appearing to the consciousness at the moment. For example, when we see shape. Shapes and forms are pannatti, although cognition of such shapes and forms is possible only because of paramatha characteristics (visible object, brightness, what appears to the eyes, etc.) that appeared, but shapes and forms don't have paramatha characteristics themselves. > A memory, for > example, of a picture has visual characteristics; > some thoughts are clear, > some are fuzzy; a tune that "keeps going through > ones head" is an auditory > thought; the concept of a musical note is > elementary; a concept of a symphony > is compound; the concept of 'hardness' is > "paramatthic" (to coin an > adjective! ;-)) I discussed this specific point and some related points on the trip. An example that was given is that when we dream about something, we don't see in our dream the way that we see in our daily life while we are awake. When we actually see, something bright (characterisitis of visible object) appears through both the eye door and the mind door. When we dream (or think of what we see, even when we are awake), at that moment there is no such brightness: how we see in a dream (and when we think) is quite different from when we actually see when we are awake. This I readily agree because my dream is quite dark without any light, but somehow I perceive shapes (like people). The sound makes a tougher argument. I can understand your point more readily. I have had the experience of hearing (with the sound not actually there) Vivaldi's for 3 days, during which I wasn't able to get much sleep. But on the other hand, there was no loudness (characteristic of sound) that appeared. Only the mental image of high/low pitch sound appeared. I think this is concept. I experience no image of smell, taste, or tangible object in my dream. So I can count this out completely. The points that were related to me relating to this topic includes: 1) For the kandha that has fallen away, it has fallen away completely. The Buddha enumerates the 11 characteristics of the 5 kandhas, 3 of which are past, present, and future. The past is further explained (Kandha-vibhanga, in Vibhangha, Abhidhamma tipitaka) "to have gone over, extinguished, disappeared, completely changed, completely fallen away, that has become and then disappeared, to be past." [this is likely to be a rough translation]. What appeared in the past can never appear again as it was again, this is a fundamental characteristics of the kandhas. A sound that appears in the past cannot appear just because we think of it, because that sound has completely fallen away. What we can truly hear must be the sound that appears now. 2) This is an inferral on the non-appearance of paramatha dhamma just because we think about it. It is said that a non-ariyan arupa brahma cannot attain, even if they know the theory of the buddha's teaching correctly and thoroughly. The reason given is that it is because even the first vipassana nana, the distinction of nama rupa, cannot appear in that person, as there is no rupa within the arupa plane of existence. But if thinking about rupas causes the paramatha charactertics to appear, then it should be possible that the arupa brahma can attain the first vipassana nana. 3) The Buddha encourage us not to hold on to the past, not to worry about what hasn't come to be, and to let go [of self, of attachment, of mana, of dithi] of the present. If past objects (via thinking) can be objects of sati, why treat it any differently than the present? > However, what is not imagined does not, > perforce, have inherent > existence. All dhammas are without core, being > dependent on many conditions > for their existence. With appreciation, kom 15649 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 6:39am Subject: Will the real concept please stand up (Re: Meditation and Satipatthana) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: Now, that seemingly real object which is "the keyboard I'm typing > on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does not truly have any > characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: (groups of) the direct > experiences which the mind compounds into this percept are viewed as its > characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to say that both the general > concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that which is the mind-constructed > percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now both fall under the range of > the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the former "concept" and the > latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on DSG seem to *also* call the > (only conventionally existing) intended *referents* of these by the name > "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that creates confusion for those of > us who do not use language that way. Hi Howard. The above is great and I love the details. Not quite sure why you would call something that is constructed of mentally reconstituted individual experiences into an image of a self- existing object a 'percept'. [take a breath, phew]. It seems like that would be the definition of a 'concept', a conceptually reconstituted object of mind that really does not refer back to the individual experiences it conceptually meshes into a whole. Since this 'object' only exists in the mind, and is given as though it existed in the world, it seems like a concept, not a percept, to me. It would seem more appropriate to me to call the actual rupa a percept. In other words, the momentary contact with a quality that is actually ascertainable through perception, such as hardness, smoothness, etc., is the 'real' percept. Anything beyond that is a concept. The thought *about* a concept like 'the chair is hard' seems to me that it could be called a 'concept' in the sense that it is a manufactured statement about something that is not really actual, but is conventionally useful, but it would make more sense to me to distinguish this as a 'thought'. In other words, a 'chair' is an idea or concept, and 'the chair is hard' is a thought or definition or statement about that 'concept' or 'conceptual object'. Furthermore, if we really look at the concept 'chair' I think we will find that even that is in trouble, because there is no one concept 'chair'. There really exist only a series of thoughts and images which contain different versions of the so-called concept 'chair'. At one moment I have a particular picture in my mind, like a drawing of a particular chair, and this orients my actions towards referring to a 'chair' in the 'real world' or towards 'sitting', etc., 'in the world'. Another moment I may have a sentential thought-conception of the chair, saying 'a chair is...' such and such...., and that will be my concept at that moment. In truth, these concepts and the thoughts about them are also only momentarily arising experiences within the mind-door, coordinating with experiences in the sense-door at any given moment, and thus also do not have a lasting reality of any kind, although they do have a variable reoccuring reality. This also leads me to something which I am less sure about. Because of the above, I have trouble with the abhidhammic notion as I understand or misunderstand it that concepts do not exist in the moment and are not the objects of cittas. It seems to me that the image of chair or the definition of chair or whatever reified version of the object is being invoked in the moment is an actual experience in the mind-door, although the object is just a mental object and does not occur as a rupa. The object of that thought may not have an actual characteristic, such as hardness or smoothness, but neither does any nama. I would prefer to see the experience of these kinds of objects as a momentary experience like any other, and maybe this can be reclarified, why a thought of a concept or the experience of the concept itself when it arises, is not a conditioned nama. Best, Robert Ep. 15650 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 2:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Hi, Bhante - In a message dated 9/12/02 2:44:10 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sanz@n... writes: > > Ms Sara, As I said for the last two years no Theravada monk in Australia, I > contacted all the temples 12 months ago) will participate or ordain a > female > as a monk. I will always oppose it. And to ordain a female monk you nedd a > minimum of FIVE ORDAINED FEMALES MONKS, at the moment there is no even one. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: With all due respect to you, and, certainly such respect *is* due, I think there are reasonable arguments to be made that are different. As I understand it, though I could be way wrong in this, and I stand to be corrected, the divergence between the rules of the Chinese Bhikkshuni Sangha and the original rules for the Theravadin Bikkhuni Sangha has not been great at all. Given that nothing remains exactly as it was, so, for example, you and I are not the same people we were as young men or in previous lives, but are "continuations" of them and are inheritors of the previous kamma, it might be quite reasonable to treat the Chinese Bhikkshuni Sangha as a lamp that was indirectly lit from the original. In that case, the Theravadin Bhikkhuni Sangha could be reconstituted by drawing upon willing Chinese nuns of highest standing and adherence to the Sangha rules, and engaging in ordination of new Theravadin bhikkhunis carefully following the Theravadin ordination procedures. --------------------------------------------------------------- > With all my respect you should close this debate because it will go no > where. > ---------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: If by this you mean that none of our discussions here are likely to lead to action, that is so, but that applies to much of what is discussed here. However I do not see such discussion as inappropriate to the purposes of the list, and I don't think that posts on this topic should be rejected out of hand. Of course, that decision rests entirely with the list owners. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Metta. Venerable Yanatharo, Buddhist Chaplain University of Canberra.> > > ================================= With metta and respect, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15651 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 2:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Thoughts / Realities / Concepts / Mind Objects Hi, Kom - In a message dated 9/12/02 4:42:41 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kom@a... writes: > Dear Howard, > > I have broken off this piece from the main > paramatha/concepts discussions as this is becoming quite a > bit more detailed. I don't think this discussion will come > to a conclusion, but I want to relate some information that > I received on K. Sujin's trip to you. > > =============================== Thank you for this detailed reply, of which I have snipped the main portion. I have no time right now to give a detailed response, but I do have a response in mind which I promise to get to *quite soon*. :-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15652 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 3:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Will the real concept please stand up (Re: Meditation and Satipatth... Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/12/02 9:39:52 AM Eastern Daylight Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Now, that seemingly real object which is "the keyboard I'm typing > > on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does not truly have any > > characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: (groups of) the direct > > experiences which the mind compounds into this percept are viewed as its > > characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to say that both the general > > concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that which is the > mind-constructed > > percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now both fall under the range > of > > the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the former "concept" and > the > > latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on DSG seem to *also* call > the > > (only conventionally existing) intended *referents* of these by the name > > "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that creates confusion for those > of > > us who do not use language that way. > > Hi Howard. > The above is great and I love the details. > > Not quite sure why you would call something that is constructed of > mentally reconstituted individual experiences into an image of a self- > existing object a 'percept'. [take a breath, phew]. It seems like > that would be the definition of a 'concept', a conceptually > reconstituted object of mind that really does not refer back to the > individual experiences it conceptually meshes into a whole. Since this > 'object' only exists in the mind, and is given as though it existed in > the world, it seems like a concept, not a percept, to me. > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Let me explain by means of an example. I have the general concept of 'tree', to which I can direct the mind from time to time. At the very moment, I look out the window and see the tree outside in the garden (to use conventional terminology). That tree I "see" is a percept. Do I really *see* that tree? No, only in a manner of speaking. What is actually *seen* is not a tree, but is an image, or, better, a sequence of images. The tree I "see" right now is not tje concept of 'tree', but is a percept, one which is quite different from the the percept of "that same tree" I saw when I was walking out in the garden. These are different percepts that are conditioned by the same concept. Each arises due to sa~n~na, with the general concept of 'tree' being applied as a template - serving as a needed condition for creating the perception of the tree I'm looking at. ---------------------------------------------------------- > > It would seem more appropriate to me to call the actual rupa a percept. --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Then the only percepts are paramattha dhammas. I think that is too strong of a restriction. ---------------------------------------------------------- > > In other words, the momentary contact with a quality that is actually > ascertainable through perception, such as hardness, smoothness, etc., > is the 'real' percept. Anything beyond that is a concept. -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I prefer to reserve the word 'concept' for general thoughts, and percepts for specific instances of concepts involving the application of a concept as an overlay to currently experienced individual paramattha dhammas or to groups of paramattha dhammas. When we observe hardness *as hardness*, that is a simple percept. When we observe a table, that is a compound percept. The concept of 'hardness' is applied by the function of sa~n~na in the first case, and the concept of 'table' in the second case. Recall that 'sa~n~na' is sometimes translated as 'perception' (as well as 'recognition'). -------------------------------------------------------- > > The thought *about* a concept like 'the chair is hard' seems to me that > it could be called a 'concept' in the sense that it is a manufactured > statement about something that is not really actual, but is > conventionally useful, but it would make more sense to me to > distinguish this as a 'thought'. In other words, a 'chair' is an idea > or concept, and 'the chair is hard' is a thought or definition or > statement about that 'concept' or 'conceptual object'. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I distinguish between the concept of 'chair' and the perceived chair on which I'm currently sitting. I see these as related, but different in kind. ------------------------------------------------------- > > > Furthermore, if we really look at the concept 'chair' I think we will > find that even that is in trouble, because there is no one concept > 'chair'. There really exist only a series of thoughts and images which > contain different versions of the so-called concept 'chair'. At one > moment I have a particular picture in my mind, like a drawing of a > particular chair, and this orients my actions towards referring to a > 'chair' in the 'real world' or towards 'sitting', etc., 'in the world'. > Another moment I may have a sentential thought-conception of the chair, > saying 'a chair is...' such and such...., and that will be my concept > at that moment. In truth, these concepts and the thoughts about them > are also only momentarily arising experiences within the mind-door, > coordinating with experiences in the sense-door at any given moment, > and thus also do not have a lasting reality of any kind, although they > do have a variable reoccuring reality. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, here I must grudgingly admit ;-)) that you make an excellent point! This argument here is quite suggestive of concepts, themselves, being imaginary! I think what you have said in this section is *very* important and calls for considerable study and contemplation! --------------------------------------------------------- > > This also leads me to something which I am less sure about. Because of > the above, I have trouble with the abhidhammic notion as I understand > or misunderstand it that concepts do not exist in the moment and are > not the objects of cittas. It seems to me that the image of chair or > the definition of chair or whatever reified version of the object is > being invoked in the moment is an actual experience in the mind-door, > although the object is just a mental object and does not occur as a > rupa. The object of that thought may not have an actual > characteristic, such as hardness or smoothness, but neither does any > nama. I would prefer to see the experience of these kinds of objects > as a momentary experience like any other, and maybe this can be > reclarified, why a thought of a concept or the experience of the > concept itself when it arises, is not a conditioned nama. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't think Abhidhamma denies concepts being objects of cittas, but only their being objects of pa~n~na (which is yet another ball of wax! ;-) ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ============================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15653 From: abhidhammika Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 8:11am Subject: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand: To Howard Dear Howard, Sarah, Christine, and Sayadaw Yanatharo How are you? This message is directed to Howard, our dear dhamma friend. The case of the likelihood of the Bhikkhuni sangha's revival after its unfortunate discontinuation has been closed since the time of the Pathama Sangiiti (The First Congress Recital). The 500 highest ranking Arahants with superhuman powers and analytical accomplishments headed by Maha Kassapa at this First Congress Recital unanimously decided to keep all the rules of Vinaya great and small as left by the Buddha. This decision was not out of mindless rigidity, but out of respect and love for ANY instruction of the Tathaagata as well as out of forethought and desire for prevention of any divisive arguments over which are to be regarded as major rules and which are to be regarded as minor rules. Maha Kassapa, the Convenor of the First Congress Recital, had duly censured Ananda for his forgetfulness and failure to ask the Buddha which were changeable minor rules, and for forcing the Buddha to reluctantly ordain Gotami as Bhikkhunii in the first place, who was Ananda's Mum and the Buddha's step Mum. If there were Mahayana nuns, then the so-called Thai Theravada nun could have herself ordained as a Mahayana nun by all means. I have no idea why this Thai lady had thought that she could reverse the decisions of the Highest Ranking Arahants from Pathama Sangiiti by calling herself a Theravada Bhikkhuni. There had been non-Theravadin sects coming and going throughout the history of Buddhism, which failed to live up to the principles of Pali Vinaya and Pali Tipitaka as a whole, and which, therefore, failed to survive or survived as deviants in disrepute. With kind regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: Hi, Bhante - In a message dated 9/12/02 2:44:10 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sanz@n... writes: > > Ms Sara, As I said for the last two years no Theravada monk in Australia, I > contacted all the temples 12 months ago) will participate or ordain a > female > as a monk. I will always oppose it. And to ordain a female monk you nedd a > minimum of FIVE ORDAINED FEMALES MONKS, at the moment there is no even one. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: With all due respect to you, and, certainly such respect *is* due, I think there are reasonable arguments to be made that are different. As I understand it, though I could be way wrong in this, and I stand to be corrected, the divergence between the rules of the Chinese Bhikkshuni Sangha and the original rules for the Theravadin Bikkhuni Sangha has not been great at all. Given that nothing remains exactly as it was, so, for example, you and I are not the same people we were as young men or in previous lives, but are "continuations" of them and are inheritors of the previous kamma, it might be quite reasonable to treat the Chinese Bhikkshuni Sangha as a lamp that was indirectly lit from the original. In that case, the Theravadin Bhikkhuni Sangha could be reconstituted by drawing upon willing Chinese nuns of highest standing and adherence to the Sangha rules, and engaging in ordination of new Theravadin bhikkhunis carefully following the Theravadin ordination procedures. --------------------------------------------------------------- > With all my respect you should close this debate because it will go no > where. > ---------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: If by this you mean that none of our discussions here are likely to lead to action, that is so, but that applies to much of what is discussed here. However I do not see such discussion as inappropriate to the purposes of the list, and I don't think that posts on this topic should be rejected out of hand. Of course, that decision rests entirely with the list owners. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Metta. Venerable Yanatharo, Buddhist Chaplain University of Canberra.> > > ================================= With metta and respect, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15654 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 4:16am Subject: To Rob/ A Drop More on Concepts Per Se Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/12/02 10:21:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@a... quotes you: > > > > > > Furthermore, if we really look at the concept 'chair' I think we will > > find that even that is in trouble, because there is no one concept > > 'chair'. There really exist only a series of thoughts and images which > > contain different versions of the so-called concept 'chair'. At one > > moment I have a particular picture in my mind, like a drawing of a > > particular chair, and this orients my actions towards referring to a > > 'chair' in the 'real world' or towards 'sitting', etc., 'in the world'. > > Another moment I may have a sentential thought-conception of the chair, > > saying 'a chair is...' such and such...., and that will be my concept > > at that moment. In truth, these concepts and the thoughts about them > > are also only momentarily arising experiences within the mind-door, > > coordinating with experiences in the sense-door at any given moment, > > and thus also do not have a lasting reality of any kind, although they > > do have a variable reoccuring reality. > > > --------------------------------------------------------- > and then replies: > Howard: > Well, here I must grudgingly admit ;-)) that you make an excellent > point! This argument here is quite suggestive of concepts, themselves, > being > imaginary! I think what you have said in this section is *very* important > and > calls for considerable study and contemplation! > --------------------------------------------------------- > =================================== I am mightily impressed by the point you made. The more I think about it, the more I see that 'general concept' is close to being an empty term. It seems that it comes to be not much more than a mental "mark", sometimes a name, associated with a fuzzy collection of experiences (or percepts). This conversation has pushed me further in the direction of seeing the unreality of concepts. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15655 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 8:55am Subject: Re: illogical? --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Egberdina" wrote: > Hi all, > > I would really like a chocolate. So I wish to add the following. > > The formulation - NOT (X AND (NOT X)) includes the negation of a > negation (double negation). This is meaningless in some systems of > logic. > > "Is the negation of the negation of A equivalent to A? That depends > on what denial is, and hence what negative particles mean. In logic > the classical answer is 'yes', and accordingly operations of > eliminating and introducing double negatives are permitted. > Intuitionist logic disallows the elimination." > http://www.xrefer.com/entry/552921 > > I don't think I have not earned my chocolate :-) And yet, Herman, much to my regret, you will not get a chocolate at this time. That is because, although we have eliminated the possibility that you do not deserve your chocolate, we have not established positively that you *do* deserve it. This is not a matter of logic, but of politics. All the best, Robert Ep. P.S. I take it that the intuitionist logic disallows the double negation because it does not yield the required result in 'real life', but only in mathematics? Interested in your and Howard's view on this, if any. : ) 15656 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 10:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Negation in Pali /Abhidhamma Hi Herman, In Pali na: there is not: natthi.(atthi: there is) Also a number of prefixes: a (anasava: no asava, the n is inserted ), vi (vippayutta, not associated), or ni (r), niramisa, not associated with the senses, or not of the flesh. Nibbana: in the dict there are many etymologys: extinguishing of fire. The ni seems to be negative. viraaga, nirodha nibbaana, can be taken as synonyms, all negations: dispassionateness, cessation. Nibbana is mostly described by negative terms. So difficult to imagine what it is, as I discussed with Howard. Best wishes, Nina. op 11-09-2002 13:51 schreef Egberdina op hhofman@t...: > > I would be interested to learn from those in the know how negation is > obtained in Pali. In English we might prefix a word with a- or just > use the word not. > > Is negation used at all in the Abhidhamma? What sort of mind object > is a negated object? How is it classified, if at all? > > Would the construct "not nibbana" have any meaning at all? 15657 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 10:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] illogical? Dear Stephen, We should look at the whole context of the Brahmajala sutta and study such ways of reasoning people had at that time (and even now). Ven. Bodhi has a good intro, it is on line. Now, under Doctrines of Endless Equivocation, amaraavikkhepavaada, or eelwriggling, under the fourth case, D: Does the Tathagata exist after death, not exist, both exist and not exist, neither exist nor not exist.. In the Cula Malunkyasutta, the Buddha does not answer such questions, it is endless equivocation. There is birth, ageing, dying... He points to the goal. We should not forget the essence of his teaching: he taught the four noble Truths. And how can we learn what dukkha is? It is the arising and falling away of nama and rupa, each moment. How can this be realized? By first knowing precisely what nama is, what rupa is: a reality to be experienced one at a time through one of the six doors, at this very moment. Kom and Larry's dialogue is most important and essential, as Sarah said. What is a concept, what is a reality. A concept is that which makes known, thus, a name, or the idea that is made known. We should not confuse concepts with thinking. Thinking itself is real and it can think of what is real or what is not real but what is a concept. I hope this clarifies, best wishes from Nina. P.S. I do not like the taste of chocolate. op 11-09-2002 03:40 schreef oreznoone@a... op oreznoone@a...: > Rob has raised some questions that I can't fully answer without exploring > Buddhist logic. > Rob has referred, in particular, to the Cula-Malunkovada where it's said that > 4 (every?) possibilities of a Tathagata after death are wrong: that he > exists, doesn't exist, both exists and doesn't exist, neither exists nor > doesn't exist. > If the above is correct, that it simply means 'every possibility," then: x, > not-x, both, neither. As such there's no reason to see it as anything but a 2 > valued or bivalent logic with four possibilities. As such nothing remarkable; > acceptable to Aristotle. > If anyone actually read this far give yourself a chocolate. If anyone can > actually reply I may give you one! > > metta, stephen 15658 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 1:52pm Subject: Confused ... and getting worse Dear All, I thought I had a working understanding of a concept and a reality, but currently everything posted seems to be meaningless words to me ... I find I have insufficient understanding to even ask a question. I am feeling particularly stupid as I haven't understood much on this List for the last week or so. But it seems that it is vital to understand, and I can't find the steps out of my confusion, which is getting worse. I realise that it is a strong possibility that everyone else understands and I'm the only one having great difficulty. With regard to the Teachings on this, what exactly (as a minimum) do I need to understand, and are there any straight forward, simple, explanations anywhere? (This is quite a serious situation for me, as I noticed this morning for the first time that I am starting to not read most of the posts.) metta, Christine 15659 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 10:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Confused ... and getting worse Hi, Christine - In a message dated 9/12/02 5:20:07 PM Eastern Daylight Time, cforsyth@v... writes: > > Dear All, > > I thought I had a working understanding of a concept and a reality, > but currently everything posted seems to be meaningless words to > me ... I find I have insufficient understanding to even ask a > question. I am feeling particularly stupid as I haven't understood > much on this List for the last week or so. But it seems that it is > vital to understand, and I can't find the steps out of my confusion, > which is getting worse. > I realise that it is a strong possibility that everyone else > understands and I'm the only one having great difficulty. > With regard to the Teachings on this, what exactly (as a minimum) > do I need to understand, and are there any straight forward, simple, > explanations anywhere? (This is quite a serious situation for me, as > I noticed this morning for the first time that I am starting to not > read most of the posts.) > > metta, > Christine > =========================== I don't think you should concern yourself about not understanding. Not understanding hasn't prevented us posters on this topic from posting! We don't really know what we're talking about , you know! ;-)) What I think is really important in all of this is that *all* dhammas are empty! All conditioned dhammas, whether "concepts" or "realities" or "percepts" or "pa~n~natti", are empty. They are all empty because they depend for there very existence on other similarly empty dhammas, including mental fabrication and prior (or simultaneous) namic and rupic conditions. It's all one big house of cards, one masterful magic show of smoke and mirrors. If we look and see how all (conditioned) dhammas depend on parts, on discernment, on concept and on prior and concurrent conditions, we see that there is *nothing* which exists on its own, in an essential, intrinsic manner. Add to that the unsatisfactoriness and impermanence of all dhammas, and that's "all" we need to see. We only need to see the tilakkhana everywhere we look, and all our atta-making will evaporate. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15660 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 3:03pm Subject: Re: Confused ... and getting worse --- Dear Christine, This is a letter I wrote about 2 years back that might help: Just to be explicit: the thinking process consists of different cittas and cetasikas all arising and passing away rapidly. These are paramattha dhammas, ultimate realities. let us consider a couple of thinking. 1. Think of a flying purple elephant. The process of thinking that imagines this, whether a graphic visualisation or your no-frills, idea only version, consists of cittas and cetasikas. The object of this thinking is a concept, not real. 2. Think of your mother or father (whether alive or not). Again same process - the cittas and cetasikas of the thinking process are real but the object, mother and father, is concept- not real. 3. If your mother and father were right in front of you now (talking to you) and you think of them, again the object is concept, not real; but the thinking process is real. The colours are real, the sounds are real, but mother and father is concept. Obviously example 1 is easily understood. It is number 2 and especially number 3 that in daily life we get confused by. Satipatthana can only take paramattha dhammas for object, not concepts. Does this mean we should try not to think of concepts? Some would have us do this but this is not the middle way. All the arahants thought of concepts but they could never confuse concept for reality. Panna and sati can understand dhammas directly even during the processes of thinking that take concepts for objects. > > "Ultimate realities are impermanent, they arise and > fall away. Concepts of people and things do not arise > and fall away [they don't?!]; they are objects of > thinking, not real in the ultimate sense." Yes they are simply concepts, not real. Only realities have actual characteristics and functions and arise and pass away. Robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear All, > > I thought I had a working understanding of a concept and a reality, > but currently everything posted seems to be meaningless words to > me ... I find I have insufficient understanding to even ask a > question. I am feeling particularly stupid as I haven't understood > much on this List for the last week or so. But it seems that it is > vital to understand, and I can't find the steps out of my confusion, > which is getting worse. > I realise that it is a strong possibility that everyone else > understands and I'm the only one having great difficulty. > With regard to the Teachings on this, what exactly (as a minimum) > do I need to understand, and are there any straight forward, simple, > explanations anywhere? (This is quite a serious situation for me, as > I noticed this morning for the first time that I am starting to not > read most of the posts.) > > metta, > Christine 15661 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 3:26pm Subject: Re: Confused ... and getting worse --- Just to add to this post Christine. The most basic step in satipatthana is about distinguishing concept from reality; and as this understanding grows then the difference between the realities of nama and rupa becomes slowly more apparent . When concepts are seen as unreal they lose their deluding power. Thinking continues just as much as always but there is not the same tendency to be fooled by the thoughts. For example, say someone left the stove on and I come along and touch it and get a little burn. Immediately there is aversion to the pain. And then there is thinking such as "who left the stove on", "why did they do that" - and this is all rooted in increasing aversion. But if there is understanding of realities then the aversion becomes the object and it dissipates, or the feeling becomes the object . And by becoming the object I mean that it is understood as simply feeling, not my feeling. Then before any harsh language the anger has gone and there is acceptance of the present moment. This is a very different process from trying to not have harsh language or realising that anger is bad and thinking you shouldn't have it. With direct understanding there is no supression because there doesn't have to be: as soon as reality is known as reality and concept as concept the delusion is ended. Robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > --- > > Dear Christine, > This is a letter I wrote about 2 years back that might help: > > Just to be explicit: the thinking process consists of different > cittas and cetasikas all arising and passing away rapidly. These > are paramattha dhammas, ultimate realities. > let us consider a couple of thinking. > 1. Think of a flying purple elephant. The process of thinking > that imagines this, whether a graphic visualisation or your > no-frills, idea only version, consists of cittas and cetasikas. > The object of this thinking is a concept, not real. > 2. Think of your mother or father (whether alive or not). Again > same process - the cittas and cetasikas of the thinking process > are real but the object, mother and father, is concept- not > real. > 3. If your mother and father were right in front of you now > (talking to you) and you think of them, again the object is > concept, not real; but the thinking process is real. The colours > are real, the sounds are real, but mother and father is concept. > Obviously example 1 is easily understood. It is number 2 and > especially number 3 that in daily life we get confused by. > > Satipatthana can only take paramattha dhammas for object, not > concepts. Does this mean we should try not to think of concepts? > Some would have us do this but this is not the middle way. All > the arahants thought of concepts but they could never confuse > concept for reality. Panna and sati can understand dhammas > directly even during the processes of thinking that take > concepts for objects. > > > > > > "Ultimate realities are impermanent, they arise and > > fall away. Concepts of people and things do not arise > > and fall away [they don't?!]; they are objects of > > thinking, not real in the ultimate sense." > > Yes they are simply concepts, not real. Only realities have > actual characteristics and functions and arise and pass away. > Robert > > > 15662 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 3:42pm Subject: ADL ch. 24 (4) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 24 (4) The arahat has eradicated all defilements and thus he has reached the end of the cycle of birth, old age, sickness and death; he has realized the end of dukkha. The arahat will not be reborn, but he still has to die and therefore one may ask whether he really has attained the end of dukkha at the moment he realizes arahatship. Even the arahat is subject to death, since he was born. He can also experience unpleasant results of akusala kamma committed before he became an arahat. However, he has no more defilements and cannot accumulate any more kamma which might produce vipåka, he is really free from dukkha. In As it was said (Itivuttaka, The Twos, chapter II, §7, Khuddaka Nikåya) two ``conditions of nibbåna´´ are explained. In this sutta Sa-upådi-sesa-nibbåna, one ``condition´´ of nibbåna, pertains to the arahat who has eradicated all defilements but for whom the five khandhas are still remaining. For the arahat who has not finally passed away yet, there are still citta, cetasika and rúpa arising and falling away. An-upådi-sesa-nibbåna, the other ``condition´´ of nibbåna, pertains to the arahat who has finally passed away; for him there are no khandhas remaining, there are no longer citta, cetasika and rúpa arising and falling away. We read in the verse of this sutta, after the explanation: These two nibbåna-states are shown by him Who sees, who is such and unattached. One state is that in this same life possessed With base remaining, though becoming's stream Be cut off. While the state without a base Belongs to the future, wherein all Becomings utterly do come to cease. They who, by knowing this state uncompounded Have heart's release, by cutting off the stream, They who have reached the core of dhamma, glad To end, such have abandoned all becomings. When someone has become an arahat there will be no more rebirth for him. When someone has attained enlightenment to the stage of the sotåpanna, he has become an ariyan, but he has not reached the end of rebirth. The sotåpanna will be reborn, but not more than seven times; thus, eventually there will be an end to rebirth for him. If we do not develop vipassanå, the number of rebirths will be endless. It was out of compassion that the Buddha spoke about the dangers of rebirth; he wanted to encourage people to develop right understanding. We read in the Kindred Sayings (V, Mahå-vagga, Book XII, Kindred Sayings about the Truths, chapter V, §6, Gross darkness) that the Buddha said to the monks: ``Monks, there is a darkness of interstellar space, impenetrable gloom, such a murk of darkness as cannot enjoy the splendour of this moon and sun, though they be of such mighty magic power and majesty.´´ At these words a certain monk said to the Exalted One: ``Lord, that must be a mighty darkness, a mighty darkness indeed! Pray, lord, is there any other darkness greater and more fearsome than that?´´ ``There is indeed, monk, another darkness, greater and more fearsome. And what is that other darkness? Monk, whatsoever recluses or brahmins understand not, as it really is, the meaning of: This is dukkha, this is the arising of dukkha, this is the ceasing of dukkha, this is the practice that leads to the ceasing of dukkha, such take delight in the activities which conduce to rebirth. Thus taking delight they compose a compound of activities which conduce to rebirth. Thus composing a compound of activities they fall down into the darkness of rebirth, into the darkness of old age and death, of sorrow, grief, woe, lamentation and despair. They are not released from birth, old age and death, from sorrow, grief, woe, lamentation and despair. They are not released from dukkha, I declare. But, monk, those recluses or brahmins who do understand as it really is, the meaning of: This is dukkha, this is the arising of dukkha, this is the ceasing of dukkha, this is the practice that leads to the ceasing of dukkha, such take not delight in the activities which conduce to rebirth... They are released from dukkha, I declare. Wherefore, monk, an effort must be made to realize: This is dukkha. This is the arising of dukkha. This is the ceasing of dukkha. This is the practice that leads to the ceasing of dukkha.'' 15663 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 3:46pm Subject: ADL Nina Dear Nina, This book is truely the work of a master of abhidhamma and a genuine source of learning. Well done! and thank you very much for this gift of Dhamma. Larry 15664 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 4:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi Howard, what I took from that quote is that pannatti are linguistic. So to discriminate between concept and reality is to find the language in one's experience. I also found it very interesting that the truth of dukkha is conceptual. This bolsters my inclination to think there is a element of pannatti in insight. Larry 15665 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 4:24pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi Sarah, just a couple of comments from the quotations you gave from CMA: "What are ultimate realities?- #2 Guide: Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their own extrinsic nature (sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of existence..." L: I would add irreducible [by direct observation/ or something similar]. All khandhas are compounded and so theoretically infinitly reducible. "'Ultimate' has a second meaning – the ultimate objects of right knowledge- Guide to #2 Ultimate realities are not only the ultimate existents, they are also the ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional realities. Concepts do not possess ultimacy. It is the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs – the dhammas – that form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma." L: As the quotation from Pm observed, the tilakkhana is conceptual so there is some kind of relationship between concept and reality in a magga citta and certainly in the daily life of an arahat. Apart from these quibbles, I'm fine with everything else. So if no one rocks the boat too much it will be smooth sailing from here on out. Larry 15666 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 1:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Confused ... and getting worse Hi, Robert (and Christine) - The following pst of yours is very good and very helpful, Robert. I would like to pursue it a bit more with you. As I understand it, a concept is a kind of thought. A thought is always described as a thought "of something". A thought of a unicorn is a thought of a nonexistent something. What about a thought of the tree in my garden? For me, that tree is more of an existent than a unicorn is (though I recognize that its existence is dependent in part on that very thinking). Am I right according to Abhidhamma? If yes, why? If no, why? There is also the matter of exactly what a thought is. The example you give below of the thought of a flying purple elephant makes it clear to me that a so-called (individual) thought is actually a whole process, a sequence of cittas whose objects are various paramattha mind-objects (such as mental images). Is it always so that a thought is such a sequence? What is the Pali for 'thought'? Now, a question about your third example: ****************************************** 3. If your mother and father were right in front of you now (talking to you) and you think of them, again the object is concept, not real; but the thinking process is real. The colours are real, the sounds are real, but mother and father is concept. ******************************************* Here you say "If ... you think of them, again the object is concept, not real; but the thinking process is real." Now, what if Christine does not *think* of them, but "merely" looks at them. That so-called mere looking at them is really a lot more than just looking. There is a big mental process transpiring that recognizes (perhaps wordlessly) two "entities" who are "people", and they are "people who she knows", and they are, in fact, "her parents". All that happens in a flash as Christine "looks" at them. Now, the most real elements of this include the visual image plus many more cittas, cetasikas, and their objects. But exactly what is all that processing, and what is it *for*? Is there not some at least derivative reality to Christine's parents whom she is looking at? It seems to me that there *is* some degree of reality there. Not only is this so because of the fact that the elements combined to create the perception of here parents are directly experienced and are interrelated, but also, because, unless solipsism is valid, corresponding to these pa~n~natti, these "unrealities" are, it seems, two streams of cittas and cetasikas of the same sort as the one we refer to as "Christine"! The bottom line on what I'm talking about here is that there is more than just real vs unreal. There seem to be degrees and kinds of reality (and unreality). If something is observable to any extent and in any way it seems to me to have *some* degree and kind of reality/existence. All this is empty, of course, and that is most important. But there are other things to say besides that. With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/12/02 6:05:51 PM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Dear Christine, > This is a letter I wrote about 2 years back that might help: > > Just to be explicit: the thinking process consists of different > cittas and cetasikas all arising and passing away rapidly. These > are paramattha dhammas, ultimate realities. > let us consider a couple of thinking. > 1. Think of a flying purple elephant. The process of thinking > that imagines this, whether a graphic visualisation or your > no-frills, idea only version, consists of cittas and cetasikas. > The object of this thinking is a concept, not real. > 2. Think of your mother or father (whether alive or not). Again > same process - the cittas and cetasikas of the thinking process > are real but the object, mother and father, is concept- not > real. > 3. If your mother and father were right in front of you now > (talking to you) and you think of them, again the object is > concept, not real; but the thinking process is real. The colours > are real, the sounds are real, but mother and father is concept. > Obviously example 1 is easily understood. It is number 2 and > especially number 3 that in daily life we get confused by. > > Satipatthana can only take paramattha dhammas for object, not > concepts. Does this mean we should try not to think of concepts? > Some would have us do this but this is not the middle way. All > the arahants thought of concepts but they could never confuse > concept for reality. Panna and sati can understand dhammas > directly even during the processes of thinking that take > concepts for objects. > > > > > > "Ultimate realities are impermanent, they arise and > > fall away. Concepts of people and things do not arise > > and fall away [they don't?!]; they are objects of > > thinking, not real in the ultimate sense." > > Yes they are simply concepts, not real. Only realities have > actual characteristics and functions and arise and pass away. > Robert > > > In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > > Dear All, > > > > I thought I had a working understanding of a concept and a reality, > > but currently everything posted seems to be meaningless words to > > me ... I find I have insufficient understanding to even ask a > > question. I am feeling particularly stupid as I haven't understood > > much on this List for the last week or so. But it seems that it is > > vital to understand, and I can't find the steps out of my > confusion, > > which is getting worse. > > I realise that it is a strong possibility that everyone else > > understands and I'm the only one having great difficulty. > > With regard to the Teachings on this, what exactly (as a minimum) > > do I need to understand, and are there any straight forward, > simple, > > explanations anywhere? (This is quite a serious situation for me, > as > > I noticed this morning for the first time that I am starting to > not > > read most of the posts.) > > > > metta, > > Christine > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15667 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 1:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Confused ... and getting worse Hi, Robert - In a message dated 9/12/02 6:28:54 PM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Just to add to this post Christine. The most basic step in > satipatthana is about distinguishing concept from reality; and as > this understanding grows then the difference between the realities of > nama and rupa becomes slowly more apparent . When concepts are seen > as unreal they lose their deluding power. Thinking continues just as > much as always but there is not the same tendency to be fooled by the > thoughts. > For example, say someone left the stove on and I come along and > touch it and get a little burn. Immediately there is aversion to the > pain. And then there is thinking such as "who left the stove > on", "why did they do that" - and this is all rooted in increasing > aversion. But if there is understanding of realities then the > aversion becomes the object and it dissipates, or the feeling becomes > the object . And by becoming the object I mean that it is understood > as simply feeling, not my feeling. Then before any harsh language > the anger has gone and there is acceptance of the present moment. > > This is a very different process from trying to not have harsh > language or realising that anger is bad and thinking you shouldn't > have it. With direct understanding there is no supression because > there doesn't have to be: as soon as reality is known as reality and > concept as concept the delusion is ended. > > Robert > ============================ Yes, indeed. All true. The question remains, however: "Who turned the stove on?" Is there any reality to the subject-matter of that question? I believe that there is. But it seems very difficult for *anyone* to adequately explain what that is. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15668 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 1:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/12/02 7:01:09 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Howard, what I took from that quote is that pannatti are linguistic. > So to discriminate between concept and reality is to find the language > in one's experience. I also found it very interesting that the truth of > dukkha is conceptual. This bolsters my inclination to think there is a > element of pannatti in insight. > > Larry ========================= I understand you, and I think you make an interesting point! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15669 From: Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 2:32pm Subject: Realities Hi, all - Do trees exist? Sure. I see them all the time, and I climbed them as a kid. I never climbed a nonexistent tree. Do trees exist in the same way as hardness? No, their existence as unitary objects depends on the mind as condition. So what? They still exist. Does a self exist? No, not in any way. I've never seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelled, or cognized my "self" (no comments about the smelling, please! ;-), and I never will. There is no self, just as there is no unicorn. It is imagined - that's all. So there is no self to be unreal. What is it that a self is supposed to be? It is an essence, a core, to be found in, among, or underlying the khandhas. Now that we know what it is supposed to be we can look to see if it's there. It isn't. So some ideas have no referents. We then use language in an odd way and say that the referents of those ideas are unreal or nonexistent, as if being unreal or being nonexistent are characteristics of things. But that is nonsense, for only existing things have characteristics, because there *are* no other things! Some imagined "things" like selves and unicorns, do not exist at all. Among those things that do exist, there are degrees and kinds of existence/reality. However, and here is what is critically important as I see it, all dhammas are coreless (anatta). Dependent arising teaches us the corelessness of all sankhata dhammas. If we can absorb that teaching deep down into the marrow of our bones, and directly see the relativity and dependent status of all conditioned dhammas, we will have seen the Buddha in front of us, behind us, on each side of us, and deep inside of us, and then we will know nibbana, the ultimate emptiness. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15670 From: rikpa21 Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 9:43pm Subject: Realities: Emptiness & Dependent Origination --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: Hi Howard & all, > However, and here is what is critically important as I see it, all > dhammas are coreless (anatta). Dependent arising teaches us the corelessness > of all sankhata dhammas. If we can absorb that teaching deep down into the > marrow of our bones, and directly see the relativity and dependent status of > all conditioned dhammas, we will have seen the Buddha in front of us, behind > us, on each side of us, and deep inside of us, and then we will know nibbana, > the ultimate emptiness. What you've said here is the heartwood of the Dhamma. Your presentations sounds so Tibetan (Geluk-pa) it's scary, Howard, even though I know you're squarely in the Theravada tradition! In the hopes of addding a different perspective on coming to Right View, one that works exceedingly well for many, I like the quotes below from Je Tsongkhapa (Guru to the First Dalai Lama)--his last set of verses from "The Fourteen Root Verses on The Three Principal Aspects of the Path": "In a limitless round they're born, and in their births Are tortured by three sufferings without a break; Think how your mothers feel, think of what's happening To them: try to develop [Bodhicitta]. "You may master renunciation and [Bodhicitta], But unless you have the wisdom perceiving reality You cannot cut the root of cyclic life. Make efforts in ways then to perceive interdependence. "A person's entered the path that pleases the Buddhas When for all objects, in the cycle or beyond, He sees that cause and effect can never fail, And when for him they lose all solid appearance. "You've yet to realize the thought of the Able As long as two ideas seem to you disparate: The appearance of things-infallible interdependence; And emptiness-beyond taking any position. "At some point, they no longer alternate, come together; Just seeing that interdependence never fails Brings realization that destroys how you hold to objects, And then your analysis with view is complete. "In addition the appearance prevents the existence extreme; Emptiness that of non-existence, and if You see how emptiness shows in cause and effect You'll never be stolen off by extreme views. "When you've grasped as well as I the essential points Of each of the three principal paths explained, Then go into isolation, my son, make mighty Efforts, and quickly win your ultimate wish." For those seeking the heartwood of the Dhamma, this is it. The last line is an injunction for those who've carefully analyzed and come to see, intellectually, how interdependence (paticcca samuppada) and emptiness (anatta) are complementary aspects of the same reality, and are ultimately inseparable. This conceptual understanding is the basis for meditation on the emptiness of all things--the personal "self" as well as all phenomena--that all are empty (sabbe sankhara anatta) of independent existence, character, or essence (sabhava); that due to dependence there is nothing that is truly singular nor is there anything truly separate, and that that very fact of dependent arising directly implies the emptiness of the 10,000 things, because there is nothing that arises without conditions; therefore, when any object is analyzed for independent existence, or "core", there is no "core" that can be found. This is the entire thrust of Nagarjuna's analyses in the "Mulamadhyamakakarika" (Root Stanzas from the Middle Way). Provided sila is well-established and the mind is capable of being trained (meaning one's not "incorrigible" with regard to the attachment to views, teachers, lineages, or afflictied with the disease of intellectual mana of "knowing it all"), when this understanding of paticca samuppada and anatta is applied in meditation consisting of the "swift pair of messengers" of samatha & vipassana, for one who does not neglect jhana, it provides the best possible set of conditions for insight-wisdom to develop to the degree of power needed to instantly cut through all conceptualization and mental elaboration. Then one has seen the Buddha directly, as you note Howard. To elaborate (hah!) a bit more to this (this was put together for a student a couple of years ago in the hopes of clarifying this a bit more, and is simply a rehash of what my Lamas have taught me), and in the hopes that some reading this far may find it helpful: Dependent Origination is the fact that all things arise in dependence on other factors. There is nothing that does not arise in dependence on other factors of some kind. The alternative view—which is a wrong view—entails the absurd consequence that somehow things arise independent of other factors, through their own power. But this is impossible, because that would mean things would happen at random, without any sort of rhyme or reason. A classic Tibetan example refuting the wrong view that things can arise independent of causes and conditions is that of the "sky flower," or the "lotus that grows in midair." It is impossible—an absurdity—that such a lotus could randomly appear in midair without the proper causes and conditions. For a lotus to exist at all it requires the proper causes and conditions, such as a lotus seed, soil, nutrients, air, water, sunlight, and favorable climate. Likewise, it is absurd to believe that something—any object of experience—can possibly come from nothing. It must come from something else! How Things Exist: Three Aspects of Dependent Origination It is not enough to merely know how things don't exist—that things lack independent existence; it is also vital to understand how they do exist. In other words, understanding the emptiness of intrinsic existence alone is not enough; one must also, at the same time, understand Dependent Origination—how things appear to exist as they do. How things exist can be broken down into three aspects: 1. All thing exist in dependence upon their causes This means that everything comes from causes—all things come from other factors. In the case of a lotus, that would include the lotus seed, the presence of soil, sunlight, water, time, etc. This is the causal aspect of Dependent Origination. 2. All things exist in dependence upon their parts, and possess valid basis This means that every object of experience depends on its parts. A classic example is that of the "person." The "person" is merely a collection of specific parts; it must possess a head, a torso, arms, and legs. This is the physical aspect of Dependent Origination. For example, all these parts must come together in a specific way to form the basis of designation for the label "person." 3. All things exist in dependence upon the mind that labels them This means that without a mind labeling a collection containing a head, torso, arms, and legs, the idea of a "person" will have no reason to arise. Furthermore, one cannot reasonably apply the label "person" to a collection of wheels, tires, etc. Any label we apply to a collection of parts must depend upon a valid basis—in other words, these parts must conform to a "valid basis of designation." In the case of a person, that means a collection of parts including a head, torso, arms, legs, etc. This is the mental or conceptual aspect of Dependent Origination. How Emptiness and Dependent Origination Relate to Each Other Right View is the wisdom that understands how emptiness of independent existence and the dependently originated nature of all things relate to each other. Both Emptiness and Dependent Origination are complementary aspects of the same reality. They are not identical conventionally; rather, one supports and complements the other. For example, because all things are dependently originated, they must lack a fixed or independent nature. In other words, the fact that things exist dependent on causes directly implies and supports the fact they lack a fixed or solid identity. Likewise, because things are empty and lack a fixed nature, it implies that they must arise in dependence on other factors. In this way emptiness and dependent origination can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Without one, the other is impossible. Because one is true, the other is implied. The Middle Way (Madhyamaka): The Middle Way Between Extremes The Middle Way school is so named because it threads the Scylla and Charybdis of the two extreme views, Eternalism and Nihilism. These wrong views can be stopped by this one logical statement: "it cannot exist truly, because it is interdependent." As Arya Nâgârjuna says in the Fundamentals of the Middle Way: "`Inherent existence' is holding to permanence. `No conventional existence' is a view of nihilism. Therefore the wise do not abide in either `inherent existence' or `no conventional existence.'" May all being directly realize the heartwood of the Dhamma! Cheers, Erik 15671 From: Antony Woods Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 0:37am Subject: Re: Confused ... and getting worse Dear Christine, You wrote: "what exactly (as a minimum) do I need to understand, and are there any straight forward, simple, explanations anywhere?" The late Mahasi Sayadaw said (English translation) in "Paticcasamuppada": "(the meditator) can follow the teacher's instructions if he knows only that life is a mental and physical process characterized by impermanence, suffering and insubstantiality. The adequacy of this simple knowledge to meet the intellectual need of the yogi who is bent on Arahatship is borne out by the Buddha in Culatanha-sankhaya sutta." ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/therabud/mahasipt.zip His brief instructions are available at: ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/medbud/mahasipv.zip Thanks for letting people know when you don't understand (I didn't even attempt to read this thread). metta, Antony. 15672 From: Antony Woods Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 0:58am Subject: observe concepts combine with realities Dear all, Ven Mahasi Sayadaw said (I posted three sentences previously): "Those unpractised in insight meditation often say, "if you note 'bending, stretching', only concepts like arms will appear to you. If you note 'left, right' only concepts like legs will appear to you. If you note 'rising, falling', only concepts like the abdomen will appear to you." This may be true to some of the beginners, but it is not true to think that the concepts will keep coming up. Both concepts and realities appear to the beginner. Some people instruct the beginners to meditate on realities only. This is impossible. To forget concepts is quite impracticable at the beginning. What is practicable is to observe concepts combine with realities. The Buddha himself used the language of concepts and told us to be aware 'I am walking' etc. when we walk, bend or stretch. He did not use the language of realities and tell us to be aware 'It is supporting, moving' etc. Although you meditate using the language of concepts like 'walking, bending, stretching', as your mindfulness and concentration grow stronger, all the concepts disappear and only the realities like support and moving appear to you. When you reach the stage of the knowledge of dissolution, although you meditate 'walking, walking', neither the legs nor the body appear to you. Only the successive movements are there. Although you meditate 'bending, bending', there will not be any arms or legs. Only the movement. Although you meditate 'rising, falling', there will be no image of the abdomen or the body. Only the movement out and in. These as well as swaying are the functions of the air-element." ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/medbud/mahasifv.zip with metta / Antony. 15673 From: phamdluan2000 Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 1:58am Subject: Re: Confused ... and getting worse Dear Christine, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: Dear All, I thought I had a working understanding of a concept and a reality, but currently everything posted seems to be meaningless words to me ... I find I have insufficient understanding to even ask a question. I am feeling particularly stupid as I haven't understood much on this List for the last week or so. But it seems that it is vital to understand, and I can't find the steps out of my confusion, which is getting worse. I realise that it is a strong possibility that everyone else understands and I'm the only one having great difficulty. With regard to the Teachings on this, what exactly (as a minimum) do I need to understand, and are there any straight forward, simple, explanations anywhere? (This is quite a serious situation for me, as I noticed this morning for the first time that I am starting to not read most of the posts.) metta, Christine KKT: Maybe a << summary >> could be useful for a clear understanding. Ultimate Realities (Paramattha Dhamma) are Rupa, Citta, Cetasika. Whatever is not Rupa, Citta, Cetasika is not Paramattha Dhamma (PD). I'm going to use the classification in 18 elements (dhatus) which embrace the << whole world >> 6 senses + 6 objects + 6 consciousnesses The first 5 senses are Rupa ---> PD The 6th sense (Mind) is Citta ---> PD The first 5 objects are Rupa ---> PD The 6 consciousnesses are Citta ---> PD It remains the 6th object which is the object of the Mind and is called Dhammayatana (Mental Object) Among the Mental Objects are 52 Cetasika ---> PD Now, whatever remain as Mental Object << ARE NOT >> Paramattha Dhamma. They are all << CONCEPTS >> and not realities. Hope this helps. Metta, KKT 15674 From: phamdluan2000 Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 2:54am Subject: Re: Confused ... and getting worse Dear Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: I don't think you should concern yourself about not understanding. Not understanding hasn't prevented us posters on this topic from posting! We don't really know what we're talking about , you know! ;-)) What I think is really important in all of this is that *all* dhammas are empty! All conditioned dhammas, whether "concepts" or "realities" or "percepts" or "pa~n~natti", are empty. They are all empty because they depend for there very existence on other similarly empty dhammas, including mental fabrication and prior (or simultaneous) namic and rupic conditions. It's all one big house of cards, one masterful magic show of smoke and mirrors. If we look and see how all (conditioned) dhammas depend on parts, on discernment, on concept and on prior and concurrent conditions, we see that there is *nothing* which exists on its own, in an essential, intrinsic manner. Add to that the unsatisfactoriness and impermanence of all dhammas, and that's "all" we need to see. We only need to see the tilakkhana everywhere we look, and all our atta-making will evaporate. With metta, Howard KKT: I must agree with Erik (rikpa21) that what you said here is << pure >> Madhyamika :-)) I don't think that Theravada holds such a view about emptiness (at least like your presentation :-)) But this gives a glimpse of how Nagarjuna arrived at Madhyamika: trying to inquire deeper into the reality of the dharmas than the presentation of the Sarvastivada school. Peace, KKT 15675 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:01am Subject: [dsg] Re: Confused ... and getting worse Dear Howard, Thanks for the questions. Howard: ""For me, that tree is more of an existent than a unicorn is (though I > recognize that its existence is dependent in part on that very thinking). Am > I right according to Abhidhamma? If yes, why? If no, why?" Pannati, concepts can be clssified in many ways (see the p.s to this post). In fact, things like a unicorn and God and rabbits horns can be considered as different types of pannati from trees. Trees, computers,humans, Robert, Howard, Christine are the shadows of what is really there - and what is really there are only namas and rupas, mentality and matter, insignificant dhammas that can barely be said to exist because they pass away instantly. These concepts are more deluding than concepts like unicorns (which we know have no reality). Because of accumulated avijja, ignorance, these type of concepts (pannati) delude and instead of being given their correct status - as neccessary designations* - they are assumed to be actual. And that is where all problems begin and end. *Note that these designations happen long, long before they are linguistic lables. What is called a thought in conventional language is comprised of billions of momentary arisings which repeatedly take a concept as object and may include metally naming it. Becuase of this repetition - and the lack of insight into the actual dhammas - the illusion of permanence is solidified. The commentary to the UDANA ( translation by Peter Masefield from PTS) (p71,vol1, enlightenment chapter) "it is ignorance since it causes beings to dart among becomings and so on within samsara.., it is ignorance since it darts among those things which do not actually exist (i.e.men, women) and since it does not dart among those things that do exist (i.e.it cannot understand the khandas, paramattha dhammas). ------ Howard: The example you > give below of the thought of a flying purple elephant makes it clear to me > that a so-called (individual) thought is actually a whole process, a sequence > of cittas whose objects are various paramattha mind-objects (such as mental > images). Is it always so that a thought is such a sequence? ________ Yes, that is right. What we call a thought in conventional language is a long and complex series of different processes. This is explained in detail in the commentaries. _____ Howard: Here you say "If ... you think of them, again the object is concept, > not real; but the thinking process is real." Now, what if Christine does not > *think* of them, but "merely" looks at them. That so-called mere looking at > them is really a lot more than just looking. There is a big mental process > transpiring that recognizes (perhaps wordlessly) two "entities" who are > "people", and they are "people who she knows", ------ Yes, this is right. As I said above the conceptualising happens long before any naming has time to occur. Even babies and animals who have no linguistic abilities are fully involved in processes of conceptualising. However, animals and babies cannot yet expand concepts into the religions, sciences, and general craziness and wonder that is the fruit of civilisation. I think it can only be known by direct insight whether this is true or not and that is why the Buddha's teaching is ehipassiko - come and see. Which is why I believe vipassana is not a matter of doing something to get something ; instead it is simply the developing of insight into what is real and what is not. All these processes, the realities and the concepts are happening every moment of the day. They do not have to be searched for - they only need to be seen. Robert p.s. Abhidhammattha Sangaha Ch VIII, section 4, on pannattis: i) formal concept (santhana pannatti corresponding to the form of things, such as land, mountain or tree, which are so designated on account of the mode of transition of the elements. ii) collective concept (samuha pannatti), corresponding to modes of construction of materials, to a collection of things, such as a vehicle or a chariot. iii) conventional concept (sammutti pannatti), such as person or individual, which is derived from the five khandhas. iv) local concept (disa pannatti), a notion or idea derived from the revolving of the moon, such as the directions of East or West. v) concept of time (kala pannatti), such as morning, evening. vi) concept of season (masa pannatti), notions corresponding to seasons and months. The months are designated by names, such as Vesakha. vii) concept of space (akasa), such as a well or a cave. It is derived from space which is not contacted by the four Great Elements. viii) nimitta pannatti, the mental image which is acquired through the development of samatha, such as the nimitta of a kasina. See http://www.abhidhamma.org/sujin3.htm Realities and Concepts Sujin Boriharnwanaket - In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert (and Christine) - > > The following pst of yours is very good and very helpful, Robert. I > would like to pursue it a bit more with you. > As I understand it, a concept is a kind of thought. A thought is > always described as a thought "of something". A thought of a unicorn is a > thought of a nonexistent something. What about a thought of the tree in my > garden? > There is also the matter of exactly what a thought is. > Now, a question about your third example: > ****************************************** > 3. If your mother and father were right in front of you now > (talking to you) and you think of them, again the object is > concept, not real; but the thinking process is real. The colours > are real, the sounds are real, but mother and father is concept. > ******************************************* > > parents". All that happens in a flash as Christine "looks" at them. Now, the > most real elements of this include the visual image plus many more cittas, > cetasikas, and their objects. But exactly what is all that processing, and > what is it *for*? Is there not some at least derivative reality to > Christine's parents whom she is looking at? It seems to me that there *is* > some degree of reality there. Not only is this so because of the fact that > the elements combined to create the perception of here parents are directly > experienced and are interrelated, but also, because, unless solipsism is > valid, corresponding to these pa~n~natti, these "unrealities" are, it seems, > two streams of cittas and cetasikas of the same sort as the one we refer to > as "Christine"! The bottom line on what I'm talking about here is that there > is more than just real vs unreal. There seem to be degrees and kinds of > reality (and unreality). If something is observable to any extent and in any > way it seems to me to have *some* degree and kind of reality/existence. All > this is empty, of course, and that is most important. But there are other > things to say besides that. > > With metta, > Howard > > > In a message dated 9/12/02 6:05:51 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > Dear Christine, > > This is a letter I wrote about 2 years back that might help: > > > > Just to be explicit: the thinking process consists of different > > cittas and cetasikas all arising and passing away rapidly. These > > are paramattha dhammas, ultimate realities. > > let us consider a couple of thinking. > > 1. Think of a flying purple elephant. The process of thinking > > that imagines this, whether a graphic visualisation or your > > no-frills, idea only version, consists of cittas and cetasikas. > > The object of this thinking is a concept, not real. > > 2. Think of your mother or father (whether alive or not). Again > > same process - the cittas and cetasikas of the thinking process > > are real but the object, mother and father, is concept- not > > real. > > 3. If your mother and father were right in front of you now > > (talking to you) and you think of them, again the object is > > concept, not real; but the thinking process is real. The colours > > are real, the sounds are real, but mother and father is concept. > > Obviously example 1 is easily understood. It is number 2 and > > especially number 3 that in daily life we get confused by. > > > > Satipatthana can only take paramattha dhammas for object, not > > concepts. Does this mean we should try not to think of concepts? > > Some would have us do this but this is not the middle way. All > > the arahants thought of concepts but they could never confuse > > concept for reality. Panna and sati can understand dhammas > > directly even during the processes of thinking that take > > concepts for objects. > > > > > > > > > > "Ultimate realities are impermanent, they arise and > > > fall away. Concepts of people and things do not arise > > > and fall away [they don't?!]; they are objects of > > > thinking, not real in the ultimate sense." > > > > Yes they are simply concepts, not real. Only realities have > > actual characteristics and functions and arise and pass away. > > Robert > > 15676 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:14am Subject: [dsg] Re: Confused2 .. --- Dear Howard, If I talk a little off the point it might be helpful. In my example below it would be taking it wrong if one decided that by knowing what is real and what is concept one takes no action. In fact the way I believe it works is that there is an abundance of energy to be directed in a wise way. So one might still reprimand the one who carelessly left the stove on - but without the unnecessary baggage of a long story about a "me" who was hurt by "she". And so the speaking can be given in a way that will reach the other party in a form so that they can better respond to. And if they don't respond well it doesn't upset one much either because our real work is to understand the moment. There is action but less attachment to it. Robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 9/12/02 6:28:54 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > Just to add to this post Christine. The most basic step in > > satipatthana is about distinguishing concept from reality; and as > > this understanding grows then the difference between the realities of > > nama and rupa becomes slowly more apparent . When concepts are seen > > as unreal they lose their deluding power. Thinking continues just as > > much as always but there is not the same tendency to be fooled by the > > thoughts. > > For example, say someone left the stove on and I come along and > > touch it and get a little burn. Immediately there is aversion to the > > pain. And then there is thinking such as "who left the stove > > on", "why did they do that" - and this is all rooted in increasing > > aversion. But if there is understanding of realities then the > > aversion becomes the object and it dissipates, or the feeling becomes > > the object . And by becoming the object I mean that it is understood > > as simply feeling, not my feeling. Then before any harsh language > > the anger has gone and there is acceptance of the present moment. > > > > This is a very different process from trying to not have harsh > > language or realising that anger is bad and thinking you shouldn't > > have it. With direct understanding there is no supression because > > there doesn't have to be: as soon as reality is known as reality and > > concept as concept the delusion is ended. > > > > Robert > > > ============================ > Yes, indeed. All true. The question remains, however: "Who turned the > stove on?" Is there any reality to the subject-matter of that question? I > believe that there is. But it seems very difficult for *anyone* to adequately > explain what that is. > > With metta, > Howard 15677 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] Searching for 'Courage' in the Teachings Dear NIna, Thank you for your post. I can understand better now why viriya is referred to sometimes as 'courage' and sometimes as 'energy'. What I most often need reminding about is the necessity to not be disheartened, to maintain persistence and endurance, to 'keep on, keeping on' when progress is not noticeable. This is so easy to forget and perseverance sometimes seems too hard - particularly when one of the defilements that had seemed to be losing its power takes control again as if none of the past few years of effort and practice had happened. (Reading your 'Perfections' and 'Cetasikas' is very useful.) Defilements certainly have strength, endurance, and resilience. And defilements, showing themselves through speech and actions, do so much harm. It is difficult to do courageous acts - but the hard daily grind of mindfully living the Teachings is much more difficult. As you say - "any moment is a moment fit for awareness. We have to become heroes." :) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Christine, > You found the word viriya, and this is courage. Further see below, you got > the meaning, courage to eradicate defilements. 15678 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:59am Subject: Re: Searching for 'Courage' /Robert Dear Robert, I appreciated the story of the walled-up King. From having been the most powerful person in the country to becoming the most powerless would have been shattering by itself. Imagining the scene - to be sealed in a wall by workmen whom he probably knew, and guarded by others who would once have obeyed his slightest command, would add to the awfulness (for them too). No doubt a larger and equally well- known audience would have been compelled to witness his interment, adding an element of humiliation as well. He managed to show such courage and equanimity while facing sadistic cruelty. Helps me to re- consider the way I react to things in my day-to-day experiences - and they're pretty trivial by comparison .... ------------------------- Thanks for sharing this: RobK : "One of the greatest things I have learnt in Dhamma is that nothing and no one can ever make us have akusala because it is conditioned within this stream of nama and rupa. Akusala -such as fear- can't be stopped by 'us' (because no 'us');but knowing that in any situation kusala can still arise is a powerful condition for viriya (energy) and saddha (faith) that supports kusala." and "understanding of anatta is a very strong condition for courage" -------------------------- Chris: I think I am still far from understanding this. I can read it and intellectually agree with it, but I don't "know" it. I still haven't integrated 'kamma' into an understanding of 'anatta' and 'no- control'. ----------------------- metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > --- > Dear Christine, > In the cullavamsa - smaller chronicle on the history of sri lanka- > there was a king who was overthrown by an evil minister (or someoone - > I forget some details). This usurper wanted the King to suffer > greatly and so had him put into a new wall while still alive and had > the his men slowly seal up the wall so that he would suffocate. 15679 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 4:17am Subject: Re: Searching for 'Courage' /Sarah Dear Sarah, Reminders about really knowing oneself and having insight into ones own defilements thread through your letter - you say: " have the courage to really understnd realities as they are, not as we'd like them to be. I particularly reflect on the aspect of knowing our kilesa when it comes to courage." This 'knowing our kilesa' is a difficult thing to do - - much easier to 'know' everyone else's and decide that the other person is blinded to their own.... or to be selective and only know our own gross defilements, when the more subtle ones could be doing the most harm. I'm not sure I see why 'confession' should happen ... what the benefit is of: "when he commits a transgression he acknowledges it as such and confesses it to his co-religionists." Acknowledging and making restitution to the person harmed is one thing, but is there really the expectation of Confession (but not Absolution?) within Buddhism for lay followers? It hasn't been a huge success (IMO) within Christianity - has resulted in some people feeling that one was 'off the hook', had a clean slate and could start again with the same old behaviour patterns, until next time. I'm still thinking over hiri and ottapa, as well as renunciation and guarding the sense doors as they relate to courage. Long term courage takes a lot more energy, effort, endurance than whatever it was that I took for courage before - which was more 'explosive' and impulsive ... perhaps an expression of defilements? I appreciate the reminders about having patience to study and consider our different cittas arising because of conditions, instead of having aversion. Thanks for your post which encouraged me to consider the Teachings in a number of areas that I hadn't previously thought of as relating to courage at all. metta, Chris --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Chris, > > I've been reflecting quite a bit on `courage in the scriptures' and > perhaps some of these personal reflections and notes will be useful for > you or others. 15680 From: Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] observe concepts combine with realities Hi, Antony - Thanks for this excellent piece. What the Sayadaw says here reminds me of what I was *trying* to say in my post on the Satipatthana Sutta, where I said that I understood it as instructing one to begin with conventional objects and end up seeing through them directly to paramattha dhammas and their empty nature. Naturally, the Sayadaw says it far more clearly more directly than I did. With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/13/02 3:59:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, antony2 72b@h... writes: > > Dear all, > > Ven Mahasi Sayadaw said (I posted three sentences previously): > > "Those unpractised in > insight meditation often say, "if you note 'bending, stretching', > only concepts like arms will appear to you. If you note 'left, > right' only concepts like legs will appear to you. If you note > 'rising, falling', only concepts like the abdomen will appear to > you." This may be true to some of the beginners, but it is not > true to think that the concepts will keep coming up. Both concepts > and realities appear to the beginner. Some people instruct the > beginners to meditate on realities only. This is impossible. To > forget concepts is quite impracticable at the beginning. What is > practicable is to observe concepts combine with realities. The > Buddha himself used the language of concepts and told us to be > aware 'I am walking' etc. when we walk, bend or stretch. He did > not use the language of realities and tell us to be aware 'It is > supporting, moving' etc. Although you meditate using the language > of concepts like 'walking, bending, stretching', as your > mindfulness and concentration grow stronger, all the concepts > disappear and only the realities like support and moving appear to > you. When you reach the stage of the knowledge of dissolution, > although you meditate 'walking, walking', neither the legs nor the > body appear to you. Only the successive movements are there. > Although you meditate 'bending, bending', there will not be any > arms or legs. Only the movement. Although you meditate 'rising, > falling', there will be no image of the abdomen or the body. Only > the movement out and in. These as well as swaying are the > functions of the air-element." > ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/medbud/mahasifv.zip > > with metta / Antony. > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15681 From: Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Confused ... and getting worse Hi, Robert - SadhuX3! Thank you for the following excellent exposition! With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/13/02 6:02:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Dear Howard, > Thanks for the questions. > Howard: ""For me, that tree is more of an existent than a unicorn is > (though I > > recognize that its existence is dependent in part on that very > thinking). Am > > I right according to Abhidhamma? If yes, why? If no, why?" > > Pannati, concepts can be clssified in many ways (see the p.s to this > post). In fact, things like a unicorn and God and rabbits horns can > be considered as different types of pannati from trees. Trees, > computers,humans, Robert, Howard, Christine are the shadows of what > is really there - and what is really there are only namas and rupas, > mentality and matter, insignificant dhammas that can barely be said > to exist because they pass away instantly. These concepts are more > deluding than concepts like unicorns (which we know have no reality). > Because of accumulated avijja, ignorance, these type of concepts > (pannati) delude and instead of being given their correct status - as > neccessary designations* - they are assumed to be actual. And that is > where all problems begin and end. *Note that these designations > happen long, long before they are linguistic lables. What is called a > thought in conventional language is comprised of billions of > momentary arisings which repeatedly take a concept as object and may > include metally naming it. Becuase of this repetition - and the lack > of insight into the actual dhammas - the illusion of permanence is > solidified. > > The commentary to the UDANA ( translation by Peter Masefield > from PTS) (p71,vol1, enlightenment chapter) > "it is ignorance since it causes beings > to dart among becomings and so on within samsara.., it > is ignorance since it darts among those things which > do not actually exist (i.e.men, women) and > since it does not dart among those things that do > exist (i.e.it cannot understand the khandas, > paramattha dhammas). > ------ > Howard: The example you > > give below of the thought of a flying purple elephant makes it > clear to me > > that a so-called (individual) thought is actually a whole process, > a sequence > > of cittas whose objects are various paramattha mind-objects (such > as mental > > images). Is it always so that a thought is such a sequence? > ________ > Yes, that is right. What we call a thought in conventional language > is a long and complex series of different processes. This is > explained in detail in the commentaries. > _____ > Howard: Here you say "If ... you think of them, again the object is > concept, > > not real; but the thinking process is real." Now, what if Christine > does not > > *think* of them, but "merely" looks at them. That so-called mere > looking at > > them is really a lot more than just looking. There is a big mental > process > > transpiring that recognizes (perhaps wordlessly) two "entities" who > are > > "people", and they are "people who she knows", > ------ > Yes, this is right. As I said above the conceptualising happens long > before any naming has time to occur. Even babies and animals who > have no linguistic abilities are fully involved in processes of > conceptualising. However, animals and babies cannot yet expand > concepts into the religions, sciences, and general craziness and > wonder that is the fruit of civilisation. > I think it can only be known by direct insight whether this is true > or not and that is why the Buddha's teaching is ehipassiko - come and > see. Which is why I believe vipassana is not a matter of doing > something to get something ; instead it is simply the developing of > insight into what is real and what is not. All these processes, the > realities and the concepts are happening every moment of the day. > They do not have to be searched for - they only need to be seen. > Robert > > p.s. Abhidhammattha Sangaha Ch VIII, section 4, on pannattis: > i) formal concept (santhana pannatti corresponding to the form of > things, such as land, mountain or tree, which are so designated on > account of the mode of transition of the elements. > ii) collective concept (samuha pannatti), corresponding to modes of > construction of materials, to a collection of things, such as a > vehicle or a chariot. > iii) conventional concept (sammutti pannatti), such as person or > individual, which is derived from the five khandhas. > iv) local concept (disa pannatti), a notion or idea derived from the > revolving of the moon, such as the directions of East or West. > v) concept of time (kala pannatti), such as morning, evening. > vi) concept of season (masa pannatti), notions corresponding to > seasons and months. The months are designated by names, such as > Vesakha. > vii) concept of space (akasa), such as a well or a cave. It is > derived from space which is not contacted by the four Great Elements. > viii) nimitta pannatti, the mental image which is acquired through > the development of samatha, such as the nimitta of a kasina. > See http://www.abhidhamma.org/sujin3.htm Realities and Concepts Sujin > Boriharnwanaket > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15682 From: abhidhammika Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 7:38am Subject: Re: Confused ... and getting worse: To Robert Kirkpatrick Dear Robert You wrote: "But if there is understanding of realities then the aversion becomes the object and it dissipates, or the feeling becomes the object . And by becoming the object I mean that it is understood as simply feeling, not my feeling. Then before any harsh language the anger has gone and there is acceptance of the present moment." What you wrote can be regarded as the essence of the Buddha's teachings, and as how we could turn abhidhamma into an applied discipline. In fact, what you wrote is also a mockery of the views of some misguided academics in the Religious Departments or Asian Studies Departments at the universities in the West who wrote off abhidhamma as an unnecessary part of Buddhist learning. By the way, last night (12 September 2002), I watched Bill Connolly's World Tour comedy show. Near the end of the program, he talked about Buddhist philosophy, and guess what? He said he wanted his children to learn to accept things as they are. And, he closed the program riding his tri-motor bike away in nude! And you also wrote in the above paragraph: "Then before any harsh language the anger has gone and there is acceptance of the present moment." What a coincidence! But, I am sure that you wrote those lines while fully dressed! SMILE With kind regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: --- Just to add to this post Christine. The most basic step in satipatthana is about distinguishing concept from reality; and as this understanding grows then the difference between the realities of nama and rupa becomes slowly more apparent . When concepts are seen as unreal they lose their deluding power. Thinking continues just as much as always but there is not the same tendency to be fooled by the thoughts. For example, say someone left the stove on and I come along and touch it and get a little burn. Immediately there is aversion to the pain. And then there is thinking such as "who left the stove on", "why did they do that" - and this is all rooted in increasing aversion. But if there is understanding of realities then the aversion becomes the object and it dissipates, or the feeling becomes the object . And by becoming the object I mean that it is understood as simply feeling, not my feeling. Then before any harsh language the anger has gone and there is acceptance of the present moment. This is a very different process from trying to not have harsh language or realising that anger is bad and thinking you shouldn't have it. With direct understanding there is no supression because there doesn't have to be: as soon as reality is known as reality and concept as concept the delusion is ended. Robert > In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" > wrote: > > --- > > > > Dear Christine, > > This is a letter I wrote about 2 years back that might help: > > > > Just to be explicit: the thinking process consists of different > > cittas and cetasikas all arising and passing away rapidly. These > > are paramattha dhammas, ultimate realities. > > let us consider a couple of thinking. > > 1. Think of a flying purple elephant. The process of thinking > > that imagines this, whether a graphic visualisation or your > > no-frills, idea only version, consists of cittas and cetasikas. > > The object of this thinking is a concept, not real. > > 2. Think of your mother or father (whether alive or not). Again > > same process - the cittas and cetasikas of the thinking process > > are real but the object, mother and father, is concept- not > > real. > > 3. If your mother and father were right in front of you now > > (talking to you) and you think of them, again the object is > > concept, not real; but the thinking process is real. The colours > > are real, the sounds are real, but mother and father is concept. > > Obviously example 1 is easily understood. It is number 2 and > > especially number 3 that in daily life we get confused by. > > > > Satipatthana can only take paramattha dhammas for object, not > > concepts. Does this mean we should try not to think of concepts? > > Some would have us do this but this is not the middle way. All > > the arahants thought of concepts but they could never confuse > > concept for reality. Panna and sati can understand dhammas > > directly even during the processes of thinking that take > > concepts for objects. > > > > > > > > > > "Ultimate realities are impermanent, they arise and > > > fall away. Concepts of people and things do not arise > > > and fall away [they don't?!]; they are objects of > > > thinking, not real in the ultimate sense." > > > > Yes they are simply concepts, not real. Only realities have > > actual characteristics and functions and arise and pass away. > > Robert > > > > > > 15683 From: Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 5:37am Subject: Elements of Thinking/Contemplation in Vipassana Bhavana Hi, all - I list below portions of the Satipatthana Sutta which seem to me to rather unambiguously describe thinking/contemplation as part of the practice. (I will set off what I wish to draw particular attention to by using double vertical bars, ||, before and after the material): ********************************** 1) Furthermore, when walking, the monk discerns that he is walking. When standing, he discerns that he is standing. When sitting, he discerns that he is sitting. When lying down, he discerns that he is lying down. Or however his body is disposed, that is how he discerns it. [Upasaka note: Walking, standing, sitting, and lying down are all pa~n~natti] 2) Furthermore...just as if a sack with openings at both ends were full of various kinds of grain -- wheat, rice, mung beans, kidney beans, sesame seeds, husked rice -- and a man with good eyesight, pouring it out, were to reflect, 'This is wheat. This is rice. These are mung beans. These are kidney beans. These are sesame seeds. This is husked rice,' ||in the same way, monks, a monk reflects on this very body from the soles of the feet on up, from the crown of the head on down, surrounded by skin and full of various kinds of unclean things: 'In this body there are head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, tendons, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, pleura, spleen, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, gorge, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, skin-oil, saliva, mucus, fluid in the joints, urine.'|| 3) Furthermore, as if he were to see a corpse cast away in a charnel ground -- one day, two days, three days dead -- bloated, livid, & festering, ||he applies it to this very body, 'This body, too: Such is its nature, such is its future, such its unavoidable fate'... || "Or again, as if he were to see a corpse cast away in a charnel ground, picked at by crows, vultures, & hawks, by dogs, hyenas, & various other creatures... a skeleton smeared with flesh & blood, connected with tendons... a fleshless skeleton smeared with blood, connected with tendons... a skeleton without flesh or blood, connected with tendons... bones detached from their tendons, scattered in all directions -- here a hand bone, there a foot bone, here a shin bone, there a thigh bone, here a hip bone, there a back bone, here a rib, there a chest bone, here a shoulder bone, there a neck bone, here a jaw bone, there a tooth, here a skull... the bones whitened, somewhat like the color of shells... piled up, more than a year old... decomposed into a powder: ||He applies it to this very body, 'This body, too: Such is its nature, such is its future, such its unavoidable fate.' || 4) In this way he remains focused internally on the body in & of itself, or externally on the body in & of itself, or both internally & externally on the body in & of itself. Or he remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the body, on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the body, or on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to the body. ||Or his mindfulness that 'There is a body' is maintained to the extent of knowledge & remembrance.|| And he remains independent, unsustained by (not clinging to) anything in the world. This is how a monk remains focused on the body in & of itself. 5) In this way he remains focused internally on feelings in & of themselves, or externally on feelings in & of themselves, or both internally & externally on feelings in & of themselves. Or he remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to feelings, on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to feelings, or on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to feelings. ||Or his mindfulness that 'There are feelings' is maintained to the extent of knowledge & remembrance.|| And he remains independent, unsustained by (not clinging to) anything in the world. This is how a monk remains focused on feelings in & of themselves. 6) In this way he remains focused internally on the mind in & of itself, or externally on the mind in & of itself, or both internally & externally on the mind in & of itself. Or he remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the mind, on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the mind, or on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to the mind. ||Or his mindfulness that 'There is a mind' is maintained to the extent of knowledge & remembrance.|| And he remains independent, unsustained by (not clinging to) anything in the world. This is how a monk remains focused on the mind in & of itself. [Upasaka note: There are others like 4), 5), and 6), but these will be omitted.] ************************************ Of the examples given above, I personally find the first three most persuasive of the point that I am attempting to make. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15684 From: Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 5:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Confused ... and getting worse Hi, KKT - In a message dated 9/13/02 5:54:30 AM Eastern Daylight Time, phamdluan@a... writes: > Dear Howard, > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > > I don't think you should concern yourself about not understanding. > Not understanding hasn't prevented us posters on this topic from > posting! We don't really know what we're talking about , you know! > ;-)) > What I think is really important in all of this is that *all* dhammas > are empty! All conditioned dhammas, whether "concepts" or "realities" > or "percepts" or "pa~n~natti", are empty. They are all empty because > they depend for there very existence on other similarly empty > dhammas, including mental fabrication and prior (or simultaneous) > namic and rupic conditions. It's all one big house of cards, one > masterful magic show of smoke and mirrors. If we look and see how all > (conditioned) dhammas depend on parts, on discernment, on concept and > on prior and concurrent conditions, we see that there is *nothing* > which exists on its own, in an essential, intrinsic manner. Add to > that the unsatisfactoriness and impermanence of all dhammas, and > that's "all" we need to see. We only need to see the tilakkhana > everywhere we look, and all our atta-making will evaporate. > > With metta, > Howard > > > > > > KKT: I must agree with Erik (rikpa21) > that what you said here is << pure >> > Madhyamika :-)) > > I don't think that Theravada holds > such a view about emptiness > (at least like your presentation :-)) > > But this gives a glimpse of how > Nagarjuna arrived at Madhyamika: > trying to inquire deeper into the reality > of the dharmas than the presentation > of the Sarvastivada school. > > > Peace, > > > KKT > ======================== Thanks for your comments. To me, what I have said, if not exactly as I expresed it, is all to be found in the Pali Sutta Pitaka. Be that as it may, if I am charged with being influenced by Nagarjuna, then I admit my guilt with pleasure. Even worse, Vasubandhu is an influence as well. So I am a two-time loser. One more strike and I'll be out - lock me up and throw away the key! ;-)) With much metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15685 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 10:05am Subject: concepts and thoughts Dear Kom and all, Kom, I was delighted with your report of the discussions on concepts and dreams. I liked your explanation about dreams, what we see in a dream is not like seeing now. And the Vivaldi example fascinated me, since I like Vivaldi very much. Was the concept of sound in your imagination so loud that you hardly slept? Had you been to a concert? Just curious. We see here that feeling and sanna are strong conditions for a story to go on and on. I think one of the reasons of confusion with regard to concept, as you mentioned, is the word . In some translations thought stands for thinking. Thinking is the act of thinking, the experience, the nama of thinking. Even the word thinking can stand for the cetasikas vitakka, applied thinking and vicara, sustained thinking. They accompany cittas of the sense-door process, except the sense-cognitions of seeing etc., and cittas of the mind-door process, and also cittas not arising in processes (rebirth consciousness, bhavanga and dying-consciousness). Thus we see that they do not accompany only cittas of the mind-door process, that they are not the same as what we mean by thinking in conventional sense. Seeing just sees, it directly experiences visible object impinging on the eye-base. It does not need vitakka and vicara to experience the object. The other cittas of the sense-door process do not have the eyebase as the physical base, vatthu, they do not see, they need vitakka and vicara in order to experience visible object. We can use thinking in a wider sense: citta experiencing an object through the mind-door, but we have to be careful. Citta can experience through the mind-door paramattha dhammas as well as concepts. We can use the word thinking for citta experiencing concepts. The word *thought*: this is what citta thinks about, the object citta thinks of, and I am inclined to use this for concept, just as you, Kom, explained. You explained about shape and form: this is the concept of a whole. Citta can think of a story, a situation, this is a concept. We can call it also a thought. Thus for me thought is the object of the citta which thinks. For me it is not the act of thinking, the experience which is thinking. Also the long quote about the kinds of concepts given by Larry is very important to consider. When citta does not experience a reality it experiences a concept. As I remarked before, when we reflect on reality and concept the difference cannot be so clear. We may keep on trying to find definitions of reality and concept, of thinking and thought. Only when we learn to be directly aware of at least some realities appearing through different doorways the difference between reality and concept will become clearer. Like the hardness and the table, visible object and (Howard's) tree. I have a mental picture of Howard looking at his tree in the garden. A concept. I appreciated, Kom, what you said about the sound which has completely fallen away. What we hear now (Lodewijk is playing Bach now) must be the sound that appears. With appreciation, Nina. 15686 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 1:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Confused / Howard Hi Howard, and all, Thanks Howard for your comforting words - I always get a lot out of your posts (especially when you write in plain english, as opposed to plain maths, plain logic or plain philosophy :-)) - but I get the most out of them when your great heart peeks around the edge of your logical mind. I was reading somewhere in the last few days (something like) only one of the tilakkhana is actually understood at a time, and that having understood either dukkha, anatta or anicca, one understands all three - but haven't been able to trace the original reference again .... Would this mean that accumulations had some bearing as to which of these was easier for the person to understand? (I seem to notice suffering everywhere - whereas, anatta ...) You say: "We only need to see the tilakkhana everywhere we look, and all our atta-making will evaporate." That all?? So-o-o - I just need to see anatta, dukkha, and anicca everywhere I look, and she'll be right, mate? Bewdy! No worries! Too easy! :-) :) much metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Christine - > I don't think you should concern yourself about not understanding. Not > understanding hasn't prevented us posters on this topic from posting! We > don't really know what we're talking about , you know! ;-)) > What I think is really important in all of this is that *all* dhammas > are empty! All conditioned dhammas, whether "concepts" or "realities" or > "percepts" or "pa~n~natti", are empty. They are all empty because they depend > for there very existence on other similarly empty dhammas, including mental > fabrication and prior (or simultaneous) namic and rupic conditions. It's all > one big house of cards, one masterful magic show of smoke and mirrors. If we > look and see how all (conditioned) dhammas depend on parts, on discernment, > on concept and on prior and concurrent conditions, we see that there is > *nothing* which exists on its own, in an essential, intrinsic manner. Add to > that the unsatisfactoriness and impermanence of all dhammas, and that's "all" > we need to see. We only need to see the tilakkhana everywhere we look, and > all our atta-making will evaporate. > > With metta, > Howard 15687 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 1:47pm Subject: Re: Confused /RobertK Dear Robert, Thanks for your posts - clarifying and calming as hoped. The example of the 'flying purple elephant' (mine has pink toes and ears a la Sri Lanka) and the two examples of 'mother and father' are helpful as was the reminder that: "Ultimate realities are impermanent, they arise and fall away. Concepts of people and things do not arise and fall away; they are objects of thinking, not real in the ultimate sense." Given my feeling of being controlled at times by emotional reactions, I found that the example of the burned finger really 'spoke' to me describing the difference in reactions between one who understands realities and one who doesn't. I felt so encouraged that I got out the copy of K. Sujin's 'Realities and Concepts' that you sent down when I was a newbie on DL (seems a lifetime ago). Interesting to see my pencilled notations, question marks, underlining and different coloured highlighting (it's a bit like reading a rainbow now :)) from the first times through .... Opening this mistreated book once more has been very heartening - not only because I've started seriously studying it again, but also because I now realise from some of my notations that understanding IS growing, even though I was so sure it wasn't. :) Thank you. Today was delightful - learning so much from Dhamma friends. As well, I found a quotation from the Sayadaws that touched on my feelings about vipassana: "For sweet taste - honey, For Truth - Abhidhamma!" metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > --- > Just to add to this post Christine. The most basic step in > satipatthana is about distinguishing concept from reality; and as > this understanding grows then the difference between the realities of > nama and rupa becomes slowly more apparent . When concepts are seen > as unreal they lose their deluding power. Thinking continues just as > much as always but there is not the same tendency to be fooled by the > thoughts. > For example, say someone left the stove on and I come along and > touch it and get a little burn. Immediately there is aversion to the > pain. And then there is thinking such as "who left the stove > on", "why did they do that" - and this is all rooted in increasing > aversion. But if there is understanding of realities then the > aversion becomes the object and it dissipates, or the feeling becomes > the object . And by becoming the object I mean that it is understood > as simply feeling, not my feeling. Then before any harsh language > the anger has gone and there is acceptance of the present moment. > > This is a very different process from trying to not have harsh > language or realising that anger is bad and thinking you shouldn't > have it. With direct understanding there is no supression because > there doesn't have to be: as soon as reality is known as reality and > concept as concept the delusion is ended. > > Robert > > In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" > wrote: > > --- > > > > Dear Christine, > > This is a letter I wrote about 2 years back that might help: > > > > Just to be explicit: the thinking process consists of different > > cittas and cetasikas all arising and passing away rapidly. These > > are paramattha dhammas, ultimate realities. > > let us consider a couple of thinking. > > 1. Think of a flying purple elephant. The process of thinking > > that imagines this, whether a graphic visualisation or your > > no-frills, idea only version, consists of cittas and cetasikas. > > The object of this thinking is a concept, not real. > > 2. Think of your mother or father (whether alive or not). Again > > same process - the cittas and cetasikas of the thinking process > > are real but the object, mother and father, is concept- not > > real. > > 3. If your mother and father were right in front of you now > > (talking to you) and you think of them, again the object is > > concept, not real; but the thinking process is real. The colours > > are real, the sounds are real, but mother and father is concept. > > Obviously example 1 is easily understood. It is number 2 and > > especially number 3 that in daily life we get confused by. > > > > Satipatthana can only take paramattha dhammas for object, not > > concepts. Does this mean we should try not to think of concepts? > > Some would have us do this but this is not the middle way. All > > the arahants thought of concepts but they could never confuse > > concept for reality. Panna and sati can understand dhammas > > directly even during the processes of thinking that take > > concepts for objects. > > > > > > > > > > "Ultimate realities are impermanent, they arise and > > > fall away. Concepts of people and things do not arise > > > and fall away [they don't?!]; they are objects of > > > thinking, not real in the ultimate sense." > > > > Yes they are simply concepts, not real. Only realities have > > actual characteristics and functions and arise and pass away. > > Robert 15688 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 1:56pm Subject: Re: Confused /KKT Dear KKT, Thanks, this really helps - your post is now printed and stuck to the shelf in my line of vision beside the computer monitor. I think remembering the summary saves the mind from floundering around in too many details. I can remember the Four Noble Truths - but not their entire explanations, the whole Pali canon. "Now, whatever remain as Mental Object << ARE NOT >> Paramattha Dhamma. They are all << CONCEPTS >> and not realities." metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "phamdluan2000" wrote: > > Dear Christine, > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > KKT: Maybe a << summary >> > could be useful for a clear understanding. > 15689 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 2:03pm Subject: Re: Confused /Antony Dear Antony, and all, (Apologies if this appears twice, the first one vanished into yahooland). Thanks for these links. I've not had time to download yet - hopefully later today, but I do have Nyanaponika Thera's translation of Mahasi Sayadaw's 'The Progress of Insight'. Could you tell me which Nikaya the Culatanha-sankhaya sutta is in? or is it one of those not yet available in english translation? Can't find a link on the Net .... Maybe an alternative spelling? I am an admirer of many of the Sayadaws from a couple of years ago with Patrick Kearney in Brisbane (when he was lecturing at UQ). He used to give weekly Dhamma Talks at the SWARA sitting group we were in. Patrick had been a student of Ven Mahasi Sayadaw and Ven U Pandita in Myanmar. Do you ever run across him now that he is down at the Blue Mountains IMC at Medlow Bath? Some of his writings are on Buddhanet ... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Antony Woods" wrote: > > The late Mahasi Sayadaw said (English translation) in > "Paticcasamuppada": > ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/therabud/mahasipt.zip > > His brief instructions are available at: > ftp://ftp.buddhanet.net/medbud/mahasipv.zip > metta, > Antony. 15690 From: robmoult Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 2:10pm Subject: DSG as an analogy of the mind Hi Christine, We haven't chatted in a bit, but I have been watching your posts (I always read all of yours). Let me share with you an experience. In July, I posted the following message on the DSG: =================================================================== Hi all, I was eating a burger with a Christian friend and he said, "I thought that Buddhists were supposed to be vegetarian." I said that all Buddhists should follow the first precept, to abstain from killing. Many Mahayana Buddhists are vegetarian because they interpret the eating of meat as indirect killing of animals. My understanding of the Theravada perspective is that if the animal was not killed explicitly for me, then eating meat is okay. In other words, I cannot go to one of those seafood restaurants where you pick the fish that you want to eat, but I can order fish from the menu or buy it in the supermarket. My friend said, "I am an accountant. I don't like ambiguity. So, who is right? Something as fundamental as a precept should not be left open for wide interpretation." I pondered. My friend continued, "Is it true that after enlightenment, the Buddha upheld all of the precepts." I said that it was true. He then asked, "Did the Buddha eat meat?" I said that I thought that there were instances when the Buddha ate meat when it was given to him. My friend said, "So then eating meat is not breaking a precept." So here is my question to the DSG. I agree with my friend that something as fundamental as a precept should not be left open for wide interpretation. However, I don't want to say that the Mahayanists are wrong. What is your view? Thanks, Rob M :-) =================================================================== Now my intention on making this post in July (and my question to the DSG) was summarized in the last paragraph; I feel an affinity with my Mahayana brothers, but how can we differ on something as fundamental as a precept? This posting of mine caused a number of responses on vegetarianism. Theravada view of vegetarianism, personal experiences of vegetarianism, etc. Vegetarianism was not the subject that I wanted to discuss and I posted a couple of messages to try and get the DSG focused on what I wanted. It did not work. I decided to simply note the posts on vegetarianism (a subject that I am not very interested in discussing at the moment) and wait until they went away. And so the postings on vegetarianism eventually died off and DSG postings returned to subjects that I was more interested in. Here is the analogy of the DSG working as a mind: - The DSG received a stimulus (my posting) - The first person who responded was not practicing mindfulness and responded on the subject of vegetarianism (this is papanca) - With this trigger, there were a flurry of additional responses (papanca proliferates) - I tried to control / focus the DSG but it did not work - I decided to simply note the DSG changes (all is impermenant, DSG subjects change all the time) - I made a mental note to myself that there is an accumulation of the DSG to latch onto the subject of vegetarianism, so I should avoid mentioning it in future posts. In your posting, you expressed dosa that the DSG was moving in a direction that you did not like (too much theory of concepts / realities). Like pain during meditation; my advice is to simply note it, don't fight it, and wait until things change (DSG is anicca). As you know, if you stop your meditation as soon as there is a bit of pain, you won't progress. As for myself, at the moment, I am thinking about the parallels between ancient Buddhism and modern science. I have not been reading the concepts / reality postings. In a few weeks, I need to do a lecture on concepts and reality and at that time, I will return to the recent string of messages as part of my research. Perhaps when the conditions are right, you will be motivated to dive into this important subject and you can then review the dialogue between our learned friends. But for now, I suggest that you simply note (and save on your hard disk). Thanks, Rob M :-) 15691 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:12pm Subject: RE: [dsg] concepts and thoughts Dear Nina, > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > > > Dear Kom and all, > Kom, I was delighted with your report of the discussions on concepts and > dreams. I liked your explanation about dreams, what we see in a > dream is not > like seeing now. And the Vivaldi example fascinated me, since I > like Vivaldi > very much. Was the concept of sound in your imagination so loud that you > hardly slept? Had you been to a concert? Just curious. We see here that > feeling and sanna are strong conditions for a story to go on and on. Yes, the concept of sound in my imagination was strong enough that it repeated tiredlessly (even when I was tired!) for a few days; it is such that I couldn't go to sleep. I have been to a few concerts here and there, the most varying experience being in Boston (with Boston Symphony, BU recitals, MIT recitals, The Academy of Ancient Music, etc.). I think I could learn a few things from the experience: 1) Whenever we hear the sound, we immediately think about the sound. With ignorance, we do not differentiate the paramatha characteristics and the concepts: for a consciousness with moha, concept is as real as paramatha characteristics. Since there are more moments of concept cognitions and the strong lobha that go along with the process, we associate the concept, even when it has no characteristic, with the sound. When we think in the same way again (about the sound), we have a strong association with sound, and the experience of thinking is similar to the original experience (when the sound was actually there), minus the sound and the cognition of the sound (which is few, compared to thinking). 2) This again shows anatta, the uncontrollability / the conditionality of all realities. Even when we are awake, it is exactly like when we are sleeping and dreaming, except with the alternation of the objects in the 5 door ways which don't appear when we are asleep. We can't control our dream, and so too, we cannot control what we think. My persistent thinking of Vivaldi was strongly conditioned by very pleasant objects, and my strong lobha toward the objects, even though I didn't *intend*, *will*, nor *put forth the effort* to do the thinking. All realities, including sati, panna, are like this too: when its conditioned culminates, the reality arises and is sustained briefly, but then it too, falls away and another reality arises by its own conditions. With apprecition, kom 15692 From: Egberdina Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:14pm Subject: Re: Negation in Pali /Abhidhamma Dear Nina and Rob M, Thanks very much for both your replies. I very much appreciate it. I am very interested in the use of negation. Some years ago I started a web-forum on another site, where you could discuss anything at all, as long as negation was not used. There were only three contributors besides myself, but it was fun. We all agreed that it was very, very difficult indeed to express oneself without reverting to "not", "a- " , that sort of thing. Because negation is only in the realm of the mind, it showed in a small way how little we derive our understanding of what goes on in daily life from what we experience through the senses, much more from what we think it all means (or not means as the case may be) Thanks again Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Hi Herman, > In Pali na: there is not: natthi.(atthi: there is) > Also a number of prefixes: a (anasava: no asava, the n is inserted ), vi > (vippayutta, not associated), or ni (r), niramisa, not associated with the > senses, or not of the flesh. Nibbana: in the dict there are many etymologys: > extinguishing of fire. The ni seems to be negative. viraaga, nirodha > nibbaana, can be taken as synonyms, all negations: dispassionateness, > cessation. Nibbana is mostly described by negative terms. So difficult to > imagine what it is, as I discussed with Howard. > Best wishes, > Nina. > 15693 From: Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 11:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Confused / Howard Hi, Christine - In a message dated 9/13/02 4:43:14 PM Eastern Daylight Time, cforsyth@v... writes: > > Hi Howard, and all, > > Thanks Howard for your comforting words - I always get a lot out of > your posts (especially when you write in plain english, as opposed to > plain maths, plain logic or plain philosophy :-)) - but I get the > most out of them when your great heart peeks around the edge of your > logical mind. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Thank you, Chris. Very sweet of you to say! ------------------------------------------------------ > I was reading somewhere in the last few days (something like) only > one of the tilakkhana is actually understood at a time, and that > having understood either dukkha, anatta or anicca, one understands > all three - but haven't been able to trace the original reference > again .... Would this mean that accumulations had some bearing as to > which of these was easier for the person to understand? (I seem to > notice suffering everywhere - whereas, anatta ...) > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I think it would have to be one's "accumulations". BTW, being trained as a "reasoner" and manipulator of ideas, and having a clear inclination in that direction from the beginning (of this life), I've always seemed to grasp anicca and anatta more easily than dukkha. But while meditating yesterday, I had a "baby insight" into dukkha: It suddenly became very clear to me that everthing that was arising, whether unpleasant, neutral, or even pleasant, was imperfect, lacking, and unworthy in the sense that its absence would be better, far better. There was no sadness or depression associated with this. There *was* a subtle aversion associated, however. But mainly it was just what I "saw" to be so. It was an odd experience and interesting in its novelty (for me). --------------------------------------------------------- > > You say: "We only need to see the tilakkhana everywhere we look, and > all our atta-making will evaporate." That all?? > So-o-o - I just need to see anatta, dukkha, and anicca everywhere I > look, and she'll be right, mate? Bewdy! No worries! Too easy! :-) -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yep, that's all! ;-) A piece of cake!!! ;-))) -------------------------------------------------- > > :) much metta, > Christine > =============================== With much metta for you as well, Howard > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Christine - > > > I don't think you should concern yourself about not > understanding. Not > > understanding hasn't prevented us posters on this topic from > posting! We > > don't really know what we're talking about , you know! ;-)) > > What I think is really important in all of this is that > *all* dhammas > > are empty! All conditioned dhammas, whether "concepts" > or "realities" or > > "percepts" or "pa~n~natti", are empty. They are all empty because > they depend > > for there very existence on other similarly empty dhammas, > including mental > > fabrication and prior (or simultaneous) namic and rupic conditions. > It's all > > one big house of cards, one masterful magic show of smoke and > mirrors. If we > > look and see how all (conditioned) dhammas depend on parts, on > discernment, > > on concept and on prior and concurrent conditions, we see that > there is > > *nothing* which exists on its own, in an essential, intrinsic > manner. Add to > > that the unsatisfactoriness and impermanence of all dhammas, and > that's "all" > > we need to see. We only need to see the tilakkhana everywhere we > look, and > > all our atta-making will evaporate. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15694 From: Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 11:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Negation in Pali /Abhidhamma Hi, Herman - In a message dated 9/13/02 6:16:02 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > Dear Nina and Rob M, > > Thanks very much for both your replies. I very much appreciate it. I > am very interested in the use of negation. Some years ago I started a > web-forum on another site, where you could discuss anything at all, > as long as negation was not used. There were only three contributors > besides myself, but it was fun. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: What about hidden uses of negation, such as the use of 'only' in the last sentence of yours? ;-) ------------------------------------------------------ We all agreed that it was very, very > > difficult indeed to express oneself without reverting to "not", "a- > " , that sort of thing. Because negation is only in the realm of the > mind, it showed in a small way how little we derive our understanding > of what goes on in daily life from what we experience through the > senses, much more from what we think it all means (or not means as > the case may be) ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Yep, negation is only in the realm of the mind. And where is assertion?! ;-)) ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Thanks again > > Herman > ================================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15695 From: Egberdina Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:31pm Subject: Re: illogical? Rob E Dear Robert Epstein, Your actions will not be without consequences. I was fully determined to share my virtual chocolate with everyone, but your behind-the- scenes politicking has deprived me of the opportunity to make merit. Do you even begin to realise the enormity of what you have done? I am not very clued up on intuitionist logic, so I will refrain from delving any deeper there, apart from saying that I personally hold that in language a double negation cannot yield a meaningful result. I don't like chocolate anyway (Yes, I do) All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Robert Epstein" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Egberdina" wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > I would really like a chocolate. So I wish to add the following. > > > > The formulation - NOT (X AND (NOT X)) includes the negation of a > > negation (double negation). This is meaningless in some systems of > > logic. > > > > "Is the negation of the negation of A equivalent to A? That depends > > on what denial is, and hence what negative particles mean. In logic > > the classical answer is 'yes', and accordingly operations of > > eliminating and introducing double negatives are permitted. > > Intuitionist logic disallows the elimination." > > http://www.xrefer.com/entry/552921 > > > > I don't think I have not earned my chocolate :-) > > And yet, Herman, much to my regret, you will not get a chocolate at > this time. That is because, although we have eliminated the > possibility that you do not deserve your chocolate, we have not > established positively that you *do* deserve it. This is not a > matter of logic, but of politics. > > All the best, > Robert Ep. > > P.S. I take it that the intuitionist logic disallows the double > negation because it does not yield the required result in 'real life', > but only in mathematics? Interested in your and Howard's view on this, > if any. : ) 15696 From: Egberdina Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 3:57pm Subject: Re: illogical? Howard, Herman, Rob --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hi Stephen, I think there are valid logical systems that have more than just the two possible outcomes of the George Bush paradigm of us & them, good & evil, true & false. But if the outcomes of say, an undefined N state system, are defined in terms of a defined two state system, then we are just tying our cortexes in an unnecessary knot. I would have been happier if the 4 terms as you initially raised them were explained in the Tipitaka in a way that I could understand them :-) My hat is in the ring of a three state system. X, not X, X does not apply. All the best Herman > Herman, > Ahhh, intuitionist logic. Brings back my student days; unfortunately not > enough to actually recall what it means :-) (Problems with material > implication as I dubiously recall.) Now as you can make this reference throw > your hat in the ring: what are the last two statements if not the above and a > virtual definition of "contradiction"? Can these two statements be subsumed > under syllogistic logic or are they something new which the Buddha foresaw? > >I don't think I have not earned my chocolate :-) > I'd send one for sure but the moderators don't allow attachments ;-) > metta, stephen 15697 From: robmoult Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 4:04pm Subject: Papanca is akusala Hi all, Five years ago, I hired a guy (Mr. A) and we worked together for a couple of years. He was a good performer. Recently, I became aware of a regional position where I thought Mr. A could contribute. Mr. A has a new boss, so I approached the new boss and put in a good word for Mr. A, suggesting that he be considered for promotion to this new position. Mr. A's boss asked me about Mr. A's skills in strategic planning. I explained that when I hired Mr. A, I did the strategic planning; it was not part of his scope. A couple of days later, I got a very long email from Mr. A. The subject was "Harrasment of Mr. A by Rob Moult". It was copied to my boss and many other bosses. Mr. A claimed that I told his new boss that he was not capable of strategic planning and Mr. A had concluded that this remark of mine had caused his boss to conclude that Mr. A is incompetent and not worthy of his current salary. Mr. A said that he would be filing a police report against me, starting an court action against me and send a report to the president of the company in the US. My boss told me to let HR handle the inquiry and I filed a statement: - I had not talked to Mr. A in more than one year - I had not talked about Mr. A to anybody in more than one year, except to suggest to his new boss that he be considered for a promotion - I replied truthfully to a question from Mr. A's new boss - Given my objective in talking to Mr. A's boss, it did not make sense that I would malign him. Mr. A has now dropped the issue, but consider the damage done to his reputation. What had happened is that Mr. A's boss had suggested to Mr. A that he improve his skills in strategic planning and made an offhand comment that I had mentioned that Mr. A did not do strategic planning as part of his initial assignment. This is where papanca took over. Mr. A took that casual remark and built it up into a conspiracy. He misinterpreted the remark and then layer upon layer of emotions added more fuel to the fire until he was so distressed that (according to his email), he was "suffering mental anguish, unable to eat or sleep" and he wrote a long email to me at 1:00 in the morning. I am also guilty of working myself up over an imagined situation. I've seen it in my wife and in my kids as well. Concepts (papanca) / reality is not just theory. It has a direct bearing on our day to day life. It is my understanding (the theorists can help me here) that the only way to have a kusala citta is to see things as they truly are (i.e. no concept) and that as soon as there is concept, the thought will be akusala. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15698 From: robmoult Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 4:19pm Subject: Re: illogical? Howard, Herman, Rob Hi Herman, Fuzzy logic / quantum theory (modern science) work with probability of truth / existence. What started this exchange is that I commented that in the Cula- Malunkyovada Sutta, Malunkyaputta asked the Buddha to clarify if: 'After death a Tathagata exists', 'After death a Tathagata does not exist', 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist'. (This is the famous poison arrow sutta). I was commenting that it was interesting that Malunkyaputta gave four options wheras "tradtional logic" only allowed two. As you probably recall, the Buddha refused to be drawn into this discussion. I am not aware of parts of the Tipitaka where the four states are explored more deeply. If there are examples in the Tipitaka of the four logical states being used or analyzed, I would be interested in getting references. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Egberdina" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > > > > Hi Stephen, > > I think there are valid logical systems that have more than just the > two possible outcomes of the George Bush paradigm of us & them, good > & evil, true & false. > > But if the outcomes of say, an undefined N state system, are defined > in terms of a defined two state system, then we are just tying our > cortexes in an unnecessary knot. > > I would have been happier if the 4 terms as you initially raised them > were explained in the Tipitaka in a way that I could understand > them :-) > > My hat is in the ring of a three state system. X, not X, X does not > apply. > > All the best > > Herman > > > Herman, > > Ahhh, intuitionist logic. Brings back my student days; > unfortunately not > > enough to actually recall what it means :-) (Problems with material > > implication as I dubiously recall.) Now as you can make this > reference throw > > your hat in the ring: what are the last two statements if not the > above and a > > virtual definition of "contradiction"? Can these two statements be > subsumed > > under syllogistic logic or are they something new which the Buddha > foresaw? > > >I don't think I have not earned my chocolate :-) > > I'd send one for sure but the moderators don't allow attachments ;-) > > metta, stephen 15699 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Fri Sep 13, 2002 5:48pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Searching for 'Courage' /Sarah Dear Christine & Sarah, > -----Original Message----- > From: christine_forsyth [mailto:cforsyth@v...] > > Dear Sarah, > > I'm not sure I see why 'confession' should happen ... what the > benefit is of: > "when he commits a transgression he acknowledges it as such and > confesses it to his co-religionists." Acknowledging and making > restitution to the person harmed is one thing, but is there really > the expectation of Confession (but not Absolution?) within Buddhism > for lay followers? It hasn't been a huge success (IMO) within > Christianity - has resulted in some people feeling that one was 'off > the hook', had a clean slate and could start again with the same old > behaviour patterns, until next time. I was thinking about this and suggest the following benefits of confession, 1) One doesn't hide one's fault: this is in contrast to one who knows the faults, but doesn't want others to know. 2) One makes a resolution not to repeat the transgression: remember the Dhatu Vibhanga sutta where Pukusati apologized to the Buddha for addressing him as friend? He apologized making a resolution not to repeat the transgression. 3) If the fault is made known by others,